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DEVELOPING STRATEGIC MANAGERS FOR UK PUBLIC SERVICES - A 
COMPETING VALUES AND COMPETENCES APPROACH
R e f o r m in g  P u b l ic  M a n a g e m e n t
The 1980’s saw a dramatic shift in attitudes to management in the public sector. A 
new ‘managerialism’ (Pollitt, 1993) or the ‘new public management’ (Hood, 1991) 
firmly replaced the old ‘public administration’ as the guiding principle of policy 
makers, especially in the UK and USA. While the UK and USA probably led the way 
initially in these developments, other countries have since also developed new, 
radical, approaches to public management reform, including in particular New 
Zealand (Mather, 1993) but embracing most developed countries to one degree or 
another (OECD, 1992). However, the old public administration and its less 
managerialist off-shoots did not simply “role-over and play dead”, either in theory or 
practice. While politicians and their official and unofficial advisors, and some public 
managers, enthusiastically embraced the new managerialism, others expressed doubts.
The early 1990s has seen a re-emergence of public sector specific trends, with a 
plethora of books seeking to ‘rediscover public services management’ (Willcocks & 
Harrow, 1992), ‘reinvent government’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) or re-establish the 
uniqueness of ‘management in the public domain’ (Ransom & Stewart, 1994 - 
forthcoming).
There has certainly been a revival of interest in the nature of public service 
management in the UK, if the spate of books on the subject is anything to go by (see 
Taylor & Popham, 1989; Flynn, 1990; Metcalfe & Richards, 1990; Elcock, 1991; 
Hadley & Young, 1991; Lawton & Rose, 1991; Starks, 1991; Carter et al, 1992; 
Common et al, 1992; Duncan, 1992; Pollitt & Harrison, 1992; Famham & Horton, 
1993; Harrison, 1993; Isaac-Henry et al., 1993; Taylor-Gooby & Lawson, 1993; 
Hughes, 1994; Morgan & Murgatroyd, 1994; Talbot, 1994; etc.).
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On explanation for this renewed interest in public management in the UK may relate 
to the emphasis placed by the new (Major) premiership on improving public services, 
especially through the Citizens’ Charter initiative and the Next Steps programme 
(Harrow & Talbot, 1994).
Strategic Management
One area where the debate has remained relatively unexplored is that of strategic 
management in the public sector. This thesis explores the nature of strategic 
management in the public services, drawing on the more general debate about the' 
nature of public services management. It explores some issues about what can, and 
what cannot, be easily transferred from the private to the public managerial domains, 
in terms of strategic management theory and practice. (This is not to assume that this 
is the only direction in which ideas and practice can flow, on the contrary we agree 
with others that the public and private sectors have much to learn from each other 
(Harrow & Willcocks, 1991; Alter & Hague, 1993)). It is to recognise that there has 
been a major gap in the public management literature on issues of strategy, whereas in 
the generic (or, more realistically, mainly private) literature strategy and strategic 
management has been a major concern (see Chapter 2).
The precise question to which this exploration is directed is: how can public 
managers be developed into strategic public managers? In order to begin 
answering this question, three prior questions have to be addressed:
• what is the nature of public management and is it different from generic or private 
sector management?
• what is the nature of strategic management, in the generic, private and public 
sectors?
• how are, could or should managers be developed in general and specifically how 
can they be developed into strategic managers?
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These issues are addressed in the first four Chapters of this thesis, which are described 
more fully below, but before turning to these it is worth a brief mention of the 
approach used.
Competing Values and Competences
The approach adopted in this thesis is derived from the growing body of management 
literature that recognises there are fundamental contradictions embedded in the nature 
of managerial work, whether public or private (e.g. Hampden-Tumer, 1990a &b; 
Quinn, 1988; Quinn & Cameron, 1988; Quinn, Faerman, Thompson, & McGrath, 
1990; Miller, 1990).
The traditional, ‘rationalist’, approach to management often tended to make 
assumptions about the coherence and logical consistency of management as an 
activity. This idea has been under fire for some time. Probably the most prominent 
attack came in Peters and Waterman’s In Search o f Excellence (1982) which sought to 
go beyond ‘the rational model’ and introduce issues about competing values and 
culture into management. Much earlier Mintzberg had, in his seminal The Manager's 
Job: Folklore and Fact (1975), attacked models of managerial work which tried to 
create an image of management as a rational, deliberate, planned and controlled 
process and sought to replace them with a model which captured some the reality of 
the fragmented, intuitive, complex, verbal and contradictory nature of management 
(see also Mintzberg, 1980).
That the ‘rationalist’ approach to management ignores issues of the values of those 
who own, control, run, work in or manage organisations is now well established. That 
clashes of values in organisations lead to conflict and that these clashes, values and 
organisational cultures need managing has been widely recognised from the early 
1980s in the UK and USA, partly under the impact of perceived success of Japanese 
management, (Pascale & Athos, 1981). However, while the limit of ‘rationalism’ in 
dealing with these ‘values’ has become recognised, the issue of contradictions
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embedded in organisational life, both values and other, structural, contradictions, has 
been more neglected
The contradictions inherent in organisational and managerial structures can be 
illustrated by an example - the contradiction between operating managerial control 
over staff and motivating staff. This particular contradiction was summarised by 
McGreggor as ‘Theory Xs and ‘Theory Y’ in his ‘The Human Side o f  Enterprise ’ 
(1985). McGreggor used ‘Theory X’ as a negative stereotype (‘people don’t like work 
and will avoid it if possible’) to buttress his ‘Theory Y’ approach (‘work is as natural 
as play and people will do it willingly in the right circumstances’). In developing the 
‘Theory Y’, human relations, approach to management he naturally emphasised the 
‘motivation’ side of our ‘motivation Vs control’ contradiction. However, he also 
implicitly recognised that both motivation and control are necessary parts of 
management: “external control and the threat of punishment are not the only means of 
bringing about effort toward organisational objectives” (1985:47).
This is but one of many contradictions which appear to be inherent in certain 
organisational and management forms. Quinn (1988) has demonstrated that such 
contradictions often become inextricably linked to values issues. A manager operating 
as a ‘director’, exercising “control and the threat of punishment” (to use McGreggor’s 
words) must operate on a different set of values from a manager operating as a 
‘facilitator’, engaging in participative decision making and team building. These 
managerial roles appear contradictory, both in terms of values and in terms of 
structures, systems, etc. Thus Quinn et al’s model (1988, 1990) of management 
explicitly seeks to combine both contradictory managerial values and contradictory
This thesis adopts an approach which focuses on contradictions in management in 
general and public management in particular, often tied to values issues, and assumes 
their paradoxical nature. This approach is further explored in Chapter 5, but it is worth 
discussing here the notion of paradox which appears frequently throughout the thesis. 
Much of management literature, especially its dominant western tradition, has tended
skills and knowledge) into a single framework.
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to ignore the subject of contradictions in organisations entirely. At best, management 
thought has progressed as far as recognising dilemmas - that is seemingly 
contradictory alternatives which have to be dealt with by making either/or choices. 
Much of the rationalist literature on decision making could be seen as trying to 
identify such dilemmas or choices and establishing methods and criteria for deciding 
between them. A more European, as opposed to Anglo-Saxon, tradition is derived 
from Hegelian dialectics which recognises contradiction in a more direct form but, 
especially in its Marxist interpretation, seeks to resolve contradiction through 
synthesis. Rather than choosing (either/or - dilemma) it establishes an amalgam of 
both/and, or in more modem jargon, synergy.
A paradox based approach seeks to stress not only the existence of contradictions, 
which both the dilemma and dialectical approaches do to some extent, but also to 
recognise the inevitability and, more importantly, the unresolvability, of some 
contradictions. Paradox based approaches tend to be based more in Eastern 
philosophical traditions (especially Taoism, but also Zen, some aspects of Hinduism, 
Sufism, etc.). These traditions not merely recognise but positively embrace the notion 
of permanent contradiction and espouse various strategies for living with the 
consequences, and especially the dynamism and flux which attend the ebbs and flows 
between contradictory poles. Paradox, therefore, is used throughout this thesis to 
denote contradictions which are to some degree inevitable and unresolvable in 
organisational and managerial life and to imply the need for approaches to manage the 
contradictions, rather than to merely choose (dilemma) or to resolve (dialectics). It 
should be stressed that (a) this is not to say that some contradictions are not amenable 
to choice or resolution and (b) the stress laid on the concept of paradox is meant as a 
corrective to the lack of understanding of such irresolvable contradictions in much 
management and organisational literature. As the narrative of this thesis unfolds, 
hopefully the reader will see the benefit of stressing paradox in helping to illuminate 
issues in public management, strategic management and management development.
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Objectives of the Research
The research objectives of this thesis can be summarised as:
1. To establish some broad-based (and comparative) information about the nature 
and extent of strategic planning practices within UK public services.
2. To explore the idea of competing, paradoxical, systems within public services 
strategic practices - by specifically (i) construction of theory or models of how 
such paradoxical systems might apply to strategic management in the public 
services and (ii) carry out some limited testing of the possible validity of one set 
of (deduced) ‘strategic modes’ and ‘strategic sub-systems’.
3. To establish a framework for analysing possible approaches to the development of 
strategic managers, establish some information about the management 
development practices and preferences of managers and organisations in relation 
to strategic management skills, knowledge and abilities and to gather some broad- 
based (and comparative) information about the knowledge-base of UK strategic 
managers in the area of strategic techniques and approaches.
4. To explore the idea of competing, paradoxical, strategic ‘competences’ and to test 
the possible validity of a specific set of (deduced) competences.
5. On the basis of the above, to make some recommendations about further research 
which would aid the ‘development of strategic managers for UK public services’.
These research objectives are further elaborated in Chapter 5, and the theoretical 
models underpinning them, derived from existing literature by a process of synthesis 
and deduction are explained in the first four Chapters. An outline of the Chapter 
structure, which helps to show how this is achieved, follows.
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S y n o psis  o f  C h a pter s
In Chapter 1 models are examined which offer explanations of paradoxes in general 
public management, such as Mintzberg’s Professional Bureaucracy (1979, 1983) and 
Kouzes & Mico’s Domain Theory (1979). The latter, in particular, offers a useful 
three-way paradox between the ‘political’, ‘managerial’ and ‘service’ domains of 
public management. In Chapter 2, a model of generic strategic management is 
synthesised from the existing literature which embodies the fourfold paradoxes 
between the ‘planning’, ‘learning’, ‘politics’ and ‘vision’ approaches to strategy.
This generic model of the paradoxes inherent in strategic management is then 
combined with the model of paradoxes inherent in public management, discussed in 
Chapter 1, to produce a model of strategic public management in Chapter 3. This 
model, following Quinn et al (1988, 1990), concentrates on identifying the competing 
managerial values and competences involved in strategic public management.
The final background element in the research is the nature of management education 
and development, which is explored in Chapter 4. This too looks at paradoxes, this 
time in the nature of management education and development, which are partly caused 
by the paradoxes of management itself and partly by contradictions inherent in 
developmental processes and problems.
These four Chapters lay the foundation for an exploration of ‘developing strategic 
managers for UK public services’. The research strategy and methodology are set out 
in Chapter 5, and the results are analysed Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 8 provides some 
conclusions and recommendations for further research activity. The principle field 
research effort reported on is a questionnaire survey of some 644 strategic public 
managers, drawn from across the public sector in the UK.
Chapter 1 - Public Services Management
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Part (I) discusses the impact of the ‘Thatcher decade’ (1979-91) on the UK public 
services, reviewing briefly some of the chief issues of fiscal policies, the 
‘marketisation’ of the public sector and the impact of European integration. Its central 
point is to re-establish some balance into interpretations of the impact of 
‘Thatcherism’, recognising that major changes have occurred in public organisations, 
including both their boundaries and internal arrangements, but also recognising the 
limits of change. This theme is re-examined at other points in the Chapter, as the 
various models of ‘public management’ are unfolded.
Part (II) begins this process by examining the changing nature of ‘public 
management’ by scrutiny of three major trends readily identifiable in the literature: 
the old ‘public administration9 approach; the ‘new public management’ or public 
‘managerialism’ movement and finally the various attempts to reconstruct a model of 
management in the ‘public domain’ as fundamentally different too generic or private 
sector based management models, including the ‘public domain’, ‘public service 
orientation’ and the ‘public organisation decentralisation’
Part (III) turns to a smaller, but growing, trend to ‘rediscover public services 
management’ by focusing on the contradictions, inconsistencies and paradoxes of 
public management. The nature of existing UK public services as ‘human services’ 
organisations is examined and the resulting implication of a threefold paradox of 
contradictory policy, management and service domains is explored using ‘domain 
theory’, supplemented by the ‘professional bureaucracy model’, and a variety of 
explanations of the nature of human services professional work. This includes 
introducing distinctions between human services, administrative and technical 
professionalism and discussing some of the peculiarities of the UK systems.
Chapter 2 - Strategic Management
This Chapter begins by reviewing, in Part (I) a range of issues about the development 
of strategic theory and practice:
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• strategy’s specialists - the people who launched ‘strategy’ as a management issue;
• strategy’s semantics - just what is meant by ‘strategy’, its military genesis and 
evolution, in both western and eastern traditions, and how the latter have affected 
management usage and the general mutability of the concept in warfare and 
management
• strategy’s substance - general trends in how far ‘strategy’ and ‘strategic 
management’ or ‘planning’ are actually practised, both generally and specifically 
in the public sector
• strategy’s strands - finally, this part reviews some of the major themes to have 
emerged from debates on strategic management over the past 3 decades, 
identifying some key themes, contradictions and paradoxes in the literature as a 
prelude to an attempted synthesis in Part (II).
Part (II) attempts to synthesise a ‘competing values’ model of strategic management, 
using as a basic framework two key contradictions:
• the contradiction in strategic decision making between ‘rational’ and ‘non-ration’ 
(i.e. intuitive, political, etc.) forms and
• the contradiction in strategic decision substance between ‘incrementalism’ and 
‘radical’ change.
This section illustrates how these two contradictions, when combined, give a rich 
model for strategic ‘modes’: the ‘learning’, ‘planning’, ‘political’ and ‘visionary’ 
modes. It demonstrates how this, admittedly reductionist, model provides a useful tool 
which corresponds closely to many major attempts to provide a taxonomy of ‘strategic 
management’. After examining each of the strategic modes in turn, it turns briefly to a 
discussion of one of the key issues to have emerged in recent years, the role of 
intuition and creativity in strategy and shows how this relates to the strategic modes.
Chapter 3 - Strategic Management and Public Management
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This Chapter opens by examining the ‘rise, fall and rise’ of strategy in the public 
sector, the evidence on trends in strategic management practice.
It then returns to the nature of the public management reforms by examining the 
nature of ‘marketisation’ within the (remaining) public services organisations in the 
UK. It develops a model of competition within public policy and provision ‘sub- 
spaces’ or ‘industries’, including non-market, quasi-market and full market 
competition. It also discusses briefly, through example, some of the problems of 
transferring strategic tools developed in private sector contexts to the public sector.
The problem of setting organisational goals, a neglected area in general strategic 
management literature but crucial for public organisations, is also briefly discussed.
Finally, this Chapter applies the models of public services management developed in 
Chapter 1 to the models of strategic management developed in Chapter 2 to develop a 
1 iriodel Jof public sector strategic management competences, related to both strategy 
modes and specific elements or sub-systems of the strategy process in the public 
sector. This model forms the basis for some of the research reported in Chapters 5-7.
Chapter 4 - Management Development and Public Services
This Chapter begins by reviewing definitions of management education and 
development and offering a comprehensive definition. Using this definition to 
examine trends in management development (MD), the Chapter offers a model (based 
on Kolb’s experiential learning cycle) which embraces the trends identified in MD 
and which, like previous models, also embraces competing approaches. This model is 
also used later, in the design of the questionnaire survey, to ask public managers about 
development of strategic managers in their organisations (reported in Chapter 7).
The Chapter also examines the relatively small literature on the development of 
senior, strategic managers and directors. It reviews the relationship of general MD to
17
developing public managers, using the models of public management discussed in 
Chapter 1.
Finally, it draws on both this Chapter and Chapter 3 to outline some ideas about the 
nature of strategic public managers and the basis for their development.
Chapter 5 - Research Philosophy. Strategy and Technique
This Chapter opens by discussing the various levels of research design, including the 
philosophical underpinnings of research, the research strategy adopted and specific 
techniques used. In outlining in more detail the paradoxical systems approach adopted 
in this research it also discusses some philosophical issues associated with it. The 
difficulties of researching paradoxical systems is briefly discussed before proceeding 
to outline the research design.
The research strategy is reported, both as it evolved (using a ‘research story’ 
approach) and the broad research objectives set. Some issues of access, research 
resource constraints and other matters are discussed and the details of the survey 
design and implementation are reported. Specifically, the use of some questions to 
gather comparative data from the public sector to use in conjunction with an earlier 
survey of private sector strategic practices.
Chapter 6 - Results and Analysis I - Strategy processes in the public services
This is the first of two Chapters reporting the results of the survey of UK strategic 
public managers. In this Chapter the survey results covering strategic management 
practices. This covers strategic planning practices, reasons for not planning, levels of 
involvement and the extent to which the ‘strategic modes’ appear to exist in public 
organisations. The results are compared with the data gathered in an earlier private 
sector based survey where appropriate.
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Chapter 7 - Results and Analysis II - Strategic public managers - knowledge, 
competences, development
As the title suggests, this Chapter reports and analyses those aspects of the survey 
dealing with strategic public managers knowledge of strategy techniques and 
authorities, with the strategic competences developed in Chapter 3 and 4, and with the 
development of strategic managers in their organisations. Again, where possible these 
results are compared to the private sector data set.
Chapter 8 - Conclusions and Recommendations
This Chapter draws some conclusions from the theoretical models developed in 
Chapters 1-4 and the results of the empirical work reported in Chapters 6 and 7 on 
some of the aspects of these models. It also draws some conclusions about the 
underpinning approach developed throughout the thesis and explored specifically in 
Chapter 5. These conclusions are reported against the research objectives established 
in Chapter 5.
The Chapter also reflects on the research process itself, identifying some strengths and 
weaknesses of the research. Finally, it offers some suggestions about further research 
in this field.
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Chapter 1 Public Management in the UK1
I n t r o d u c t io n
This Chapter begins by setting out in Part (I) some important features of developments 
that have taken place within the public sector in the UK over the past 15 years. This 
chapter refers to a period commonly recognised as one of dramatic change and during 
which occurred the so-called break-up of the post-war social democratic consensus 
(Gamble, 1988). Together with other changes, such as European developments, the 
period of ‘Thatcherite’ reform and radicalism have had a perceived large impact on 
public services. These changes have been more complex, and uneven. They have also 
been less radical than some supporters and detractors alike have suggested, a view 
now becoming more prevalent (Johnson, 1991; Marsh & Rhodes 1992; Hogwood, 
1992; Wilson, 1992). In their implications for public service management however, 
their impact has been great.
Part (II) records the development of differing approaches to understanding of public 
service management that have emerged from the fragmentation of the traditional 
public administration perspective. It identifies two major children of this break-up - 
the ‘new public management’ and the ‘public domain’ approaches.
In Part (IE) an emerging model of public service management that draws on 
organisational theory and the new trends outlined is further developed. It focuses on 
the contradictions and paradoxes inherent in public management, using ‘domain 
theory’ and a model of ‘professional bureaucracy’ to illustrate these paradoxes.
1 earlier drafts of parts of this Chapter have already appeared in Talbot, C (1993) Developing UK 
Public Managers, International Journal o f Public Sector Management, Vol. 6. No. 6.
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(I) T h a t c h e r ism  a n d  th e  P u blic  S e c t o r
The international reputation of the UK’s reforming Conservative government elected 
in 1979, headed by Margaret Thatcher, was one of radical tax cuts, tight monetary 
policy, reductions in state intervention in the economy. Thatcherism also meant 
public spending reductions, privatisation and strong defence and law and order 
policies.
The reality is somewhat more complex. Some of the policies most closely associated_ 
with the Thatcher experiment only evolved slowly, whilst others were severely 
misrepresented by supporters and detractors alike. This chapter looks at two crucial 
areas for public services: fiscal policy and spending programmes; and the introduction 
of market forces or privatisation into the public sector.
Fiscal Policies
Despite much of the rhetoric, UK general government expenditure (GGE), as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), has remained relatively stable. It 
actually rose during the recession of the early 1980’s, then fell during the period of 
more rapid growth but has again risen during the current recession (Figure 1:1). The 
main cause of the fluctuations has undoubtedly been the fact that the Government, 
despite its reforming zeal, has not been able to significantly reduce spending on 
central social welfare programmes (unemployment benefits, social security payments, 
pensions and investment in deprived urban areas). The riots of the early 1980’s 
showed the potential for unrest in some of the areas most badly affected by industrial 
and social decline. This was clearly one factor, amongst others, which prompted the 
Government not to make substantial cuts in welfare and urban programmes. Neither 
was this a purely UK phenomenon, as The  E conom ist noted:
“The 1980s were proclaimed by conservatives, and mourned by leftists, as a decade 
of public frugality. Governments everywhere talked loudly about rolling back the 
boundaries of the state...Despite that avowed ‘restraint’, most of the world’s big
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industrial economies are expected to have budget deficits in 1992 that, in relation to 
their national incomes, will be as big as, if not bigger than, those of the early 1980s. 
Total public spending by the G7 countries will top 41% of GDP this year - its 
highest ever - compared with 38% in 1980.” (15-Aug-92:13).
Figure 1:1 Real GGE as a % of Real GDP
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There has been constant Government pressure to reduce public spending. This 
reduction has tended to be far more incremental rather than of radical surgery as 
pictured by supporters and detractors alike. It is also unevenly distributed across 
different spending programmes (see Figure 1:4)
With public spending staying broadly stable, how has it been possible for the 
Conservative governments to drastically reduce personal income tax? The rise in 
indirect taxation (the VAT rate has risen from 8% to 17.5%) partly accounts for the 
change, with VAT income almost doubling as a percentage of total taxation (from 
9.6% to 18.3%). Personal income tax, by contrast, fell from 34.4% to 27% of the total 
tax take (see Figure 1:2).
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Figure 1:2 Changing UK Tax Income Patterns 1978-89
1978 £m % of total 1989 £m % of total
Income
Tax 18,767 34.4 47,232 27.0
Value Added 
Tax 5,239 9.6 31,949 18.3
Income tax + VAT 44.0 45.3
Source: adapted from Jackson (1992)
The substantial revenues derived from privatisation and North Sea oil (see Figure 1:3) 
also accounts partially for this apparent contradiction. Moreover, they also point to a 
possible major problem for the future. With both privatisation and North Sea oil 
revenues declining, the fiscal problems confronting future governments can only 
worsen; unless the UK economy enters a period of sustained and rapid economic 
growth, thus increasing revenues and decreasing ‘transfer’ payments as unemployment 
reduces. The persistence of the recession makes this seem highly unlikely, with at best 
a slow and hesitant recovery forecast. Neither is it entirely clear how much of the 
fiscal crisis is short-term and cyclical and how much is long-term and structural.
The broad stability of public spending is however slightly misleading in two respects. 
Firstly, the Major government has sharply increased the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR) by £26bn and planned spending by 5.5% between 1990 and 
1991 (Johnson, 1992 pp27-30). The current PSBR of £50bn plus is in stark contrast to 
the sharply deflationary polices of cutting public spending carried out by Thatcher and 
Howe in the 1981 recession.
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Figure 1:3 Privatisation and oil revenues - UK government 1979-90
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Source: adapted from Jackson (1992)
Secondly, the balance of public spending on different programmes has varied 
markedly over the past 13 years. The groupings used in Figure 1:4 partly illustrate the 
changing balance between central and local government programmes. Defence and 
Law Enforcement (mainly central government) have risen (although more serious 
Defence spending cuts are now planned). In the area of “human services” Social 
Security and Employment (central government) and Health and Personal Social 
Services (mainly central government) spending has risen, the former as a function of 
increased unemployment and the latter as a result of an ageing population and 
inflation in health costs. In the areas of Housing and Education (mainly local 
government) there have been significant reductions.
It is noteworthy that the biggest relative increase is in the area of ‘transfers’, that is, 
payments of money to recipients of social security or employment benefits.
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Figure 1:4 Relative Shifts in Public Spending for selected functions
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The balance between central and local spending was 71.0% and 26.9% in 1984/5 and 
had changed to 73.2% and 24.0% respectively by 1988/9 (Upton 1989 p33).
While it would be wrong to conclude that central government managers have not been 
subjected to cost cutting and efficiency demands throughout this period it is clear that 
the pressures on local government managers have been markedly greater (at least in 
purely fiscal terms). Moreover, these figures only give the level of inputs to various 
programme areas, they do not suggest that demand for services was either static or 
changing equally. (For a full discussion of the ‘no change’ vs. ‘radical change’ debate 
on public spending see Flynn, 1993: Ch. 2). In most services demand was subject to 
variation, mostly increasing for a variety of demographic, economical or technological 
reasons (e.g. health, social services, housing, law enforcement) but in some cases 
fluctuating (e.g. parts of education and employment related transfers).
‘Marketisation’ - Privatisation and Quasi-Markets
Four major avenues of change have been used in relation to the public sector:
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• ‘Privatisation’ - mainly of state owned industries and utilities
• ‘partial privatisation’ - ‘compulsory competitive tendering’ of parts of public 
services in health and local government and ‘market testing’ of similar partial 
services in central government
• ‘quasi-markets’ - the introduction of more or less competitive ‘quasi-markets’ 
based on ‘puchaser’ and ‘provider’ splits, in health and education
• ‘contractualisation’ - the breaking up of hierarchical organisations into ‘policy’ 
and ‘executive agencies’ with quasi-contractual relationships between them, e.g. 
‘Next Steps’ Agencies and Framework Agreements in central government or 
‘service level agreements’ in local government
P r iv a t is a t io n
Privatisation, again contrary to general belief, was not a founding principle of the 
Thatcher period. In the early years it was a minor plank of Government policy and 
only became a significant factor with the privatisation of British Telecom in 1984 
(during the second Thatcher Government, 1983-87) (see Figure 1:3).
The major area of privatisation has been in ‘natural monopoly’ utility industries, such 
as telecommunications, gas, electricity, and water, together with nationalised 
manufacturing concerns such as cars and steel.
For the managers employed in these privatised organisations the practical and 
ideological shift has obviously been dramatic. (The degree of the change also 
reinforces the view that public sector management is different from private sector 
management and therefore requires different forms of management education.) There 
have been a number of studies dealing with the problems associated with cultural 
change in these organisations (United Research, 1990). A number of studies of British 
Telecom, in particular, have been published (Smith et al, 1986 & 1988; Price and 
Murphy, 1987) and a recent study of industrial relations in the privatised water 
industry also emphasises the degree of change (O’Connell-Davidson, 1993).
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However, for managers still in the public sector the subsidiary themes of privatisation 
- compulsory competitive tendering and quasi-markets - have been far more 
significant.
P a r t ia l  P r iv a t is a t io n  - Co m p u l s o r y  c o m p e t it iv e  t e n d e r in g  (C C T ) a n d  M a r k e t  Te s t in g
Compulsory competitive tendering is the compelling, by central Government, of 
public organisations to sub-contract a wide variety of subsidiary or ancillary 
operations (e.g. waste disposal, house building and repair, services such as laundry, 
estates management, transport, etc.); In the case of local government this was carried 
out through legislation, whilst in the NHS it was achieved through Government 
instructions. While CCT was initially applied mainly to manual occupations it has 
now been widened to include professional services such as legal advice, surveying, 
etc. (Flynn, 1990). Market Testing in central government, in Departments and 
Executive Agencies, has likewise concentrated largely on peripheral and support 
services activities in most cases (Harrow & Talbot, 1994b) although there has been 
some confusion in terminology as ‘market testing’ has also been used to describe the 
competitive tendering for the whole services of some Executive Agencies, by both ‘in- 
house’ and external providers (Next Steps, 1993).
Q u a s i-M a r k e t s
The third approach is to create, within an area of service provision, a ‘mixed 
economy’ or ‘quasi-market’. The quasi-market involves making a split between the 
‘purchaser’ and the ‘provider’ of a service and involves competition for contracts 
from a variety of providers. Unlike the ‘compulsory competitive tendering’ and 
‘market testing’ approaches, which specifically set out to transfer provision to the 
private sector (or at least compete directly with private sector providers), the 
competition in quasi-markets is mainly confined to public (or voluntary sector)
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providers, although in some cases (e.g. community care) this includes private sector 
providers.
The largest examples of this are the reforms of the health service and education, but 
the new arrangements for ‘community care’ of the sick, disabled and mentally ill also 
incorporate the same principles. This particular issue is dealt with at greater length in 
Chapter 3.
A g e n c ie s
The final approach has been to turn an entire service into an ‘Agency’, with a quasi- 
contractual relationship with a ‘purchaser’ (such as the Social Security Benefits 
Agency and the Department of Social Security). Here the Government Department 
retains the policy function while the operational management of service delivery is 
given to the Agency. The relationship between the Department and Agency is 
managed through a quasi-contract system, embodied in a Framework Agreement that 
is revisable every 3 years. The Agency Chief Executive is usually appointed through 
open competition and is directly accountable to a Minister and to Parliament. Over 90 
Agencies have been formed involving around 230,000 staff (about 60% of the total) 
(Harrow & Talbot, 1994a). However, a similar move towards ‘service level 
agreements’ between local government departments has some parallels with the 
Agency approach.
The key dimensions, of suppliers and the scope of the service, are set out in Figure 
1:5. This also gives some idea of the scope of the various approaches.
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Figure 1:5 Change and Markets in Public Organisations
Whole
Service
Single Public Multiple Private Providers
Provider Public/V oluntary
Providers
Agency Quasi-markets Privatisation
Central government: NHS: purchaser- Telecoms
92 PSO’s including provider split and NHS Gas
Social Security Trusts Water
(65,600) Employment Electricity
(34,500) Education: local Cars
management of Steel
Service schools and Grant etc.
Decentralisation Maintained Status
mainly within Local
Authorities as a move
towards more local
delivery /
accountability of
services
Functional Mixed Economy Compulsory
Decentralisation competitive tendering
mainly within Local Social Services Local Authorities and
Authorities as (Community Care) NHS originally mainly
functional ‘cost individual care manual ancillary
centres’ in response to contracts services but now
CCT including
“professional” services
Partial
Service
These approaches to public organisation reform are explored further in Chapter 3, 
which looks at the structuring of both non-market and market based competition 
between public organisations.
The European Dimension
Another dimension of change impacting on public management is increased European 
integration. As a supra-national body with law and policy formation powers, the 
European Union has an effect at several levels.
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In terms of policy formation, a variety of issues have moved to the European level. 
Policies affecting a variety of public services, including: planning; public transport; 
regional development; contracting for public construction, supply and services; law 
enforcement and border controls; health and safety and environmental protection; 
have all been influenced if not decided at a European level (Terry 1992).
This creates a new, supra-national, tier of policy formation with its own structures. 
Two leading European public managers have recently suggested that this will include 
co-operation at many levels and embracing a variety of actors, including: the EC 
Commission as a whole; individual EC Directorates; national administrations as a 
whole; individual national ministries; individual agencies; local and regional 
government, etc. (Talbot 1992).
To give some examples, French and English local government bodies at either end of 
the Channel Tunnel have already held meetings to discuss planning issues. Police and 
Customs organisations across Europe have been meeting to discuss the implications of 
the erosion of border controls for the control of drug trafficking and terrorism. UK 
local government bodies have direct links with a variety of EC institutions. However, 
these links have been growing haphazardly and some problems have emerged. UK 
local government associations have complained that, while being responsible for the 
implementation of a great deal of EC policy decisions they have no direct link into 
policy formation (Terry 1992).
This has led some commentators to call for the formation of a ‘European 
Administrative Community’ to overcome what they have called the ‘management’ or 
‘administrative deficit’ of European integration (see Sutherland, reported in Talbot 
1992).
At the level of service delivery, increased European economic integration, coupled 
with more freedom of migration, are likely to lead to demographic and economic 
developments affecting provision of housing, health and education services as well as 
community relations (as recent events in Germany have demonstrated). All public
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services will be affected by EC policy controls on public borrowing; contracting for 
public construction, supplies and services; regional development; competition policies 
(affecting public enterprises), etc.
All of these changes will clearly impact on public management. In the personnel field 
changes in the legal framework for health and safety, equality, qualifications will 
mingle with increased labour mobility (Pinder 1991). While the effects of the latter 
are likely to be small in general, in certain specialist areas (e.g. computing) a freer 
European labour market may increase skills shortages. In other areas it may solve 
problems, as for example the recent recruitment of teachers from Europe by the 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets to meet acute shortages.
More generally, the policy and service environment of UK public managers will 
become increasingly more complex and ‘Europeanised’. Managers will need at least a 
basic understanding of EC structures and processes and in some cases a much higher 
level of comparative public administration knowledge. Moreover the EC will offer 
opportunities, for example in the field of regional development funds, which will 
require ‘Euro-preneurial’ skills from some public managers, not least of which will be 
language skills.
Conclusions about the impact of “Thatcherism”
The period of ‘Thatcherism’ has been characterised as one of radical and continuous 
change at the legislative and institutional level, however
“the Thatcher Government, like its predecessors, failed to achieve many of the aims 
it set itself. In addition, the policies sometimes had unintended consequences that 
undermined the effect of the policy, or the achievement of another policy objective. 
Even in those areas which the Government regard as most important...achievements 
have been much less substantial than is often claimed.” (Marsh & Rhodes, 
1992:174)
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This conclusion, drawn on the basis of a survey of the Thatcher Government’s record 
in a wide variety of areas (the economy, industrial relations, local government, 
housing, social security, health, environment and the EC), represents in some ways a 
sense of ‘balance’ being re-established in estimates of ‘Thatcherism’s’ impact. 
Hogwood’s survey of public policy (1992) reinforces the view that, while some 
polices that the Thatcher Governments attempted were radical some was more 
incremental, dominated by the inertia of past policies.
For public service managers the impact could be usefully assessed from three points 
of view, (i) inputs - of legislation, policy and resources, (ii) transformation - the 
institutional and managerial arrangements for organising inputs to produce maximum 
outputs and outcomes, sometimes referred to as “managing for social outcomes” and, 
(iii) outputs - changing demands for quantity and quality of services. This is the much 
used ‘economy’ (inputs), ‘efficiency’ (transformation) and ‘effectiveness’ (outputs).
While the legislative and policy inputs have in some cases changed radically, what 
both surveys (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992 and Hogwood, 1992) show clearly is that 
resources have changed mainly incrementally. On the other hand, the conditions of 
transformation have changed radically in many areas, as the survey of the variety of 
‘market mechanisms’ and institutional changes above shows. All this is in the context 
of the changing and often but not always increasing demand for services through 
demographic, social, economic or technological change.
The impact on public services management, which has to juggle the contending forces 
of change, has indeed been great. Whether or not the fundamental nature of that 
management has changed is explored in the next two sections.
(II) Interpreting  New  Trends in Public Services M anagem ent
The previous section gave a broad, descriptive account of some of the changes taking 
place in the structuring of public service provision in the UK. In this section some of 
the trends in Public Service organisation and management are outlined, giving some
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analytical frameworks that have emerged for interpreting and understanding these 
changes.
A note of caution should be made at the outset that this account, which is based 
mainly on three sources - the literature on public services management, changes 
initiated at policy levels and empirical research. While there is plenty of empirical 
evidence regarding actual changes from research activity in Government, Local 
Government and the NHS, this evidence is often fragmented and piece-meal. 
Moreover a great deal of this information is of a ‘celebratory’ type - examples of ‘best 
practice’ culled from broad surveys (the Audit Commission in particular specialises in 
publishing this sort of material). On the other hand much of the literature is of a 
prescriptive and frankly partisan nature, championing particular approaches. Similarly, 
policy decisions are not the same as policy action - the level of implementation of 
national and local initiatives has been at best, variable.
Hambleton & Hoggett (1986) have tried to identify emerging patterns of relationship 
between local authorities and their communities by developing a conceptual map, 
which has a broader relevance to public service organisations. (Fig. 1.4 - their original 
map consists of the circled items and their relationship - the additional explanations 
and boxed items are new). They argue that until the early 1980’s the predominant 
model of local authority relationship with their communities was ‘bureaucratic 
paternalism’. During the early 1980’s this approach was subject to political and 
managerial critique. The former stressed the unresponsive nature of supposedly 
‘public’ institutions and proposed either privatisation (from the Right) or greater 
democratisation and consumer power (from the Left). The managerial critique focused 
on the failure of both public and private organisations to respond to customers needs, 
on inward-looking and conservative managerial cultures. This ‘in search of 
excellence’ movement (Peters & Waterman, 1982) resulted again in proposals for 
privatisation or for a new ‘public service orientation’.
The results of these criticisms have been two broad responses - privatisation (or other 
market-based solutions) and what they call ‘public service reform’. It should be
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remembered that at this point (mid-1980’s) the concentration of the Thatcher 
government had been perceived as being mainly on privatisation as the only solution 
for public services. In fact it was not the only course being pursued, as analysis of the 
new ‘managerialism’ shows (Pollitt, 1993). The ‘public service reform’ movement 
concentrated on issues of democratic accountability and the ‘public service 
orientation’, with varieties of ‘decentralisation’ emerging as the dominant 
organisational change proposal.
In fact this conceptual map can as easily be applied to the literature on public 
management. If the ‘bureaucratic paternalist’ relationship equates to the traditional 
public administration school then ‘privatisation’ can be equated with the ‘new public 
management’ and ‘public service reform’ with the ‘public domain’ approach.
The adapted model shows the way in which specific types of initiative - e.g. 
localisation of services and decentralisation of management - intersected with these 
broader conceptions (in this example consumerist approaches). Certain concepts to 
emerge during the 1980s seemed to eclectically combine more than one of the 
conceptual approaches outlined by Hambleton & Hoggett as different protagonists 
sought to fill the concept with differing contents. For example, the notion of the 
“Enabling Authority” was interpreted by some as a move towards greater privatisation 
of service delivery (Ridley, 1988) or by others as a more collectivist, local 
government, approach (e.g. Stewart & Stoker, 1988; Gyford, 1991).
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Figure 1:6 Emerging trends in relations between public services and 
communities
Old Solutions Bureaucratic
paternalism
New Patterns Privatisation
(market-based
approaches)
Public service 
reform (non­
market-based 
approaches)
Privatisation
CCT & Market 
Testing
Purchaser-Provider
Source: Hambleton & Hoggett (1986) with additional descriptive material
Public Administration
Traditional ‘public administration’ as a discipline has focused on the relationship of 
public policy and politics on the one hand and their implementation and 
administration (management) on the other. One leading UK exponent of public
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administration has given a useful summary of the traditional view, which is worth 
quoting fairly fully:
“Until the 1970’s, modem public administration was relatively clearly defined, both 
as an activity and as a subject of academic study. As an activity it is concerned to 
secure the honest, economical provision of public services and the efficient 
administration of national and local government. Public servants are held 
accountable to elected representatives...In consequence, public servants are 
expected to record their activities meticulously. Unconventional or unduly speedy 
actions tend to be frowned upon. Compliance with appropriate laws and regulations 
is of paramount importance, together with acceptance of the policies and decisions 
of elected representatives; these members must none the less be advised as to what 
decisions are or are not legal and practicable. Hence, it follows that the academic 
disciplines which have been regarded as appropriate for a public administrator to 
study are Law, History and increasingly Political Science.” (Elcock, 1991:2)
The focus of public administration has remained the relationship, and distinction, 
between policy (politics, policy analysis, policy formation, etc.) and administration 
(implementation, management, etc.). It has been argued that the distinction between 
policy and administration has broken down in both theory and practice (Elcock, 1991; 
Heady, 1991; Lynn & Wildavsky, 1990). What has been called ‘the new public 
administration’ has breached the ‘Chinese wall’ between policy and administration, 
stressing “the interrelationships rather than the differences between policy-making and 
policy-execution”. This has challenged the “traditional emphasis on the techniques of 
administration, and stressed the obligations of public administrators to be concerned 
with values, ethics, and morals, and to pursue a strategy of activism in coping with the 
problems of society” - functions and issues traditionally reserved for the politicians 
rather than administrators (Heady, 1991:2-3). Nevertheless, the focus of public 
administration remains public bureaucracy, whose “pivotal structural characteristics 
can be reduced to three: (1) hierarchy, (2) differentiation or specialisation, and (3) 
qualification or competence.” (ibid.:74).
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New Public Management
The first new pattern to emerge from the old “bureaucratic paternalist” or classical 
public administration approach is identified by Hambleton & Hoggett (Figure 1:6) as 
the “privatisation” or market based solution. This has been characterised elsewhere as 
the “new public management” (Hood, 1991).
In traditional approaches to public administration, management (as an academic 
discipline) was seen as having added, together with political science, important and 
integral components to public administration but “public administration has defined 
its identity as something apart and distinct from both political science and 
management.” (Henry, 1990:3)
In seeking to bolster this separate identity, Henry stresses the importance of 
recognising management’s specific contribution to public administration:
“Management had at least three distinct influences on public administration: It 
forced public administration to examine more closely what the public in public 
administration meant; it convinced many public administrationists that a whole new 
set of methodologies was needed; and it provided public administration with a 
model of how to assess what, as a field, it was teaching and why.” (Henry, 1990:12)
Thus, traditional public administration has not ignored ‘management’ but has sought 
to co-opt it.
However, the movement known as the ‘new public management’ (Hood, 1991) is a far 
more radical reappraisal of public administration in comparison to ‘management’. 
Gunn describes the new approach as a “simplistic view” which “holds that 
government has everything to learn from more efficient practices in the private sector 
and should, literally, become more ‘business like’.” (1988:21).
For Hood (1991:4-5) the key components of the new public management are:
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• ‘hands-on professional management’ - active, visible, management and control 
with clear responsibility and ‘freedom to manage’
• explicit standards and measures of performance, clearly defined goals, targets, 
and indicators of success
• greater emphasis on output controls, resource allocation and rewards linked to 
measured performance
• shift to desegregation and decentralisation, break up of ‘monolithic’ units, 
relationship between units on ‘arms length’ basis
• move towards more competition and mixed provision, contracting relationships, 
rivalry as the key to lowering costs
• stress on private sector based models of management, greater flexibility in hiring 
and rewards, need to use ‘proven’ private sector tools
• emphasis on greater economy in resources, cutting costs, raising productivity, 
resisting union demands, ‘doing more with less’
Th e  Cit iz e n ’s Ch a r t e r
It is interesting to note that in Hood’s outline of the new public management the issue 
of consumers' rights hardly appears explicitly at all. Even in areas such as 
performance, the emphasis in the new public management was, until recently, on 
performance measurement as a management tool. It focused primarily on quantifiable 
outputs rather than outcomes. The Citizen’s Charter initiative, launched in 1991, 
sought to address some of these issues and clearly incorporates some of the principles 
of the new public management:
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• explicit, and public, performance standards for public organisations - informing 
customers or clients of what they can expect
• consultation with customers on measures and standards to be set
• information on the performance achieved to be made public on a regular basis
• openness of management and decision processes and responsibilities - fully
• accessibility of services - making the services more ‘user friendly’, adjusting 
opening hours to suit users rather than staff
• means of redress for customers - providing mechanisms for either dealing 
adequately with complaints or providing some form of compensation to 
individual users
(Goldsworthy, 1991 cited in Harrow & Talbot, 1993)
The Citizen’s Charter initiative, from its initial focus on the relationship between the 
individual service user and the service providing organisation (Pirie 1991) has 
broadened out to include a wide range of other policy initiatives, such as 
privatisations, agency status, market testing and compulsory competitive tendering, 
amongst others - (Citizen’s Charter 1991, 1992 and see Harrow & Talbot, 1993 & 
1994b.) However, the core ideas clearly aim to add a “consumerist” dimension to the 
new public management. In this sense the Charter initiative from the Government falls 
mid-way between Hambleton & Hoggett’s (Fig. 1.4) “privatisation” and 
“consumerist” solutions (see above). It should be mentioned that the notion of a 
Citizen’s Charter has also emerged from Labour controlled local authorities (e.g. York 
City Council which launched its own Charter, before either the Government or its 
unofficial advisors were advocating Charters as an approach) and here the 
interpretation of “charter” type initiatives has been almost entirely “consumerist” in its 
approach.
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Public Domain Approach
What is here called the ‘public domain’ approach is seen as a combination of some of 
the ‘consumerist’ and ‘collectivist’ elements of the public service reform off-shoots 
from the disintegration of the public administration, or ‘bureaucratic paternalistic’, 
style of public management.
This approach has been given a variety of names. Gunn argues for a ‘third way’ which 
“avoids both the public administration and business management extremes, 
combining appropriate elements of both.” (1988:21). Probably the most consistent 
advocates of the ‘public domain’ model of public services have been Stewart and 
Ranson, arguing that “the public domain has its own purposes” and that “although a 
management approach developed for the private sector can have relevance to the 
public domain, that approach may have to be transformed in its application.” 
(1988:13). Crucial to this approach was the notion of the ‘public service orientation’ 
(PSO) developed by Stewart and Clarke in the mid-1980s (Clarke 1985; with Stewart, 
1985; 1986a & b; 1987). Indeed Pollitt (1992) identifies the public service orientation 
approach as a distinctive trend, as opposed to public administration and the new 
public management.
The Public Domain approach, and especially the public service orientation variant, has 
two crucial points of departure - the service role of public services to the public as 
customer or client and their political accountability to the public as citizen.
P ublic  D o m ain
Stewart and Ranson (1988) argue that:
“There are dangers if, consciously or unconsciously, management in the 
public domain adopts models drawn from outside organisations. That is 
not to say that management in the public domain cannot learn from
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management in the private sector, or vice versa. Specific management 
ideas can be transferable. What is not transferable is the model of 
management - its purposes, conditions and tasks.” (1988:13)
They explain what they mean by purposes, conditions and choice as follows:
• purposes - the public domain is the arena for organisation of the pursuit of
collective public values and objectives and this is done through democratic 
processes, which is itself a basic value of the public domain
• conditions - these are the limits placed on the public domain, in terms of its 
accountability, its legitimacy and its collectivity - politics and political processes, 
including protest, are not an optional extra but fundamental conditions of the 
public domain
• tasks - these are the tasks of government, which include balancing different 
interests, maintaining order and justice and carrying out a range of other activities 
which are not in themselves ‘public’ (e.g. managing housing can be a public or 
private activity) but because they are being carried out within the public domain 
have distinctive managerial requirements (1988:14-16)
They argue that this leads to a set of dilemmas that are intrinsic to public domain 
management, some of which include balancing between:
collective vs. individual - the public domain, as the collective expression of values, 
can impose on the individual but such action needs justification
representative vs. participative - collective action can be determined by popular 
representation or participation, in practice the two tend to be incompatible
bureaucracy vs. responsiveness - bureaucratic rule can help to ensure equity of 
treatment at the cost of individual responsiveness
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order vs. service - maintaining order and providing services are often carried out 
alongside one another, yet each has different management needs
controlling vs. enabling - complex urban societies must have both control to function 
and enabling to involve
political conflict vs. institutional continuity - the public domain has to provide both 
an arena for conflicting values and a means of continuity
(Stewart & Ranson, 1988: 16-17)
These dilemmas, they argue, lie at the heart of the distinctive nature of management in 
the public domain.
Stewart has also developed a very similar list for dilemmas in policy making systems 
(Stewart, 1982:238-242) and these basic issues about the purposes, conditions and 
tasks of the public domain being different from other private or voluntary 
organisations have recurred throughout Stewart’s work (e.g. Stewart, 1971; 1972; 
1983; 1986). More recently, others associated with INLOGOV, Stewart’s academic 
home, have used very similar frameworks to analyse the changing management of 
schools (Cordingley & Kogan, 1993).
P u b l ic  Se r v ic e  O r ien ta tio n
The public service orientation developed during the mid-1980s in local government. 
Whilst mostly limited to local government, the approach clearly has a wider relevance 
to public services management. The phenomenal interest in Peters and Waterman’s In 
Search of Excellence, published in the UK in 1984 (two years after the US 
publication) prompted the Local Government Training Board to publish a collection 
of responses by Clarke, Greenwood and Stewart (Clarke, 1985) and organise a 
seminar of senior local government managers to discuss the book. While this 
particular book clearly had a direct influence, it was representative of a broader
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literature which emphasised a ‘customer focus’, especially in service industries 
(Normann, 1991). What soon emerged was the ‘Public Service Orientation’ (Clarke & 
Stewart, 1985).
The essential components of this approach were explained as being:
• local authorities exist to provide services for the public
• local authorities succeed or fail by the quality of service they provide
• quality of service demands closeness to the public - as client, customer and citizen 
(Clarke & Stewart, 1986b: 1)
In detail this meant a local authority needed to develop mechanisms for listening more 
closely to the public; giving greater access to the public; looking at services from the 
receivers point of view; seeking out views, suggestions and complaints; developing 
the publics ‘right to know’ and developing quality of service which would be tested 
against public opinion of the service. (Clarke & Stewart, 1986a: 1). (There are some 
striking similarities here with the principles underpinning the Citizen’s Charter 
initiative which emerged in the early 1990s - see above).
P ub l ic  O r g a n isa t io n  D e c e n t r a l isa t io n
The other major trend, again largely occurring in the local government portion of 
public management, although not exclusively, was towards decentralisation or 
localisation. Early experiments in ‘area organisation’ in Liverpool and Stockport 
(Hambleton, 1978:223-253) mirrored similar, though more radical, developments in 
the US. By the mid-1980s “wherever one looks, whether in major cities (like 
Manchester, Birmingham, Edinburgh or Leeds) or in smaller local authorities (like 
Rochdale, Norwich, Halton, or Greenwich), officers and councillors will insist that 
they are busily engaged in new initiatives related to decentralisation.” (Hoggett &
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Hambleton, 1987:1). The study of this decentralisation movement, largely associated 
with the School for Advanced Urban Studies in Bristol, has emphasised the difference 
between what has been called ‘service responsiveness’ and ‘service democratisation’ - 
the former is the localisation of service delivery combined with the sorts of measures 
suggested by the public service orientation whilst the latter is about a much more 
radical decentralisation of power and participative involvement of consumers 
(Hoggett & Hambleton, 1987:4). The source of this movement has been traced, like 
the public service orientation, to the private sector. Hoggett argues that the emergence 
of ‘post-Fordist’ small batch production techniques, coupled with the failures of 
centralised planning, has forced many private sector organisations down the road of 
decentralisation and that this has ‘spilt over’ into the public sector (Hoggett, 
1987:215-232).
The theme of needing to combine service responsiveness and democratisation has 
been pursued in the work of these authors and others (Hoggett & Hambleton, 1987; 
Hambleton, 1990; Hoggett, 1991; Garrish, 1986; Boddy & Fudge, 1984; Blunkett & 
Jackson, 1987).
Hoggett’s work has extended the examination of decentralisation to other areas of the 
public sector and argues that there is now a paradoxical process through which radical 
reforms are leading to decentralisation of operational management combined with 
greater centralisation of strategic control, citing Murray’s phrase about “the 
decentralisation of production and the centralisation of command” (Hoggett, 
1991:249). He suggests “that we use of the term devolved service unit (DSU) to 
describe the new generation of schools, libraries, leisure centres, area housing and 
social services teams, etc.” because this encapsulates the notion of decentralised 
service delivery but does not imply local control and command, which is retained 
centrally.
(I ll)  M odels of Public  Service  Organisations and Managem ent
Having reviewed the three main trends in public service management writing over the 
last decade or so we turn to two slightly different approaches. We begin by outlining a
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framework for distinguishing ‘human service’ organisations from other types of public 
organisations and arguing that the former are now the predominant form of public 
service organisation in the UK. The human service model has been further developed 
into the ‘domain’ model, which situates public service management in a triangular 
relationship including human service professionals and the accountable nature of 
public service organisations. A configurational model of ‘professional bureaucracies’ 
is also explored, giving useful insights into professionalism.
Human Service Organisations
The notion of ‘human services’ has been well developed in the US literature. Kouzes 
and Mico have developed a model contrasting the nature of HSOs with business and 
industrial organisations, building particularly on the work of Harshbarger (1974) and 
Hasenfeld and English (1974). Their list of contrasts is meant to be illustrative rather 
than definitive.
Figure 1:7 Contrasting Attributes of HSOs and Business/Industry
Dimension Human Service 
Organisations
Business/Industrial
Organisations
Primary motive Service Profit
Primary beneficiaries Clients Owners
Primary resource base Public taxes Private capital
Goals Relatively ambiguous and 
problematic
Relatively clear and 
explicit
Psychological orientation 
of work force
Professional Instrumental
Transformation processes Staff-client interactions Employee-product
interactions
Connectedness of events 
and units
Loosely coupled Tightly coupled
Means-ends relation Relatively indeterminate Relatively determinant
Outputs Relatively unclear and 
intangible
Relatively visible and 
tangible
Primary environmental 
influences
Political and professional 
communities
The industry and suppliers
Source: Kouzes & Mico (1979)
45
While this distinction works for human services that are publicly owned, it does not 
easily apply to other publicly owned services or organisations.
In an authoritative review of UK government during the period 1914 -1964, the 
authors make a distinction in “social services” between:
“the ‘personal’ side, education, the national Health Service, the national 
schemes of insurance, family allowances, and assistance, etc.: and on the 
‘environmental’ side, housing, town and country planning, public health 
and related matters.” (Chester & Willson, 1968)
Others have made a distinction between the types of professionals involved - between 
what have been called “personal service professionals” (teachers, nurses, doctors, 
dentists, social workers) and “impersonal service professionals” (scientists, engineers, 
architects, surveyors, solicitors, judges, accountants)(Halmos, 1970).
Looking more widely at professionally dominated firms, Parry has combined 
dimensions of ‘physical vs. people assets’ and ‘manufacturing, retailing and services’ 
to produce a definition of professional service commercial organisations - the 
majority of costs are salaries; staff tend to have shared professional skills; clients pay 
time-based fees; staff serve multiple customers; professional skills develop over time, 
etc. (Parry, 1991:4-13).
Carter et al have developed three internal organisational dimensions which can be 
related usefully to public organisation classifications:
• heterogeneity - the range of products or services produced by the organisation
• complexity - the number of different skills that have be brought together to 
provide the product or service
• uncertainty - how clear is the relationship between means and ends; how certain 
is the relationship between inputs of resources and achieving stated objectives
(Carter et al, 1992:32-3)
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Organisations providing relatively simple products, needing a limited range of skills 
with a clear relationship between inputs and outputs can work relatively routinely - 
they are ideal candidates for public bureaucracy, such as social security collection and 
payment (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992:15-6; Metcalfe & Richards, 1990:147). On the 
other hand, organisations with a wide range of products or services, very complex 
mixes of skills and uncertain relationships between inputs and outputs are unlikely to 
be manageable through bureaucratic principles.
For the purposes of this analysis, it is useful to start by dividing the functions provided 
by public organisations into three broad categories: Human Services; Physical, 
Environmental and Transfer Services and public Enterprises. The type of function 
falling into each category is outlined in Table 1.3. (The Enterprises listed are merely 
illustrative examples of formerly public owned organisations.). Some broad functions 
contain more than one type of specific function - e.g. employment services contain 
both a routine function of distributing unemployment benefits and more personalised 
services such as careers advice and counselling. This has been illustrated by showing 
some functions spreading across categories in Figure 1:8.
Figure 1:8 Types of Public Organisations
Public Human Services Public Physical, Public Enterprises
Environmental &
Transfer Services
Education Housing Construction Automobiles
Fire & Civil Defence Planning Coal
Health Services Public Works Manufacturing
Housing Management Road Building & Steel
Law Enforcement Maintenance
Social Services Solid Waste Disposal 
Water and Sewerage
Employment 
Environmental Health 
Social Security 
Taxation
Posts & Telecommunications 
Power 
Public Transport
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Each of these categories has a unique combination of organisational structures, 
management, staffing, revenue sources, products and success measures (Figure 1:9). It 
should be stressed that this is a functional analysis, rather than an institutional one. 
Many organisations contain more than one function (e.g. housing management and 
maintenance) within a single organisational structure and thus the tendencies 
described in Figure 1:9 are just that, tendencies.
It should be stressed that these are broad categories and not meant to be exclusive but 
to identify wide trends. Thus the typology of organisational structure follows 
Mintzberg’s configurational model of organisations (Mintzberg 1983) but it is clear 
that some human services organisations tend more towards the machine bureaucracy 
(e.g. social security) whilst some physical services (e.g. planning) tend more towards a 
professional bureaucracy.
One recent trend has been for certain Physical Services to move to Enterprise status 
and then to privatisation, whilst many Enterprises have already gone into the private 
sector. Former Physical Services, which usually enjoy a natural monopoly, have been 
subject to continuing tight legal and regulatory controls.
Figure 1:9 Types of Public Organisations - Key Differences
Public Human 
Services
Public Physical, 
Environmental & 
Transfer Services
Public
Enterprises
Organisation professional
bureaucracy
machine
bureaucracy
divisionalised form
Management service
professionals or 
general managers
technical
professionals or 
general managers
general
Staffing professional & 
clerical
technical, clerical 
& manual
manual
Revenue Sources grant fees, charges & 
subsidy
sales & subsidy
Principle
Products
human services public goods, 
physical or routine 
‘impersonal’ 
services
commodities and 
physical services
Success Measures service delivery service & profit profit & economic
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For example, the UK telecommunications services moved from being a Physical 
Service (as merely a part of the General Post Office - a central government 
department) to becoming a public Enterprise (British Telecom pic - a wholly owned 
public company) to becoming a private Enterprise (through the sale of a majority 
shareholding to private investors), but still regulated by the Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel). Similarly, London Transport moved from Physical 
Service (as a de facto department of the former Greater London Council) to becoming 
an independent public Enterprise.
It would appear that the ease of application of ‘market forces’ runs in a continuum 
from Enterprises (the easiest) through Physical, Environmental & Transfer Services 
through to Human Services (the hardest). If we return to the model used in Figure 1:5 
to examine application of market forces to public organisations we can see the pattern 
in terms of human, physical (for short) and enterprises (Figure 1:10).
Figure 1:10 Patterns of Public Organisation Reform
Single Public Multiple Public & Private Providers
Provider Voluntary
Providers
Whole Agency Quasi-markets Privatisation
Service
Human & Physical Human Physical and 
Enterprises
Partial Decentralisation Mixed Economy Compulsory
Service
Human and Physical Human
competitive
tendering
Physical
Professions and Public Services
There have been several different discussions about professionalism and public 
management which have overlapped or, sometimes, seemed to have missed one 
another entirely. Each has focused on differing types of ‘professionalism’, usually 
with the definition of ‘professionalism’ employed more as an antithesis to some other 
type of professionalism or unprofessional role or behaviour.
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Pr o fe ssio n a l s  - Ad m in ist r a t iv e . Tec h n ic a l  and  P er so n a l  Se r vices
Professionalism, in a public services context, can be taken to embrace three different 
but overlapping definitions:
• administrative or techno-bureaucratic professionalism, usually defined in contrast 
to amateurism and politico bureaucratic patronage (chief executives, permanent 
secretaries, etc.)
• technical specialist professionalism, usually defined in contrast to administrative 
or techno-bureaucratic generalist professionalism (solicitors, engineers, treasurers, 
surveyors, etc.)
• human or personal services professionalism, usually defined in contrast to 
technical or physical services professionalism (teachers, doctors, social workers, 
nurses, etc.)
Ad m in ist r a t iv e  Pro fessio nals  and  Tec h n ic a l  Specialists
One debate has been about the ‘professionalism’ of the senior civil service and local 
government chief officers, partly stimulated by comparative public administration 
studies. This has focused firstly on professionalism vs. patronage and secondly on 
administrative generalists vs. technical specialists.
In the case of central government the issues have in practice been reduced to a dispute 
between non-technically educated generalist vs. technical educated specialists. 
Attempts to bridge the gap, such as the Fulton Report (1968), by establishing a system 
for producing technically qualified generalists have largely failed (Drewery & 
Butcher, 1991).
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In the case of local government ‘professionalism’ has often been used to justify and 
explain the need to have technically qualified professional experts to advise elected 
officials and administer or manage services on their behalf, and the distinction 
between the two has been the subject of continuing contention (Laffin & Young, 
1990).
It is worth making some comparisons here with public administrative systems in other 
countries, which help to illuminate some of the specific features of the UK system. 
Heady makes a distinction between two major differing strands within developed 
countries - what he calls the ‘classical administrative system’ and the ‘civic culture’ 
(Heady, 1991:Ch. 5&6). The former he sees most strongly represented by Germany 
and France, but also in Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and to a lesser 
extent the Scandinavian countries (i.e. the majority of EC countries). The latter he 
identifies with the UK and USA.
The ‘classical’ system he defines as being closest to the Weberian model of 
bureaucracy - rigorously rule bound, merit structured, relatively autonomous of the 
political system and clearly role defined. He points out that public administration in 
Germany and France has evolved a strong and stable structure despite intense political 
instability and in some ways in contrast to it. This ‘strong’ bureaucracy has an 
intensely professional or technocratic culture, linked to systematic specialist 
education, training and selection of its functionaries.
By contrast the ‘civic culture’ system of the UK and USA is characterised by a stable 
political environment and a more integrated political-bureaucratic system. The 
political systems have been dominated by a culture of consensus and diversity, 
permitting change but moderating and absorbing it. The autonomy and role of the 
bureaucracy have emerged only gradually from a history of a more patronage based, 
and far less professionalised, service. Writing about the USA, Osbome and Gaebler 
have noted that it was not until the rise of the Progressive Movement in the early part 
of this century that federal, state and local bureaucracies became ‘de-politicised’ and
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officials began to be appointed on merit rather than by political patronage. (1992:12- 
16)
In the UK in particular this has led to a specific ‘culture of deference’, quoting Crozier 
who points out that UK administrative organisations “maintain their effectiveness by 
relying on the old patterns of deference that binds inferiors and superiors”. Crucially, 
at no time has the public administrative system of either the UK or US had to assume 
the national burden of government because of the break-down of the political system, 
unlike many European countries. This creates a distinctive sense of the subservient 
role of administration, for as Sampson puts it: “the British civil service - unlike the 
French - has been designed as a passive and obedient instrument” (Sampson, 
1965:249)
The early bias against administrative or managerial professionalism in the UK Civil 
Service is best summed up by a citation from a study by Lowe of the latter during the 
inter-war years:
“Establishments policy stereotyped recruitment by increasing the 
percentage of Oxbridge entrants (at a time when a thorough academic 
training in the social sciences could only be gained else where)...by 
banning the appointment of mature outsiders; promotion was likewise 
biased against those with specialist and managerial 
skills...[and]...administrative experiment and planning was discouraged by 
the contraction of the research department...[and]...by an ostracism of 
administrative experts (such as the founders of the Institute of Public 
Administration)...’’(Lowe, 1984)
Lowe also cites a remark of the head of the then (1920) head of the Treasury 
establishments division, in response to the founding of the IPA, that “for the most part 
Civil Servants have no concern with Administration.” As late as 1965 Anthony 
Sampson was able to report that the Civil Service was still dominated by “gifted 
amateurs” recruited from the Oxbridge Universities (Sampson, 1965:257-8), along 
lines set out by Lord Macaulay in 1854, in one of a series of critical attacks (Garrett, 
1972:30-57) on the Service which culminated in Chapman’s famous remark that “at 
the very heart of British government there is a luxuriant amateurism and a voluntary
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exclusion of talent.” (cited in Garrett, 1972:32). Despite the Fulton Committee 
proposals for reform in 1968, a decade later the preponderance of Oxbridge graduates 
had hardly changed (Sedgemore, 1980:48-153), a position reconfirmed more recently 
still (Drewery & Butcher, 1991:51-5)
A similar debate has occurred in Local Government with Laffin and Young 
concluding that the “growth of local government (..over the century and half since 
reform of the municipal corporations..) is almost synonymous with growth of 
professionalism.” (1990: 4).
It is possible to argue that the less strong definition of the role of public administration 
and its more subservient culture in the UK is one of the sources of the peculiarly 
strong role of various groups of more specialist professionals within it, especially the 
roles of technical specialists and human services professionals. While these groups 
made little headway in the central civil service they became increasingly important in 
the areas of service delivery - especially local government and health.
The debate in central government was very much between the amateur generalist and 
the technical specialist - Fig. 1.5 shows the relative current size of the technical 
specialist group in relation to the generalists. Despite there being more than double the 
number of technical specialists (covered by the groups Professional & Technical and 
Other Specialist) than the generalists (Policy & General) it is the latter that occupy the 
key roles in most Ministries. It is possible to speculate that in some ways the creation 
of Executive Agencies will in fact increase the distance between the specialist groups 
and policy making.
Individuals may seek professional group affiliation and protection as a compensation 
for a strongly recognised role as autonomous professional administrators. Rather than 
being seen as the less prestigious ‘public servants’, they place stronger emphasis on 
being seen as Solicitors, Treasurers, Teachers, Social Workers, Engineers etc. 
Whatever its source ‘professionalism’, in the sense of individual professional 
groupings as opposed to administrative professionalism, has been peculiarly powerful
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in the UK (for a monumental discussion of the peculiar rise of professionalism in the 
UK see Perkins, H (1989) and has had a dramatic influence on the nature of public 
services and their management (the role of Consultants in the NHS is the most 
notorious example).
Figure 1:11 UK Civil Service - staffing by selected professional groups (1991)
General Admin. 
& Secretarial
. 237
Other
Specialists I21
Professional & 
Technical ■  23
Policy & 
General 120
50 100 150 200 250
in thousands
Source: derived from Civil Service Statistics, 1991. HMSO
Figure 1:12 UK Health Service - selected staffing by professional groups (1990)
Admin. & Clerical 
(NHS)
Professional & 
Technical (NHS)
Nursing & Midwifery 
(NHS)
Medical, Dental & 
Opthalmic (FHS)
Medical & Dental 
(NHS)
130
88
402
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
in thousands
Source: derived from Health and Personal Social Services, 1990
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Figure 1:13 UK Local Government - selected staff by professional groups (1990)
Other Staff
Police
Social Workers & 
Care Staff
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
in thousands
Sources: Health Statistics, 1990; Trinder, 1992
Figure 1:11, Figure 1:12 and Figure 1:13 give some idea of numerical strength of 
professional and semi-professional groups central and local government and the health 
service. Figure 1:14 gives an idea of the overall size of the major ‘human services’ 
organisations in the UK. These numerical patterns in themselves demonstrate the 
power of professional groups throughout the UK public services, although it is clear 
that the actual power wielded by certain groups (e.g. doctors) is out of proportion to 
their size. Recent events surrounding the police service reforms have demonstrated the 
power of the police as a professional group (see Talbot, 1993e).
Figure 1:14 UK Public Services - Major Human Services - employment
Police 
Employment 
Social Security 
Social Services 
Education 
Health
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
in thousands (full and part-time)
Sources: DHSS, 1990; Trinder, 1992
55
Human/Personal Services (T) - Domain Theory
The Domain model of ‘human service organisations’ (see Figure 1:16) was originally 
developed by a pair of organisation development specialists working in the USA in 
the 1970’s. (Kouzes and Mico, 1979). More recently it has been revived to reiterate 
the different nature of public service management and explore a specific case in the 
UK national health service. (Harrow and Willcocks, 1990 and 1992, Brazzell 1987 
and Edmonstone 1982).
It “can be operationalised fairly comfortably within British public service 
organisations,” according to Harrow and Willcocks (1990). In local government, 
health services, police and other services the three domains are readily identifiable.
Figure 1:15 Domains of Public Management
Policy Domain Management
Domain
Service Domain
Principles Consent of the Hierarchical 
governed control and co­
ordination
Autonomy, self­
regulation
Success Measures Equity Cost efficiency, 
effectiveness
Quality of service, 
good standards of
practice
Structure Representative,
Participative
Bureaucratic Collegial
Work Modes Voting,
Bargaining,
Negotiating
Use of linear 
techniques and 
tools
Client-specific, 
problem solving
Source: adapted from Kouzes & Mico, 1979
It postulates three domains in public service organisations: the policy domain, 
management domain and service domain. Kouzes and Mico suggested that these three 
domains operate with different principles, success measures, structures and working 
methods (Figure 1:15). This creates a permanent state of potential conflict and
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disharmony among the three domains and a constant “struggle for power and control” 
between them (Figure 1:16).
This ‘map’ of three contending domains is strikingly similar to a more recent 
characterisation of public management:
“Analytically, we have chosen to reverse the formula of much contemporary 
thought and research and to suggest that since public sector managers have to 
oversee the highly evaluative and discretionary activity of those who deliver 
services, they have the task of reconciling the sometimes diametrically opposed 
demands of external ‘controllers’ and internal ‘carers’ and it is this which gives 
public sector management, as it exists today, its special features.” (Ackroyd, 
Hughes & Soothill, 1989:606-7)
Figure 1:16 Domains of Public Service Organisations
Policy Domain
Service Domain
Source: Kouzes and Mico, (1979)
57
These authors go on to write of the “very real dilemmas confronting public sector 
managers” and the “ominous silence” in most contemporary accounts of public 
management on these issues.
Aspects of these different domains have been addressed in a variety of other models, 
some of which will be briefly reviewed below.
M a n a g e r s  a nd  P ro fessio nals
For example, a study of early Social Services Departments started its elaboration with 
a simple, stereo-typical model of such organisations which emphasises the dissonance 
between professional and administrative (i.e. managerial) values (Rowbottom et al 
:20-21 - see Figure 1:17). This intentionally simplistic model parallels the Domain 
Model’s conflict between the Service and Management Domains. The authors base 
this model on the contemporary sociological view, which sees in particular that 
administrators (i.e. managers) may be ex-professionals but that their professional 
competence (and authority) is said to reduce the further in time and managerial level 
the administrator is removed from professional practice. Their simplified description 
of the professionals and administrators, culled from contemporary sources, is
strikingly similar to Kouzes and Mico:
“Essentially it (the Agency) contains two groups: the professional social workers 
and the administrators. By and large the former identify with clients and are 
primarily concerned with their needs. They bring into the situation ‘professional 
values’ which they have imbibed in training and in association with their fellow 
professionals...On the other hand, the administration tend to identify with
‘bureaucratic values’. They see rules and regulations as most important. Their 
desire is to contain costs and their instinct is to repel what they see as extravagant 
demands for service.” (Rowbottom et al 1974:19).
This same distinction between administration and professionals appears in a
discussion of innovation in social administration:
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“Career officials may need specific encouragement to put forward ideas that are 
potentially disruptive or threatening to the self-esteem of superiors on whom they 
depend for promotion. There is a bias towards the status quo, reinforced by the 
understandable concern of many top administrators with internal stability and 
smooth relationships. Professional staff have fewer inhibitions, and may value the 
esteem of their peers outside the organization more than their reputation as 
comfortable colleagues within it.” (Brown, 1975: 38)
Nor has the issue faded in public services - in November 1990 a London Conference
on ‘Managers and Professionals’ focused on the idea that:
“good public services require management of the tension between professionals and 
managers. Managers must not regard professionals as obstacles to efficiency; 
professionals must know that managers are not cavalier with standards of quality 
and equity.” (Office of Public Management, 1991:1)
Figure 1:17 Simple Model of a Social Services Department
The Agency
Administration 
(Bureaucratic Values)
Professionals 
(Professional Values)
The Clientele
Source: Rowbottom et al, 1974
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Rowbottom et al’s study went on to develop a more pluralistic systems model, which 
identifies many more elements of the internal structure and environment of a typical 
Social Services Department (Figure 1:18). This more complex model includes specific 
features most of which can readily be subsumed within the domain model - central 
and local government (policy domain), professional associations, departmental 
representative structures and professional staff (service domain) and middle and 
senior administrators (management domain).
Figure 1:18 Complex Model of a Social Services Department
Overview of Social Services Departments - A Complex of Interacting Social Systems)
Central
Government
Other Pressure 
Groups
Local
Authority
Other
Agencies
Departmental
Representative
Systems
Social Services Department
The Public
Source: Rowbottom et al, 1974
Human/Personal Services (ii) - The Professional Bureaucracy
Mintzberg’s configurational model of organisations has, as one of its five ‘ideal type’ 
variations the professional bureaucracy (see Figure 1:19 - Mintzberg, 1979). In this 
particular type the operating core of the organisation is staffed by professionals who 
largely self-regulate their work.
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However, their work is still standardised, as in other bureaucracies, but in this case the 
standardisation is self-imposed through acceptance of these professional standards and 
norms. The organisation achieves standardisation by appointing suitably qualified 
professionals who have internalised the relevant norms for their particular profession. 
Hence there is a very small techno-structure with very little need or desire for 
planning and work-study by semi-autonomous, self-regulating, professionals. A 
relatively large support service (often itself very ‘machine’ bureaucratic in nature - 
producing inevitable clashes of culture and norms within the professional operating 
core) provides the necessary administrative back-up to the professionals.
In the case of the UK National Health Service for example, approximately 66.8% of 
staff are in the medical, dental, nursing and allied professions whilst of the remainder 
14.3% are administrative and clerical staff (NHS Handbook 1991:158 - and see Figure 
1:12).
Figure 1:19 The Professional Bureaucracy
E xternal C oalition
T e c h n o / 
S tru c tu re  i
Source: Mintzberg (1979, 1983)
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There are some similarities between the ‘professional bureaucracy’ configuration and 
‘domain theory’. The ‘professional operating core’ corresponds closely to the ‘service 
domain’, while the ‘middle-line’, ‘techno-structure’, ‘support services’ and ‘strategic 
apex’ match the ‘management domain’. Mintzberg’s later development of his model 
to include what he calls the “external coalition” (Mintzberg, 1983) which, in the case 
of public services, corresponds largely to the ‘policy domain’ (Figure 1:20). However, 
the senior management parts of the ‘strategic apex’ and support services, together with 
the policy and strategy functions of the ‘techno-structure’ also operate substantially in 
the ‘policy domain’ (hence the excursion of the latter into these areas in Figure 1:20).
What is unique about public services is precisely this policy domain, as Broterick 
notes:
“that political priorities have a significant impact on management...even 
when managers try to operate efficiently, political imperatives sometimes 
force different actions. The reason for this is easy to see. The market test 
of politicians is re-election. Therefore they need to act in such a way that 
people will vote for them. But what proves to be ‘good politics’ for 
getting re-elected is not always good management for the 
public.”( 1992:54)
What is special about human services is the nature of the service domain or 
professional operating core. To use a health service example:
“hospitals are professional bureaucracies, that is organisations where most 
of the influence lies with the professionals who actually deliver services, 
rather than with management” (Champagne et al, 1987).
McKevitt argues that much of Government policy (the policy domain) during the 
1980’s was an attempt to impose regulation on the services professionals (service 
domain):
“Thus, for example, the emergence of the National Curriculum could be 
viewed as an attempt to control the teachers’ influence as much as it was a 
programme for curriculum development” ( McKevitt, 1992:37).
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It is the combination of public service and human service, mediated by the 
management, which is illustrated by domain theory.
While the configurational model illuminates some of the more detailed organisational 
structuring, the domain model stresses the different nature’s of the three domains and 
their interaction. Both help to explain, as will be shown below, the paradoxical nature 
of management in public services organisations.
Figure 1:20 Domains and the Professional Bureaucracy
External Coalition
_____________________
/M id d le  
 Line.
Professional Operating
Source: adapted from Talbot, 1993
POLICY DOMAIN
MANAGEMENT
DOMAIN
Techno-
Both the domain (Kouzes and Mico) and the professional bureaucracy configuration 
(Mintzberg) models may be criticised for being too much closed, as opposed to open, 
systems models (see McKevitt, 1992). While the configurational model as presented 
graphically (see Figure 1:19 and Figure 1:20) does appear to be a closed system, 
Mintzberg’s textual presentation (1979) and his subsequent additions (1983) make it 
clear that this is an open systems model. Similarly, while Kouzes & Mico (1979)
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present a diagramatically closed model, the textual explanation shows clearly this is 
an open systems model.
Both models emphasise the contradictions between various elements within public 
human services organisations. They suggest strongly that these contradictions are 
embedded in the structuring of these organisations and are therefore ‘paradoxical’ in 
the sense discussed in the Introduction to this thesis.
Government Policy and Domain Theory
In many ways, recent UK Government strategy towards public service organisations 
can be seen as an attempt to manipulate these paradoxical contradictions by 
‘resolving’ them in favour of the management domain, at the expense of parts of the 
policy domain and especially the service domain.
Firstly, in the UK a large proportion of public service organisations have traditionally 
had a divided policy domain, with policy inputs at both national and local level. Of the 
three main areas of public employment two, the NHS and Local Government, both 
had national and local policy inputs. There is clear evidence of central government 
attempting to undermine local policy inputs and centralise the policy domain at 
national level. In the NHS, for example, the roles of District Health Authorities as the 
representative bodies of local communities have been systematically removed. 
Similarly, the systematic increase in Government powers to control Local Authorities 
is well established (John, 1990; Crouch & Marquand, 1989).
Secondly, in all three areas Government policy has been to strengthen the 
management domain. This has occurred largely through the policy domain (central 
government and its allies at local level) adopting or endorsing the principles, success 
measures, structures and working methods of the management domain. In a sense the 
centralising tendencies in the policy domain can be seen as the Government gaining 
greater policy control precisely in order to re-reinforce the management domain. This
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can be seen as trying to ‘resolve’ or ‘suppress’ the contradiction between the policy 
and management domains.
Figure 1:21 UK Public Employment (1991/2)
Central Government (excluding NHS)
National Health Service 
Local Government 
Source: adapted from Flynn, 1993
Thirdly, central government has launched a sustained ideological critique of 
“professionalism” in the service domain which the Government has seen as a 
manifestation (alongside trade union power) of the employees of a service running it 
in their own interests rather than that of its recipients or the taxpayers. Examples of 
the practical consequences of this approach would include the introduction of “general 
management” into the NHS, to weaken the power of health professionals, and the 
introduction of the “national curriculum” and teacher assessment into education, to 
weaken the teaching profession /  trade unions. Again, this can be seen as an attempt 
to ‘resolve’ or ‘suppress’ the contradiction between the combined weight of the policy 
and management domains on the one hand and the service domain on the other.
Domain theory also provides a useful way of viewing resistance to Government 
policy. The Local Authorities which attempted to resist increased central control of 
their spending did so primarily by trying to form strong alliances between the policy 
and service domains. As a consequence the objectives of the management domain 
were frequently under attack in these authorities (Lansley; Goss & Wolmar, 1989; 
Laffin, 1989).
Before leaving this analysis for the moment it is also interesting to note that the 
natural monopoly utilities which have been privatised (BT, Water, Gas and 
Electricity) all still have (albeit greatly weakened) a policy domain in the form of
1,130 (thousands) 
970 
2,280
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statutory regulators (the so-called Oftel, Ofwat, and Ofgas) charged with statutory 
powers to control prices and standards of service.
C o n c l u s io n s
This Chapter has sought to argue that the unique features of public services are 
precisely their ‘publicness’ and the nature of their professional, human, personal 
‘services’. It has also sought to explain the nature of the reforms of public services 
and the nature of public ‘markets’.
As will be shown in Chapter 3 these are crucial elements in determining the nature of 
strategic management in the public sector. Competition is not the only factor in 
strategic analysis of the public organisation’s environment, or its scope for action, but 
without a clear understanding of the nature of public competition, and how it differs 
from its private counter-part, it is not possible to clearly analyse this environment. 
Similarly, without a proper framework for understanding the peculiar internal 
environment of public services organisations, especially their ‘publicness’ and the 
‘services professionals’ that predominate in their production of services, issues of 
strategically matching the organisation to its external environment are difficult or 
possibly misleading.
However, before turning to look at some of the issues surrounding strategic 
management in the public sector, it is necessary to look at the nature of strategic 
management itself, in its generic form, which is the subject of the next Chapter.
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Chapter 2 Strategic Management
(I) Som e  Them es from  S trategic M anagement T heory and  Practice  
Introduction
“History proceeds in such a way that the final result always arises from 
conflicts between many individual wills...innumerable intersecting forces 
which give rise to one resultant - the historical event.” (Engels, 1890:395)
This Chapter sets out to identify some historical characters, definitions, themes and 
trends in the literature and practice of strategic management and relate them to public 
services management.
The term strategic management is being employed loosely at this point, to embrace 
business policy, corporate planning, strategic planning, strategic thinking, etc. As will 
become clear, there is little consistency or consensus in the literature on the use of 
terms (Hofer & Schendel, 1978). This is at times confusing, but not as confusing as 
the semantic contortions engaged in by some writers in search of exact definitions. For 
the moment we will be content with broad and ill-defined usage, trying for clarity of 
meaning rather than semantic accuracy.
This Chapter considers the issues of strategy’s specialists (those usually associated 
with the origins of the ‘strategic’ management literature); strategy’s semantics (the 
variations in definition and military origins of the concept); strategy’s substance (the 
practice and reality of strategic management) and strategy’s strands (the themes and 
trends within the strategic management literature). The inter-relationship between 
these four is very great and hence there is certain amount of overlap, but hopefully not 
too much duplication, in what follows.
In the area of strategy’s strands the issues of paradox and values assert themselves 
very clearly and a model of four paradoxical strategic modes, each embedded in a 
differing values system, is explored.
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The models of strategy in differing modes, derived from the generic management 
literature, and the model of strategic systems and elements within public services are 
then combined to produce a synthesis of strategic management in the public services 
from a competing values perspective. This model is used to help develop a model of 
strategic managerial competencies, in Chapter 3, relating to each strategic mode.
Strategy’s Specialists?
Most writers attribute to the industrial historian Alfred Chandler the seminal use of 
the strategy concept in business organisations in his Strategy and Structure: Chapters 
in the History of American Industrial Enterprise (1962).
However, the view of Chandler as the main progenitor of modem organisational 
strategy is not unchallenged. Montgomery and Porter (1991) suggest that the 
“pioneering work on which many modem strategy ideas now rest” was conducted “at 
Harvard Business School in the early 1960s, led by Kenneth R. Andrews and C. 
Roland Christensen.” While they later acknowledge that others “such as Igor Ansoff, 
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and Peter F. Drucker” participated in propelling “the notion of 
strategy into the forefront of management practice”, pride of place is clearly given to 
Harvard and Andrews.
It should be noted that this analysis suggests clearly that theory preceded practice, 
which others (see below) have disputed.
Still others have suggested that it was Ansoff who “effectively founded [the field of 
strategic planning] in 1963, the year he left Lockheed to teach strategy at Carnegie 
Institute of Technology” (Kennedy 1991:6).
Other writers have been less definitive about elevating one of the trio of ‘usual 
suspects’ - Chandler, Andrews and Ansoff - to sole pre-eminence. Clutterbuck and
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Crainer trace a more complex history, but assign Chandler and Ansoff the key roles 
(1990:141-158) while giving only the briefest of mentions to the Harvard team, 
interestingly without naming Andrews at all (:143). Moore (1992), in a major 
contribution to the ‘personal’ history of strategic management, ranks Chandler and 
Andrews (including his Harvard Business School colleagues) alongside Ansoff as the 
three ‘founding fathers’ (: 1-3). He suggests that “no single person can be said to have 
invented corporate strategy” but that “it ‘emerged’ during the 1960s, as the 
consequence of a series of apparently disconnected events, and the articulation - 
principally - of three people...Kenneth R. Andrews, Alfred D. Chandler and H Igor 
Ansoff.” He suggests they were “the first formally to delimit the area of strategy in 
terms of concepts, definitions, and methodologies.”(:l)
This is probably the closest to a balanced view of the origins of the explicit use of the 
terminology of strategy but as others have pointed out, just because the term strategy 
was not in use it does not mean that early management theorists were not addressing 
similar, if not identical, issues.
As Schendel and Hoffer (1978) have pointed out, others did address similar problems 
but in different terminology at an earlier stage. They mention Drucker (1954) who 
posed the questions ‘what is our business’ and ‘what should be’ a decade earlier than 
Andrews and Ansoff, but without explicitly discussing ‘strategy’.
An even more instructive example is the following quote from Henri Fayol, originally 
published in 1925:
“The Plan is the synthesis of the various forecasts: annual, long term, 
short term, special, etc. It is a sort of picture of the future, where 
immediate events are shown clearly, and prospects for the future with less 
certainty. It gives the known facts, and those forecast for a certain time....
...The Plan must receive the support of all those with authority and 
responsibility.
The act of forecasting is of great benefit to all who take part in the 
process, and is the best means of ensuring adaptability to changing 
circumstances.
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The collaboration of all concerned leads to a united front, an 
understanding of the reasons for decisions, and a broadened outlook.”
(in Fayol, 1949: x-xi)
He uses the terms ‘Survey’ (which we would now call strategic analysis) and ‘Plan’ 
(strategic planning) in this remarkable interview, a full 40 years before Andrews and 
Ansoff. Indeed, the quotation given embraces a remarkable range of the key issues of 
debate in contemporary strategic management, when translated into modem 
terminology:
Fayol Modern equivalent?
“a sort of picture of the future” strategic vision and mission statements
“the support of all those with authority 
and responsibility” and creating “a united 
front”
leadership and change management
“the act of forecasting is of great benefit to management development and
ail those who take part in the process” participative planning
“a broadened outlook” strategic thinking
“ensuring adaptability to changing 
circumstances”
flexible and learning organisations
It is difficult to see how Fayol’s position cannot be seen as part of the strategic 
management tradition, in content if not in the explicit use of ‘strategy’ based 
terminology. Indeed it could be seen as an extremely prescient part of it. As George 
notes, Fayol’s “broad comprehension of the planning function was unique at the 
time.” (1972, pi 15)
This contrasts with the position of Hofer and Schendel, who argue that “a hierarchy of 
strategy concepts has emerged over the past quarter century (i.e. 1953-78) as a 
response to business needs..” (1978, pl5, emphasis added). Prior to this, they argue 
(following Chandler), only individual business policies existed and that “top
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management integrated their organisations different functional area policies implicitly 
in their own minds without the need of special concepts or processes to do so.” (p i3)
In contrast, Fayol provides a case study of detailed planning activities in a “great 
mining and metallurgical concern with which I am well acquainted” (1949: 45-48) and 
later claims that “fifty years ago; i.e. in 1866! I began to use this system of forecasts, 
when I was engaged in managing a colliery, and it rendered me such good service that 
I had no hesitation in subsequently applying it to various industries...” (:48).
It is clear that this is very much ‘strategic’ management, as opposed to simply 
operations planning, as the following passage illustrates:
“When serious happenings occur, regrettable change of course may be 
decided upon under the influence of profound but transitory 
disturbance...The plan protects the business not only against undesirable 
changes of course, (But also)., it protects against deviations, imperceptible 
at first, which end by deflecting it from its objective.” (:49).
It is clear that at least some enterprises were engaging in the sort of planning activities 
usually associated with the post-World War II period as early as the turn of the 
century. However, Fayol points out that while “everyone recognises the necessity for a 
Plan...even private undertakings often neglect to prepare one, and the State rarely does 
so.” (: xi) He explains this failure as being due to the fact that “its preparation 
demands considerable effort from the senior members of staff, lead by a stable Chief.”
While it may be true that later strategic theory developments have been driven by 
practice (although even this is doubtful) the work of Fayol clearly demonstrates that at 
least some theory preceded any extensive practice of strategic planning.
While Montgomery and Porter claim that theory preceded practice, and Hofer and 
Schendel the exact opposite, the reality (as will be demonstrated below) is far more 
complicated.
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Even this brief review indicates that it seems safer to return to Moore’s judgement that 
“no one person can be said to have invented corporate strategy” and await a more 
definite history, whilst treating existing accounts with some caution.
Semantics of Strategy
M a r t ia l  O rigins
The martial origins of the term strategy in the ancient Greek name for a the art of the 
general, strategos, are well known. (Baucom 1987:3) Prior to the development of the 
use of the term in management in the 1960s the term had most use in military practice, 
although it had also crept into other fields such as game theory. As the term has 
become widely used in management, it has joined a wide assortment of military 
metaphors used in non-military organisational settings. The use of military analogies 
and metaphors is not unproblematic however and has been criticised for distorting and 
confining management thinking (Weick 1979, Webb 1989). As Webb puts it:
“when there is much of value to learn from a source, the unstated 
implication creeps in that everything from it is correct...though there are 
valuable similarities there are also many, many differences between 
business and military organisations.” (Webb 1989:10).
W e st e r n  M il ita r y  T ra d itio n
However the usage of the concept of ‘strategy’ in military theory and practice has 
been extremely mutable. Baucom has shown that from ancient Greece to the modem 
era, the term ‘strategy’ has undergone a variety of incarnations in military usage 
(1987). He identifies several phases determined by a variety of economical, political, 
social and technological factors. The following table uses Baucom’s categorisation but 
also draws on other sources (Evered, 1983; Fuller, 1925; Clausewitz, 1974 and 
Liddell-Hart, 1967). It should be emphasised that this review of Western (in its 
broadest sense) military thinking - the Eastern traditions have evolved along very 
different (but sometimes linked) paths, as will be discussed later.
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ancient Greece The art of the general - embracing everything from military strategy 
(circa 500 BC) and tactics to operational support and dispensation of justice.
Recent historians have also emphasised the leadership role (Hanson, 
1989)
limited war Following Thirty Years war a period of limited war - strategy as
period (1648- plan of battle, usually one of attrition not annihilation, involving
1789) limited forces (Marshall Saxe thought the optimum size to be
50,000).
mass war Where the limited war period had small armies the French
period (1789- Revolution began a period of mass warfare - the Revolutionary
1914) government fielded over 800,000 troops against the armies of the
European Monarchs. This period culminated in the American Civil 
war which saw the industrialisation of warfare. Although concepts 
of management and organisation become vital, strategy remains in 
the limited ‘plan of battle’ variant but with the usual objective
becoming one of annihilation. Clausewitz (1974) develops
distinctions between ‘policy’ (national objectives), ‘strategy’ (plan
of warfare) and ‘tactics’ (plan of battle) but is largely ignored by 
contemporary practitioners.
total war (1914 The logical next stage of mass war, as attacks on the industrial 
-1945) capacity (including civilians) of opponents became a major aspect
of warfare - technological advances, especially airpower and long- 
range weapons, made this possible. ‘Strategic bombing’ in WWD 
formed part of what Liddell-Hart (1967) and Fuller (1925) had 
advocated as ‘grand strategy’ between the wars - a total plan to 
undermine the enemy in the field and beyond. Strategy thus became 
much wider than merely a ‘plan of battle’.
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nuclear war the advent of atomic and nuclear weapons redefined strategy into 
(1945 - ?) several usages: strategic warfare - nuclear exchanges; national
strategy - combinations of military, economic, political and cultural 
weapons to undermine an enemy without resorting to strategic 
exchanges; military strategy - more traditional ‘plans of battle’ or 
plans for limited wars (e.g. US strategy in Korea and Vietnam)
This by no means exhausts the mutations of the concept of strategy in Western 
military thinking and practice. An important point to make is the disjuncture between 
strategic military theory innovations and strategic military practice. Clausewitz’s ideas 
were largely ignored at the time, despite their subsequent popularity in both military 
and management.
Ea st e r n  M il ita r y  Tr a d itio n
Two broad trends can be identified in Eastern thinking on military strategy which in 
turn relate to different philosophical traditions (Taoism and Zen). They are broadly 
associated with the two most famous military thinkers - Sun Tzu (between 5th & 3rd 
C BC) and Miyamoto Musashi (1584-1645). They are reviewed briefly here for two 
reasons. Firstly, they show that the western military tradition is not the only one and as 
such provide a necessary cross-cultural dimension to thinking about strategy that may, 
among other things, help to illuminate western concepts by comparison and contrast. 
Secondly, these traditions have a definite impact on strategic management practice in 
two ways - firstly in their countries of origin and secondly in the West. There must be 
few business sections in western bookshops that do not now display copies of Sun 
Tzu’s 'The Art of War’ or Musashi’s 'Book of Five Rings'. Writers on strategy in 
Japan have noted their influence while recently an effort has been made to apply Sun 
Tzu to modem Chinese business enterprises, complete with obligatory genuflections 
to Marxism-Mao Tse Tung Thought (Shijun et al 1990). In Japan, Musashi is not just 
an influence on business organisations but a national cultural phenonmenon (his semi- 
fictional biography by Yoshinkawa has sold 120 million copies since it was published 
in 1935) and he is known as ‘Kensei’ - roughly translating as ‘Sword Saint’.
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Musahsi’s approach to strategy is limited exclusively to the sphere of actual combat 
and is extremely intuitive in that it extrapolates from individual combat to group 
combat: “The principle of strategy is having one thing, to know ten thousand things.” 
(Musashi, 1985:32) Moreover, as Cleary has noted, Musashi’s approach is based on 
an extremely confrontational approach (mirrored in his personal confrontations in 
which he is reputed to have slain numerous opponents simply to prove the superiority 
of his system). According to Cleary (1991) Musashi’s seemingly amoral approach can 
be seen as an extreme form of an attempt to attain Zen’s ‘satori’ (enlightenment) 
through ruthless and single-minded dedication to a ‘Way’. (Cleary contrasts 
Musashi’s approach with that of another Japanese warrior-strategist, Yagyu 
Munemori, whose approach was much more ethically orientated and influenced by 
both Zen and Taosim). The influence on Japanese military conduct of Musashi’s 
thought has been dramatic - even when fighting for limited objectives in WWD 
Japanese forces displayed a total commitment:
“Perhaps the abiding paradox of the Second World Was is that of all the 
major combatants, Japan alone did not aspire to final victory but 
nevertheless fought with a totality and finality unequalled by countries 
intent on securing the unconditional surrender of their enemies.” 
(Willmott, 1983)
Sun Tzu’s approach falls into a Chinese tradition which is influenced by Taoism’s 
ethical basis and understanding of how events unfold through and with inevitable 
paradoxical elements. His is much more the view of the General and leader rather than 
the individual fighter and teacher. For him strategy embraces policy, strategic and 
tactical concepts and results in a series of broad rules and advice about positional 
elements in warfare (indeed Mintzberg includes Sun Tzu in his ‘Positioning School’ 
of strategic management - along with Clausewitz and Liddell-Hart (Mintzberg, 
1990:124)). His writings form part a broad stream of military writings from this 
period on specific strategies, such as the ‘Secret Art of War: The 36 Strategies’ 
(Haichen, 1991). His advice on commitment is always only to use just sufficient force 
to achieve clearly understood objectives and to recognise the excessive force is self- 
defeating. Similarly, the 36th Strategy (Haichen, 1991:328-9) is ‘Running Away as the
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Best Choice’, which emphasises that retreat does not equal defeat and is ‘as well as 
advance, a normal practice of war.’ In many ways his approach is embodied in 
individual martial arts such as Tai-Chi (China) and Judo and Aikido (Japan) with their 
emphasis on avoiding unnecessary combat and turning an enemy’s strengths against 
themselves through avoidance, manoeuvre and decisive application of force at critical 
points.
Before turning to look at how strategy has evolved in management thinking, it is 
worth noting that western and eastern military traditions have not evolved in total 
ignorance of one another. For example, Liddell-Hart records that reading Sun Tzu in 
1927 helped him clarify his own thinking while in turn his own and Fuller’s books 
were the amongst the principle textbooks used in Chiang Kai-shek’s military 
academies in 1942 (Sun Tzu, foreword, 1963). The communist movement also 
provided a transmission belt between west and east, with eastern communist leaders 
such as Ho Chi Minh (who trained in the USSR) and Mao Tse Tung influenced by 
western military theorists including Clausewitz and Trotsky (Neuberg, 1970; 
Semmell, 1981; Keegan and Wheatcroft, 1987 and Pomeroy, 1969).
This review of the military usages of the concept of strategy does emphasise that in 
military usage ‘strategy’ has not been a static concept - either in its practice or more 
importantly in its defined role in relation to other concepts such as policy, tactics, 
operations, etc. in either western or eastern military traditions. In one respect it has 
tended to be translated from the military to the non-military organisation consistently - 
seeing strategy as essentially about combat, competition and defeat of opponents. 
Arguably this is a misuse, ignoring the more political aspects of concepts like ‘grand 
strategy’ or ‘national strategy’ developed by military thinkers, which clearly embrace 
elements of diplomacy and alliance as well as conflict (see Kennedy (1983) for a 
useful discussion of the intertwining of military and diplomatic strategy in British 
history). Nevertheless it is the conflictual model that has remained dominant in the 
management literature on strategy. As will be discussed this has possibly contributed 
to an underestimating of the role of co-operation and alliances even in competitive 
business environments.
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In fl u e n c e s  o f  t h e  M il it a r y  M eta ph o r  o n  Stra t e g ic  M a n a g e m en t  Th in k in g
‘The concept of strategy in business is analogous to that in war.’ (Smith,
1985)
How far has the military, conflictual, view of strategy informed business and 
management writing and thinking? In this section we explore how this martial 
metaphor for strategy has impacted on strategic management theory and practice 
through two approaches - how has the military notions of strategy been translated into 
management writing? - and how far has the military notion excluded other possible 
approaches? The latter is specifically examined by a brief look at how diplomatic 
strategy (i.e. the formation of political co-operation and alliances) could have 
provided a useful additional framework but has been excluded by the concentration on 
the military metaphor.
The explicit use of military models of strategy is fairly widespread, examples include: 
“business war games - using military strategies to beat the opposition (James, 1984); 
“marketing warfare” (complete with illustrations of tanks, etc.) (Ries & Trout, 1986); 
etc. A leading strategic management writer, Argenti, specifically uses Clauzwitz’s 
distinction between policy-strategy-tactics in the politico-military domain to apply to 
business strategy (Argenti 1982).
Kay (1993:336) specifically associates the use of military analogies with the 
“rationalist framework” in strategic management theory - especially the “appraise, 
determine, act” sequencing of strategic processes. This is indeed very close to the 
“analysis-choice-implementation” used so heavily in strategic management textbooks 
(e.g. Johnson & Scholes, 1993). Whittington (1993:15) echoes this view in associating 
use of the military metaphor with the classical, rational planning school of strategic 
management writers. Some writers have been strongly influenced by other military 
traditions that the rationalist ‘Clausewitzian’ school. Ohmae’s views, for example, 
have been influenced by the eastern military tradition of strategic thinking, which,
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unlike its western counterpart, places more emphasis on the role of intuition and also 
on strategic alliances and co-operation, as well as the combative dimension (Ohmae 
1983).
One of the major writers of the rationalist school, Ansoff has recognised the military 
origins of the concept of strategy but with a particular approach. Implicit, and 
sometimes explicit, in Ansoff s work is the notion that competition (conflict) is the 
only possible relationship between corporations ‘Competition is not slackening but 
intensifying’ he writes (Ansoff 1979) and in none of his major works is there any 
discussion of strategic co-operation and alliances(Ansoff 1965, 1979, 1987 and 1990).
A recent review of trends in strategic management research has shown that strategic 
management ‘experts’ rated the issue of strategic alliances and co-operation as the 3rd 
most important issue (of 12) for practising managers, it was rated only 7th (of 15) for 
strategic management research and does not feature at all in the list of ‘most important 
issues...in the 1990’s’ (Lyles 1989). This finding (which is not highlighted by the 
researcher) is fascinating. While experts in the field see the issue of alliances and co­
operation as important to practising managers ‘out there’, they underplay its 
importance to strategic management in general and to research in particular. While 
this trend has certainly shifted since the research was carried out and there has been a 
sudden surge in publications (e.g. Badarracco, 1991; Lorange & Roos, 1992; Alter & 
Hague, 1993; etc.) this has yet to be reflected in strategic management textbooks, the 
majority of which make no mention of alliances.
(Of four major UK textbooks, 1 does not discuss alliances or joint ventures at all, 1 
discusses joint ventures briefly, 1 discusses joint ventures slightly more fully and only 
the remaining 1 has substantial discussion of both alliances and joint ventures 
(Greenley, 1989; Bowman & Asch, 1987; Johnson & Scholes, 1993; Thompson, 
1993)).
It is not improbable to suggest that the reason for reluctance of ‘experts’ to rate 
alliances as an important area for exploration, in research or teaching, is the
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ubiquitous influence of the combatitive martial view of strategy. A pattern of thought 
exists which can see the emerging tendency to co-operation and alliances but finds it 
difficult to integrate such a trend into its own activities and theories, which have been 
so strongly conditioned by the military metaphor.
On the basis of this changing trend to alliances (as opposed to Ansoff s ever 
increasing competition), Boderracco suggests that the military analogy is becoming 
outdated. ‘In the world of strategic alliances, the idea of a firm as a medieval fortress 
that invents, owns, controls and finances all of its assets has faded’ Boderracco states 
(1991:3). This echoes Weick in arguing, 12 years earlier, that the military metaphor 
has served its purpose and is becoming redundant (1979). While the empirical 
evidence of increasing strategic alliances is fairly secure, there is no evidence to show 
that the use of military metaphors in strategic management writing is decreasing and 
the evidence of Lyles would tend to show that researchers and writers are still working 
within this paradigm.
In many senses this conflictual obsession is ironic given that the most influential 
military writer on strategy, Clauswitz, is most famous for his dictum that ‘war is 
nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means’ which implies that it is 
policy which is important, not war itself. Policy can be either conflictual or co­
operative, war is only the continuation of policies with the potential for conflict by 
other means. Co-operative policy is by definition likely to minimise conflict. As 
Porter’s popular ‘five forces’ model recognises, the level of real competition within an 
industry, what he calls ‘jockeying for position’, can vary enormously (Porter 1982).
M u t a b il it y  o f  St r a t e g y  in  an  M an a g e m en t  Co ntex t
According to one author there are currently around 27 books in print with the title 
“Strategic Management” (Whittington 1993:1). Two major reviews of the use of the 
concept of ‘strategy’ - one including military, futures and managerial uses (Evered, 
1983) and one looking just at management (Hofer & Schendel, 1978) - confirm that 
management usage, like its military counter-part, has been mutable, inconsistent and
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sometimes paradoxical. In reviewing strategy approaches in management, Hofer and 
Schendel identify wide disparities of semantic and definitional content for strategic 
management concepts and terms used by the 13 authors covered in the review.
Before turning to look at the trends discernible within the field, it is worth asking how 
far strategic management, in the more narrow sense usually associated with strategic 
planning, has penetrated real organisations?
Substance of Strategy
Ge n e r a l  Trends
Most writers agree on a broad pattern of evolution of strategic planning practice along 
the lines of that suggested by SRI (see Figure 2:1). This model indicates the level of 
strategic management practice, rather than the level of theory output. One significant 
writer suggests that: “Corporate planning was first started in the United States in the 
late 1950s and it is now [i.e. 1968] being used, in one form or another, in several 
hundred companies there. In Britain only a few dozen are yet using it..” (Argenti, 
1968: 13).
However, Ringbakk (of SRI) concluded from a survey of 40 US corporations in 1967 
that:
“organised corporate long-range planning is neither as well accepted nor 
as well practised as suggested by the literature on the subject” and that 
“although much planning is done, the effort is often sporadic, it is lacking 
in co-ordination, and is less formalised and sophisticated than much of the 
literature suggests.” (1983: 25)
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Figure 2:1 Trends in strategic planning
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A similar study in the UK reported that “few companies have implemented corporate 
planning” (Hewkin & Kempner, 1968). A further study in the UK in 1969, covering 
27 companies, found that “less than half the sample companies were found to have 
complete corporate plans” and of these some were little more than “extended 
budgeting”. The authors note that, since their sample was designed to “select those 
companies who were thought to have made substantial progress...one may conclude 
that industry in general is doing much less.” (Taylor & Irving 1983: 126).
It does seem reasonable to assume therefore that SRI’s starting point is relatively 
accurate. How far does the rest of their model correspond to practice? A further UK 
survey in 1977 of 71 enterprises found that “80 per cent were found to practise 
corporate planning and a further 6 per cent were found to be developing a corporate 
planning system.” (Higgins & Finn 1977: 89). Given that this survey was based on a 
random sample taken from ‘The Times 1,000 Companies’ it clearly suggests a 
massive increase in corporate planning activity over the decade. This broadly confirms 
the SRI model.
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Wilson suggests that “by the mid-1970s, no self-respecting chief executive officer 
(CEO) would dare appear before a board without a strategic planning system either in 
place or under development.” (1988: 2).
The apparent failures of strategic planning in the turbulence of the 1970’s recession 
have led to the some of strongest attacks on the rational model coming from the 
management literature, with the most popular management text of the 1980’s (Peters 
& Waterman, 1982:54) proclaiming “we have to stop overdoing things on the rational 
side.” However, the period that SRI characterises as “the inevitable backlash” does not 
seem to have diminished organisations appetite for planning.
A more recent report suggests that of 183 UK organisations surveyed, 65% claimed to 
have a formal strategic business plan, whilst another 19% claimed to have an informal 
strategic plan. (BDO, 1992:6-9). The same survey showed a wide diversity of 
approaches to strategic planning on a number of variables (levels of integration, 
participation, scope of plans, etc.) summarised by the researchers as “no right way to 
plan” (:7). Interestingly, when asked if the organisation followed a specific 
management author’s philosophy or methodology, of the 6 authorities cited the 
highest rating was 16% and the lowest 3% (9% average), indicating a lack of 
knowledge and/or use of the literature. On the other hand, some specific techniques 
received widespread support: mission statements (69%); SWOT analysis (57%); risk 
analysis (38%) and five forces analysis (37%) (although Porter himself achieved only 
16% recognition)(BDO, 1992:19).
Ansoff gives a chronological account of the development of corporate level 
management practice, focusing on the type rather than the level of activity (see Figure 
2:2).
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Figure 2:2 Changing corporate management
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Hussey (building on the work of Gluck et al), develops a chronological model o: 
successive dominant themes in strategic planning (Figure 2:3).
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Figure 2:3 Phases in the evolution of strategic planning
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Source: Hussey, 1990.
As can be seen, the implicit assumption in all these accounts is that ‘strategic 
management’ is strategic management of business enterprises. The concepts employed 
in model building (Ansoff & McDonnell, 1990) or the research conducted (Ringbakk, 
1983; Taylor & Irving, 1983; Higgins & Finn, 1977; BDO, 1992) have all been private 
sector based.
Strands of Strategy
This section reflects on some of the themes that have emerged from the literature on 
strategic management and planning. It should stressed that this is a review primarily of 
what the writers on strategy have said about strategic practice, rather than a review of 
research on practice itself . Obviously research on practice has informed many (but by 
no means all) developments in the theory (or rather theories) of strategic management 
developed by writers in the field.
Sometimes the link between theory and practice is more solid. Many popular ‘how to’ 
strategic management books aimed at managers often draw very heavily on practice, 
sometimes in a case study form but more often merely as collections of anecdotes.
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The classic strategic management textbook approach also relies heavily on cases,
although usually as either illustrations of theory or learning tools. The theory
advanced in these books is mainly prescriptive, as with the more popular books, but in
this case more systematic and academic in tone, in keeping with their target audience
of MBA or other management students. The field of strategic management research
has its own confusions and differing themes. The state of the research field has been
characterised by two commentators as:
“hitching a ride on a fast train to nowhere ..(because)... the desire to be 
scientific in strategic management has meant that most often only 
quantitative variables are measured ... (while)... lack of robust theory 
development leads to studies that fail to probe into deeper aspects of the 
phenomenon and thus fail to provide insight into how organizations 
work.” (Daft and Buenger 1990:96).
We begin by reviewing how some of the strategic management experts have 
themselves sought to structure the emergence of trends and themes in the literature. 
The writers have been selected because of their prominence in the field (Ansoff, 1991 
and Mintzberg, 1991), because their classification system represents a sustained 
attempt to produce a typology (Mintzberg, 1991 and Whittington, 1993) or because of 
the influence of their specific text in the UK (Johnson and Scholes, 1993 - although 
their approach is based on research reported in Bailey & Johnson, 1992) and finally to 
provide an international and culturally differentiated perspective (Kono, 1992).
Each writer has suggested differing classifications for the strategic management 
literature: Ansoff (1991:3) suggests that there are three major trends, Whittington 
(1993:Ch.2) and Kono (1992:50) four, Johnson and Scholes (1993:39-70) six and 
Mintzberg (1991: whole chapter) ten. These classifications have been set out in Table 
x. (It should be noted that Ansoff s is extremely limited, almost an aside, the whole 
section is only 5 paragraphs of 66 pages outlining his approach, but is included here 
because of his influential role in the strategic management field.)
It is instructive to compare these approaches and search for matching themes (see 
Figure 2:4). It quickly becomes apparent that the four sets of classifications contain 
some related themes. Of these one will be disregarded for subsequent analysis. The
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grouping of ‘evolutionary’, ‘natural selection’ and ‘environmental’ themes is clearly a 
strong one, appearing in three out of four author’s lists. However, as it is essentially a 
passive theme - organisations being seen largely as victims of circumstance, accident 
and chance and having very little opportunity to influence their future it is not useful 
as a guide to action for managers - except perhaps to either achieve maximum 
efficiency within existing organisations or perhaps to play the stock market.
The final category in Mintzberg’s list - the configurational school - is an all 
embracing, contingency based, approach to the other categories. Mintzberg quotes 
Darwin talking about ‘splitters’ and ‘lumpers’ in social sciences (1990:180), or what 
we would probably now call ‘reductionism’ and ‘holism’ (for a useful, if sometimes 
one sided, discussion of reductionsim Vs holism see Phillips 1976) . The 
configurational approach, of which Mintzberg declares himself an adherent, is firmly 
holistic. We will return to this approach after examining the more reductionist 
‘splitters’, including Mintzberg’s own
The four remaining common themes identifiable from all four authors’ categories are 
fairly clear - we have called them the Learning Mode, the Political Mode, Planning 
Mode and the Visionary Mode. We will look at each of these modes and what the 
authors (and others) have to say about them below, but first we introduce a model 
which helps to explain the relationship between the four modes. It should be noted 
that some of the categorisations of the author’s cited do not always fit entirely neatly 
into the broader categories proposed here and their are areas of overlap. What is being 
attempted is to produce a balance between utility of the model being developed and its 
detailed accuracy. Some sacrifice of accuracy is necessary to obtain relative simplicity 
and generalisability (Thomgate, 1976). The degree of congruency of the five 
typologies is fairly high and the trends suggested very strong and, as will be shown 
below, can be placed in a theoretical framework which sustains the four ideal types 
suggested.
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Figure 2:4 Themes in strategic management writing
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(II) A S tr a t eg ic  Pr o c ess  and  C o n t en t  M o d e l : S tra teg y  in  F o u r  M o d es
The four modes of strategy making identified above relate to two central debates in 
the strategic management literature, which centre on two questions:
• are strategic decisions the outcome of logical, rational, decision processes or of 
non-rational, intuitive, political or accidental processes?
• are strategic decisions mainly about major, radical, reorientations of organisational 
goals and aims or the practical result of decisions about small scale, incremental, 
cumulative adjustments to changing circumstances?
These two questions obviously overlap, as will be shown below.
The classic debate between ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1959) and ‘rational 
satisficing’ (Simon, 1960) in government policy decisions is both about the content of 
policy (or strategic) decisions and the process. If policy or strategy changes are likely 
to be radical in nature then large scale effort at rational analysis, options generation 
and planning would seem, assuming they work, to be worthwhile. If change is to be 
mainly incremental in practice, regardless of whether more radical change is necessary 
or not - because of the very nature of organisational decision making and 
implementation, then ‘muddling through’ seems not only perfectly adequate but 
inevitable. In this debate there clearly is a relationship between the content and 
process of strategic decisions.
However in the strategic management literature there have been two debates or themes 
focusing somewhat separately on strategy decision processes and on strategy content.
The debate on decision processes has been about non-rational decision processes such 
as intuition (Mintzberg, 1979:Ch’s 4 & 5); politics (Pettigrew 1973) and emergent 
strategies (Mintzberg 1987b) Vs rational decision processes such as planning (Ansoff
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& McDonnell, 1990; Leach, 1982); heuristic learning (Quinn, 1980) and ‘soft’ 
rational decision methods (Rosenhead, 1989; Eden & Radford, 1990). (For a 
somewhat heated exchange on some of the issues see Mintzberg, 1990b; Ansoff, 1991 
and Mintzberg 1991b and see Leach, 1982 for a further defence of the rationalist 
position. The issue of intuitional decision making, which has often generated more 
heat than illumination, is dealt with in a separate section below.)
The issue of strategic content has been addressed through the development of 
numerous typologies of strategy content, e.g. Miles & Snow, Gould & Campbell, 
Millar, etc. While there are many variants and variables in the various typologies 
which have been developed the simplest and most generalisable issue about strategy 
content is that posed above: does the strategy mean radical change in the orgnisation’s 
goals, aims or methods or not? Is change to be radical or incremental?
It is possible to develop a matrix based on typologies of strategy making processes on 
one dimension (rational Vs non-rational) and the content of strategic decisions (radical 
vs incremental) on the other (Fig.l). It can be seen that the four strategy modes 
identified above (learning, political, planning and visionary modes) can be mapped 
onto the matrix and that additionally specific other trends and themes can be brought 
into the same framework (e.g. organisational learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978)).
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Figure 2:5 Strategic Content & Process Model
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Strategy in Fluctuating & Paradoxical Modes ?
Before turning to examine each of the strategy modes in detail, it is important to stress 
that these are broad conceptual themes and few writers or organisations will fit 
exclusively into one or other category. In reality, most organisations will have 
mixtures of all four modes operable at the same time, as paradoxical as that may seem. 
Mintzberg’s “configurational school” has a broadly similar approach. Having 
reviewed his other 9 schools he opens his section on the configurational school thus:
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“All of the above: that is the message of the confirgurational school but 
with a particular angle. Each at its own time, in its own place, as an 
integrated phenomenon.” (Mintzberg, 1990:179-180)
However, the approach posited here goes further stressing the paradoxical nature of 
these modes, their incompatible but parallel existence within organisations together 
with fluctuating patterns of ascent and descent, whereas Mintzberg’s approach 
suggested a more discrete approach, with each of his 9 types appearing in its “own 
time” and “own place” with the integrated phenomenon appearing through time 
sequencing and spatial separation rather than parallel development.
One or other mode may well be dominant in specific situations, the criteria for which 
will be a mixture of internal and external influences. For example, entrepreneurial and 
visionary leadership (visionary mode) has been widely attributed to situations of 
organisational start-up or of crisis driven turn-around (Mintzberg, 1990:140)
More importantly, few organisations practice a ‘pure’ version of any of these models 
over time. The combined research of Mintzberg et al and Quinn suggests that some 
organisations alternate between the ‘learning mode’ and ‘visionary mode’ phases. 
Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that ‘visionary’ leaders seek to utilise 
‘planning mode’ strategic planning processes to underpin or reinforce their intuitive, 
inspirational, initiatives. Once a radical shift in direction has been achieved, the 
organisation gradually allows the strategic planning system to fall into disuse and slips 
back to incremental adaptation. It is therefore tempting to suggest an organisational 
cycle or, more cautiously, that fluctuations occur frequently and there are some 
patterns to these fluctuations.
Stacey (1990) suggests a balance between opportunistic, intuitional and heuristic 
principles for long range decisions and rational business planning for more short term- 
goals. Indeed Mintzberg’s research programme on strategy making suggests an 
episodic alternation between ‘logical incrementalism’ and ‘strategic thinking’ or 
entrepreneurial ‘great leaps forward’.
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Figure 2:6 suggests that not only do fluctuations occur but that each mode, when 
dominant still contains elements of the other three modes. A ‘pure’ example is not 
likely to be found in reality - these are very much idealised abstractions, ‘ideal types’, 
conceptual maps not real territories.
Figure 2:6 Relationships between strategic modes
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While the content of strategic decisions has been broadly classified as either radical 
(planning and visionary modes) or incremental (political or learning modes) there are 
some finer distinctions. Using Mintzberg’s five “Ps” of strategy (as plan, position, 
perspective, pattern and ploy - 1993:12-19) each mode, it can be suggested, would 
have characteristic strategic outputs.
The planning mode naturally produces strategy as plans (“some sort of consciously 
intended course of action, guideline (or set of guidelines)”) or as positions (“a means 
of locating an organisation in what organization theorists call an ‘environment’ “).
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The visionary mode produces strategy as perspectives (“not just a chosen position but 
an ingrained way of perceiving the world”) both in the mind of the organisations 
leader but also as the way in which he/she manages to create a collective, single, way 
of seeing the organisations way forward. Occasionally as a ploy (“a specific 
‘manoeuvre’ intended to outwit an opponent or competitor’“).
The political and learning modes are more likely to produce strategy as emergent 
patterns (“a pattern in a stream of actions...strategy is consistency in behaviour, 
whether or not intended”). These are both are incremental, small scale and adaptive 
and often only recognisable in retrospect as they emerge either from internal conflict 
and compromise (political mode) or from diverse and uncoordinated learning 
(learning modes). The political mode can also sometimes, as result of temporary 
strong internal alliances emerging, produce strategies as a ploy in a similar way to the 
more directive visionary mode.
A similar exercise can be undertaken using Mintzberg & Water’s (1985:270) typology 
of eight types of strategy, running from the mainly deliberate (planned strategy) to the 
mainly emergent (consensus or imposed strategy) (Figure 2:7).
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Figure 2:7 Strategic modes and types of strategy
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Finally, each mode is underpinned by quite different values systems and values 
content. As suggested (see “political mode”, below) each mode has distinctive values, 
culture and ideology which align with Handy’s power, role, task and person cultures 
(see Figure 2:8). This results in differing values systems. In the planning mode, values 
are underplayed, even suppressed or relegated to differing decision systems, as Leach 
argues in relation to public policy making:
“a distinction can still be usefully be made between stages which are 
intrinsically of value choice (and hence, it is assumed, a political 
responsibility) and stages which are, in principle at least, technical (and 
hence, it is assumed, departmental responsibility).” (Leach, 1982:17)
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and similarly Carley separates rational analysis and values choice:
“the output of rational analysis has no special meaning in and of itself - it 
only becomes relevant to a policy problem when value judgements are 
applied to the output...the integration of the two aspects of the problem 
must take place if a realistic decision is to be arrived at.” (Carley, 
1980:27)
The dominance of ‘rationalism’ pushes values issues off into spheres (e.g. social 
responsibility, ethics, personal values, etc.) or decision systems (politics in the public 
sector, stakeholder or external coalitions in the private) which are seen as separate and 
related mainly through the mechanism of goal setting.
To take just one values issue: the recognition of what constitutes ‘authority’. The 
differing modes will be underpinned by quite different values. The visionary mode 
rests on charismatic and persuasive authority values; the planning mode on 
legitimisation of authority through ‘rule of rules’; the political mode posits authority 
in ‘real’ manifestations of power (resource acquisition, ‘clout’, ability to achieve, etc.) 
and ‘realpolitik’ (negotiation, bargaining and compromise making); and finally the 
learning mode vests authority in knowledge, professional or technical expertise.
Figure 2:8 Strategic modes and values
Strategic Mode
(Organisational
Culture)
Values system Values content: authority
Planning Neutral discussion of Legitimate - authority derived
(Role Culture) values issues is avoided or from formal status and rule by
suppressed, assumed to rule
belong to different domain
Political Fragmented - conflicts of Realpolitik - authority
(Task Culture) values are recognised, derived from exercise of ‘real’
welcomed and accommodated power, e.g. resource control,
through compromises infonnation control, etc.
Visionary Hegemonic - the values of the Charismatic - authority
(Power Culture) central leader or leadership derived from charisma,
team dominate leadership abilities,
ideological conviction 
Learning Consensus - values are Expert - authority derived
change from loiqwledge and skill
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These differing values systems are paradoxical and cause tension (not to say stress) in 
those forced to either change rapidly from one mode to another or to try to co-exist 
with two or more modes strongly competing for dominance.
T h e  Pl a n n in g  M o de
“The procedure within each step of the... {adaptive search method for 
strategy formation)... is similar: (1) A set of objectives is established, (2)
The difference (the ‘gap’) between current position of the firm and the 
objectives is estimated, (3) One or more courses of action (strategy) are 
proposed, (4) These are tested for their ‘gap-reducing properties’. A 
course is accepted if it substantially closes the gap; if it does not, new 
alternatives are tried.” (Ansoff, 1987:45-46)
The dominant theme in strategic management literature has clearly been the strategic 
planning and management model (Mintzberg 1990a; Whittington, 1993). This is based 
on a combination of rational decision making processes and radical strategic change. 
While the model has softened its overly rationalistic approach lately, through the 
admission of some creativity to the strategic decision process (e.g. Ansoff, 1991 and 
Leach, 1982) and the recognition of the iterative nature of these processes, it remains 
bounded by rationalism and planning.
For Mintzberg the premises of the planning school are:
“1. Strategy formation should be a controlled, conscious, and formal 
process, decomposed into distinct steps, each delineated by checklists and 
supported by techniques.
2. Responsibility for the overall process rests with the chief executive in 
principle; responsibility for its execution rests with the staff planners in 
practice.
3. Strategies emerge from the process full blown, to be explicated so that 
they can then be implemented through detailed attention to objectives, 
budgets, programs, and operating plans of various kinds.” (1990:119)
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What is a formal strategic planning process? A multitude of examples exist in the 
literature ranging from the very simple (Argenti, 1989 - which he notes has been 
“criticized for being naive and simplistic”), through the relatively complex (Johnson 
& Scholes, 1993) through to the very complex (Ansoff, 1988 - see below).
One simple/intermediate model suggested by Dyson (1990:6-7) involves 11 steps (of 
which the first 9 constitute strategic planning process whilst the last two are 
“necessary to implement strategies”:
1. Objective setting and review 7. Performance measurement
2. Strategic option formulation 8. Feedback signal
3. Feasibility check 9. Gap analysis and selection
4. Resource assessment 10. Implementation process
5. Assessment of uncertainty 11. Resources
6. Coprorate system model
Dyson insists that for the process to work “every element must be present and working 
effectively” (1990:7). This (edited) volume looks at a number of strategic models and 
techniques and concludes with a helpful matrix of how each relates to six areas of the 
strategic planning process (see Figure 2:9)
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Figure 2:9 Strategic planning process and techniques
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(Source: adapted from Dyson, 1990:308 - original contained primary impacts (‘P’)
and secondary impacts (‘S’), the latter have been removed).
(What is fascinating about this classification is that only one technique (cognitive 
mapping) is deemed to have a significant impact on objective setting and review.)
P l a n n in g  a n d  P o sit io n in g
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A specific variant of the Planning Mode is what Mintzberg calls the “positioning 
school”, primarily associated with the work of Porter at Harvard Business School. The 
approach concentrates not on the rationalistic planning process but on developing 
‘generic strategies’, by developing typologies of organisations and typologies of their 
environment and by relating the two producing normative models of organisational 
response. Besides Porter’s own work (1980) similar approaches have been developed 
by many other writers, e.g. Miles and Snow’s ‘prospector-analyser-defender-reactor’ 
(1978); Gould & Campbell’s typology of strategy and style in diversified corporation 
(1987) or the Boston Consulting Group’s market growth-share matrix (see Johnson & 
Scholes, 1993: ). All of these approaches share a common belief in strategy making 
as a conscious, rational and analytic process and a focus on the organisation-market 
interface and resulting appropriate strategic stances. In essence they try to simply the 
more complex rational-analytic approaches by (a) restricting analysis of the 
organisations environment primarily to its economic (market) environment and (b) 
producing typologies of organisational-market matches (or mismatches).
Th e  P o l it ic a l  M o de
“The processes by which strategic changes are made seldom move directly 
through neat, successive stages of analysis, choice and implementation.
Given the powerful internal characteristics of the firm it would be unusual 
if they did not affect the process: more often they transform it. Changes in 
the firm’s environment persistently threaten the course and logic of
strategic changes: ambiguity abounds one of the defining features of the
process, so far as managerial action is concerned, is 
ambiguity...(the)...process may derive its motive force from an amalgam 
of economic, personal and political imperatives.” (Pettigrew & Whipp, 
1991:31)
Strategy in the political mode is essentially about issues of power within, and to a 
certain extent around, the organisation. Pettigrew (1977) suggests that strategy 
formulation inside organisations can be seen as a set of dilemmas and processes:
• identifying the set of dilemmas facing the organisation
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• analysis of which dilemmas become a focus of organisational interest and which 
are suppressed
• identification of groups and sub-groups which seek to define alternative dilemmas 
as worthy of attention
• analysis of how these groups mobilise power and demand attention to their chosen 
issues
• identifying the patterns of outcomes (strategies) of the processes of demand 
generation and power mobilisation
• considering the implementation of the strategy and how that implementation 
impacts on future strategy formulation
Thus strategy becomes a process of reconciling conflicting interests in deciding 
between organisational dilemmas. Similarly, writing about decision-making in 
organisations McGrew and Wilson (1982:227) state that:
“to explain decisions as the result of political activity is essentially to 
introduce the elements of ‘power’, ‘influence’, and ‘interests’ into the 
equation. Decision making is thus to be considered an activity in which 
there are conflicting interests at stake, as well as conflicting perceptions of 
the substance of the problem which requires decision...”.
Strategy in the political mode is thus where a number of influential ‘stakeholders’ 
both compete for their own interests, mobilise support and eventually agree, after 
bargaining and negotiation, to decisions. The outcomes of strategy making in the 
political mode tend towards incremental rather than radical decisions, because the 
process of internal competition and compromise inevitably tend to ‘water down’ 
radical options. This process has been well documented in both strategy making 
(Pettigrew, 1973, 1977) and in policy formation in government (Richardson & Jordan, 
1985). It clearly builds on the work of Cyert and March (1964) on ‘the behavioural 
theory of the firm’, which sought to integrate classical economic theory of the firm
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with organisation theory. Managers, they suggest, spend much of their time managing 
internal coalitions and strategic decisions result from ‘fire-fighting’ reactions to 
immediate circumstances rather than long-term calculation.
This view has been substantiated by research on the nature of managerial work 
(Stewart, 1988; Mintzberg, 1980 and Kotter, 1982) and on power in and around 
organisations (Pfeffer, 1981 and Mintzberg, 1983).
Nor is this view of the organisation as a set of competing political interests merely a 
descriptive account of how things are. Some writers have developed a theme of 
seeing intra-organisational conflict not as a source of weakness or just as a descriptive 
device but also as a positive source of improving organisational performance. Thus 
Tjosvold talks of the “conflict positive organisation” which positively stimulates 
diversity of views and values, whilst adopting various mechanisms to create unity out 
of diversity (1991). He lists the benefits of conflict as including increased problem 
awareness, promoting organisational change, improving organisational solutions, 
increasing morale, aiding personal development, increasing self- and other awareness, 
promoting psychological maturity and that conflict can be fun. (:3-4) Probably the 
most famous advocate of this type of approach is Tom Peters whose more recent 
writings have celebrated “thriving on chaos” (1988).
The nature of strategy in the political mode suggests that decision making is 
inevitably incremental. Where there are powerful internal or external coalitions, a 
dominant autocracy or a powerful ideology which suppresses conflicts of interest 
strategy making would be in the visionary rather than the political mode (Mintzberg, 
1983). Thus the political mode is incremental in content.
Pure incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959) has not remained a popular approach, probably 
because there is nothing to ‘sell’ - in the sense that this is a descriptive explanation of 
practice rather than a prescription (as in the case of strategic planning models). As an 
explanatory framework it still has its supporters in specific areas. Elcock et al (1989), 
for example, have produced some persuasive evidence of incrementalism being alive
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and well in UK local government budgetary decision processes over the preceding 
decade. In fact incrementalism probably lies on the border between strategy in the 
learning and political modes, as it is easy to see how an emerging consensus between 
organisational actors could lead from ‘incrementalism’ to ‘logical incrementalism’. 
The source of incremental decision making is a mixture of the impossibility of 
rational decision making and realities of organisational politics.
In the textbooks the political aspects of strategic management have usually been 
incorporated as varieties of ‘stakeholder’ analysis (e.g. Johnson & Scholes 1993:175- 
188; Bowman & Asch, 1987:23-25), including techniques for assessing the groups of 
stakeholders, their power, predictability, levels of interest and likely stances on key 
issues. The political aspects appear not only as issues in formulating strategies but 
also as issues in implementation and here there is an overlap with the literature on the 
management of change and organisational development (OD). Hitchin and Ross 
(1991), for example, develop an OD perspective on strategic management, proposing 
the use of standard OD techniques to help build a participative strategic management 
system and overcome implementation problems.
One valuable additional insight into strategy in the political mode is provided by 
MacMillan (1978) who suggests that not only can the internal strategy formulation 
process be seen as a political process but that the conceptions of external strategy, 
including the organisation’s analysis of its environment also become political. Thus 
environmental analysis takes the form of identifying potential allies and enemies and 
the systems within which they are operating and matching these to the potential 
resources of the organisation, again couched in political terminology (negotiating 
base, influence, authority, power, etc). The resultant strategies are seen as being either 
offensive or defensive and should include anticipating opponents counter-responses 
and even negotiating compromises with them (1978:1-5).
P o l it ic s , C u l t u r e  a n d  Id e o l o g y
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Why have Johnson & Scholes’ (1993:46-51) “cultural view” and Mintzberg’s 
(1990:166:172) “cultural school” been included in strategy in the political mode? The 
answer is that there are two parts to the ‘cultural’ explanation usually proffered, one of 
which really forms part of the political mode (ideology) and the other which (power 
relations) dissolves into all four modes.
If we use Johnson & Scholes (1993:46) own model of culture they define it (following 
Schein, 1985:6) as the “deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared 
by members of an organisation” which is remarkably close to Harrison’s (1972) 
definition of “ideologies, beliefs and deep-held values”. On these definitions, there is 
a very close overlap between ‘culture’ and ‘politics’, the key word linking the two 
being ‘ideology’ - i.e. the expression of basic values and world view. It is ideology, 
rather than culture, which informs a world view or frame of reference, cultural 
symbols are merely the symbolic representation of underlying values. Thus if ‘culture’ 
were dominating organisational strategy it can and would only do so through a ‘world 
view’ or ideology. Mintzberg suggests that when ideology is strong and coherent, the 
system of authority, expertise and politics tend to be weak (1983:162) as a strong 
ideology substitutes for these other forms of power. Where this ideology was weak 
and fragmented, it would result in struggles for authority, expertise and power - i.e. 
political struggles within the organisation. This is close to Whittington’s (1992:28-39) 
notion of the “systemic approach” which subsumes notions of culture, politics and 
ideology within an overall sociological approach to the organisation. For Whittington 
the systemic approach sees organisations themselves, and the societies in which they 
are embedded, as a web of economic, social, political and cultural relations which 
condition how organisational actors can and do see their world. Indeed, he suggests 
the notion of ‘strategy’ itself is culturally determined and clearly, for example, does 
not have the same meanings in eastern cultures as in the west (see the discussion on 
military notions of strategy above).
The second source is a re-reading of a classic text on organisations, Handy’s 
“Understanding Organizations” (1987) which popularised the four-fold cultural 
typology of organisations as power, role, task or person cultures. Handy had in fact re­
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worked Harrison’s (1972) work which originally categorised organisations on 
ideological, not cultural, criteria. An examination of Handy’s four ‘cultures’ reveals 
that the crucial variable which he uses is not the ‘the ideologies, beliefs and deep-set 
values’ (Harrison, 1972) of the organisations but in fact the power relations between 
organisational members. Kakabadse et al offer a typology of power in organisations 
which includes reward power (control of rewards); coercive power (based on role); 
legitimate power (positional or role related); personal power (akin to charismatic 
power); expert power (based on knowledge); information power (based on control of 
data sources); and finally connection power (based on personal networks and 
alliances) (Kakabadse et al, 1988:214-225).
Handy’s ‘power culture’ clearly rests on personal power whilst the ‘role culture’ uses 
reward, coercive and legitimate power, or legal authority, in the Weberian sense (see 
Albrow, 1970:40). Both are hierarchical but with different forms of power 
relationship, one based on charisma and the other on rules and roles. These two 
‘cultures’ could be seen as corresponding closely to strategy making in the visionary 
mode (power culture) and in the planning mode (role culture). Strategy formation in 
both results from the strong hierarchical authority which permits radical strategic 
shifts, in the power culture through visionary leadership and in the role culture 
through planning systems.
The other two cultural types - ‘task’ and ‘person’ - describe less hierarchical and more 
egalitarian models, but are no less based on power. Both can be seen as a combination 
of expert, information and connection power. In the case of the person culture, the 
predominant power base is clearly expert and knowledge based. In the case of the task 
culture the strongest power bases could be seen as information and connection power.
Handy makes clear that the task culture is still hierarchical - “control is retained by top 
management by means of allocation of projects” rather than by the setting of rules or 
the exercise of authoritarian power as in the role or power cultures. However, these 
task cultures are difficult to manage because of the partial decentralisation of power
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and in difficult times tend to revert to power or role cultures to reassert top 
management control (Handy, 1987:193-4).
As Handy himself points out, for example, as times get hard in the task culture “the 
team leaders begin to compete using political resources, for available resources” 
(: 194). This sounds remarkably like strategy making in the political mode, where 
decentralisation of power prevents radical shifts of strategic position. While in the 
task culture the power exercised by middle and front-line managers is mainly based on 
a combination of formal authority and technical expertise and relies heavily on team- 
working, in the person culture the source of power is professional knowledge which 
can be converted into services relatively free of the need for close team-working and 
inter-dependence (Handy, 1987:195-6). Strategy, in such a set of relationships, can 
only be emergent and comes from a process of learning and adaptation - strategy in 
the learning mode.
The crucial factor in all these so-called ‘cultures’ is not the differences in “ideologies, 
beliefs and deep-set values” but the difference in power relations between the 
principle organisational actors. The cultural elements can be seen as either functional 
‘add-ons’ to the underlying power relations or as accidental ephemera, but either way 
it remains power which is crucial. In other words the ‘deep-set values’ of team 
working count as nothing in the political struggle for survival. Handy’s model is a 
model of power, not culture, although culture does lubricate and, in some ways, 
express the power relations. The crucial test is rather simple - is it possible to imagine 
any of Handy’s particular ‘cultures’ operating in a different set of power relations than 
the ones implicit or explicit in his own exposition - for example could a ‘people 
culture’ exist in an organisation with a rigidly authoritarian, centralised, power 
structure?
Strategy making in the political mode is therefore seen here as being primarily about 
the consequences of power and political competition within organisations but does not 
exclude other behavioural aspects and issues of culture, values and ideology. These 
are seen as being so closely entangled with the power issues as to be not usefully
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distinguishable for the analytical and functional uses to which the model developed 
here (politics, learning, planning and visionary) is being put.
Th e  V isio na ry  M o de
“Effective leadership...in complex organisations is the process of creating 
a vision of the future that takes into account the legitimate long-term 
interests of the parties involved in that activity; of developing a rational 
strategy for moving towards that vision; of enlisting the support of the key 
power centres whose co-operation, compliance or teamwork is necessary 
to produce that movement; and of motivating highly that core group of 
people whose actions are central to implementing the strategy.” (Kotter, 
1988:25-26)
Unlike the learning mode, where intuition is limited to playing a partial role within a 
decision process fuelled by experience and analysis as well, the visionary mode is 
much more of a purely intuitive process, linked closely to the leadership abilities and 
charisma of the visionary central controller of the organisation.
Whilst generally part of the ‘classical’ school of strategic management and it clearly 
has strong links with the Mintzberg’s (1990:111-116) planning and positioning 
school, his design school falls into the visionary mode because of the critical role 
played by the individual organisational ‘strategist’, who’s analysis and intuition, 
science and art, determine strategy. Indeed, Mintzberg attributes the earliest 
manifestation of the design school to Selznick’s book “Leadership in Administration” 
(1957) and also cites the more recent “The Mind of the Strategist” by Ohmae (1982). 
While Mintzberg rightly insists that the progenitors of the design school (Selznick, 
1957; Christensen et al. 1982; Andrews, 1982) insisted that while strategic decisions 
are the work of the single organisational leader and strategist they are the product of 
conscious, analytical and not intuitive processes. The latter point may be sustainable 
for what some writers of the design school say, but not all. It is worth quoting 
Andrew’s views on the inter-relationship between analysis and values at length:
“We have been examining the changing relationship of company and 
environment as if purely economic strategy, uncontaminated by the
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personality or goals of the decision maker, were possible. We must 
acknowledge at this point that there is no way to divorce the decision 
that names the most sensible economic strategy for a company from 
the personal values of those who make the choice...
Certain entrepreneurs, whose energy and personal drives far outweigh 
their formal training and self-awareness, set the course in directions not 
necessarily supported by logical appraisal. Such disparity appears most 
frequently in small privately held concerns, or in companies built by 
successful...owner managers. The phenomenon we are discussing, 
however, may appear in any company....
In examining the alternatives available to a company, we must henceforth 
take into consideration the preferences of the chief executive. 
Furthermore, we must also be concerned with the values of other key 
managers...We therefore have two kinds of reconciliation to consider - 
first, the divergence between the chief executive’s preference and the 
strategic choice which seems most defensible and, second, the conflict 
among several sets of managerial personal values...” (Andrews, 
1971:104-106 - emphasis added).
Nor is the purely analytical approach to strategy sustainable in any detailed analysis of 
actual strategists, as Ohmae’s work attests (1982). Mintzberg’s entrepreneurial school, 
on the other hand, falls completely within the visionary mode (indeed it seems that 
only the issue of intuition separates the design and entrepreneurial schools). Strategy 
exists in the mind of the leader, as a vision of the organisation’s future, formed by 
semi-conscious or intuitional processes based on intimate knowledge of the 
organisation and its environment (Mintzberg, 1990:138-9). For Kono the 
entrepreneurial mode is characterised by unclear goals but long time horizons 
combined with radical, adventurous, quick and intuitive decisions (1992:49-53). In a 
survey of UK entrepreneurs for a leading venture capital company, Lloyd (1992) 
characterises entrepreneurs as “often holding very strong views and opinions” about 
their personal visions, dreams and philosophies (1992:123). He goes on to note that 
the individuals interviewed seemed more outspoken during ‘passive’ phases of their 
careers, whilst ‘active’ individuals were constrained by organisational considerations 
from making too public their personal visions (1992:142). Lloyd also concludes that 
entrepreneurs are happiest and perform best in the start-up phase of organisations, but 
that all organisations require entrepreneurial talents in rapidly changing conditions 
(: 145-147). He also emphasises the internal leadership abilities of entrepreneurs, their
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ability to convince and persuade not only that their vision is right but that it can and 
will work. Strategic decision making is seen as bound up with leadership - strategic 
leaders need an intimate understanding of their organisations, a ‘hands-on’ feel which 
allows them to make intuitive ‘leaps of faith’ (Iaccoca, 1984 ) in proposing radical 
reorientations of their organisations but also provides them with the necessary 
knowledge to skilfully lead the organisation in the required direction. These 
leadership characteristics are where the visionary mode spills over into the literature 
on leadership. Kotter, for example, concludes that “most US corporations today are 
overmanaged and underled” (1990:103-4). (For a discussion of the overlap between 
strategy and leadership, see Whittington, 1993:44-49).
T h e  L e a r n in g  M o de
“A Learning Company is an organisation that facilitates the learning of all 
its members and continuously transforms itself. This is a dream - that we 
can design and create organisations which are capable of adapting, 
changing, developing and transforming themselves in response to the 
needs, wishes and aspirations of people, inside and outside. Such 
companies will always be realizing their assets without predatory take­
overs; they will be able to flex without hiring a new Top Man; they will 
be able to avoid sudden and massive restructurings that happen after years 
of not noticing the signals.” (Pedler, Burgoyne & Boydell, 1991:1)
In strategy in the learning mode, the focus is on change being adaptive learning, small 
adjustments to environmental changes either through incremental processes or by 
iterative learning processes (as proposed in the ‘learning organisation’ movement). 
Decision processes are seen as rational, reflective and analytical while the resulting 
changes are individually small scale and often experimental. In the learning mode, 
there is no rigid separation between strategy formulation and strategy implementation, 
between decision and action. Rather action may precede decision, in that 
experimentation may precede any thought-out change of direction - what has been 
called the “Ready. Fire. Aim.” approach (an anonymous Cadbury’s executive quoted 
by Peters and Waterman, 1982:119). The idea behind this ‘bias for action’ is that 
learning can only occur from experience and that successive, iterative, applications of
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‘ready, fire, aim’ allow for such learning (even making the point that in artillery firing 
it is common to use ‘ranging shots’ to home in on a target).
The learning mode can draw on a number of different sources - logical incrementalism 
(Quinn, 1980), learning organisations (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Argyris, 1992; Senge, 
1990; Pedler et al., 1991; Garratt, 1987, 1990) crafting strategy (Mintzberg, 1987a), 
etc. More recent innovations include techniques and technologies for aiding 
management learning via parallel learning structures (Bushe & Shani, 1991), small 
and team group learning (Johansen et al., 1991; Cole, 1991), and group decision 
support and ‘soft’ decision making methodologies (Eden & Radford, 1990; Huff, 
1990; Rosenhead, 1989).
Logical incrementalism was developed by Quinn (1980) as an explanation of actual 
strategic decision making in firms, suggesting that this was usually a combination of 
incremental choices, ‘small wins’ (Bryson, 1988b) or small scale ‘breakthrough 
projects’ (Schaffer, 1988) which were guided by vaguely perceived long term goals:
“Executives managing strategic change in large organisations should not - 
and do not - follow highly formalised textbook approaches in long-range 
planning, goal generation, and strategy formulation. Instead, they artfully 
blend formal analysis, behavioural techniques, and power politics to bring 
about cohesive, step-by-step movement towards ends which initially are 
broadly conceived, but which are constantly refined and reshaped as new 
information appears.” (Quinn, 1988)
Strategic decisions may be based on combining rational analysis and intuition, but 
actions are restricted and cautious, moving in the desired direction gradually and 
sometimes indirectly. J. B. Quinn’s (1980) work fed into the ‘strategic thinking’ or 
‘crafting strategy’ approach developed by Mintzberg (1987a) and there is a strong 
cross-over. Stacey (1990) proposes as best practice a balance between opportunistic, 
intuitional and heuristic principles for long range decisions and rational business 
planning for more short term-goals.
‘Learning organisations’ is one of the latest trends to emerge in the organisational 
strategy literature, even though its origins are somewhat older (Argyris and Schon,
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1978). The main theme has been to offer a re-combination of the ideas of rational 
decision making and progress through small steps, with an underlying theme of 
iterative or even continuous processes. Some of the learning organisation literature 
appears to be repackaged management development (MD), assuming that creating a 
learning culture or learning individual managers will create organisational learning 
(e.g. Garratt, 1987, 1990). Some also seems to be trying to give organisational 
development (OD) a new lease of life by concentrating on the social psychology of 
organisational learning or creating new techniques to overcome bureaucratic barriers 
to learning (e.g. Bushe & Shani, 1991; Cole, 1991). Finally, some has concentrated on 
information systems as the key to learning (e.g. Boisot, 1987).
Senge (1990:6-11) proposes that five new “component technologies” or disciplines 
are converging to create learning organisations:
• systems thinking - seeing the network of interrelationships that make up
organisations
• personal mastery - clarifying and deepening personal vision
• mental models - learning to understand personal ‘maps’ of reality
• building shared vision - creating a shared pictures of the organisational future
• team learning - promoting genuine dialogue within teams and recognising and
removing barriers to collective learning
Of these five, he sees systems thinking as the ‘fifth discipline’ because it provides the 
framework for integrating the other four into organisational behaviour, whilst itself 
relying on each of the other four to work (:12). While the approaches described above 
(focusing on MD, OD or information systems) undoubtedly have merits, they appear 
to fragment the Teaming organisation’ concept rather than, as Senge suggests, 
integrating a variety of disciplines or technologies to create organisational learning.
Benchmarking can be seen as the latest wave in the organisational learning tide. The 
notion of benchmarking organisational performance and practice against perceived 
examples of “best practice” in either whole organisations or functional areas is
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arguably simply another version of organisational learning, but focusing very 
explicitly on inter-organisational learning.
M a n a g e m e n t  In fo r m a t io n  Syst em s  in  D iffe r e n t  M o des
This model is remarkably similar by one developed by Hopwood (1980) to analyse 
aspects of behaviour and organisation in organisational budgeting and control. Using 
two dimensions about the levels of uncertainty over the objectives of action and the 
outcomes of action, he produced a two-by-two matrix (see Figure 2:10) whose 
elements correspond closely the model above. (The categories developed above have 
been added in brackets.)
Figure 2:10 Decision Making Processes and supporting information “machines”
Uncertainty over Objectives of action
Uncertainty over 
Consequences of 
Actions
Relative Certainty Relative Uncertainty
Relative
Certainty
Computation 
“Answer Machines” 
(Planning)
Bargaining 
“Ammunition Machines” 
(Political)
Relative
Judgement Inspiration
Uncertainty “Learning Machines” “Rationalisation Machines”
(Learning) (Visionary)
Source: adapted from Hopwood, 1980
Translating Hopwood’s categories onto the Strategic Modes Model, the role of 
management information systems is seen to vary considerably in different modes. In 
the classical planning mode, the role of MIS is firmly as part of the machinery of 
strategic planning based on comprehensive analysis and rational choice - what 
Hopwood calls an “answer machine”, in the computational sense of a device for
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producing “the” answer. In the visionary mode where strategic analysis and decisions 
are much more intuitively based the role of MIS becomes more one of self­
justification, a “rationalisation” machine to endorse and sustain the strategic decisions 
taken by the organisations entrepreneurial leader. In both these roles, answer machine 
and rationalisation machine, it can be seen that MIS systems have a clear, integrated 
function with relatively stable and uncontradictory aims. The next two categories, as 
learning and ammunition machines, are both categorised by a fragmentation of MIS 
aims and uses. In the learning mode, MIS’s become fragmented because learning is 
not a logical, single or coherent process in organisational contexts but can occur 
anywhere, at any time. To use the famous Honda example (Pascale, 1992, in Quinn & 
Mintzberg, 1992), the serendipitous learning by Japanese sales executives in 
California that there might be a hitherto unknown market for the small Honda, 50cc, 
Super Cubs (completely contrary to Honda’s marketing strategy) was the archetypal 
learning opportunity. To accommodate such opportunities MIS’s have to be flexible, 
open and inevitably to a certain extent ‘disorganised’. In the case of strategy in the 
political mode the disorganisation of MIS comes not directly from external sources 
but from the internal power struggle. Just as the telephone exchanges, radio and 
television stations and newspaper offices are the habitual targets of revolutionaries 
and leaders of coup d’etats everywhere some control of the organisations 
communications networks, especially its MIS, is a vital element in organisational 
political struggles, thus Hopwood’s “ammunition” machine (another military 
analogy).
A N o te  o n  Th e  R o le  o f  Int u it io n  a n d  C reativity
Mintzberg has probably been the strongest advocate of recognising the role of 
intuition in strategic management (see for example Mintzberg, 1987a, 1989, 1990a, 
1990b, 1991a, 1992). He suggests a test for managerial intuition: (1) that it is deeply, 
often passionately felt; (2) it is rooted in experience of the context, even if the learning 
is subconscious; (3) it emerges as a conscious choice and direction (1991a: 109). 
Mintzberg also makes it clear that intuition plays a role primarily in synthesis - 
creating an overview of a problem or choice - but that it must be backed and tested by
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rigorous analysis. This is very similar to the view of ‘systems thinking’ as advanced 
by Senge (1990) as “a body of knowledge and tools that has been developed over the 
past 50 years, to make the full patterns clearer, and help us see how to change then 
effectively.” (:7). He goes on to add that the underlying world view of systems 
thinking is extremely intuitive. Ohmae (1983:4) argues that:
“great strategies, like great works of art or great scientific discoveries, call 
for technical mastery in the working out but originate in insights that are 
beyond the reach of conscious analysis.”
Nor is this emphasis restricted to academic commentators. The former head of 
Chrysler, Lee Iacocca, comments in his autobiography that:
“..there’s a new breed of businessmen, mostly people with MBA’s, who 
are wary of intuitive decisions. In part, they’re right. Normally, intuition is 
not a good enough basis for making a move. But many of these guys go to 
the opposite extreme. They seem to think that every business problem can 
be structured and reduced to a case study.” (Iacocca, 1984:55)
This is not, it must be emphasised, to suggest that Mintzberg, Senge, Ohmae or 
Iacocca decry the use of analysis - rather they see analysis and synthesis as 
complimentary and that while the former can be produced by detachment and rational 
techniques the latter requires intimacy and intuition. Moreover, as both Mintzberg 
(1991a) and Goldberg (1983) have pointed out, intuition works best when well fed by 
data and experience, and analysis can help to provide this intimacy with the subject, 
provided it is not allowed to dominate thinking. As Ohmae puts it:
“strategists do not reject analysis. Indeed they can hardly do without it.
But they use it only to stimulate the creative process, to test ideas that 
emerge, to work out their strategic implications, or to ensure successful 
execution of high-potential “wild” ideas that might otherwise never be 
implemented properly.” (1983:4).
Goldberg (1983) has developed a model of differing types of intuition which is useful 
for understanding different types of intuiton and the roles they might play in the 
strategy process. He suggests intuition can be divided into discovery, evaluation, 
prediction, operation and creative forms. If a common framework of strategy were
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adopted, such as strategic analysis, choice and implementation (Johnson & Scholes, 
1993) then intuitive discovery and prediction would be important for analysis, 
intuitive creativity and evaluation for choice and intuitive operation for 
implementation.
This model can also be used in assigning intuition differing levels of importance in 
differing strategy modes as in the following table - in which the size of the S  
indicates the probable importance of intuitional, as opposed to rational decision 
making, processes (see Figure 2:11).
Figure 2:11 Intuition - types and strategy modes
Type of intuition Planning
Mode
Visionary
Mode
Learning
Mode
Political
Mode
Discovery - new laws or 
facts from insufficient data V V
Evaluation - making 
choices between alternatives V S
Prediction - forecasting 
future trends V
Operation - knowing what 
the right thing to do is
s
Creative - generating 
alternatives
It is obviously least accepted in the planning mode, but here it is assigned a role which 
is restricted mainly to the creation of alternatives.
At the other extreme lies the visionary mode, where intuitive decisions play the 
critical role in strategy formation. Not only is it used in all five ways (discovery, 
evaluation, prediction, operation and creation) but it also plays a dominant role in 
most of these. (Given the lack of importance attached to ‘alternatives’ when an 
organisation is operating in the visionary mode intuition plays a smaller role). The 
learning mode, on the other hand, whilst utilising intuition combines it with rational 
analysis both before (to provide ‘food’ for intuitive thought) and after (to provide
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planning and coherence) a leap of intuitive insight. Its strongest role in this mode is in 
making Iacocca’s ‘leap of faith’ or what Vickers calls ‘the art of judgement’ in 
selecting between alternative courses of action.
Japanese strategic decision making appears, to many westerners, to present a paradox 
- on the one hand Japanese firms spend more on data gathering and analysis than their 
western counter-parts whilst their actual strategic decisions seem to be taken in 
intuitional, even inspirational ways (see Pascale’s account of ‘the Honda effect’).
As Mintzberg and Iaccocca have argued (cited above), only someone intimately 
knowledgeable about their organisation and its environment can make really useful 
‘intuitive leaps’.
The Japanese approach is therefore based on a sound system of combining analysis 
with intuition. However, it requires organisational leaders schooled in ‘the art of 
judgement’ (Vickers), more than (or as well as) the science of decision and 
organisational information systems to feed this decision process.
The Japanese have concepts of ‘omote’ and ‘ura’. In martial arts this means to attack 
from or throw in the direction of the opponents front (omote) or towards their rear 
(ura). In business and government this means in public view (omote) or behind the 
scenes (ura). The Japanese place great emphasis on ‘ura’, behind the scenes 
preparation and planning, before the ‘omote’ phase - the public unveiling. Omote is 
the culmination, after all the real work has been done. So while strategic decisions 
may be intuitive in nature they are preceded by data-gathering and analysis and 
followed by careful organisation and planning. Only then do they burst upon a 
(usually unsuspecting) world.
The popularity of the intuitive approach to decision making amongst senior Japanese 
managers is clearly illustrated in a summary of interviews with presidents of large 
manufacturing companies, conducted by Nihon Keizai Shimbum (during 1980-81).
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The key “conceptual skill” identified by 34% of the 47 interviewees was “long range 
vision” which:
“is the ability to see into the future...such future vision is arrived at by a 
kind of flash of intuition after the analysis of information. Great flexibility 
is necessary to be creative in this way - to see the new approach, new 
applications and methods that are quite different from today’s products 
and process.” (Kono 1984: 38).
Summary of Strategic Modes
When the quotes used to introduce each of the strategic modes, which are illustrative 
examples of each approach, are placed together the contradictory and paradoxical 
nature of the strategic modes is fairly obvious:
The Learning Mode
“A Learning Company is an organisation that facilitates the learning of all its members 
and continuously transforms itself. This is a dream - that we can design and create 
organisations which are capable of adapting, changing, developing and transforming 
themselves in response to the needs, wishes and aspirations of people, inside and outside. 
Such companies will always be realizing their assets without predatory take-overs; they 
will be able to flex without hiring a new Top Man; they will be able to avoid sudden and 
massive restructurings that happen after years of not noticing the signals.”
(Pedler, Burgoyne & Boydell, 1991:1)
The Planning Mode
“The procedure within each step of the... {adaptive search method fo r  strategy 
formation)... is similar: (1) A set of objectives is established, (2) The difference (the 
‘gap’) between current position of the firm and the objectives is estimated, (3) One or 
more courses of action (strategy) are proposed, (4) These are tested for their ‘gap- 
reducing properties’. A course is accepted if it substantially closes the gap; if it not, new 
alternatives are tried.”
(Ansoff, 1987:45-46)
The Political Mode
“The processes by which strategic changes are made seldom move directly through neat, 
successive stages of analysis, choice and implementation. Given the powerful internal 
characteristics of the firm it would be unusual if they did not affect the process: more 
often they transform it. Changes in the firm’s environment persistently threaten the
course and logic of strategic changes: ambiguity abounds one of the defining features
of the process, so far as managerial action is concerned, is ambiguity...(r/ie)...process may 
derive its motive force from an amalgam of economic, personal and political 
imperatives.”
(Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991:31)
The Visionary Mode
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“Effective leadership...in complex organisations is the process of creating a vision of the 
future that takes into account the legitimate long-term interests of the parties involved in 
that activity; of developing a rational strategy for moving towards that vision; of enlisting 
the support of the key power centres whose co-operation, compliance or teamwork is 
necessary to produce that movement; and of motivating highly that core group of people 
whose actions are central to implementing the strategy.”
(Kotter, 1988:25-26)
Figure 2:12 seeks to summarise the key features of each strategy mode as presented in 
this Chapter. These serve to more fully explain the model, whilst also placing some 
emphasis on the contradictions and paradoxes between the different modes.
Figure 2:12 Summary of features of strategy modes
Planning
Mode
Political
Mode
Visionary
Mode
Learning
Mode
decision types radical and 
detailed 
‘cascade’ 
plans
incremental,
sometimes
coherent,
sometimes
fragmented
radical and 
broad brush, 
leave details to 
implementatio 
n
incremental,
fragmented,
though
sometimes
innovative
strategy types plans and 
positions
patterns and 
ploys
perspectives 
and ploys
patterns
decision
processes
computational bargaining inspirational judgmental
information 
systems use
answers ammunition rationalisation learning
values system neutral fragmented hegemonic consensual
authority legitimate ‘realpolitik’ charismatic expert
system
Definitions of Strategic Management
The conclusion of the analysis in this Chapter is that there is no one definition of what 
constitutes ‘strategic management’ and that, for the operational purposes of this thesis, 
it is divided into four contradictory definitions.
Strategic Management as:
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Strategic Planning - rational decision making processes by senior management to 
achieve major changes in organisational direction.
Strategic Vision - non-rational, intuitive, decision making processes by senior 
management to achieve major changes in organisational direction.
Strategic Politics - non-rational, bargaining, processes of decision making by senior 
management and other important organisational actors to achieve a coalition for, 
usually incremental, changes in organisational direction.
Strategic Learning - rational decision making at decentralised points within the 
organisation which lead to incremental and evolutionary changes in organisational 
direction.
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Chapter 3 Strategic Management and Public Management
The main part of this Chapter examines three interrelated issues about strategic 
management as applied to the public sector. Before doing so, however, it briefly 
reviews some evidence on strategic management trends in the public sector, pointing 
out particular evidence which supports the notion of paradoxical practices.
It looks at the environment in which public organisations have to operate in terms of 
both competitive and some non-competitive forces. The latter are the directive, mainly 
legislative and political, forces affecting public organisations. Other environmental 
factors affecting public organisations are categorised as non-market, quasi-market and 
market competitive forces.
It investigates the uncertainties over objectives affecting public organisations and the 
impact this has on strategic issues. The issue of values, already explored in Chapter 1, 
is especially relevant here.
It examines how the models of public management (developed in Chapter 1) and 
models of generic strategic management (developed in Chapter 2) might be combined 
to create a preliminary idea of how a strategic management model can be developed 
for public organisations. This is in turn used to identify some strategic competences 
which public managers may need to operate successfully.
T r e n d s  in  t h e  p u b l ic  s e c t o r  - t h e  r is e , f a l l  a n d  r is e  o f  s t r a t e g y
Lawton and Rose (1991:116-7) suggest that planning and the use of rational 
techniques was highly popular in the expanding UK public sector in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. With the mid-1970s economic and fiscal crisis, and the 1979 change of 
government, planning became firmly out of favour. Some writers began to analyse the 
failure of corporate planning in local government in the early 1980s (Skelcher, 1980; 
Norton & Wedgewood-Oppenheim, 1981). By the late 1980s planning and strategy
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was making a comeback, in the form of setting organisational missions and targets, 
performance measurement and efficiency and economy measures. This echoes Pollitt 
and Harrison’s view that:
“one of the ironic features of the 1980’s was the way in which ‘planning’, 
at first scorned by the market purists of the new right, crept back in [to the 
public services]. By the late 1980’s... ‘strategies’ were firmly back in 
fashion.” (1992:281)
Caulfield and Schulz (1989:9-16) paint a very similar scenario for local government in 
the UK - strategic management, under the rubric of “corporate planning” being very 
popular in the early 1970s, falling out of favour due to a variety of factors but re- 
emerging in newer, more business orientated and slimmer guises in the late 1980s, 
whilst Ascher and Nare (1990:299) explicitly use the SRI model (see Chapter 2) but 
suggest a distinct time lag of about 5 years in the public sector pattern compared the 
private sector.
Few of these broad brush accounts give any details of the levels of penetration of 
strategic or corporate planning in public services organisations. One tangential 
exception may be Greenwood’s (1987) study of UK local government strategy and 
structure relationships, which included a survey of chief executives to establish the 
organisation’s strategic style, using Miles & Snow’s (1978) typology of strategic 
styles (see Figure 3:1).
Figure 3:1 Strategic styles in UK local authorities
Style Council Nos. Percentage of sample
Prospector 23 11%
Analyser 60 29%
Defender 20 10%
Reactor 105 50%
Total 208
(source: adapted from Greenwood, 1987:300)
This was not a survey of local authorities’ strategic styles, but merely what their Chief 
Executives said was their organisations strategic style. Some respondents may have 
opted to avoid the slightly unglamorous “reactor” option (as Greenwood suggests),
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thus the figure of 50% “reactors” is both a remarkably high one and probably an 
underestimate. Miles and Snow’s model (which was private sector based) describes 
“reactors” as inconsistent and liable to go out of business rapidly and they are seen as 
a minor category. This sample of UK local authorities suggests, on the other hand, that 
half had (in the mid-1980’s) no consistent strategic style and therefore, presumably, 
no systematic strategic management.
Young and Mills’ survey of UK local chief executives (conducted in 1992) showed 
that the prevalence of corporate or strategic planning was indeed increasing in the 
early 1990s. The number of respondents who said that their local authority had 
adopted a formal strategic plan since 1989 rose steeply to almost half, with a further 
quarter saying that they were considering adopting one. Almost one quarter (24%) 
said that they were definitely not considering adopting one. The projected rate of 
formal strategic planning would therefore be expected to reach around 75% (see 
Figure 3:2).
Figure 3:2 UK Local authorities - formal corporate or strategic plans
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Percentages of respondents - cumulative. N=285
Source: adapted from Young & Mills, 1993:25__________________________________
This could be taken as confirmation of the general scenario of the “rise-fall-re- 
emergence” of strategic management. The Greenwood survey occurred in the ‘fall’ 
period whilst the Young & Mills survey occurred in the hypothetical second ‘rise’ 
period.
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Greenwood’s survey also raises more important issues about why so many local 
authorities can, and do, have such inconsistent and unstable, even paradoxical, 
strategic stances as characterised by the “reactor” style? Remember that the “reactors” 
are defined as having unstable styles, often trying to implement more than one 
approach.
The reason why they might do so could be linked to the issues of competing values 
and domains discussed in Chapter 1. Firstly, the ‘policy’ domain itself has 
institutionalised values conflicts embedded in it (in the form of organised politics) and 
secondly this domain conflicts with the value systems underpinning the ‘management’ 
and ‘service’ domains as well. This endemic system of conflicting values makes 
having consistent strategies very difficult (and in setting broad organisational 
objectives) - the exception is where one of the three domains becomes dominant and 
has a consistent approach itself.
The second important the question is - why can local government have so many 
“reactors”?. The answer could simply be that they can have so many organisations 
with inconsistent strategic styles because, unlike their private sector counter-parts, 
pursuing inconsistent and even incoherent strategies doesn’t necessarily lead to rapid 
demise (see Chapter 1). In Meyer & Zucker’s phrase, performance and persistence 
have become ‘de-coupled’ (1989).
A small indicator of trends may be given by evidence from Long Range Planning, the 
main UK journal dealing with strategic management issues. A count of articles 
dealing with the public sector over the period 1970-1992 does show a similar rise-fall- 
rise pattern. (Given the time-lag between research/writing and publication - often as 
long as two years - then the peaks and troughs do correspond reasonably well to the 
picture painted by other commentators.)
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Figure 3:3 Strategic management in the public sector?
Public Sector Articles - Long Range Planning 1970-1992
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Source: derived from LRP Index, 1970-1992.
C o m p e t it io n , M a r k e t s  a n d  th e  P u b l ic  Se c t o r
Private sector organisations which fail usually go into liquidation. They cease to exist. 
Public organisations however can continue to fail without ceasing to exist, which is 
why they can so easily become bad performers. This argument has regularly been 
advanced about public and private organisations:
“The single key fact which makes the public sector different in kind from 
the viewpoint of consumer sensitivity is that the customer cannot take his 
or her money and shop elsewhere. In the private sector the need to retain 
customers ... makes businesses acutely conscious ... at the bottom line is 
profit. Without customers there is no revenue flowing in from which to 
draw profits....The public sector does not usually make profits...Its 
revenue, derived from the taxpayers, reaches it from government hands 
rather than from its customers.” (Pirie, 1991:4-5)
This has always been the principal argument for the privatisation of public 
organisations. The common view of the nature of free market competition vs. public 
ownership is that in the former the successful survive and prosper whilst the failures 
close down and the resources embedded in them (finance, materials, equipment,
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labour, etc.) are reallocated elsewhere, whereas in the latter public organisations are 
virtually indestructible.
However this view is challengeable on three counts: that at both macro-economic and 
individual organisation level, “failing” private organisations do not always cease to 
exist and also at the organisational level, public organisations do “die”, even if the 
causes of death aren’t always “failure”.
Firstly, at the macro-economic level, successful national economies or business 
networks can accept and support “failing” organisations for strategic reasons. As 
Lazonick has shown persuasively in his study of UK, US and Japanese economic and 
business organisation history the inter-organisational structures which determine 
overall economic success are not determined by simple market forces (Lazonick, 
1991). As a consequence, it is perfectly possible to have within a network of business 
alliances both successful and ‘failing’ organisations because it is the success of the 
ensemble which counts. He specifically cites the peak of inter-organisational alliances 
achieved by Japanese companies which, he suggests, do everything “wrong” in terms 
of free-market theory but are nevertheless brilliantly successful.
The idea of variable levels of real competition within industries is also explicit in 
Porter’s (1979) “five forces” model of industry competitiveness. The central element 
of Porter’s model, “jockeying for position”, poses the question: to what degree do 
competitors really compete? The answer is obviously that in some industries ‘real’ 
competition is fiercer than in others, and that in extreme cases of monopoly or cartels 
there is virtually no real competition.
Secondly, at the individual private organisational level, even isolated individual 
private sector organisations can bee seen as “permanently failing organisations” which 
may be kept in existence because of the benefits to “dependent actors” such as 
workers, communities or other organisations and performance and persistence have 
become “decoupled” (Meyer & Zucker, 1989:91-118)
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Thirdly, public organisations are not immortal - in a classic study of US federal 
agencies it was shown that of 175 organisations in existence in 1923, by 1973 (50 
years later) 27 (15%) had ceased to exist. Interestingly, the average age of the group in 
1923 was 27 years and the average age of the 148 survivors in 1973 was also 27 years 
- the average age of the fatalities at ‘death’ was 44. In other words, public 
organisations seem to have a ‘life span’ which, while undoubtedly much longer than 
their private sector counterparts, is far from being immortal. Also interesting was that 
‘staff organisations (i.e. policy making organisations) had a disproportionate 
‘survival rate’ compared to ‘line’ (i.e. service providing organisations) - 81% of 
‘deaths’ were line organisations although they made up only 64% of the sample. 
(Kaufman, 1976). Unfortunately, this study did not examine the ‘cause of death’ of 
these organisations so it is not clear whether this was from competition or some other 
mechanism.
What is clear is that public sector organisations have always operated to some extent 
within a market setting. The issue of the relationship between the capitalist market 
economy and public sector organisations has never been whether the latter are affected 
by the market, but to what degree.
In the case of public enterprises, the impact of the market has often been very strong 
and public ownership has been a means of mitigating market forces, by subsidy and/or 
preferential purchasing by other public bodies, in order to preserve what are seen as 
nationally important organisations (for social, economic, political or technological 
reasons).
Public enterprises are, by definition, those parts of the public sector which usually are 
seeking to compete through the sale of goods or services within markets and thus are 
competing directly with private sector organisations, either nationally or 
internationally. While their ‘bottom-line’ profitability may be under-written or 
protected by a variety of measures, they usually still have to sell at least some goods in 
competition with private sector rivals. The degree to which this is true fundamentally 
affects their position. Thus ‘natural monopoly’ providers do not have many direct
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competitors for their goods or services (e.g. water, telecommunications) whilst other 
state owned enterprises may face stiff competition (e.g. British Leyland, as a state- 
owned car manufacturer, or the former INMOS, as a state owned ‘micro-chip’ 
producer).
The case of human and physical services is different to that of public enterprises. 
Whilst not ‘natural monopolies’ (e.g. there is no intrinsic reason why there should not 
be competing hospitals or schools or even fire services) they are de facto monopoly 
suppliers because they either provide public goods (e.g. non-exclusive physical 
services) or they provide services which have been politically deemed to be primarily 
‘public’ services (e.g. health, education, policing).
Whilst there has (in the past in the UK) therefore largely been no ‘market’ for their 
products or services (there are no rival producers, no paying customers, etc.) the 
organisations are nevertheless affected by market forces. Their supplies of goods, 
services, labour and finances are to a greater or lesser extent affected by market 
changes for each of these resources. Changing interest rates, labour shortages, 
inflation in supplies prices, all affect these organisation despite their core functions 
operating outside the market as such. They are not closed systems. Using a classical 
organisational environment analysis framework (PEST - political, economic, social, 
technological), even in situations of relative stability in political and social terms, 
organisations may need to adjust to changes affecting economic and technological 
factors.
A model of the factors affecting public human service organisations could be seen as 
involving four levels of forces, ranging from non-competitive forces through to fully 
market based competition (Figure 3:4). Each of these four levels will be examined 
briefly below.
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Figure 3:4 A Model of Forces Affecting Public Organisation
1. Policy constraints - • legislative and directive political power
non-competitive, • demographic, social, environmental and technological
non-market, forces
2. Policy competition • competition between policy/provision sub-spaces to
- competitive non- “capture” issues and resources (e.g. between health and
market forces social services over community care)
• competition within policy/provision sub-spaces over 
resource distribution (e.g. within health over regional 
distribution)
3. Quasi-markets- • competition between purchasers over providers*
constrained • competition between providers over purchasers
competitive forces • competition between purchasers and providers over the
terms of.exchange;.(e.g: namre etc.)
4. Markets - less • competition within external markets (e.g. for labour,
constrained fully finance, supplies, etc.)
competitive; forces 
(* providers may include non-public organisations, e.g. voluntary and private)
Policy Constraints - Non-Competitive Forces
There are numerous non-market, non-competitive forces which impact directly and 
more-or-less equally on all organisations, public and private. By non-market, non­
competitive forces are meant forces which are not directly based on fluctuations in 
either market or political forces. These include factors such as demographic changes, 
social trends, environmental changes, technological changes, etc.
There is another set of forces which also acts on all organisations but are more likely 
to impact disproportionately on public organisations. These include the coercive and 
taxation powers of government, embodied in legislation and enforcement.
Some policies of government, which apply across all organisations, are likely to 
impact more on public organisations than others because public organisations are 
subject to both ordinary enforcement procedures and political accountability, making 
them more susceptible to these policy initiatives than their non-public counterparts. 
Thus, for example, a public organisation which breaches anti-discrimination 
legislation can be subject both to enforcement through the courts and to direct
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political intervention. The power of political rule-makers to govern bureaucratic 
discretion should not be exaggerated - see, for example, Wilson (1989:333-4) for an 
example where such anti-discrimination rules were effectively side-stepped by local 
bureaucrats.
Policy Competition - Non-Market Competition within Public Services
The idea that no competition takes place within the public sector because there are no 
“market forces” is rejected by both traditional policy analysis and public 
administration writers on the one hand and by the advocates of applying economic 
analysis to political systems, the “public choice” school (see Wilson, 1989; Self, 
1993). From the debates over bureaucrats as “budget maximisers” promoted by public 
choice theorists through to models of “bureau shaping” advocated by those from the 
more traditional political science school, one key assumption is that there is some 
form of non-market competition operating within the public sector (for a discussion of 
these different approaches, see Dunleavy, 1991).
Skok (1989) has developed, through a synthesis of some US public policy literature, a 
model of non-market based competition between public agencies within what he calls 
“policy sub-spaces”. He argues that within these broad policy sub-spaces (e.g. 
education, transport) a variety of public agencies may compete for power (which he 
defines in terms of their access to political support, expertise and their internal 
organisational cohesion and leadership). They use these sources of power to protect or 
extend their ‘turf within existing policy sub-spaces or even to invade other sub­
spaces. He argues that agencies may compete, aggressively or defensively, and form 
co-operative alliances for both purposes, both within their policy sub-space and to 
mount ‘poaching’ attempts on other sub-spaces. A contemporary UK example might 
be the defensive alliances formed, in some cases, between local authorities and 
housing associations in order to maintain local control over social housing against 
attempts by central government to take-over its management through the mechanism 
of Housing Action Trusts ( in some cases local authorities legally transferred 
ownership of their housing stock to local Housing associations to avoid the effects of 
the Housing legislation).
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This model is very close to the notion of a “super program budget” advanced by 
Dunleavy (1991:182) in his model of the hierarchy of bureau budgets (Figure 3:5)
Figure 3:5 Components of Core, Bureau, Program and Super-program Budgets
Super-program budget
• other agencies resources controlled by top-tier agency
• plus
Program budget
• funding passed to other public agencies for spending
• plus
Bureau budget
• funding used to purchase external services
• plus
Core budget
• direct spending on bureau personnel, buildings, etc.
Source: adapted Tom Dunleavy, 1991:182)
Dunleavy’s model suggests a missing element from Skok’s model, which is the more 
tangible resources available to public agencies (e.g. control of existing 
revenue/budgets, ownership of property, etc.) which in some instances can be a major 
area of dispute. This needs to be added to his list of organisational resources: political 
support; technical expertise and organisational cohesion and leadership. This gives a 
four factor model, as shown in Figure 3:6
Figure 3:6 Public Organisations competitive advantages
Skok’s (1989) model: adding the level of material
resources controlled by the 
organisation:
Cohesion &' 
LeadershipExpertise
Political
Support
Cohesion & 
Leadership
Material
esourcesExpertise
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simplifying the 
terminology and linking 
with ‘domain theory’
Management
Matenal
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Professions
Expertise
Political
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Skok’s concept of a policy sub-space also needs to be expanded to embrace the notion 
of service provision as well as policy formation. If this is done, it is possible to apply 
this notion of a policy/provision sub-space, embracing all the key “institutions, 
agencies, and groups with (both) a seriously felt stake in the outcomes of policy” and 
a role in providing services. (Skok, 1989:141).
Quasi-Markets - Constrained Competition
A relatively new phenomena for public organisations, and their managers, in the UK 
has been the introduction of “quasi-markets”. What are “quasi-markets”?
“They are ‘markets’ because they replace monopolistic state providers 
with competitive independent ones. They are ‘quasi’ because they differ 
from conventional markets in a number of key ways.” (Le Grand & 
Bartlett, 1993:10)
Le Grand and Bartlett suggest the limitations of quasi-markets are that on the supply 
side some, if not all, providers may be non-profit organisations whilst on the demand 
side consumer purchasing power is not expressed directly in money terms, but through 
a purchasing agency or allocated to the users in the form of vouchers rather than cash 
(1993:10).
These points can be expanded and added to by utilising the notion of a 
policy/provision sub-space developed above. Thus, in quasi-markets there are a 
number of limitations which would not apply in open market situations. These 
include the size and structure of the market being politically determined, limitation of 
choice to within the market, limits on the expansion/diversification of public 
providers and limits on the legal enforceability of contracts and consumer’s rights.
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Figure 3:7 Quasi-markets and conventional markets
Quasi-Markets in the Public Sector Conventional Markets
total size of the market is determined by the total size of market
agency(ies) controlling resource allocation to the determined by consumer
sub-space (e.g. the total health budget determined by choice
t^D o H )
the quasi-market is structured by allocative decisions internal structure of market
within the overall policy/provision sub-space (e.g. determined by consumer
regional or sub-programme allocations of health choice
budgets)
choice by consumers (through vouchers) or agents consumers can “exit” market
acting on their behalf is limited to within the sub- altogether and choose
space (i.e. recipients can’t use training vouchers to alternative markets
buy health seryices)
expansion/contraction of individual public provider providers can take-over less
units is limited (e.g. a successful NHS Trust cannot successful rivals
begin purchasing oAer Tmsts)
diversification of provider units is also controlled providers can diversify into
(e.g. a successful NHS Trust also cannot start other markets
purchasing Grant Mainlined Schools)
contracts within quasi-markets (in the UK) between contracts are legally
public organisations (e.g. DHAs and NHS Trusts) enforceable
are usually unenforceable in law.
consumers have very limited legally enforceable consumers have extensive
rights leg^rights
(on the last two points see Harden, 1992)
Thus, quasi-markets have severe limitations placed upon them even in theory. In 
practice, research is beginning to show that the degree of actual competition within 
quasi-markets is quite limited by other operational factors, including geographical 
problems, incomplete information, transaction costs, and others (see e.g. Le Grand & 
Bartlett, 1993; Tilley, 1994).
Indeed, it is arguable that some of the actual effects of the introduction of quasi­
markets have been to stimulate greater non-market competition. Thus Tilley (1994) 
shows that in one London NHS purchasing area non-GP fund-holders were stimulated 
into using much greater lobbying and other pressures (i.e. non-market) pressures to 
achieve their objectives.
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It is also arguable that policy towards quasi-markets has been less than consistent. For 
example, when the NHS internal market reforms of 1990 threatened to produce a 
major market-driven structural change in provision within London, the Government 
immediately responded with a non-market (but nevertheless competitive) process 
embodied in the Tomlinson Commission and subsequent specialist reviews and the 
London Implementation Group. The keynote of this process has not been quasi-market 
competition but political and lobbying competition at a variety of levels.
Markets - Less Constrained. Fully Competitive
As has been argued above, all public organisations are subjected to some market 
forces in so far as they have to compete in markets for labour, finances, supplies and 
other services within conventional markets. Thus many public organisations were 
badly hit by shortages of certain types of skilled personnel (e.g. in IT) during the mid- 
1980s boom.
However, some public organisations have been pushed much further into the 
conventional market place. Some 12 UK Executive Agencies that have become full 
“trading funds” (i.e. they receive no direct public money but must earn it by 
competitive bids, and can also earn income from non-public sources) operate in 
(almost) conventional markets (e.g. HMSO, Fire Service College, etc. - see Harrow 
and Talbot, 1994). It is unclear how far these Agencies will move into a fully 
conventional market setting and how far they currently receive covert support from 
their traditional public customers or government.
Analysing Competition: Policy. Quasi-Market and Market
All public organisation are affected by three of the four forces examined above - non­
competitive force; competitive non-market forces and market forces - and many are 
now also affected by variants of quasi-markets (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993).
This section concentrates on the question: how can competition within a 
policy/provision sub-space be analysed?
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This policy/provision sub-space is clearly analogous to the idea of an ‘industry’ in 
private sector organisation and management theory. (Indeed, some policy/provision 
sub-spaces are sometimes colloquially called ‘industries’, e.g. the “education 
industry”). Can models of competitive forces in ‘industry analysis’ be adapted to 
analyse the competition within policy/provision sub-spaces. Figure 3:8 gives an 
example of trying to adapt the most famous industry competitive analysis model, 
Porter’s “five forces” (1979), to analysing competitive forces within a public 
policy/provision sub-space.
In this model the bargaining power of suppliers in the private sector has been replaced 
by the main ‘supplier’ in the public sector - the power of the agency which provides 
material resources and policy frameworks. The power of buyers is replaced by the 
power of customers/clients, service recipients, to affect the levels of and types of 
services provided. The threat of new entrants includes both non-public providers 
(private and voluntary) as well as rival agencies from other policy/provision sub­
spaces. The threat of new products or services is very similar to Porter’s model, whilst 
the ‘jockeying for position within the industry’ becomes the level of competition/co­
operation within the policy/provision sub-space by different agencies.
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Figure 3:8 Competition in Public Policy/Provision Sub-Spaces
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This model can also be used to explain changes in other sectors and indeed to 
illustrate the policy options being pursued by central government to positively 
promote increased competitiveness in most policy/provision sub-systems. Thus the 
Citizen’s Charter is purported to increase the power of customers/clients whilst the 
use of market testing and CCT is meant to promote the power of new entrants. The 
creation of the NHS internal market is clearly an attempt to create greater competition 
within the health policy/provision sub-system by forced break-down of previous 
alliances and co-operative arrangements whilst the education reforms do the same by 
removing the local education authorities as the vehicle of co-operation, increasing the 
power of the central state and (supposedly) the customer and even creating new 
entrants (e.g. City Technology colleges, TEC’s, private sector training providers, etc.) 
Similarly, the Higher Education reform (creating single status HE) can be seen as a 
deliberate attempt to disrupt old alliances within the two parts of the old binary HE 
and promote greater competition.
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Common et al (1991) have suggested a six fold model of public markets in the UK, 
based on their analysis of a number of organisations subject to varying degrees of 
competition:
1. single providers - single purchasers (“playing at shops”)
2. multiple providers - single purchasers (monopsony)
3. single providers - multiple purchasers (monopoly)
4. multiple providers - multiple purchasers (competitive internal market)
5. multiple providers - multiple purchasers; limited individual consumer choice 
(competitive internal market with limited individual choice)
6. multiple providers - multiple purchasers; limited individual consumer choice;
mediated by limited political control (competitive internal market with limited
individual choice and political control)
This typology is clearly of varieties of quasi-markets and a further category should be 
added - the ‘non-market’ or classical public administration model.
Their definition of “political control” for type (6) is that the overall amount of 
resources allocation is still determined by political decision making (e.g. the total 
NHS budget), whilst allocation within the internal market is by various competitive 
mechanisms. It is difficult to see how this condition does not apply to all the types 
suggested, which reduce their typology to 5 types, each one operating within a 
framework of overall resource determination by political decision.
It is also possible to distinguish between those instances of multiple providers (in 
types 2, 4 & 5) where competitors include both public and private providers and those 
where competition is limited to public organisations. Applying these factors to the 
“five forces” model developed above we get the following sets of possibilities and 
questions (Figure 3:8).
Each of the Common et al types can be mapped onto this structure, (Figure 3:8) e.g.:
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1. single providers - single purchasers (“playing at shops”)
The establishment of the Next Steps Agencies, which mainly involves splitting the 
overall agency determining resources and policy (e.g. Dept, of Social Security) from a 
single provider of services (e.g. Benefits Agency, in the distribution of benefits).
5. multiple providers - multiple purchasers; limited individual consumer choice 
(competitive internal market with limited individual choice)
Figure 3:9 Internal Markets in the Public Sector
1. Resource/Policy Agency
1.1 Power of the agency supplying
resources inputs and policy
frameworks (e.g. is it sole source
of funding)?
and
1.2 is it separated from provision
(e.g. Next Steps agencies)?
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by rival public ^ 3.2 how much do they a— ‘alternative’ medicine)
providers (e.g. local compete?
government/ NHS
over community care)?
it ft it
5. Purchasers/Consumers
5.1 multiple purchasers (e.g. NHS
reforms)?
and
5.2 public only purchasers?
and
5.3 how much individual
consumer choice (e.g. patients-GP
fund holders; fee paying; etc.)?
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It should be added that in some cases the ‘market’ for public sector providers has been 
subject not only to multiple purchasers but that the reduction in overall resource 
provision and the freeing of the agency to ‘sell’ services outside the public sector has 
resulted in private purchasers or individual paying consumers also becoming part of 
the organisation’s market position, e.g. in the case of HMSO (see Common et al) or 
the Fire Service College.
Problems of Transferring Private Sector Tools
One point worth mentioning here is the implication of the above analysis for the 
viability of transferring analytical tools used in the private sector to the public sector. 
The “five forces” model needs substantial adaptation, along the lines suggested here, 
to be useful to public managers. The need to adapt ‘generic’ (in reality private sector 
based) approaches to public management conditions is made, but not greatly expanded 
upon, by Bryson when he analyses nine private sector approaches to strategic planning 
and concludes that all of them could be used for public organisations but only either 
with modifications or if certain conditions are met (1988:24-30).
Strategic management is clearly derived as an idea and a practice from profit-making, 
private sector institutions. Can it be transferred to public service organisations? Some 
of the strategic management experts certainly have their doubts. Argenti, one of the 
earliest strategic management writers in the UK, thought that strategic management 
ought to be applied to ‘non-for-profit’ (NFP - public and charitable) organisations but 
wasn’t sure that it could be:
“Most these (non-profit) organisations do not do corporate planning as I 
define it; most of them do not do it as anyone would define it. Why not? 
Chiefly because they cannot determine their corporate objectives to the 
same standard as companies can and, consequently, cannot use corporate 
planning....Alas, they fall at the first fence.” (Argenti, 1989:87).
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He goes on to set out a tentative, and not too convincing, method for establishing 
corporate objectives for NFP’s based around defining intended beneficiaries, benefits 
and corporate performance indicators.
Most textbooks on strategic management seem to be still grappling with, or trying to 
slide around, this central problem identified by Argenti.
Many textbooks simply seem to ignore public sector organisations altogether (e.g. 
Boseman and Phatak, 1989). Others address the issue but conclude that public 
organisations are really no different. Johnson and Scholes, for example, give some 
reasons why public sector organisations are different - greater political influence, their 
‘market’ is a political one for resources, quasi-monopoly position, emphasis on value 
for money and performance measures, the criterion of ideological acceptability in 
public sector strategies is more important than for private companies, etc. They then 
still go on to conclude that “the model of strategic management discussed here still 
holds” (1993:27-29). Similarly, Thompson sets out a similar list of differences of 
NFPs, whilst still treating them as essentially the same as private sector companies:
• importance of stakeholders, especially those providing funding
• potentially conflicting objectives, with financial ones seen as less important than 
more qualitative ones
• financial objectives are easier to measure than more qualitative ones, making 
assessing performance in terms that are important more difficult
• efficient use of resources (rather than effectiveness) tends to become key objective
This approach is explicitly rejected by Bowman and Asch who state that:
“...there were fundamental differences between [not-for-profit and profit 
seeking] types of organisations....In contrast, [to Johnson and Scholes] we 
believe that NFPs require special treatment in a book on strategic 
management” (1987:379)
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and go on to identify key differences in areas such as goals, performance 
measurement, funding and external coalitions and internal power structures (:379- 
400).
Perhaps the best illustration of the problematic nature of transferring many of the 
processes, techniques and tools of private sector strategic management to the public 
sector is the dearth of serious attempts to tackle public sector issues in many strategic 
management textbooks. We have already mentioned, for example, Jonhson & Scholes 
fairly cursory treatment. However, even Bowman and Asch, who at least recognise the 
issue (see above), state that:
“As this book is primarily concerned with strategic decision-making in the 
firm we make no apologies about the overwhelming emphasis on private 
sector organisations.” (1987:379)
Whilst commendably honest, and they do at least include a whole Chapter on not-for- 
profits, the ‘overwhelming emphasis’ on private sector companies does little to help 
public managers struggling with strategic issues. Others have virtually ignored the 
issue altogether, either failing to recognise any fundamental differences or covering 
public organisations very little or not at all (e.g. Greenly, 1989; Boseman & Phatak, 
1989, Thompson, 1993).
This problem is reinforced by the lack of textbooks on strategic management 
specifically for the public sector. While there are some, they are relatively few and far 
between compared to the mass of private sector based books. Of these, most simply 
transfer the basic models of private sector strategic management with very little 
explicit discussion of the constraints operating in the public sector (e.g. Koteen, 1991 
or Burkhart & Reuss, 1993). In one case the authors talk about “stripping the 
‘business’ veneer” from strategic planning to “demystify” the subject (Burkhart & 
Reuss, 1993:x). This seems to imply that the private sector orientation of most 
strategic management literature is just a veneer and what they have to say is easily 
transferable to the public and non-profit sectors once the veneer has been stripped 
away.
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They implicitly recognise the differences - few of them, for example, would bother to 
include a section on product/market strategies or portfolio analysis. However, Bryson 
(1988) argues that most private sector approaches to strategic management (if not all 
techniques) can be transferred, with reservations or modifications, to the public sector. 
However, Bryson (1988) offers one of the few attempts at constructing a public sector 
model for strategic management which differs substantially from the private sector 
based models and seriously addresses the specificity of these types of organisations. 
As will be discussed below, the crucial difference identified by Argenti (above), in 
setting organisational objectives, is also the major defining difference between the 
model offered by Bryson (and other such as Nutt & Backoff, 1992) and the private 
sector based models. The next section examines this issue.
O r g a n is a t io n a l  G o a l s  - P u b l ic  S e c t o r  P r o b l e m s
In the previous section some of the differences in the environment within which 
public organisations operate have been mapped out. Public organisations are 
controlled by policy constraints and participate in competition over resources, whether 
through policy competition, quasi-market and market. Of these four forces, only one 
(conventional markets) apply to fully private organisations. In this section the 
problems associated with setting goals for public organisations are considered.
An interesting example of how crucial, and difficult, the issue of overall 
organisational objectives is implied in the Audit Commission’s ‘Handbook’ for Local 
Authorities on ‘Improving Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness’ (1985). This 
reproduces the McKinsey ‘7S Framework’, much publicised by the success of Peters 
and Waterman’s ‘In Search of Excellence’ (1982, for a more detailed account of the 
model see Pascale & Athos, 1981).
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Figure 3:10 Shared Values or Vision?
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However, the Audit Commission’s version of the ‘7S’s’ has a notable difference from 
the McKinsey version - the central ‘S’ is not an ‘S’ at all (Figure 3:10). In the 
McKinsey version, this central ‘S’ was ‘superordinate values’ (later changed to 
‘shared values’ for simplicity). The Audit Commission version, which perhaps 
understandably is not attributed, changes the ‘shared values’ into ‘vision’ - “what the 
authority is seeking to be or to achieve” (1985:5). They go on to discuss how ‘vision’ 
should be set out in “the manifesto presented to the local electorate” but that:
“councils have been reluctant to accept risks inherent in setting out 
explicitly, a philosophy of ‘what we are about and how we want to 
change’ with which people can disagree, and priorities...which by 
definition favour some interests at the expense of others...(which) may be 
difficult to achieve in a democracy (and may lead to a polarisation of 
opposition)...” (1985:6).
It is of course not “councils” who will not accept this approach but politicians. 
Publicly accountable organisations like local authorities, which operate through 
institutionalised values conflicts, otherwise known as political parties, cannot have 
‘shared values’ (McKinsey) but can only manage ‘vision’ (or ‘dominant values’) at 
best (Audit Commission) and often not even that.
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S t r a t e g ic  pr o c e ss  a n d  Co n ten t  in  th e  Public  S e c t o r
Strategic Contradictions
The ‘espoused theory’ (Argyris & Schon, 1974) of public sector policy and strategy 
formation for three decades, or more, has undoubtedly been strategy in the ‘planning 
mode’. From PPBS in the 1960s through to contemporary attempts to apply private 
sector strategic management techniques this model has dominated theory and practice 
(Tomkins, 1987). The ‘theory in use’ (Argyris & Schon, 1974) of public sector 
management has probably tended to be more dominated by strategy in the political 
mode - strategic decision processes dominated by ‘political’ processes of conflict and 
coalition forming and strategic decision content of an mainly incremental, piece-meal, 
nature.
The identification of most UK local government as having no coherent strategies of 
their own (being ‘reactors’) (Greenwood, 1987 - see Figure 3:2 above) and of 
adopting ‘compliant’ budgetary strategies towards central government (Elcock et al, 
1989) adds significant evidence that ‘strategic management’ in its active, private 
sector, sense is more prescribed than practised. Yet it is practised by some, in the case 
of the “prospectors” (10% in Greenwood’s study) in quite radical and innovative 
ways. Certainly the external pressure, from bodies such as the Audit Commission, to 
adopt more strategic planning and management remain strong (Audit Commission, 
1986; Caulfield & Schultz, 1989).
This, implicit, acceptance of competing values in local authorities by the Audit 
Commission reinforces the findings of Greenwood (1987, and see above) about the 
single largest ‘strategic style’ of these organisations being ‘reactors’, i.e. pursuing 
unstable and inconsistent strategies (using Miles & Snow’s ‘prospector’, ‘analyser’, 
‘defender’ and ‘reactor’ categories of strategic style). This instability and lack of 
consistency clearly comes from the competing values of the ‘policy domain’ and their 
impact on strategy, as well as the differing values underpinning the ‘policy’, 
‘management’ and ‘service’ domains discussed in Chapter 1, and is more or less 
pervasive throughout public organisations.
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This chronic system of conflicting values makes having consistent strategies very 
difficult - the exception is where one of the three domains becomes dominant and has 
a consistent approach itself. For example, a radical local authority ruling party, with a 
strong majority and policy, may be in a position to impose a consistent strategy on the 
other domains (becoming a ‘prospector’ or ‘analyser’?) Similarly, a very weak and 
evenly divided ‘policy’ domain may allow a strong ‘management’ team or powerful 
‘service’ domain to drive strategy in consistent directions (i.e. ‘prospector’, ‘analyser’ 
or ‘defender’). Conversely, a ‘balanced’ conflict between the three domains would 
undoubtedly produce a ‘reactor’ style.
Likewise, the flux of competing values systems within the public organisation will 
produce fluxes in strategic modes - in particular periods of stable domination by one 
strategic mode are fairly unlikely, with the exception of the ‘political’ mode which is 
best suited to such internal conflicts.
Many writers on strategy in public service organisations have raised the issue of 
contradictory forces operating in these organisations, although the terminology used 
varies through ‘dilemma’, ‘dualities’, ‘quandary’, and ‘choices’. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 5, these variations can be reduced to three responses to contradiction: 
‘dilemma’ which seeks to pose either/or alternatives, ‘dialectics’ which seeks to 
resolve contradictions through synthesis, or ‘paradox’ which recognises the 
inevitability of contradictions and seeks to work with them rather than ‘resolve’ the 
irresolvable. It is the latter approach which is adopted later to examine strategy sub­
systems in public services organisations. In the examples of commentaries on 
contradiction which follow, it tends to be the ‘dilemma’ approach which 
predominates.
Pettigrew et al (1992), in a longitudinal study of strategic change in the NHS, talk 
about the “dualities and dilemmas in managing change”, which reflects Pettigrew’s 
wider approach to strategy (Pettigrew, 1977, Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991).
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Bryson (1988b), writing about the public sector generally, discusses the “strategic 
quandary” of big wins and small wins. The process of strategic planning and 
management is not a ‘one best way’ issue: “it should be clear that strategic planning is 
not a single concept, procedure or tool” Bryson (1988a:43), which are more or less 
applicable in the public services. While he describes a model system, he stresses the 
importance of context and sensitivity in developing specific applications.
In the same vein, commenting on a set of case studies of strategic management in a 
variety of public services, Pollitt and Harrison (1992:281) state that the cases 
represent both differences in strategic management models and differences in context 
of application. Thus there is no ‘one best way’ for strategy formulation or 
management, content or process, in the public services.
Stewart, in a commentary on ‘approaches to public policy’, suggests that in designing 
policy making systems in public organisations there are series of dilemmas to be 
confronted (which could apply to strategy making systems): comprehensive vs. 
selective; uniformity vs. diversity; intervenes vs. permits; participatory vs. directive; 
certainty vs. flexibility; incremental vs. radical; political vs. neutral; centralised vs. 
decentralised; quantitative vs. qualitative (Stewart, 1982:239-241).
Elcock et al (1989) have identified three common strategies which UK local 
authorities used in budget preparation, as a response to constant central government 
pressure:
• compliance strategies, which incrementally adjust existing strategies to meet 
reduced provision;
• shadow-boxing strategies, which seek to marginally increase revenue through 
bargaining with central government whilst hiding real spending patterns;
• and brinkmanship strategies, which seek to defend existing levels and patterns 
of provision by through political conflict
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Whilst the first of these was found to predominate, the organisations were seen to be 
faced with real dilemmas about which to adopt.
Strategy Sub-Systems in the Public Services
As can be seen from the examples given above, the focus on ‘dilemmas’, making 
either/or choices tends to dominate the analysis of strategic practice in public services 
organisations. Yet it also clear from these analyses that in practice making such 
choices is problematic a best, if not unattainable in practice. The ‘paradox’ or 
‘competing values’ approach developed in this thesis (following Quinn, 1988; Quinn 
& Cameron, 1988, Quinn et al, 1990, etc.) offers a different view of the contradictions 
which so clearly predominate in strategy processes and content in public 
organisations.
In this section a particular ‘map’ of some key paradoxes is developed. An attempt is 
made to identify strategy sub-systems within public services organisations, using 
domain theory as a frame of reference, and to establish some key contradictions or 
paradoxes, within each domain. This is not to suggest that these are the only 
contradictions, as can be seen from the previous section contradictions abound. The 
particular set which have been identified have been kept simple and broad enough to 
provide a useful framework for beginning to identify ‘strategic competences’ which is 
attempted later in this Chapter.
That there are strategic paradoxes between the approaches of the ‘policy’, 
‘management’ and ‘service’ domains is best illustrated by using an example from 
more generic or private sector issues in strategic management: what are our products 
and who are our customers?
P e o p l e  a n d  P r o d u c ts
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In private sector models of strategy these would be markets and products and would 
form the real core of strategic decision processes - what to produce and who to sell it 
to? The public services are far more complex. As domain theory suggests, each 
domain perceives ‘customer’ and ‘product’ very differently. The terminology of 
‘customer’ itself would be viewed differently from different domains, so for the sake 
of this analysis the more ‘domain-neutral’ word ‘people’ will be used.
For the policy domain, ‘people’ are seen simultaneously as the ‘Public’ (as voters), the 
‘Citizen’ (an ideal type individual with rights and responsibilities) and as 
‘Constituent’ (real individuals pressing real claims, casting real votes). 
Correspondingly the product of public services is seen primarily in political terms as 
either ‘public service’ (a service done to the voters), ‘public duty’ (a service done for 
civic principle) or as ‘dispensation’ (a service done for specific interest groups with 
specific political objectives).
Figure 3:11 Public services - people and products
Public Service Domain People as.... Product as....
Policy Domain ‘Public’ ‘Public Service’
‘Citizen” & ‘Public Duty’
‘Constituent’ & ‘Dispensation’
Management Domain ‘Consumer’ & ‘Products’ or ‘Services’
‘Customer’ Provision
Service Domain ‘Client’ & 
‘Participant’
‘Personal Services’
The management domain perceives ‘people’ mainly as ‘consumers’ or as ‘customers’ 
(in the new public management) to whom ‘products’ or ‘services’ are provided. As 
‘consumers’ or ‘customers’ they can complain and make legitimate demands on their 
‘suppliers’ for quality services and reasonable treatment.
For the professionals in the service domain ‘people’ are seen as ‘clients’ and often as 
‘participants’ in the provision of individually tailored ‘personal services’.
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Thus the two key components of strategy, markets (who) and product (what) are seen 
quite differently by the three domains. Inevitably this leads to different types of 
strategy, as will be examined below. The three views of ‘people’ and ‘product’ are 
clearly incompatible and contradictory and, domain theory suggests, paradoxical.
In the next three sections a key strategic paradox within, rather between, each domain 
is suggested.
St r a t e g y  in  th e  P o lic y  D o m a in : P o lic y  v s . Pr o v isio n
“Deciding corporate objectives for non-profit-making organisations is the 
last unconquered peak in the study of management.” (Argenti, 1989:xiv)
As Argenti suggests, and as the Audit Commission/McKinsey 7S ‘vision’ or ‘shared 
values’ example discussed earlier, deciding on objectives for public organisations is 
beset with problems. Setting of organisational objectives or mission is seen as a key 
issue which separates public sector organisations from their private counterparts at the 
strategic level. Strategic objectives can be viewed from two perspectives:
• strategic objectives as ‘policy’ is the broad, long term, (usually formalised in 
legislation or other authoritative documents) approach to both specific areas of 
public services and the general principles underpinning particular approaches
• strategic objectives as ‘provision’ is embedded in decisions about the of resources 
allocated to different policy areas as well as the total allocated for public services
The usual perception, and often criticism, of public services organisations has been 
that they are budget driven. The Audit Commission’s ‘Handbook’ for Local 
Authorities (1986) suggests strongly that local government has been often reluctant to 
set clear, broad, policies about organisational objectives. Setting of budgets, or 
‘provision’, is therefore by implication the key strategic objective setting system. In
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practice, ‘policy’ and ‘provision’ systems are often out of step with one another. For 
example, a critical difference between these two systems is their differing time-cycles. 
The time horizons of ‘policy’ systems are largely determined by electoral cycles and 
the process of developing manifestos, policy documents and legislation or rules - i.e. 
they are usually spread over 4-5 years. The time horizons of ‘provision’ systems are 
usually much shorter, determined by annual budget cycles. These differing cycles 
obviously contribute to the contradictions and tensions between the two systems. One 
local government manager commented to the author “we seem to spend 9 months 
every year talking about broad policy issues and then promptly forget everything in 
the scramble for resources in the annual budget period.”
This view is confirmed by a review of research on public management which 
identified public management as ‘custodial management’ but drew a distinction 
between ‘budgetary’ and ‘policy’ management:
“The first of these [budgetary management] in which the requirements of 
meeting predetermined budget limits are the major device of control. The 
second [policy management] is where policy, in the sense of a definite 
choice between different ends, has in some way dictated the direction and 
character of managerial action.” (Ackroyd, Hughes & Soothill, 1989:603- 
604)
This model is presented as a dilemma between two forms of custodial management, 
with the authors choosing to favour the ‘policy management’ end of the dilemma, but 
it could equally be seen as a paradox between two competing elements in strategy 
making.
Strategy in the ‘policy’ domain can therefore be seen as concentrating on two, 
paradoxical, sub-systems: ‘policy’ making and ‘provision’ or resource allocation. 
Managers who operate at the strategic level, it can be suggested, need competences to 
deal with both sub-systems and, perhaps more importantly, how to manage the 
paradox between the two.
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St r a t e g y  in  t h e  M a n a g e m en t  D o m a in : P la n n in g  v s . Pr a g m a t ism
‘Planning’ and ‘pragmatism’ appear to be logically contradictory and clearly a 
problem for strategic managers in whatever organisation they work. Writers on 
strategy, from all strands of thinking, have constantly rehearsed the arguments about 
the tension between ‘plans’ and ‘pragmatism’. Hampden-Tumer (1994) poses this as a 
“dilemma within strategic learning loop” (see Figure 3:12).
Figure 3:12 Strategic learning loop
Top management
 ► designs strategies from ----------
the top down so that...
Strategic initiatives
----------- emerge from the bottom *---------
up, so that...
Source: adapted from Hampden-Tumer, 1994
Others have talked about the dilemma between ‘big wins and small wins’ (Bryson, 
1988b) or ‘balancing opportunism and planning’ (Stacey, 1990).
This tension has led public managers to try to ‘resolve’ it through ‘blending planning 
and pragmatism’, as two Kent County Council managers put it in describing their own 
organisations strategic management system (Lavery & Hume, 1991). They point out 
that:
“the production of a paper plan often appears to be an end in itself. How 
often have you been in an organisation which goes through the motions of 
preparing a plan but the status quo remains unchanged? There is no point 
in producing a plan if you do not expect to make significant changes in 
resource allocation, major policies or methods of service delivery.” Lavery 
& Hume, 1991:40).
Parston makes a similar point that “strategy is not simply a plan” and echoes Lavery & 
Hume in suggesting that “strategic planning, though, more frequently produces a plan 
than a strategy.” (Partson, 1986:59). He goes on the argue that J.B.Quinn’s ‘logical
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incrementalism’ offers a link between strategy making and learning from practice 
(implementation).
The two strategy systems in the management domain can be thus be suggested as:
• strategy as ‘plan’ can be seen as both about strategic process (a planning cycle) 
and about strategic content (a plan), although the emphasis is usually on the latter. 
Bryson (1988) outlines a general, formalised, planning process for public and non­
profit organisations, while Joubert (1988) argues that such processes will only 
work if the political and managerial domains are clearly separated, with the latter 
given a great deal of autonomy.
• strategy as ‘pragmatism’ is about ‘response systems’ or ‘learning’ from 
implementation and experience. It is about responses to changing circumstances, 
which sometimes fall within broad plans and sometimes require radical re­
orientation, often without the time to re-plan effectively.
St r a t e g y  in  t h e  Ser v ic e  D o m a in : Pr o fessio nal  pra ctic e  v s . Pro duc t /se r v ic e  d e l iv er y
As has been argued in Chapter 1, professional practice, which is heavily influenced by 
national professional bodies (Mintzberg, 1983), usually evolves only slowly, and is 
difficult for the policy or management domains to control. On the other hand, there 
has been a strong tendency, culminating in policy initiatives like the Citizens’ Charter, 
for the policy and managerial domains to want to impose standards of service 
delivery, and often new organisational forms to support such standards, on to the 
‘professional operating core’ or service domain.
A good example of the tension between what will be called here the ‘professional 
practice’ and the ‘product/service delivery’ sub-systems is the introduction of total 
quality management (TQM) initiatives. Some difficulty has been encountered in 
applying TQM - one report of US public sector TQM initiatives shows that less than 
half of the sample measured ‘customer satisfaction’ at all (Brockman, 1992), largely
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due to opposition from professionals. Morgan & Murgatroyd likewise argue that TQM
V
has often been seen by professionals as a managerialist challenge to their traditional 
autonomy and self-defining standards of practice. They point out that other systems 
besides TQM, such as clinical audit, are also forcing professionals, reluctantly, to 
come to terms with organisationally imposed systems for delivering, standardising, 
measuring and evaluating services (1994:73-74).
The two paradoxical strategy systems which can therefore be identified as operating in 
the service domain could be described as:
• professional practice which leads to emergent and evolutionary changes in service 
delivery (and hence organisational strategy), often driven by professional 
innovations imported from outside of the organisation through professional 
channels
• product/service strategy which defines the standards and delivery methods of 
services to be provided by the organisation, which can often be imposed by the 
managerial or policy domains and linked to technological changes (in the broadest 
sense of both managerial/organisational technique and service delivery 
technology).
The three pairs of strategic sub-systems described above can be mapped onto the 
domain structure of public service organisations as in Figure 3:13. It should be 
stressed that this is not an attempt to produce an exhaustive analysis of possible 
contradictory and paradoxical elements in strategic processes and content in public 
human services organisations. Its purpose is primarily to allow analysis of the types of 
paradoxical elements which strategic public managers have to cope with. The 
elements have therefore been deliberately kept reasonably small in number, to prevent 
over-complication of the issue and allow for feasible research within the constraints 
discussed later in Chapter 5.
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Figure 3:13 Strategy sub-systems in public service organisations
ervice
omain
Product/Service
Delivery
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Sub-System
Provision (Resource) 
Decision 
Sub-System
Policy Making 
Sub-System
Management
Domain
Pragmatic Response Planning
Sub-System Sub-System
As can be seen from Figure 3:13, it is also not the case that these six sub-systems 
which relate to strategy are merely three pairs of mutually contradictory and 
paradoxical elements. As the diagram suggests, in reality all six elements can be 
regarded as to some degree paradoxical and interactive. Strategy making, this model 
would suggest, will often be the consequence of a particular configuration of relative 
strengths and weaknesses amongst these six elements or sub-systems.
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For example, an account of strategy making process and outcomes of the Ministry of 
Social Security, British Columbia, makes explicit the links between managerial 
planning and policy decisions ( Russell & Prince, 1992). Another detailed 
examination of strategy formation as a combined policy and planning process in local 
government is given in Rider (1983). Both these could be viewed as examples where 
the policy, planning and product/service delivery sub-systems predominate.
Joubert (1988) argues that strategic planning will not work in public organisations 
without substantial reforms to separate more clearly policy making from management, 
along the lines of the UK government’s “Next Steps” initiatives. This is an example of 
how the close link between policy and planning sub-systems, as noted in the two cases 
above, can also be seen as detrimental to planning. Policy making can just as easily be 
seen as (values driven) political interference in the (managerial) planning process as it 
can be seen as a rational integration of the two sub-systems.
In the case of local authorities that make medium term revenue and spending plans 
which are “projections of levels of spending necessary to sustain the present pattern of 
services” then “if there is strategy in these cases, it is often concealed in the detail of 
the planning process” (Caulfield & Schultz, 1989:7). This is perhaps an example of 
the resource allocation system dominating strategy almost exclusively.
Strategic Modes in Public Services
The strategic modes discussed in Chapter 2 (planning, learning, politics and visionary) 
are derived from the trends in generic literature and research on strategic management. 
In this section each of these four strategic modes is very briefly reviewed in the 
literature on public services organisations. These comments are intended to be 
additional to the outline of the four modes developed more fully in Chapter 2, 
appending some ideas from the public sector to the basic concepts.
Th e  P l a n n in g  M o d e
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Just as the planning mode has dominated writing and prescription in generic strategic 
management so it has also dominated the in public sector:
“Despite the criticisms of PPBS as a top-down, over rational planning 
system, many publications, managers and consultants still think in terms 
of its basic building blocks and form of deductive logic when asked to 
describe what planning and control is all about.” (Tomkins, 1987:77)
Tomkins goes on to show how such varied official initiatives as central Government’s 
“Financial Management Initiative” and the Audit Commission’s advice to local 
authorities in the mid-1980’s are all based on rationalist approaches and that while:
“those responsible for improving management in the public sector 
recognise the arguments against totally comprehensive rationalistic 
planning but, given that they have responsibilities for achieving progress, 
still adopt the only model of management that they feel has a general logic 
and acceptability; despite its imperfections.” (Tomkins, 1987:78-9)
The rational planning model has been strongly defended from more recent attacks, for 
example Leach writes ‘in defence of the rational model’ (1982) whilst Caulfield & 
Schulz write about the need for ‘restoring strategic planning’s reputation’ (1989).
The planning systems have evolved from Plan, Programme and Budgeting System 
(PPBS - originated under the Johnson administration in the US); Zero Based 
Budgeting (ZBB - Carter administration); cost-benefit analysis; etc. More recently 
writers have proposed a range of strategic planning models which have the same sorts 
of rationalist, step-by-step, models as dominate generic models (e.g. Bryson, 1988a; 
Osbome & Gaebler, 1992; Hughes, 1994; Caulfield & Schulz, 1989; etc.). Many of 
these models do stress one difference between private and public organisations, that is 
that the setting of broad policy, organisational mandates or objectives in the policy 
domain. In most cases they propose specific solutions, for example Bryson’s (1988a) 
discussion of a necessary stage of clarifying mandates as a precursor for the rest of the 
strategic planning process. However, in most cases this is the only essential difference 
between these models and their private sector equivalents.
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T h e  P o l it ic a l  M o de
In one sense, the stage of resolving political direction for public services organisations 
discussed above forms part of strategy in the political mode.
“Policies are frequently ambiguous; but their ambiguities are less a result 
of the deficiencies in policy makers than a natural consequence of gaining 
necessary support for the policies, and of changing preferences over time. 
Conflict of interest is not just a property of the relations between policy 
makers on the one hand and administrators on the other; it is a general 
feature o f policy negotiation and bureaucratic life” (Baier et al, 1986 - 
emphasis added)
It is important here to avoid a confusion in terminology. The ‘political mode* is used 
to describe the generic situation, in public or private organisations, when contending 
forces vie for power and control within the organisation. These struggles, which 
include issues of expediency and values, take place in all organisations. ‘Politics’ is 
the best metaphor for this situation, but it is only a metaphor and is not to be confused 
with the real political activity of parties, politicians, elections, etc. surrounding public 
organisations and within which they are embedded. The difference is between 
organisational politics (small ‘p’) and electoral Politics (big ‘P’).
Having said that, public sector organisations have a propensity for encouraging 
organisational politics precisely because of the instability and institutionalised values 
conflicts which go to make up organised Politics. Domain theory (described in 
Chapter 1) posits on-going potential for conflict between the policy, management and 
service domains because of their different modes of operating, success measures, 
underlying values, etc. This already provides scope for plenty of organisational 
politics (small ‘p’) without adding that each of the three domains are often themselves 
divided: the policy domain by organised Politics; the management domain by normal 
bureaucratic divisions; the service domain by professional rivalries where more than 
one profession operate.
There is therefore a great need in public services organisations to find positive ways of 
dealing with these political forces, which many writers now suggest can give rise to
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creative tensions as well as destructive conflict. As Pollitt and Harrison (1992:282) 
put it:
“if strategic management is anything it is relational; that is it requires the 
creation and nurturing of relationships of trust and respect between 
different levels and groups within an institution.”
T h e  V isio n a r y  M ode
As the quote from Baier (above) captures some of the possibilities for the political 
mode to become dominant in public organisations. This poses the question, given all 
these potential conflicts why is it that the ‘political mode’ isn’t always dominant in 
public service organisations? Potential for such a development always exists but it can 
be mitigated in a variety of ways. For example, one small UK district council 
(Braintree) has attained a remarkable string of successes in gaining awards (e.g. 
Charter Mark; BS 5750; etc.), establishing performance targets and performance 
related pay, etc. This does not sound like incremental, non-rational decision making in 
the political mode and indeed it is not. The Council had a very fragmented policy 
domain throughout the 1980s because the Council was ‘hung’ (i.e. no political group 
had a majority) and the Parties themselves were characterised by pragmatism and 
willingness to compromise. At the same time, being a District council it did not have 
responsibility for education or social services, the two biggest and most powerful 
professionally driven services in UK local authorities. Thirdly, it had a strong Chief 
Executive who, with the support of a significant group of chief officers, was able to 
drive through a number of reforms. In other words here was a Council dominated by 
the management domain because of weaknesses in the policy and service domains, 
enabling it to act initially more in the visionary mode and latterly more like the 
planning mode. (Based on unpublished case study, Talbot, 1993).
Other examples of visionary mode public service organisations might include where 
radical political leaderships have driven through reforms - either in the case in right- 
wing radical local government (e.g. Wandsworth or Westminster) in the direction of 
managerialist solutions or in the case of some Labour (and Liberal Democrat) councils 
(e.g. Islington or Tower Hamlets) in democratic decentralisation initiatives. In other
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cases unified political leaderships have adopted what Elcock et al (1989) called 
‘brinkmanship’ strategies to confront central government over cuts in funding (e.g. 
some left-wing Councils in the mid-1980s, on slogans like “Services Well Worth 
Defending” - Lambeth).
T h e  L e a r n in g  M o d e
In a very useful review of organisational learning within a public sector context, 
Willcocks & Harrow (1991) conclude that many of these organisations have either 
been steered, or are steering, towards external learning sources derived largely from 
the public sector. Indeed, further research by Harrow & Talbot (1992, 1993) has 
indicated that inter-organisational learning between public sector organisations has at 
least partially, and possibly temporarily, been impaired by the reaction of public 
service organisations to the introduction of quasi-markets, especially in the form of 
somewhat over-zealous interpretations of what competition and commercial secrecy 
may mean in practice.
(At one recent seminar, the author was struck by an NHS Trust manager introducing 
his organisation with an overhead showing its metropolitan location and pointing out 
“this is us - and here are our competitors” - pointing to neighbouring hospitals).
As Willcocks & Harrow point out, there are some unique features to the public 
services, not the least of which is the existence of a plethora of official and semi­
official conduits and interpreters for information about “best practice”, such as the 
“Audit Commission, the Social Services, Prisons, Police and Education Inspectorates, 
and the Health Advisory Service” (1992:32) to which could be added the National 
Audit Office (NAO); Local Government Management Board (LGMB); Local 
Authority Associations (AMA, ACC, ADC etc.); National Association of Health 
Authorities and Trusts (NAHAT); etc. While these bodies have some parallels with 
private sector associations and organisations, the power which they exercise (often 
with official and in some cases legal sanctions to enforce them) is quite different to 
the private sector.
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These externalities are further complicated by the internal developments already 
mentioned - the development of maladapted private sector models, the new 
managerialism. As Edmonstone (1990) has pointed out the role of political support (or 
lack of it), of professionalism, of competing interpretations of organisational values 
and purpose all make creating learning public organisations more difficult.
Strategic management in the public services - competing competences?
In this Chapter, and Chapter 2, two models have been developed from the existing 
literature on strategic management and the public services, adopting a competing 
values and paradoxes approach.
The first of these models gives four modes in which strategic process and content can 
evolve (planning, vision, learning, politics) and suggests that these are contradictory 
and paradoxical modes which can often co-exist in organisations alongside one- 
another. It suggests that there is a constant evolution in the particular configuration of 
strategic modes in an organisation.
This in itself has obvious implications for the competences required by strategic 
managers - they need to have the skills to work with any particular mode; they need to 
be able to recognise the different modes of working and when it is appropriate to 
deploy the skills relevant to a particular strategic mode; and finally they have to have a 
tolerance for ambiguity, contradiction and paradox in order to work with what are 
often conflicting strategic modes simultaneously.
These are generic strategic management competences, applicable in both the public 
and private sector. Also developed in this Chapter is a model of some of the strategic 
sub-systems which may be operable in public services organisations. Six specific sub­
systems have been identified, based on the theoretical framework of domain theory 
and existing literature on strategy in public organisations. Each of these six sub­
systems imply specific competences. Rather than spell these out as individual
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competences however, the model of strategic sub-systems has been combined with 
the model of strategic modes to produce a matrix of strategic competences for public 
services organisations (see Figure 3:14 Strategic competences: in public services and 
strategic modes
Figure 3:14 Strategic competences: in public services and strategic modes
Strategic Mode
Public services 
strategy sub­
system
$
Planning Mode Visionary Mode Political Mode Learning Mode
Policy M aking set detailed 
missions, policies, 
objectives and 
rules for the 
organisation
set broad
missions, policies, 
objectives and 
values for the 
organisation
integrate 
ambiguous 
missions, policies, 
objectives and 
rules for the 
organisation
tolerate diversity 
of missions, 
policies, 
objectives and 
mles within the 
organisation
Provision
(Resource
Allocation)
integrate resource 
allocation and 
policy making 
systems
derive resource 
allocation and 
targeting from 
mission and policy 
objectives
adjust resource 
allocations to meet 
conflicting 
priorities and 
policies
allow flexibility in 
resource 
allocation and 
allow resources to 
follow 'success*
Planning use the 
organisation's 
planning system to 
produce rational 
solutions to 
problems
use the 
organisation's 
planning system to 
justify the 
organisational 
mission
use the 
organisation's 
planning system to 
support particular 
projects or 
policies
use the 
organisation's 
planning system 
for learning and 
adaptation
Pragmatism make pragmatic 
adjustments to 
stay within the 
overall plan
make pragmatic 
adjustments to 
stay within the 
broad
organisational
mission
make pragmatic
adjustments
through
negotiating
internal
compromises
make pragmatic 
adjustments 
through 
experience of 
practical service 
delivery
Professional
Practice
integrate, through 
persuasion or 
coercion, 
professional 
practice to match 
plans
integrate, through 
persuasion or 
coercion, 
professional 
practice to match 
mission
integrate, through
compromise,
professional
practice into
organisational
goals
allow professional 
practice scope for 
innovation, within 
broad goals
Product/ Service ensure services are 
clearly defined 
and organised to 
meet plans
ensure services are 
broadly organised 
to meet mission 
and policies
achieve
compromise and 
consensus over the 
design and 
organisation of 
services
allow for diversity 
and innovation in 
design and 
organisation of 
services
The resulting twenty-four competences identified here are suggested by the matrix 
using the strategic modes and strategic sub-systems and are therefore seen as
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competing competences. This can be illustrated by looking at one set of competences - 
those associated with the ‘product/service’ sub-system. The common element in all 
four suggested competences is ‘the ability to organise and define services’.
In the planning mode this is posed as ‘the ability to ensure services are clearly defined 
and organised to meet plans’, in other words services are tied to strategic plans. In the 
visionary mode the definition of services is linked to the organisational mission and 
policies rather than the plan: ‘ability to ensure services are broadly organised to meet 
mission and policies’. In the political mode the emphasis is placed on obtaining 
compromise and consensus: ‘achieve compromise and consensus over the design and 
organisation of services’ whilst in the learning mode the emphasis is not on obtaining 
consensus but on tolerating diversity: ‘ability to allow for diversity and innovation in 
design and organisation of services’.
This approach has been applied to all the other five sets of competences, to produce 
twenty four competences which can be seen as competing competences. This initial 
suggestion of some strategic competences for managers in public services 
organisations is developed for the exploratory research survey which is explained 
further in Chapter 5. It should be emphasised here that these suggested competences 
have been deliberately constrained by the intention to carry out exploratory 
confirmatory research - it is not suggested that this is an exhaustive or comprehensive 
model. It has been derived by a process of synthesis and deduction from existing 
research and theory from the general perspective of paradoxical systems elements. 
Obviously, different approaches would produce different sets of potential 
competences which could form the basis for exploratory research.
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Chapter 4 Management Development and Public Services 
Management1
In t r o d u c t io n
This Chapter begins with a review of current generic approaches to management 
development (MD). It offers a simple framework for the analysis of these generic 
approaches, based on Kolb’s work on experiential learning (Kolb, 1984). It develops a 
four-fold analytical model which embraces both the practice and theory of MD in the 
UK and elsewhere. This is not intended as a fully comprehensive examination of MD 
but as sufficient a review to provide a reasonable framework for analysing the 
development of strategic managers, especially for the public sector. It makes some 
brief mention of attempts currently being made to elevate MD programmes currently 
focused on general MD into programmes for strategic managers. It examines the 
relative paucity of advice on how strategic managers are to be developed.
It then looks at some additional models of management education and development 
MD) of public managers, using domain theory. It argues that there are ‘domains of 
academia’ broadly corresponding to the domains of public organisations and each 
with its unique approach to the issue of management, and hence MD, within them. 
Finally, it examines the small amount of extant advice on developing strategic 
managers in public services.
D e f in in g  M a n a g e m e n t  D e v e l o p m e n t
1 parts of this Chapter have appeared in earlier, draft, forms in: Talbot, C (1993) Twin Peaks: MBAs 
and the Competence Movement, A Tale o f Two Courses, MEAD, Vol. 24, No. 4., AMD; and Talbot, C 
(1993) Developing Public Managers in the UK, International Journal of Public Sector Management, 
Vol. 6 No. 6., MCB.
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It would be useful to explore some of the definitional problems associated with this 
area and what is meant by terms such as “management development,” “ management 
education,” etc.
Chapter 1 discussed some of the issues in defining the term “management” in relation 
to the nature of public services management. It is clear that differing definitions of 
“management”, in a generic sense, have fairly substantive relations with differing 
approaches to defining what is meant by terms such as “management development” 
and “management education”. Lee and Piper have pointed out, for example, that the 
growing understanding of the role of organisational politics in managerial practice has 
had significant impact on the nature of management education (1986).
So far, the term “management development” has been used as an all-embracing one to 
cover all activities and approaches to the “formation” of managers. This will continue 
to be done.
The three key terms usually discussed in relation to MD are “education”, 
“development” and “training.”
A useful starting point is the definitions offered by the former Manpower Services 
Commission (1981):
Education
“Activities which aim at developing the knowledge, skills, moral values 
and understanding required in all aspects of life rather than knowledge 
and skill relating to only a limited field of activity....”
017)
Development
“The growth or realisation of a person’s ability, through conscious or 
unconscious learning. Development programmes usually include elements 
of planned study and experience, and are frequently supported by a 
coaching or counselling facility”
015)
Training
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“A planned process to modify attitude, knowledge or skill behaviour 
through learning experience to achieve effective performance in an 
activity or range of activities....”
062)
There have been extensive discussions of more precise definitions in both the general 
training and management development literature (for a brief review see Silver, 
1991b).
Much earlier discussions tended to use different terminology, but widely similar 
concepts - thus Hooper (1960, first published in 1948) suggests three levels of 
management “training”:
1. general training in principles and science of management
2. practical training relating to specific businesses
3. training to develop the “whole man” to enable managers to practice 
the art, as well as the science, of management (: 176).
These broadly correspond to the MSC definitions given above - education (iii); 
development (i) and training (ii). However, there is clearly a great deal of overlap in 
these three definitions and it is virtually impossible to draw exact lines between them.
Hooper also argues, incidentally, that an “administrative staff college”, similar in 
nature to an army staff college, is needed to provide (iii) as “many men need what 
amounts to a mental revolution” which short, intensive courses at such a college could 
provide (: 182). This was in fact the style developed at the Administrative Staff 
College at Henley, which opened in 1947 and gained a good reputation for its 12 - 
week courses aimed at both civil servants and private sector managers. (For a 
contemporary discussion of the state of UK MD at the beginning of the 1960s see 
Falk, 1961:170-191 and for an historical account see Wilson, 1992:Chapter 1).
Mant (1979) has argued that the character of “management development” and 
“management education” in the UK has been determined by the traditional split in 
British education between generalist education (represented in the post-war period by 
public schools, grammar schools and Oxbridge) and vocational training (secondary
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schools, technical colleges and ‘red-brick’ Universities). He also argues that this split 
determined the characters following the Franks Report, 1963) with University based 
educational approach winning out (Chapter 8)
As Wilson points out, the Franks Report, which led to the establishment of the 
London and Manchester Business Schools (launched in 1965), was itself was the 
result of a clash between those who wanted a “educational” approach run by the 
Universities (represented by the Foundation for Management Education) and those 
who wanted a “training” approach run by industry (the so-called “Savoy Group”). The 
former won the argument (although by the mid-1980s most UK managers received 
neither education nor training - see Handy et al, 1987 and Constable & McCormick, 
1987).
Thus, as Silver argues (1991b), running through the history of UK MD is a debate 
about “knowledge versus action”, or between education and training, with 
development falling somewhere in between. However, a fourth term also emerges - 
“experience”, with Handy et al (1988) defining management development as “a 
mixture of experience, training and education.”(:12).
Handy et al also make a distinction between what they call “business education” and 
“management development”. This distinction is, for them, both about the content of 
the activity and the responsibility for engaging in them. Thus “business education is to 
a large extent the responsibility of the individual” and is about “learning the languages 
of business” which they see as something to done by someone aspiring to become a 
manager. On the other hand “management development is a mixture of experience, 
training and education which is usually initiated by the organisation with the 
necessary co-operation of the individual.” (1988:12)
The distinction between pre-managerial “business education” and “management 
development” which can only be done with practising managers, is interesting and 
partially concurs with Mintzberg’s views on the nature of the process of developing 
managers (1989:Ch.5). However, Mintzberg goes much farther, arguing that
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undergraduate and graduate education in management (by which he clearly means 
degrees in business administration at both levels) is not useful at all (:80) and that 
only “management training...directed at people who have substantial organisational 
experience coupled with proven leadership ability as well as the requisite intelligence” 
is really useful (:80). Thus the “business education”, such as that enjoyed by the 
70,000 or so US MBA graduates per year (the vast majority of whom have no 
managerial experience), cannot be classed as management development.
Here is also clearly some imprecision in Handy et al’s definition, for the word 
“education” appears both as part of “business education” and a part of “management 
development” (“a mixture of experience, training and education”). It is thus not clear 
how to distinguish between “education” which is business education and that which is 
management education, other than on the criteria of the degree of experience of 
management of those undertaking the education. This is particularly problematic when 
the majority of management education (at least at the post-graduate level) in the UK is 
directed at practising managers doing part-time post-graduate Certificate, Diploma or 
Masters courses (Handy et al 1987, Constable & McCormick, 1987).
Having said that, it is clear that Handy et al’s identification of “management 
development” as learning or development directed at practising managers is broadly in 
line with the common usage in the MD literature (e.g. Mumford, 1986; Cooper, 1981; 
Margerison, 1991; Taylor & Lippitt, 1983). However, as Lees has pointed out, the 
usage of MD as a term has tended to shift being a set of activities carried out by the 
organisation upon their own managers, to something delivered by external 
professionals on behalf of the organisation (Lees, 1992:89).
The definitions used here embrace all four categories of management development, 
education, training and experience (see Figure 4:1). Management development is seen 
as an integrative term embracing all aspects of management learning. Management 
education is seen as focusing on knowledge, management training on skills and 
management experience programmes as developing competence.
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Figure 4:1 Defining management development
Management
Development
embraces all of the below, 
as well as non-learning 
systems such as reward 
systems:
M anagem ent education
developing knowledge of 
business, organisation 
and management
M anagement training
developing skills in the 
practice of business, 
organisation and 
management
M anagement experience
programmes of systematic 
exposure to a variety of 
business, organisation 
and management settings 
to develop competence in 
applying skills and 
knowledge
These definitions are seen as analytically useful broad concepts rather than mutually 
exclusive categories. For example, much of management education in the UK now 
includes skills development (especially competency based programmes) and in many 
cases incorporate elements of experience based learning (e.g. through action learning 
approaches). These broad definitions (or at least education/training/experience divide) 
are therefore not particularly useful in trying to categorise approaches to MD. In the 
next section, as model will be advanced which helps to understand differing stances 
on MD.
T r e n d s  in  G e n e r ic  M a n a g e m e n t  D e v e l o p m e n t
This first section looks at various approaches to MD, some of which are used very 
widely in MD practice and others which are much less extensively used, and in some 
cases are more recommendations rather than practised approaches.
Few attempts seem to have been made to develop typologies of MD approaches, with 
most major textbooks and reviews of the subject area offering no attempted 
classifications (e.g. Mumford, 1986; Cooper, 1981; Margerison, 1991; Taylor & 
Lippitt, 1983). One encyclopaedia of MD (Huczynski, 1983), covering over 300
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specific approaches and techniques, offers only a utilitarian model for selecting 
techniques according to need, based on the levels of student autonomy, objectives and 
group size (:7-19).
One relatively simple categorisation is offered by Wallace (1991) as set out in Figure 
4:2 below, which utilises the dimensions of “concern for task” and “concern for 
learning” to group MD approaches. This model is most useful in distinguishing 
between “theory” based approaches, which it characterises as low on concern for task 
and “practice” based approaches, which is asserts are high on concern for task.
Figure 4:2 Types of management development
High
Concern
for
task
Low
Type 1: Accidental Type 2: Business-change 
schemes, combining tasks 
and learning opportunities
Type 0: No learning, no 
challenge
Type 3: Formal diploma 
programmes with little 
linkage to job
^ °W Concern for learning
Source: adapted from Wallace, 1991:80
High
Kubr and Prokopenko (1989) offer a categorisation of methods which related to MD 
(see Figure 4:3) which uses the distinction between management training needs and 
interventions on the one hand and on the other somewhat overlapping non-training 
interventions to improve organisational performance (a similar distinction to 
Wallace’s).
167
On the basis of this distinction they evaluate seven approaches to improving 
organisational performance, of which six can be seen to have some MD component 
(Figure 4:3). Only management education is seen as wholly falling within the 
management “training needs or interventions” whilst only improvements to 
organisational systems and practices is seen as wholly “non-training.” The other five 
methods are all seen as having some component of both: management development, 
management training, experiential learning, organisational development and 
management consulting. (The somewhat confusing use of terminology should be 
noted - management “education” is a “training” intervention? We will return below to 
the issues of definitions and confusing terminology.)
Figure 4:3 Interventions for improving performance
Training needs and interventions |
Non-training needs and interventions
Management education i
ill
Management development 
Management training
Experiential lea 
Organisational 
development
Imf
organisa
Management consult!
iming
>rovements in 
tional systems and 
practice
ng
Source: adapted from Kubr & Prokopenko, 1989:13
Lees (1992) offers an intriguing categorisation. Arguing that MD can be constructed 
as the intersection of three variables - individual career, organisational succession and 
organisational performance - he contends that while these three are usually seen as 
reconcilable, in reality there are tensions between them. In the “socio-political domain 
of management” which is driven by “a complex dynamic of hopes and fears, 
ambitions and opportunities, threats and disillusionments, conflicts and 
contradictions” there is a gulf between ideals of MD and reality of management (:91). 
He suggests ten “faces of MD”, many of which are usually hidden but are nonetheless 
potent:
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a) Functional-performance - MD as an organisationally driven direct contribution 
to organisational performance through increased individual performance
b) Agricultural - ‘grow our own managers’ similar to above, but more emphasis 
individual responsibility and less direct or immediate links to organisational 
performance
c) Functional-defensive * MD as luxury, the organisation doesn’t really need it but it 
might come in useful and individuals like it - can lead to dysfunctional behaviour 
due to frustration by those developed
d) Socialisation - MD as a mechanism for transmitting organisational culture and 
attitudes
e) Political reinforcement - MD as an instrument for reinforcing the political 
credibility of those shaping the vision of how organisational improvements are to 
occur
f) Organisational inheritance - MD is seen, either by the organisation or 
individuals, as a key for individuals to establish their ‘right’ to succession to 
senior posts
g) Environmental legitimacy - MD as a mechanism for giving credibility to the 
organisation as a responsible part of society
h) Compensation - MD as a fringe benefit of employment
i) Psychic defence - MD as a vehicle for recognising “officially” what managers 
already know or do and a “badge” of achievement
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j) Ceremonial - MD as a symbolic system placing legitimacy on a managers 
progress through the organisation
(adapted from Lees, 1992).
These “faces” of MD may appear slightly cynical, they do correspond with views of 
the organisation as a competing systems of values discussed earlier, with “faces” 
clearly representing competing value systems both about the purposes of the 
organisation and the purposes of MD within it. Some of them also correspond to ideas 
advanced by Schein (1988), that much of management education is in reality about 
socialisation and indoctrination.
Schein advances what he calls “four troublesome realities” about management 
education:
1) the occupation of management is, in fact, many different occupations involving 
different kinds of responsibilities, skills and attitudes
2) management is not, has never been, and probably should not ever be a 
“profession” in the sociological sense of what a profession is
3) we do not really understand the nature of learning and development
4) though the world needs more leaders and entrepreneurs, we do not know how to 
identify or educate such people (Schein, 1988:5-15)
Others have investigated the problems of different managerial “skills languages” 
which cloud discussions about the nature of management development (Hirsh, 1989)
MD - A Competing Values Model
In order to give some shape to an analysis of MD Kolb’s “experiential learning cycle” 
(Kolb, 1984:42) has been used (see Fig.4.3). Kolb’s model suggests a cyclic learning
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experience moving through concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract 
conceptualisation and active experimentation. (Kolb derived his model from two 
dimensions: prehension - the dialectic between apprehension (of concrete experience) 
and comprehension (of abstract conceptualisations); transformation - the dialectic 
between transformation by active experimentation and transformation by reflective 
observation (Kolb, 1984:43-58)).
The emphasis in Kolb’s model is on an integrated process, involving all four stages of 
the cycle, although as the title “experiential learning” suggests, Kolb’s emphasis is on 
concrete experience as the starting point of the cycle.
The model presented here (Figure 4:4) suggests Kolb’s learning stages can be used as 
a framework for categorising differing approaches to MD, according to the emphasis 
placed on different stages of the learning cycle and, as will be shown below, the 
exclusion of other elements. Each embodies a set of values about the nature of 
learning and relationships between the learner and others. In particular the relative 
allocation of value between theory and practice, between self-managed or organisation 
directed learning, between peer and superior guidance and assessment, between 
experimental, experiential, reflective and didactic learning, and so on.
It should be stressed that this is not to suggest that the approaches concentrate 
exclusively on only one stage of the learning cycle, but that the particular stage 
represents the focus for those particular approaches. As will be shown below, some of 
the approaches do seem to either distort or “short-circuit” the learning cycle, 
excluding some elements of the learning cycle almost completely.
Traditional management education (as practised in MBA and other post-graduate 
courses) can be seen as primarily focused on abstract conceptualisation - developing 
cognitive skills and analytic ability as well as an understanding an knowledge of a 
wide-ranging set of management theories.
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Figure 4:4 The Learning Cycle and Approaches to Management Education and
Development.
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Reform of these programmes has recently led some to develop approaches based on 
active experimentation in management interventions, either through projects or Action 
Learning, aimed at applying management theory in organisational contexts.
A stronger reaction against the perceived “academic” quality of much MD is the 
application of the competences approach, which has been widely adopted in the UK’s 
National Vocational Qualifications system, to management. Management 
competences (in the UK embodied mainly in the MCI’s management Standards (MCI, 
1990)) focuses on managerial action, concrete experience, and its outcomes, 
demanding that managerial performance be the key to both learning and assessment.
Finally, some have advocated models of MD based mainly on reflection on practice, 
reflective observation. Most notable has been Schon’s “Reflective Practicum” which
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has been most popular in areas of professional development (e.g. teaching - see 
Schon, 1991) but is clearly applicable to management. The most high-profile attempt 
to apply something along these lines to MD are embedded in the recommendations of 
Handy’s report on UK management development (Handy, 1987).
It has been argued that two of these approaches - traditional management education 
and the competences approach - represent the dominant “twin peaks” of current UK 
MD (Talbot, 1993). In the sections that follow, all four approaches will be briefly 
examined.
Before moving to look at each of these approaches it is worth noting that a version of 
Kolb’s work has been popularised and operationalised into an instrument for detecting 
an individuals preferred “learning styles” (Honey & Mumford, 1988).
Abstract Conceptualisation: the traditional Management Education (MBA) 
model
‘I am pleased if a student does well in my subject even though that student 
might not be able to find a brewery, never mind organize anything in it.’
Silver (1991b:80)
Internationally, there may now be over 100,000 MBA graduates every year, from 
around 800 business schools (Bickerstaff, 1993) with about 70,000 graduating in the 
US and nearly 6,000 in the UK, provided by over 92 institutions(Francis Beckett, Ind. 
On Sunday, 8/5/94). In Britain, besides the MBA there are also about 2,000 graduates 
from post-graduate Diploma and Certificate courses per year (mainly from the 70 or 
so “new” Universities - formerly CNAA institutions).
This section will concentrate on the MBA as representative of “management 
education” as an approach to management development. It should be noted however 
that many providers of management qualifications have now adopted the competence 
based Management Standards and methods of assessment developed by the 
Management Charter Initiative (MCI), which will be examined below.
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A summary of the traditional MBA (or pre-competences post-graduate Diploma in 
Management Studies - DMS) structure is suggested in Figure 4:5. The assumes a 
model of management that embraces knowledge and skills in the three broad areas of:
• strategy (strategic management, business policy and environment, etc.).
• functional management (personnel, marketing, operations, etc.) and
• management skills in its broadest sense, including management science,
quantitative methods, inter-personal skills and organisation theory and practice;
Figure 4:5 The traditional management education model
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Management Skills
Strategic Management 
Business Environment
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At a deeper level this model clearly assumes a model of organisation. The similarity 
with Handy’s ‘role culture’ is striking when depicted as in Figure 4:5. As Handy 
points out, this was the traditional model of large scale business organisation (Handy, 
1987:190-2). It is hardly surprising therefore that it underpins the traditional MBA 
structure.
There are many variants on this general theme, but one survey of 12 leading US 
MBA’s at least confirms the broad outlines (see Figure 4:6). A similar summary of 
MBA core subjects is offered by Squires (1993:27) which includes strategic planning;
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business law; information systems management; operations management; 
organisational behaviour and business methods (including management theory).
Figure 4:6 Subject distribution in 12 MBAs
Subjects Percentage of required 
curriculum
Strategy Business and Public 12
Policy and Policy and 
Strategy
Functions Accounting, Finance & 
Marketing
29
Management Skills Management Science & 
Organisational Behaviour
29
Statistics 9
Communications 4
Management 2
total % 85
Source: adapted from Cheit, 1991:205-6
This is essentially a model of management as a function, rather than of managers, of 
what “the management” as a whole does in the organisation rather than what any 
particular manager has to do. It implies that individual managers need to understand 
the totality of management functions in order to practice “management” in their 
specific jobs:
“Our basic management ideas are functionally oriented. We manage each 
piece of an organisation - design, research, product development, 
manufacturing, engineering, purchasing, sales, marketing, finance - as if 
optimizing the pieces optimizes the whole.” (Lataif, 1992:128)
Some have drawn distinctions between an “American” and a “European” model of 
MBAs, and between the traditional US MBA and a newer variant. The US model is, 
and largely remains, highly academic and based around analytical, numerical skills 
based in economics and finance. There have been changes in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, which have included a greater emphasis on international issues, “softer” 
subjects of social psychology and organisation theory, and leadership and team 
building skills (Lewis, 1993:14; Mintzberg, 1989:Ch.5). The traditional MBA model 
has been pronounced “doomed” or at least in need of further urgent reform by a
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number of academics and practitioners in a heated debate in the pages of Harvard 
Business Review (Lataif, Mintzberg, Saka and Hendry, all 1992).
Particularly subject to scathing attack has been the use of the case study method for 
teaching. As Lee Iacocca, a former leading practitioner, comments:
“there’s a new breed of businessmen, (sic) mostly people with MBA’s, 
who ... seem to think that every business problem can be structured and 
reduced to a case study.” (Iacocca, 1984:55)
In a similar vein, Mintzberg has attacked Harvard’s MBA for taking
“people who know nothing about a particular company and then 
insist(ing), based on 20 pages of verbalized and numerical abstractions, 
that they pronounce on it in the classroom...Let’s stop pretending to train 
non-managers to be managers through the use of detached case studies 
and disconnected theories.” (Mintzberg, 1992:129)
Mintzberg’s critique flows, in part, from his model of the fragmented and contingent 
nature of managerial work, where he had already proposed an alternative model of 
management education (Mintzberg, 1973:186-8) and his later writings on the nature of 
strategy (Quinn, Mintzberg & James, 1988:13-20 & 82-89) and the role of intuition 
(ibid:715-724) in the management process suggest a much more fluid model of 
management and a whole different dimension of skills. Mintzberg has suggested that 
his
“ideal management education would change priorities. It would contain 
less analysis and prescription, more soft material and insights into how the 
world of organizations really does work, as opposed to how it should 
work.” (Mintzberg, 1989:85)
Moreover, this would not necessarily be in the form of qualification programmes. 
Incidentally, Mintzberg also proposes removing the Business from the MBA title, on 
the grounds that “we need to teach management, and it really makes little difference 
whether that be for hospital directors, government administrators, or business people.” 
(ibid:85).
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In the UK, Hendry has noted that:
“The standard MBA turns out good analysts with large egos who can’t 
necessarily manage.” (cited in Lewis, 1993:14).
There are some obvious implications for learning and assessment in the traditional 
approach. Managers need to know something about all aspects of the totality of 
management. Since they are not necessarily personally using all the necessary skills or 
knowledge, the key way they can know is through traditional academic style teaching 
and learning processes. These should be focused mainly on developing knowledge and 
analytic skills. (In the case of full-time MBA’s this is even more true.) As the only 
reasonable way to assess knowledge and analytic skill is through traditional methods 
(assignments, exams, dissertations) these are usually the methods employed.
The obvious disadvantage of this approach is that managers grasping new concepts 
and theories for areas of management with which they are not personally familiar are 
easily disorientated. At best they acquire formal knowledge that may be unrelated to 
practical experience. Attempts have been made to overcome this on full-time MBA’s, 
mainly by the by the introduction of case study based teaching and assessment.
In terms of the learning cycle, traditional MBAs can be seen as yet another truncated 
learning cycle (Figure 4:7) because of the lack of any real opportunity for active 
experimentation and the weak link to concrete experience.
European MBA programmes have reputedly suffered less from the dominance of 
analytic and numerical subjects, have broader curricula, and include greater emphasis 
on business experience. This has included much greater use of part-time, consortia or 
organisation based MBAs and average age of European part-time students is reported 
as being 31, compared to below 27 for US full-time courses. Many European courses 
insist on entrants having several years experience of working in organisations (Lewis, 
1993:14).
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Figure 4:7 MBAs (management education) as a truncated learning cycle
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Some of these criticisms of MBAs, including US and European versions, have been 
mitigated by the growth in part-time, post-experience MBA’s. On these courses 
participants usually have significant management experience to draw on and an 
organisational environment in which they can test-out their learning. This also allows 
assessment to be more directly work-related. Even here there have been significant 
problems in getting academic staff to re-orientate their teaching more learner and 
work centred approaches.
Probably the biggest change in learning strategies has been an increasing emphasis on 
practice based learning being included within the MBA programme. Some of these 
changes will be examined below in the section on active experimentation, but it is 
worth noting an example of the ‘new’ MBA, the Cambridge University Judge 
Institute’s programme. Cambridge (and Oxford) had long resisted establishing MBAs 
so when the Judge Institute launched its programme in 1991 it was able to do so from 
a fresh start (Lewis, 1992:14). The new course includes a one-year full-time course, 
followed by two years full-time work experience punctuated by six one-week returns 
to the Institute. Hendry (course director for the Judge MBA) states:
“that if an MBA were to have any value, it should be conceived of and 
delivered as a management development program, the central task of 
which would be to help people becomes better managers. Of course, good 
managers need good minds. We were not going to depart from intellectual
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rigor, clarity, and creativity, which are the hallmarks of a major university 
and provide the foundation for clear managerial thinking and
communication. But in other respects, we found ourselves departing 
rapidly from the traditional MBA design.” (Hendry, 1992:136)
The new course includes elements of self-managed learning, personal and
interpersonal skills development and extensive contact between faculty and the
organisations where course members are working.
Active Experimentation: Action Learning, project and consultancy based 
approaches
Acton learning (AL) was developed by Revans within the UK National Coal Board in 
the immediate aftermath of world war two. Revans has summarised the ideas of AL 
as:
“All action learning claims is that, since managers are employed to run 
businesses...or non-business organisations...they will fulfil their contracts 
of employment more effectively only by asking how they fulfil them at 
any particular moment...The primary and inescapable obligation of the 
manager is to run whatever he is employed to run. Action Learning 
suggests that, since he is doing it in any case, he might just as well find 
out how he is doing it at the moment and, with what he discovers, try to 
do it a little better the next day, or next week, or even next year.” (Revans, 
1980:251-2)
The future orientation of AL is stressed over and over again by Revans, who sees “the 
idolization of their own past successes, the condemnation of their own past failures 
and their conviction that they knew the final reasons for these particular events to have 
worked out as they had done” as “the first occupational weakness of 
managers.”(Ibid:253).
Revans specifically argues against “education” and theoretically based approaches, 
which he accuses of merely codifying the past and be no reasonable guide to the 
future. (Indeed, his antipathy towards traditional management education caused him to
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be “ostracised by the business schools for his heretical notions” (Christopher Lorenz, 
Financial Times, 9 July 1982).
The method of AL is also simply stated: peer review of action plans or projects to 
solve managerial problems. In answer to the questions how can the manager know 
how well he is doing today?” and “how can he then contrive to improve upon it?” 
Revans answers that he should “get the help and advice of a few other managers.” 
(Revans, 1980:252). This developed into the AL “set”, a group of managers offering 
mutual support, questioning and criticism to each other in developing solutions to 
their individual management problems.
AL began to experience something of a renaissance in the early 1980s, partly due to 
the sponsorship of leading UK industrialists such as Lord Weinstock and Sir Adrian 
Cadbury (see Lorenz, op. cit.). By the late 1980s it was sufficiently influential to 
prompt a special issue of the Journal of Management Development (Vol. 6, No. 4) 
dedicated to reviewing its use.
The focus of AL on the active experimentation approach is summarised well by 
Boddy (1980), who states that
“the best opportunities for learning take place in a manager’s everyday 
job. This is viewed formally as embodying three broad activities - the 
formulation or development of strategy, acting to implement strategy and 
finally reviewing the outcome...”
In terms of the Kolb learning cycle, this process clearly starts out from active 
experimentation, goes through concrete experience and reflective observation but 
clearly cuts out, or marginalises, abstract conceptualisation. Boddy does, however, 
point out that AL recognises that what Revans calls “P”, or “programmed learning” 
(i.e. theory and research) does have its place, but that it is of strictly secondary use to 
managers learning.
AL has developed its’ problem solving approach into the notion of a project, which 
may or may not take place in the manager’s own organisation or job. Boddy suggests
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that these projects or tasks may be either familiar or unfamiliar and may take place in 
either familiar or unfamiliar settings (see Figure 4:8)
Figure 4:8 Action learning - tasks and settings
Task
Familiar Unfamiliar
Familiar
Setting
Unfamiliar 2 4
Source: Boddy, 1980.
Attempts have been made to marry AL to management education, or at least to 
management qualifications, and the idea of the action learning project has developed 
alongside (and is often confused with) consultancy assignments, action research 
projects and group projects (see below, and see Wallace, 1990 for a discussion of 
some of the confusions in terminology surrounding AL as used in management 
education contexts).
The most prominent attempt, in the UK, to integrate AL and management education is 
probably the AL based MBA at the International Management Centre, Buckingham 
(IMCB). The approach has to been to incorporate AL sets as a substantial part of a 
programme, an “action learning” MBA (introduced in the early 1980s). This in fact 
combines some traditional teaching and assessment with AL sets and peer assessment 
for parts of the course (Caie, 1987). The course combines ordinary teaching inputs, 
assessed written action cases (WACs) produced by participants about their own 
organisations and others and a dissertation which includes both an intervention in their 
own organisation and a literature review, thus embracing both AL and traditional 
management education approaches (Lethbridge, 1989).
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A different approach which incorporates elements of AL is the “Self Managed 
Learning (SML) MBA” run by the Roffey Park Management College, in association 
with the University of Sussex (introduced in the mid-1980s). This programme 
combines some of the forms of AL - sets and peer support, self-set problems, and peer 
review - with a more traditional educational content. Course members use their course 
“sets” to help them agree their personal learning objectives, support them during the 
learning process and evaluate and assess their achievements against their own 
objectives (see Roffey Park - undated). This approach of carrying the AL principle of 
peer support/review right through to the assessment stage of a qualification is quite 
novel (although it actually originated at the then North East London Polytechnic - for 
an account see Pedler, Burgoyne and Boydell, 1988, and Cunningham, 1986). The 
actual learning process may take a wide variety of forms, from traditional lectures to 
computer based training, but the overall framework for the learning process seems 
very similar to AL (although interestingly its originators do not allude explicitly to 
AL, or discuss the differences between AL and their SML approach - see 
Cunningham, 1986).
Alongside the success of the IMCB and Roffey Park courses, many other courses have 
incorporated aspects of the AL approach, including “set” based group projects and 
other innovations. AL approaches have also continued to be used extensively as an in- 
house approach to MD by organisations (see Lewis & March, 1987 for an account of 
the Prudential’s programme and Coates, 1986 for a local authority example and 
Wallace, 1990 for an example from education management).
An interesting account of participating in this course suggests that preferred learning 
styles discussed above do (Honey & Mumford, 1988), at least in this case, correspond 
to preferences for MD approaches. The author reports a strong personal rating towards 
“pragmatist” and “activist” on Honey & Mumford’s instrument and a corresponding 
preference for the action learning aspects of the IMC MBA (Caie, 1987). This 
corresponds to Mumford’s prediction about learning styles/preferences and AL 
(Mumford, 1982). AL can be seen as a truncated version of the learning cycle (see 
Figure 4:9).
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Figure 4:9 Action Learning as a truncated learning cycle
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Action research (or action science) is related to, but not the same as, action learning. 
(Both can be traced back to the work of Kurt Lewin - see Kolb, 1982 & Argyris, 
Putnam & McLain-Smith, 1985. For a discussion of the relationship between AL and 
action research, see Margerison, 1978). Where action learning concentrates on solving 
the individual managers problems with the help of their “set” peers, action research 
focuses on more systemic change brought about by collaborative intervention between 
the action researcher and participants in the organisational or social system being 
“action researched” (Huczynski, 1987:22-3).
Action research has also been incorporated into management education programmes, 
despite its active experimentation approach. It is mainly used at the 
research/dissertation stage of part-time management Masters programmes, as a 
research method for managers who are working within organisations. It is also 
frequently tied to issues of internal consultancy and intervention (see Easterby-Smith 
et al, 1991; Gill & Johnson, 1991 & Gummesson, 1991).
Unlike AL, action research clearly has an “abstract conceptualisation” or theory 
building component although the focus is on “active experimentation” (see Figure 
4:10). More importantly, whilst AL has at its core individual “active experimentation” 
which, although supported and encouraged by a “set” of peers, remains an essentially 
a solo activity. On the other hand, action research concentrates heavily on 
collaborative intervention where the active experimenter works with, rather than on, 
the “subjects” of the intervention/experiment (see Reason & Rowan, 1990).
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Figure 4:10 Action Research as a complete learning cycle - focused on active 
experimentation
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Another approach to trying to bridge the theory-practice divide is using projects (again 
tied to notions of consultancy and intervention). Many part-time management 
qualification courses include either group or individual projects aimed at analysing 
and/or intervening into an organisation
Consultancy assignments (both internal and external), where the manager has to 
advise and help in the solution of particular organisational problem, are also used as 
part of MD (Huczinski, 1983:79). Again, the emphasis is on active experimentation. 
However, the traditional role of “consultant” has only a limited relationship with 
abstract conceptualisation (theory) which is mainly pragmatic - “how can this theory 
be applied in this situation to help me solve this problem?” (for an example of this 
theory-in, no theory-out model see Bennis, 1969:16). Theoretical outputs from 
consultancy are of very limited utility for the consultant (Gummesson, 1991:187).
Depending on whether the consultancy is primarily normative or process based 
(Burke, 1979 & Schein, 1969) it may include a lesser or greater emphasis on reflection 
(see Figure 4:11). Thus normative consultation might draw heavily on theory in order 
to inform a consultancy intervention but is unlikely to contribute to theory 
development. As a prescriptive intervention, it is also unlikely to necessarily involve 
any particular reflective observation, other than in a very limited sense. On the other 
hand, process consultation, with its emphasis facilitation, involves less dependence on
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theory (except perhaps for certain aspects relating to interpersonal psychology and 
group dynamics) but is more likely to incorporate reflective observation (Gummesson, 
1991; Burke, 1979 & Schein, 1969).
Figure 4:11 Normative and Process Consultation - differing relationships to 
learning cycle
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Thus both process and normative consultancy draw on limited aspects of the learning 
cycle. When incorporated into a MD context however, some of these limitations may 
be overcome. The use of consultancy assignments as part of a MD qualification 
programme will often include a requirement for reflective observation (in the form of 
some commentary on the consultancy process) and abstract conceptualisation (in 
terms of any theoretical implications of the process and normative elements of the 
intervention). This is clearly not the case where consultancy assignments are used as 
an MD exercise, either in-house or in another organisation, where there are no 
specified outcomes which would require a reflective observation or abstract 
conceptualisation component.
Concrete Experience: the Competency Approach
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“Reforming zeal must...beware of...the belief that the managerial skills 
and competences required in all types of managerial roles can be 
described in one all-embracing structure... [and]... that managerial 
competences can be accurately described and measured.”
Constable (1991:231)
The approach of the competences movement is quite different from the MBA model 
and in some ways a reaction to it. The Mangham and Silver report, for example, 
showed that many employers were unhappy with MBA programmes, especially their 
perceived abstract nature (Mangham & Silver, 1986:part two) (This was in the context 
of the traditional full-time programmes - as noted above the growth of part-time, post- 
experience programmes has alleviated some of these problems.)
The competences movement is not merely, or even originally, a UK phenomenon but 
in fact originated in the US in the early 1980’s (Vaill, 1989:Chapter Two).
Vaill has set out very cogently the assumptions of this movement:
1. Competences of managing are relatively independent of one another.
2. The manager’s job has identifiable outputs that result from the exercise of various 
competences.
3. Managerial competency is a high-leverage variable in attainment of increased 
organisational effectiveness.
4. Related to (3) above: Given the ambiguity and fluidity of all organisational 
situations, stability and control are introduced and maintained in the person of ‘the 
manager’.
5. Exercise of a competency is relatively unaffected by the real-time, here-and-now 
perceptions of the manager. To possess a competency is to know how to use it.
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6. Competences can be attained and exercised across a wide range of action contexts.
7. Exercise of a competency is possible irrespective of the morals, motives, and 
competences of those to whom the competency is directed. For instance, a 
competent negotiator can negotiate regardless of whether the other party is equally 
sincere. (1989:36-40)
The UK’s MCI brand of the competence model focuses on outcomes. One survey of 
pilot competence based programmes noted that, while ‘programmes vary in what they 
assess..[and]..there is no universal agreement about what competences are’ there is 
agreement ‘that management education and assessment should be based on what 
managers actually do..’. In order to overcome the lack of agreement about 
competences, ‘MCI has now developed comprehensive competence-based standards 
(CNAA/BTEC, 1990:19).
The MCI’s management standards have been derived from a process that includes 
using a methodology called ‘functional analysis’ and the ‘disaggregation’ of 
managers’ functions (for full details see MCI, 1990).
The learning processes associated with this model as equally clear - a strong emphasis 
on work-based learning guided by both teachers and mentors. Assessment must, by 
definition, relate to work-place demonstrated competences and outputs. Both learning 
and, especially, assessment becomes broken down into relatively simple and discrete 
items and this seen as a positive advantage especially for assessing ‘transferable 
skills’, prior experiential learning, etc.
The MCI’s own evaluators have questioned the ‘functional analysis’ approach. For 
example, when a disquieting result was obtained by functional analysis of 
management practice (i.e. ‘the ability to lie effectively’) the result was quietly 
forgotten. In other cases where there were either conflicting results problems were 
sometimes conveniently ignored. Finally, the research was based only on large,
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hierarchical, organisations which raises issues about the Standards comprehensiveness 
(Janes, 1991).
Figure 4:12 Competences - a truncated learning cycle
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One strong claim of the competence movement is to have ‘solved’ the evaluation 
problem (Fletcher, 1991:172-3). As each training and development intervention are, 
by definition, assessed in terms of measurable outcomes the problem of quantifying 
benefits is unravelled. This ‘solution’ however, at best, provides a mechanism for 
validation, rather than evaluation. It is not clear how individual competence (Vaill’s 
point 2) is linked to organisational effectiveness (point 3)(see Talbot, 1992).
Reflection: Reflective Practicum, Professional development. Apprenticeships
The two reports which sparked the debate on, and growth of, MD initiatives in the UK 
in 1987 (Handy et al, 1987; Constable & McCormick, 1987) both advocated reform of 
UK MD. Both suggested substantial expansion of management education, training and 
development, together with reforms of structure and content of management education 
awards. However, there is a notable difference in the recommendations of these 
reports, perhaps relating to the international perspective of the Handy et al report. 
Following its ten recommendations, this report commented that:
“Were all this to happen Britain would have developed an approach to the 
formation of her managers remarkably similar to the ways in which all
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other the professions in Britain, including the armed services, develop 
their members in their desire to maintain a proper professionalism. 
Doctors, architects, accountants, lawyers, nowadays spend up to seven 
years (like managers in West Germany or in Japan) from the time of entry 
to a degree course, through a period of apprenticeship and further 
study before they are allowed to practise without supervision...In all 
the professions:
♦ a knowledge of the basics of the profession is required to be learned 
and demonstrated before or soon after entry;
♦ a period of practice under supervision supplemented by study is 
specified;
♦ the practitioners are also teachers or members and the academics are 
also practitioners;
♦ there is a code of effective practice and a code of ethical behaviour;
♦ there is a central source of information and recognised ways for 
practising members to update their knowledge;
♦ study is respected and reading is essential” (Handy et al, 1987:15-16 - 
emphasis added.)
This report has been quoted at length in order that some important features can be 
highlighted. Firstly, the educational thrust of these recommendations (as for the 
Constable and McCormick report) are clearly contrary to the views of those who 
advocate the non-educational approaches to MD expressed above. The critics of the 
MBA quoted above, and the advocates of action learning and similar approaches, 
would clearly reject an even greater emphasis on education as preparation for 
management.
However, one key issue stands out in Handy et al’s report - the notion of management 
development through guided, supervised, practice - a professional apprenticeship 
model. This is not a new concept, as Handy et al are at pains to point out, but based 
firmly on the professional development in other spheres than management. The core 
of this part of professional development is what can be called “guided practice.” As 
Handy et al subsequently put it in ‘the book of the report’:
“A business education is not, by itself, a qualification for management, 
only a prelude to it. You cannot learn about the real-life dilemmas and 
skills of managing by studying the problems of business and management 
in the classroom....All the education and training in the world will make 
little difference if the individual is not in a position to try it out. The best 
incentive to leam, we realised, is to be in a situation where you are
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concerned that your responsibility might exceed your competence.” 
(Handy et al, 1988:13)
One of the most developed forms of this is Schon’s notion of the “reflective 
practicum” (Schon, 1983 & 1987) which has become widely used in professional 
development practice, especially areas such as education (Schon, 1991).
Schon argues that “technical rationality” dominates the education and training of 
professionals. This assumes that there is a fixed body of professional knowledge and 
techniques which merely have to learned and then applied to relevant problems within 
the particular professional domain. In contrast he argues that many problems are 
“problematic” (following Dewey, 1938), that is made up of messy sets of issues and 
factors (including clashes of values) which cannot be solved through mere application 
of technical rationality but requires a degree of “professional artistry.” Such 
professional artistry includes aspects of “tacit knowledge”, i.e. knowledge of which 
the practitioner is not consciously aware (after Polanyi, 1962) and includes an element 
of informed intuition. To develop such artistry it is necessary to develop the skill of 
what Schon calls “reflection-in-action,” the ability to critically reflect upon practice.
Such professional artistry can only be learnt within the environment of a “reflective 
practicum” where the novice practitioner works alongside, and under the supervision 
of, a more experienced colleague. Schon describes the practicum as:
“a setting designed for the task of learning a practice. In a context that 
approximates a practice world, students leam by doing, although their 
doing usually falls short of real-world work. They leam by undertaking 
projects that simulate and simplify practice; or they take on real-world 
projects under close supervision. The practicum is a virtual world, 
relatively free of the pressures, distractions, and risks of the real one, to 
which, nevertheless, it refers. It stands in an intermediate space between 
the practice world, the “lay” world of ordinary life, and the esoteric world 
of the academy.” (Schon, 1987:37)
In terms of the learning cycle, this clearly places the emphasis on reflective 
observation, with a slightly weaker form of concrete experience and active 
experimentation, and less emphasis on abstract conceptualisation (Figure 4:13).
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Schon’s is not the only approach which emphasises reflection - a recent special issue 
of Management Education and Development (1992, Vol. 23 No. 3), for example, 
focuses on “biography in management and organisational development.” Biographical 
and autobiographical approaches outlined in this volume showed a relatively 
underdeveloped, but clearly growing, area of MD and research. Particularly in the 
autobiographical variant, this approach is clearly about reflective observation as a 
developmental and learning tool (see Torbert, 1987 & 1991; Torbert & Fisher, 1992).
Figure 4:13 The Reflective Practicum - a partially truncated learning cycle
Usually, but j 
not always, ; 
simulated
Concrete
experience
Active Reflective
experimentation observation
▲
Abstract ^........
conceptualisation
S u m m a r y  - M a n a g e m e n t  D e v e l o p m e n t  A p p r o a c h e s
Using Kolb’s ‘learning cycle’ as a template, four broad approaches to management 
development have been identified and briefly explored. Some of the issues are set out 
as a tentative summary of the different approaches in Figure 4:14. It should be stressed 
that these are analytic, conceptual distinctions. In practice, there are many overlaps 
between the approaches, as can be seen especially in the evolution and adaptation of 
management education, through the incorporation of aspects of other approaches.
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Figure 4:14 Competing models of management development
Management
education
Action
Learning
Competences Reflective
Practicum
Focus on aspect Abstract Active Concrete Reflective
o f learning conceptualisation experimentation experience observation
cycle &
methods
Learning style
(after Honey & Theorist Pragmatist Activist Reflector
Mumford)
Relationships in dependent on dependent on dependent on dependent on
learning and external experts peer and self­ performance professional
assessment review, collegiate assessors superiors
Core skills cognitive and problem functional reflection-in-
acquired analytic identification and (performance) action
solution skills
Core theoretical and organisation inter-personal professional,
knowledge functional specific and functional explicit and tacit
acquired
Core value Value of theory Value of Value of practice, Value of
and knowledge questioning and performance and reflection and
skills skills praxis
Implicit in these four approaches are also differing approaches to defining “what is 
management”. For the management education and competency approaches, despite 
their widely differing ways of addressing how to develop managers, there are in fact 
some shared assumptions about the nature of management:
• firstly, there is a generic model of good “management”, “managers” or 
“managing” which is broadly applicable across all sectors and types of 
organisations
• second, that we know what that model is
• third, that the skills, knowledge, attitudes, behaviours or competences associated 
with that model can be acquired by some combination of education, training, 
development or experience
• fourth, having acquired these abilities, managers can be assessed in their 
performance
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(Talbot, 1993b:331)
These assumptions are not shared (or at least not fully) by the action learning and 
reflective practicum approaches. The former sees what it calls “programmed 
knowledge”, including theories about the nature of management, as at best a useful 
starting point and at worst as positively misleading. Similarly, the reflective approach 
assumes that there are tacit, non-explicit, aspects of management which cannot be 
captured by any model and can only be learnt through guided reflection-in-action. In 
this respect, the two approaches share similar assumptions about the contingent and 
specific nature of management.
One balanced approach has been exhibited here: Kolb’s experiential learning cycle, 
which can by definition embraces all four phases of learning. Kolb’s work has been 
adapted and popularised by Honey and Mumford as a general approach to the 
identification of individuals’ preferred learning styles. The four styles developed are 
“activist” (preference for concrete experience); “reflector” (reflective observation); 
“theorist” (abstract conceptualisation); and “pragmatist” (active experimentation). It is 
reasonable to suggest that anyone with a strong preference for a particular learning 
styles, using this model, is likely to be more comfortable with the associated 
approaches to MD suggested in Figure 4:14 Competing models of management 
development above (see Mumford, 1982, 1984 and 1986 for discussions of this). 
However, Honey and Mumford have consistently argued that individuals should, 
whilst recognising their preferred styles, systematically attempt to compensate for 
their weaker preferences as well as building on their strengths. Following Kolb, they 
argue that only a balanced learning cycle including all four elements leads to sustained 
and useful learning processes.
A balanced approach to management development would therefore include all the four 
approaches outlined above, with particular approaches offering the preferred starting 
point for particular individuals but with all learners being encouraged to use all types 
of learning experience. It can be reasonably argued that the developments taking place
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in, for example, management education reflect a tendency towards broadening out 
from dependence on “abstract conceptualisation” as the focus of learning towards 
incorporating elements reflecting the other three approaches (e.g. action learning, 
competences, mentoring, etc.)
Before moving on to look at strategic manager development, one further “balanced” 
model of MD will be introduced: the Assessment, Learning, Analysis, Practice, 
Application (ALAPA) model advanced by Quinn et al (1990) and its associated 
“competing values and competences” model of management (Quinn, 1988). Building 
on the work of Whetten and Cameron (1984), who advanced a similar five step 
learning model, Quinn et al suggest a model including the following stages (Figure 
4:15).
Figure 4:15 ALAPA model of management learning
1. Assessment: discovering your present level of ability in, and awareness of, a
competency using self, peer or tutor assessment techniques
2. Learning: acquiring new knowledge about the competency through taught
or self-taught methods, including lectures, reading, tutorials, etc.
3. Analysis: exploring appropriate and inappropriate behaviours for given
situations using cases, role plays, etc.
4. Practice: applying competences in a simulated managerial situation using
games, exercises, etc.
5. Application: using assignments, projects, tasks and other applications of new
skills and knowledge to actual managerial situations 
(Source: adapted from Quinn et al, 1990:20-21)
This ALAPA model resembles very closely the complete learning cycle. Quinn et al 
do not suggest their model is actually cyclical, but rather it is iterative at each stage 
and that stages can be easily overlapped and mixed within learning processes. 
However, Figure 4:16 illustrates how their five stages can be broadly related to the 
four stages of the learning cycle. Assessment (stage 1) is achieved through reflective 
observation which is used to establish the knowledge and skills gaps to be filled 
through acquisition (stage 2) - abstract conceptualisation. Analysis (stage 3) consists
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of actively experimenting to establish appropriate and inappropriate behaviours before 
moving to simulated practice (stage 4) and then actual practice (stage 5).
Figure 4:16 The ALAPA Model and its relationship to the learning cycle
4. Practice
5. Application
Concrete
experience
3. Analysis Active Reflective 1. Assessment
j experimentation i observation
Abstract 
j conceptualisation ; 4........
------------------------- 2. Learning 4
Sources: ALAPA: Quinn et al, 1990; Learning Cycle: Kolb, 1984
As with other models, Quinn et al’s approach includes a model of the nature of 
management. This shares with the management education and competency approaches 
the assumptions mentioned above, about there being a generic model of management, 
that we know what it is and that it can be taught/acquired and assessed. It differs from 
both in an interpretation of “competence” which emphasises both skills and 
knowledge, theory and practice (Quinn e al, 1990:20), which can be seen as a more 
integrated approach than either (traditional) management education and the UK 
version of competences. Their ALAPA learning model reinforces this integrated 
approach.
Where this model differs radically from other approaches is in its emphasis on 
competing competences and competing values systems underpinning them. Based on 
Quinn’s (1988) work establishing this framework, they argue that managerial 
competences are contradictory and paradoxical. Their framework (see Table 4.2)
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identifies four models of management (open systems; rational goals; internal process; 
and human relations); eight clusters of competences, and twenty-four individual 
competences (three for each of the eight clusters).
The initial four models of management are based on successive developments in 
management theory (rational goal and internal process models - 1900-1925; human 
relations model - 1926-1950; open systems model -1951-1975). Two dimensions are 
used to group them: internal Vs external orientation and flexibility Vs control. The 
four models can be combined in single framework because of what Quinn et al call a 
fifth model - the “both/and” model or recognition of paradox, which has emerged 
since 1976 (Quinn, 1988; Quinn et al, 1990). (See Figure 4:17 - competences for each 
role are summarised).
Figure 4:17 Management Roles - a competing values framework
Open Systems Rational Goal Internal Process Human Relations
Model Model Model ModelO $ A O
(external - (external - (internal - (internal -flexibility) control) control) flexibility)
Innovator Producer Co-ordinator Facilitator
creative thinking Motivating self Planning, team building,
and living with and and others, time organising and conflict
managing change and stress controlling management and
management participation
Broker Director Monitor Mentor
selling ideas, Goal setting, Receiving and Understanding and
building power taking initiative processing routine developing self
bases, negotiating and delegating information and others
Source: adapted from Quinn, 1988
The developmental model associated with this model thus has two features - the first 
is the balanced approach to learning already discussed. All twenty-four competences 
are systematically addressed, using the ALAPA framework. However, the second 
element in this developmental approach is quite novel. It uses the framework to
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encourage an understanding of the contradictory, paradoxical, aspects of management 
and recognition of the tensions between different competences.
An example of two contradictory roles and associated sets of competences - Director 
and Mentor:
One role, and its associated competences, is highly task oriented and controlling and 
relies on power and authority to achieve results (Director). The other is much more 
flexible, process and people oriented and relies on persuasion, understanding and 
developmental approaches to subordinates (Mentor). Even for seemingly fairly close 
roles, such as Mentor and Facilitator, there are values contradictions - the Mentor role 
implies a more hierarchical relationship than the Facilitator, which is more like a peer 
based role.
Quinn suggests that there are non-balanced sets of roles which are effective 
managerially, but that for true “mastery” of management a balanced approach is 
needed (Quinn, 1988:90). This point will be returned to below and its relationship to 
developing strategic managers discussed, after a brief review of other approaches.
M D  and Strategic  Management
Having examined approaches to developing managers generally, are there any major 
differences when approaches to developing strategic managers are considered? The 
literature on strategic management and management development would seem to 
suggest, implicitly, that this is not an issue. Little of the literature on management 
development addresses the issue of there being any significant difference between
Director
1. Taking initiative
2. Goal setting
3. Delegating effectively
M entor
1. Understanding and developing self 
and others
2. Interpersonal communication
3. Developing subordinates
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strategic and operational levels of management, except in so far as it discusses how to 
integrate MD with organisational strategies. The literature on strategic management, 
on the other hand, says a great deal about the nature of strategic management 
processes and content, something about the nature of strategic managers (usually 
drawn from the literature on leadership) and next to nothing about how to develop 
strategic managers.
Braddick & Casey, writing in 1981, noted that:
“Serious efforts at management development began about 20 years ago in 
the UK...progressive companies now have a more professional
management Above them there is forgotten army of senior managers
and directors whose development needs have largely been ignored both by 
their companies and the educational institutions.” (1981:169)
That there is an issue to address has now begun to emerge from three directions, all 
from within the broad sphere of strategic management. The development of the 
literature on strategy implementation, especially on managing organisational change 
and on leadership, has at least begun to address the issue of the skills and knowledge 
needed by strategic managers. Similarly, the literature on learning organisations and 
on strategic thinking has also begun to delimit some of the competences of strategic 
managers. Another, somewhat less developed, source has been the literature on 
mergers and acquisitions, examining the problems of integrating (or valuing diversity) 
amongst corporate and business senior management teams.
Two questions immediately pose themselves:
• What are “strategic managers” and what skills, knowledge, attitudes, behaviours 
or competences do they need?
• How can managers be developed to meet these requirements?
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As with management in general, disentangling these two questions is extremely 
difficult. Many MD approaches tend to assume an understanding of what “strategic 
managers” look like without spelling out any clear model.
One useful discussion of the differences between operational management and
strategic management suggest the following pattern of difference between the two:
Operational managers: Strategic managers:
• manage allocated resources to • procure resources to respond to
achieve best performance tomorrow’s opportunities
• manage by objectives, setting goals • manage unallocated resources
and monitoring through investment and reinforcing
new opportunities
• define problems, choosing between • use entrepreneurial skills in
alternatives and acting visualising organisational futures,
utilising innovation and turn these 
visions into rational plans
• use human resource skills of • determine the key strategic questions
initiating orders, communicating, which strategic plans have to answer
counselling and motivating
(adapted from Zabriskie & Huellmantel, 1991:30)
According to the Constable & McCormick report (1987), at that point, the distribution
of managers in the UK and the annual turnover was approximately as in Figure 4:18.
The question here is clearly: at what level do managers become “strategic”? For some, 
senior management is equated almost completely with strategic management (Silk, 
1991 & Knight, 1991).
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Figure 4:18 UK Management - Distribution by Level and Turnover (1987)
Management Total Movement
levels Numbers upwards
(annually)
Senior 350,000
ir
Middle /  800 ,000 \ 17,500
\Junior / 1,600,000 \  35,000
1t
90,000
Source: adapted from Constable & McCormick, 1987:15-16
Handscombe and Norman (1993) identify two new tasks for strategic management
teams (from a US perspective):
• leadership of continuous change process by the ongoing audit, challenge and 
integration of operational and strategic management practices
• managing the strategic dimensions customer and supplier relationships and 
effective use of technology
and pose a series of questions about the development of chief executives:
• what are the relative merits of internally growing CEOs (with consequent 
problems of narrowness) or recruiting them (with problems of lack of closeness to 
organisational cultures)?
• how can managers with narrow, national vision be equipped with the international 
perspective needed today?
• how to achieve the continuous development of the CEOs already in-post?
• who does the CEO call on for support? Internally from company chairpersons or 
non-executive directors or externally through networking and action learning?
(Handscombe & Norman, 1993:13-16)
200
A different tack is taken by Easterby-Smith and Davies (1983) who give a more 
sustained treatment of “developing strategic thinking”. They emphasise that there is a 
profound difference between managers who have a capacity to manage “in a strategic 
way” and managers who are merely involved in the strategic planning process. The 
former have developed capacities of analyse and generate a vision of the 
organisation’s future, which may take place without a formal strategic planning 
process. The latter may merely contribute facts or opinions to a strategic planning 
process in a very inactive, uninvolved way (:40).
They however make no further attempt to spell out what they mean by “strategic 
thinking” before turning to look at different MD approaches and evaluate their 
usefulness in helping mangers to develop it. Firstly, they review some “off-the-job” 
techniques (lectures, case studies, games and simulations) and conclude that these are 
good for imparting knowledge about strategic processes and policies but poor at 
developing strategic abilities. They turn, secondly, to “on-the-job” methods (action 
learning, project based methods, natural learning, coaching, counselling and 
mentoring). They conclude broadly that these methods are more effective, because 
they combine learning with practice and provide more flexible learning opportunities. 
They conclude that the full strategic potential of managers can only be developed by 
involvement in the planning process:
• utilising natural opportunities by involving junior managers in projects and task 
forces
• support learning by developing relationships with more senior managers
• involve junior managers in operational planning in their own areas
• encourage junior managers to become involved in discussions about broader 
corporate policy issues, through policy seminars or think-tanks
(Easterby-Smith & Davis, 1983:47)
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One report, based on US research, suggested that methods for developing “strategic 
leaders” should be a combination of the following:
• external seminars and workshops about strategic planning
• internal seminars and workshops about their own strategic planning systems
• giving managers duties within the strategic planning process, with progressively 
more important
• tutoring and coaching by experienced executives and trainers
• incentive systems to reward developing strategic abilities and work
(adapted from Zabriskie & Huellmantel, 1991:30-31)
An example of a single firm’s MD programme for strategic managers (General 
Electric in the US) is given by Michel (1976) and this broadly conforms to the pattern 
of on-the-job development supplemented by management education (in this case very 
intense 8 week programme designed to meet the specific requirements of the 
attendees) and on-going strategic awareness seminars.
One point made in this report is the problem of the breadth of knowledge needed by 
strategic managers compared with professions:
“In the medical and legal professions, specialization is the usual route to 
excellence and eminence. The manager, too, during the early phases of his 
career, follows this pattern, he establishes a track record by excelling in a 
particular speciality. But unlike the doctor and the lawyer, his career 
progression pattern is brutally shifted. Having earned his spurs as a 
specialist, the manager is given a new, a drastically different challenge, 
that of excelling as a generalist. Instead of knowing more and more about 
less and less, he now shifts to knowing less and less about more and 
more.” (Uyterhoeven, 1972, cited in Michel, 1976:251)
There are two important points here: firstly, this suggests a very strong, and abrupt, 
shift in managerial roles from operational to strategic management, which has 
implications about managing such a shift; secondly, it suggests that the problems 
posed by the broadening knowledge base required by strategic managers is an acute
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one both for the managers themselves and for the design of MD support systems for 
them.
Silk explicitly applies the learning cycle approach to senior management 
development, to advocate a balanced approach embracing all four elements of the 
cycle (1991:136). In a “Director’s Development Guidebook, Mumford, Honey and 
Robinson (1988) develop a typology of methods for learning from experience 
(intuitive, incidental, retrospective and prospective) for strategic managers which also 
clearly conforms to the learning cycle approach, especially Honey and Mumford’s 
simplified version (activist, reflector, theorist, pragmatist - 1988). As with Honey & 
Mumford’s learning styles, Mumford, Honey and Robinson advocate both building on 
the strengths of a predilection for a particular learning styles whilst also trying to 
develop a more rounded approach.
Bartree (1976) argues, however, that certain types of learning approach are 
inappropriate for developing strategic managers. Starting from the proposition that “it 
is one thing to think strategically and it is quite another to be able to act strategically” 
he suggests that learning through traditional educational mechanisms reinforces 
dependent behaviour on the part of learners. In contrast, he argues, what is needed for 
strategic managers is to encourage interdependent action. This requires a process of 
re-education which involves individual behaviour being changed:
• from a dependent basis to an interdependent basis
• so that knowing how is as legitimate as knowing about
• there is higher tolerance for ambiguity, conflict and risk-taking
Traditional educational techniques foster dependence, give priority to knowing about 
and promote avoidance of risk and conflict (Bartree, 1976:217-218). However, 
Bartree still argues for a balanced approach, including inductive and deductive 
learning experiences (:219), although the emphasis is on inductive, experiential, 
learning.
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Dunbar and Stumpf (1989) suggest that one solution to this problem is behavioural 
simulations of strategic decision situations which attempt to recreate, as closely as 
possible, situations which are encountered in the “real world”. They point, with some 
justification, that the traditional case study method not only has learning limitations 
but also that cases are usually selected to illustrate and reinforce the particular 
technique or approach being suggested by the controller of the learning event. 
Behavioural simulations, designed to allow for multiple decision strategies and 
outcomes provide the opportunity to explore skills in decision framing and choice and 
even, to a limited extent, (simulated) implementation. There are obvious similarities 
here with Schon’s reflective practicum, in so far as an artificial practice environment 
is concerned (although the emphasis on autonomous decision making is quite different 
from Schon’s supervised method).
Bartree makes the point that “learning new concepts will not influence the change in 
executive behaviour from an incremental style to an entrepreneurial style” (1976:218). 
This, he states, is because even if the cognitive development (skills or knowledge 
acquisition) is radical the method of learning (which is teacher dependent) will 
reinforce incremental behaviour.
Embedded in this last point is the assumption that “entrepreneurial style” behaviour is 
preferable to “incremental style” behaviour. This is reinforced by the assumption that 
“strategic managers are required to function effectively in ill-structured environments” 
(:219). This is a questionable assumption, as the analysis of strategic management 
generally and in the public sector (Chapters 2 and 3) has already shown. There are 
examples organisations which do act incrementally and therefore their strategic 
managers do not, presumably, need to be entrepreneurial rather than incremental in 
their style, as opposed to needing both according to circumstance.
There is some emerging evidence that the strategic style of the organisation and its 
strategic managers both are correlated and, where the “fit” is good the performance of 
the organisation is improved. The findings of a study of middle management 
involvement in the strategy process in 25 organisation (in the US) seems to show a
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relationship between middle managers’ role in strategy making and organisational 
strategic style. Using Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology of strategic styles 
(prospectors, analysers, defenders, reactors - although the latter was excluded from the 
analysis) the authors show that in strategy formation processes the levels and types of 
middle management involvement appear related to the organisations strategic style 
(Floyd & Woolridge, 1992).
A similar study, also using Miles and Snow’s typology, focusing on the tripartite 
relationship between strategic style, managerial fit and organisational performance 
suggests again a link between organisational strategic style of managerial style 
(Thomas, Litschert & Ramaswamy, 1991). A further study has shown that when either 
strategic content or the strategy making process change independently there is no 
strong correlation in top-management turnover but where both strategic content and 
process change there is a significant top-management turnover (Betts & Calingo, 
1986).
What conclusions can be drawn about developing strategic managers?
Firstly, there is no substantial difference to the structure of managerial learning, as a 
process, for strategic managers from that applicable to all managers. A balanced 
approach to learning, as illustrated in the learning cycle (Kolb) or the ALAPA model 
(Quinn et al) seems equally applicable to strategic managers. If there is a difference it 
is simply that an unbalanced approach to development for such managers is likely to 
have more acutely dysfunctional results because of the demands placed upon them.
Secondly, on the content of strategic managers’ development, there are major 
differences in two areas. Firstly, the need for a much broader understanding of the 
organisation and its environment - “knowing less about more” to use Uyterhoeven’s 
phrase. The second is in understanding and being able to practice the strategy process 
itself - how do, or can, organisations make and implement strategy? Particularly, 
drawing on Chapters 2 and 3 above, is there ‘one best way’ to practice strategic 
management or are there multiple, contingent or even paradoxical, ways?
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It is interesting to return here to Quinn’s model of competing competences and values. 
In an analysis of the prevalence of the eight roles at five managerial levels (ranging 
from first line to top management) Quinn establishes that for four roles (Producer, 
Director, Co-ordinator, Monitor) there is little variance. Two roles, both in the human 
relations model quadrant (Facilitator and Mentor), show an interesting pattern of high 
scores at lower management levels, decline in middle management and then climb 
again towards top management levels. In general, all the other four roles (Facilitator, 
Mentor, Innovator and Broker) tended to increase in importance with managerial 
level. Quinn comments that:
“As people move up in an organisation, the emphasis on the top four roles 
(Facilitator, Mentor, Innovator and Broker) tends to increase. People 
need a more dynamic and complex world view in order to cope with the 
complexity and change that are encountered at higher levels.” (Quinn, 
1988:92).
Later, Quinn argues that both effective and ineffective sets of role preferences are also 
distributed hierarchically within management layers (1988:105-109). More 
importantly, Quinn suggests of those managers who obtain very balanced scores on all 
eight roles - the so-called “master managers” - that
“collectively, they are at higher levels of management than those in other 
profiles, they have been in the organisation longer than others, and they 
have a large female representation.” (Quinn, 1988:109).
M D and Public  Service M anagers
Domains and Development for Public Service Managers
The Domain model of the nature of public service management, developed in Chapter 
1, has implications for how public service managers (PSMS) should be developed for 
their roles.
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All PSM’s, it is argued, operate in the context of all three domains. However some are 
clearly more likely to have to encounter the interface between domains more 
frequently than others.
For example, middle managers operating mainly at the service domain - management 
domain interface may require to employ quite different skills, knowledge and abilities 
than senior managers operating at the policy domain - management domain interface. 
In the traditional public services professional bureaucracy, these managers would have 
only limited contact with the policy domain. However, with new attempts at 
decentralised working it is quite likely that they may have considerably more direct 
contact with the policy domain, as recent survey evidence strongly suggests (Talbot, 
1994).
While some private sector managers have the problem of managing professional 
groups (especially in the service sector) few have to deal with the policy domain, 
except the most senior at national levels.
Moreover, many managers are simultaneously part of more than one domain. For 
example, a Director of Social Services may see her/him self as a member of:
• the service domain in their professional role as a qualified social worker, and 
perhaps expert in a particular field (e.g. child protection)
• the policy domain when formulating policy with Councillors
• the management domain when meeting with their Management Team.
The potential role conflicts, not to mention the demands for a range of skills and 
knowledge, are qualitatively different from other managerial roles in private sector 
organisations.
Public services managers are therefore likely to require development in a range of 
skills, knowledge and competences which embrace not only each of the three domains 
but also managing the interface and conflicts between them. It is useful here to turn to
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look at one aspect of the ‘supply side’ of management development - the supply of 
management education programmes which may be useful to PSMs. In these case of 
three fairly typical post-graduate management education programmes it can be seen 
clearly that each only provides a partial solution, even at a very broad level, to the 
needs of PSMs for management development across all three domains (see Figure 
4:19).
Figure 4:19 Domains and management education - typical courses
Policy
Domain
Management
Domain
Service
Domain
MBA V
Diploma in Public Admin. V V
MSc in Social Policy and Admin. V
Source: derived from 3 anonymous course brochures
Masters and post-graduate Diploma programmes in Social Policy and Administration 
(of which there are a number in the UK) usually meet two of these requirements (the 
service domain and the management domain) while similar courses in Public 
Administration (of which there are a few) usually address a different pair (policy and 
management). A typical MBA programme only addresses one (management) whilst is 
may carry a very small amount on policy (see the section on traditional management 
education earlier in this Chapter).
There are however many courses beginning to appear which acknowledge the 
differentiation of public service management, some in particular services such as 
Health Service MBA’s. Public Service sector MBA’s have also been more evident 
(e.g. Henley Management College and CIPFA are offering a new Public Service 
MBA) as well as public service options on existing DMS and MBA courses (Moore, 
1992; Drumond, 1992). New courses seem to be appearing almost daily.
Several writers have suggested the need for a specialised curriculum for public 
services management. Stewart has suggested the need for courses focused on the
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‘public’ aspect of public services management, insisting that this political dimension 
is a defining characteristic of these organisations: ‘The political process is essential to 
public institutions. It underlies their rationale.’ (Stewart 1989). Similarly, Walsh has 
identified the unique issues in developing management for quality public services 
(Walsh 1990). In Canada a major national initiative on public management has been 
based on the special needs of public service management (Dodge, 1991). Pye has also 
suggested that not merely is the MCI approach flawed but that it ignores the 
specificities of public management (Pye, 1988).
This is not to suggest that all management development initiatives aimed at public 
managers have adopted this contextual approach. Some have explicitly set out to 
introduce generic, or even private sector, management competences to public service 
management, such as the management development initiatives associated with the 
Next Steps programme. (Wright, 1990)
Both courses based on generic (private sector dominated) and specifically public 
service models of management need to take into account the specific problems of 
managing the range of arrangements such as Agencies, CCT, Quasi-markets, 
decentralisation, etc.
The learning models adopted from using Domain theory as an underpinning 
framework is of necessity flexible, fluid and eclectic in approach. A deliberate attempt 
to span differing educational traditions (government & policy analysis; sociology & 
social policy; business & management - see Figure 4:20 below) means that a more 
learner-centred approach becomes essential, with a degree of relative autonomy of 
course participants and learning self-selection. This approach is strikingly similar to 
that adopted by the Canadian governments PS 2000 exercise and its associated 
management development programmes, which has an emphasis on ‘personal 
responsibility and professionalism’ coupled with very ‘learner centred’ techniques. 
(Dodge, 1991)
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Social/Policy/Management Divisions
The problem for public service management education has been that the domains of 
public service organisations have been reflected in academic and institutional 
divisions within higher education (see Figure 4:20). The fields of politics and 
government, social policy and sociology and business and management have remained 
divided, usually into separate faculties or departments, and often jealously guarding 
“their” territories (Easton & Schelling, 1991). Instead of the respective experts 
providing a rich synergy from their differing perspectives all too often there has 
simply been mutual incomprehension. It is tempting to think that there may be a 
causal link in the relationship between each discipline and its potential professional 
market which generates this mutual miscommunication.
Figure 4:20 Domains and divisions of management education
Govemement, 
politics and 
policy analysis Business and management
Sociology and 
social policy
Source: adapted from Talbot, 1993a
The problem of ‘supply’ driven education provision is not exclusive to public services 
management education - one director of a leading UK business school recently 
described their reorganisation thus:
“Cranfield’s structure has, switched from supply- to market-driven. 
Dominance is given to the elements of our business rather than to the 
subjects, which makes for a multifunctional approach. By breaking down 
the invisible barriers between various subjects, we have been able to tailor
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our courses more easily to industrial and corporate needs, integrating, say, 
marketing, finance, strategy and operations management into specific 
programmes...” (Murray, 1993)
Strategic  Public  Managers
Very little appears to have been written about developing strategic managers for, or in, 
public services organisations. One of the few examples is Bozeman and Straussman, 
who have developed a characterisation of the effective strategic public manager. As 
this is such a rare example it is worth summarising their main points:
• the are “not boring”, they do not suffer from tunnel-vision or 
overspecialisation, they have “a breadth of knowledge, an interest in 
learning, and a willingness to tap the knowledge of others.”
• they have a sense of the “good” as well as a sense of the “politic”. 
Whilst bringing clear personal values and vision to their work, they 
also have the capacity to recognise the legitimacy of competing 
interests and the necessity for negotiation, bargaining and compromise
• they are extremely patient. Because decision processes public 
organisations tend to be slower than in the private sector, effective 
strategic managers require much greater resources of tenacity
• they have diverse work experience: “not only is experience needed for 
effective strategic public management, but effectiveness requires 
diverse experience”
• they are people oriented, but more importantly they are able to both 
motivate individuals and see how each specific individual can best 
contribute
• they feel comfortable with analysis and analytic thinking, which 
includes both quantitative and conceptual analysis, and the ability to 
integrate analysis with values, judgement, intuition and experience 
(1990:206-215)
They conclude that while public and private strategic management has much in 
common, they are sharply separated by political authority: “at the core...is a single 
assumption: public management is the management of political authority” (:xi). Their 
model therefore rests firmly in the ‘public administration’ or policy-management
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domain interface. In this respect it adds little to the models, such as they are, of 
generic strategic managers reviewed above, other than the emphasis on dealing with 
political authority and values conflicts. The beginnings of an alternative approach has 
been outlined in Chapter 3, which seeks to integrate a more comprehensive model of 
public services management and strategic management with a more comprehensive, 
paradox based, model of generic strategic management.
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Chapter 5 Research Philosophy, Strategy and Technique
This Chapter will outline the philosophy underpinning the research reported in this 
thesis, the research strategy adopted and some of the technical issues dealt with. This 
is a very similar in structure to a model of the main elements of management research 
advanced by Easterby-Smith et al (1991) as being the philosophical, political and 
technical issues. Their definition of the philosophical underpinnings of management 
research is retained, i.e. examining the broad stance of the researcher with regard to 
issues such as that between positivist and phenomenological approaches.
However, their definition of ‘philosophy’ includes issues of research design 
(including issues such as levels of researcher involvement with the subjects, number 
of cases, testing or generating theory, experimental or fieldwork, and verification or 
falsification.) Many of these issues are more usefully discussed under what is called 
here ‘research strategy’, which also embraces the ‘political’ issues of research access 
in management research discussed under Easterby-Smith et al’s second heading.
Finally, their definition of the more ‘technical’ issues is retained. What does need to 
be emphasised is the degree to which the philosophical, strategic and technical issues 
overlap and affect one another. For example, a research strategy which it is not 
realistically possible for a singleton researcher to implement because of 
logistic/technical problems would obviously not be a useful strategy. Johnson & 
Schole’s (1993) model of strategic management is an iterative one between strategic 
analysis, choice and implementation.
So research is here also seen as an iterative process of change and interaction between 
philosophical framework, research strategy and technical implementation. However, 
this is (or should be) an unequal interaction between the three factors with the 
philosophical approach being the largest determining factor, research strategy the next 
most influential and technique the least powerful. (See Figure 5:1 - the notion of
213
relatively autonomous but dialectically interacting spheres is not a new one - see 
Engels, 1890).
Figure 5:1 Research as a dialectical (but unequal) interaction between 
philosophy, strategy and technique
Strategy
Philosophy
Technique
In some respects these three elements are closely related to Guba’s ‘three basic 
questions’ about the nature of any research:
Ontological: What is the nature of ‘knowledge’? Or, what is the nature of 
‘reality’?
Epistemological: What is the nature of the relationship between the 
knower (inquirer) and the known (or knowable)?
Methodological: How should the inquirer go about finding out 
knowledge?
(Guba, 1990:18).
There is a clear sense here in which the philosophical framework is the same as the 
answer to the ontological question; where research strategy is largely about the 
relationship between the researcher and the researched (knower and knowable); and 
where the techniques employed to gather knowledge are the same as methodology.
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Each of these three questions will be discussed in greater detail below.
P hilosophy
Many issues in the philosophy of knowledge are posed as dilemmas - either or 
choices. Examples might include: induction vs. deduction; materialism vs. idealism; 
proof vs. falsification; rationalism vs. relativism; theoretical determinism (or 
structuralism) vs. anarchism (or eclecticism); positivist vs. humanistic inquiry; etc. 
(see Chalmers, 1990; Medawar, 1969; Reason & Rowan, 1981; Guba, 1990).
If we take one issue, induction vs. deduction, this often posed as a dilemma. Induction 
derives theory from observation whereas deduction derives new theories (hypotheses) 
from existing theories which can be tested by observation (experimentation). Thus the 
inductive method and the hypothetico-deductive method are seen as alternative, 
mutually exclusive, approaches (see, for example, the Penguin Dictionary of 
Sociology: “Induction is contrasted with deduction...” [1988:121] or Gill & Johnson, 
1991:36). That this is a relevant debate in management research has been raised 
forcefully by Mintzberg (1979b) who argues for much greater use of inductive and 
descriptive research in management. Indeed, some of the most interesting research in 
strategic management can be seen as more inductive than deductive (see for example 
Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991; Mintzberg et al, 1982 & 1986).
Chalmers’ depiction of the relationship (see Figure 5:2) already suggests a slightly 
different relationship. Rather than a linear relationship (as suggested by Chalmers) the 
relationship can in fact be depicted as a circular and iterative process (and in this case 
it has been linked to Kolb’s experiential learning cycle - see Chapter 4) as in Figure 
5:3. It is important to note that what is being suggested here is not straightforward
Figure 5:2 Induction and deduction
Facts acquired Laws and ; Predictions and
through - » Induction -»  i theories 1 —> Deduction -> j explanations
observation
Source: adapted from Chalmers, 1990
215
circulation between inductive and deductive phases of research but rather an attempt 
to show the (possible) general relationship between them. Any particular research 
project might emphasise one at the expense of the other (as Mintzberg (1977b) 
advocates emphasising induction, for example), although no project is likely to 
completely ignore both. Similarly, any project may evolve through a series of circular 
iterations. Finally, it is also possible to combine both induction and deduction in 
investigating a particular research topic in ways which are not quite so tidy.
For example, a deductive approach might be adopted to produce a very broad 
approach to a particular issue (in this case the development of strategic public 
managers). Such an approach might be used to produce a whole series of speculations 
(in strict terms hypotheses) about the nature of strategic management in the public 
sector, what competences managers might need to work with such strategic processes 
and how managers might be developed in these competences. In parallel with is work 
of theoretical synthesis and elaboration it might be possible to conduct a largely 
inductive research project based on biographical accounts of public sector strategic 
managers personal development (for the use of biographies as a research tool see the 
special edition of Management Education and Development, spring 1992).
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Figure 5:3 Deduction and induction as phases in an iterative learning cycle
INDUCTION
Experience - Action
ReflectionPlan Action
Construct Theory
DEDUCTION
There are obviously potential dangers in such an approach - the deductive phase could 
be seen as ‘contaminating’ the inductive phase of the research, causing the researcher 
to see patterns in the biographical material which ‘fit’ the deductions and ignore other 
explanations. Nevertheless, this seems to be at least plausible as a research approach.
(As will be discussed below, the actual approach adopted here has combined elements 
o f induction and deduction, although the emphasis has been largely on the latter.)
A second issue will be briefly explored here: the idea of paradox. This has already 
been mentioned briefly in the Introduction. Whilst the management literature has only 
recently begun to explore contradiction in organisation and management, already 
trends have emerged in how these contradictions are to be viewed and dealt with. 
These trends can be summarised as contradiction as ‘dilemma’, ‘dialectic’ or 
‘paradox’ (see Figure 5:4).
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Figure 5:4 Contradiction: dilemma, dialectic and paradox
Dilemma - Dialectic -
resolving through «. > resolving through
choice \ \ / /  synthesis
contradiction
Para
f
tdox -
living with the
contradictions
Seeing contradictions as dilemmas essentially means making choices - either/or. This 
approach to contradictions has been mainly developed by those most closely 
associated with the more ‘traditional’ rationalist approach. Thus, for example, Stewart 
(1982) poses a series of dilemmas for designing policy making systems (e.g. 
comprehensive vs. selective; participatory vs. directive; centralised vs. devolved; etc.) 
and argues that choices have to be made, although these may not be completely 
“absolute” but may be about selecting a “point on a continuum between conflicting 
values” (:238).
A dialectical approach to contradiction - (thesis + antithesis = synthesis) - has been 
largely neglected, probably due to its incorporation in Marxist philosophy which is 
not a popular underpinning for much management writing. However some writers 
have explored the use of dialectics in organisational analysis (Morgan, 1986:255-267) 
and in strategic management (Stacey, 1993:104-5). Whilst Stewart (above) sees 
resolving contradictions through choices, a dialectical approach attempts to synthesise 
the best of both parts of the contradiction into a new unity.
Both the preceding approaches essentially attempt to ‘resolve’ contradictions - the 
first through ‘choice’ and the second by ‘synthesis’. The third approach does not 
attempt to resolve contradictions but recognises them as inevitable and unavoidable 
parts of organisational life and seeks to develop strategies for managing them. This is
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the ‘paradox’ approach. While individual contradictions may be resolved, many are 
inherent to organisations. Attempts to sketch an approach to managing paradox have 
taken two principle forms -
• fluid ‘cognitive mapping’ and ‘processual’ approaches (e.g. Eden & Radford, 
1990; Hampden-Tumer, 1990a & b, 1994; Huff, 1990; Smith & Berg, 1987) and
• static model building (e.g. Quinn, 1988; Quinn & Cameron, 1988; Quinn, 
Faerman, Thompson, & McGrath, 1990; Farey, 1993).
Interestingly, the work of Quinn et al (1988, 1990) on management competences and 
Belbin (1981), and Margerison & McCann (1984) on management team roles, all 
implicitly adopt the fundamental framework of the ‘Pa-Kua’ or eight trigrams model 
of Taoist philosophy. This illustrates four sets of contradictory polarities (see Figure 
5:5). The ‘Pa-Kua’ is interesting in that starting from a set of only two symbols 
(representing the basic polarity - yin and yang) a complex model can be developed by 
combining the three symbols into trigrams and producing an eight-fold model of all 
the possible combinations.
Each of the models developed by Quinn (1988), Belbin (1981) and Margerison & 
McCann (1984) includes eight management roles or types, grouped as four 
contradictory pairs. Farey (1993) explicitly uses the ‘Pa-Kua’ as a framework for 
analysis of a series of management and organisational development issues.
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Figure 5:5 Taoist ‘Pa-Kua’ or ‘sequence of earlier heaven’
Lake >
Heaven
V  Wind
•Ar >
Fire m  mm Water
>
*  .  .  4
Thunder > m  mm v  Mountain
Source: Rawson & Legeza, 1973
Earth
Taoism is one of the few philosophical approaches which recognises the inevitably of 
paradox, hence the popular Taoist ‘yin-yang’ emblem which symbolises contradiction 
and paradox (Watts, 1979):
Besides the examples of the use of, or parallels with, the ‘Pa-Kua’ already given, the 
‘yin-yang’ symbol and other Taoist ideas have also become increasingly evident in 
management literature. The ‘yin-yang’ symbol denotes not only contradiction and 
paradox but also the ebb and flow between the paradoxical elements in any system. 
Thus, for example, Pettigrew & Whipp (1991:271) use the ‘yin-yang emblem to 
illustrate the interaction of primary and secondary conditioning elements in their 
model of change management. Gummesson (1991:56 & 150) introduces Taoist ideas 
to explain the need for understanding how to balance apparently irreconcilable 
elements of management research. Heider goes so far as to update and contextualise 
the Taoist classic the ‘ Tao Te Ching’ and apply it to a modem organisational context 
to offer ‘The Tao o f  Leadership' for modem managers (Heider, 1985). Cleary offers a 
collection, and interpretation, of Taoist writings relevant to ‘leadership and strategy’ 
for modem organisational and political managers and leaders (Cleary, 1990).
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Interestingly, Taoist ideas have also been increasingly emerging in physics (see 
Capra, 1976) and more recently have been seen as a philosophical framework for the 
science of ‘fuzzy logic’, which has formed the basis for many new computer 
developments (see Kosko, 1993).
It would be wrong to say that the philosophical underpinning of this thesis is Taoist 
philosophy - there is obviously a lot more to Taoism than simply the recognition of 
paradox. Nevertheless, it has provided a useful intellectual aid in thinking through 
some of the difficulties of understanding paradox in organisational and management 
systems.
Quinn and Cameron (1988:15) set out a series of points about organisational 
paradoxes and the difficulties of researching them. These can be summarised as:
1. Ignoring the contradictory nature of organisations may be dysfunctional for 
managers and researchers - in particular researchers may tend to ignore one part of 
a paradox.
2. Theories of congruence have an order bias - that is, they tend to assume the need 
to resolve contradictions through synthesis or choice.
3. Paradoxes are paradoxical - they are both confusing and understandable, common 
and surprising, but they are also predictable.
4. Paradoxical criteria are not indicated merely by both high and low scores on an 
attribute - a high or low score for “a” says nothing about whether its paradoxical 
counterpart “b” is present or not present.
5. Many inferential statistical procedures mask rather than uncover the presence of 
paradox in organisational research - means may disguise paradoxical elements in 
data.
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6. Hypotheses should not be generated that do not consider merely the rejection of 
the null or not - contradictory hypotheses, antitheses, are required for investigating 
paradox.
These issues obviously cover the range of issues from philosophy, through research 
strategy to technique. They clearly raise issues about what research methods are 
appropriate to investigating paradox and these are dealt with in more detail in the 
sections which follow.
S t r a t e g y
The research story
This discussion of the research strategy adopted for this project begins by explaining 
how it evolved using some tools adapted from strategic management practice and 
theory. Mintzberg’s model of the strategy process, which sees the outcomes the 
process as always being a mixture of deliberate and emergent properties can also be 
applied to research (see Figure 5:6). In this application, however deliberate the 
implementation of a research intention, it is always the case that to some degree the 
realised research will differ from the deliberate effort to the degree that it is influenced 
by emergent factors in the research process.
While this point may appear fairly obvious, the question it raises is how can the 
process, especially the emergent parts of the process, be accounted for, recorded and 
analysed? Here it is useful to turn to another tool used in strategic management, for 
group and individual decision support, namely cognitive mapping (see Huff, 1990). 
The use of cognitive maps in this context is similar to the narrative form of research 
reporting - telling the history of a research project as a story or using the metaphor of 
the research ‘journey’ (see Frost & Stablein, 1992 for examples).
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Figure 5:6 Deliberate and Emergent Research
Intended
Research
Realised
Research
Unrealised
Research
Emergent
Research
Source: adapted from Mintzberg & Quinn, 1992:14.
In this case a simple cognitive map is used to illustrate a part of the particular research 
journey being recounted here - the formulation of the research question. In this case 
the original research question, or more properly issue, posed was as ‘what is that 
nature of strategic management in the public sector?’ This formed the basis for the 
original proposal for MPhil/PhD research. As the search of relevant literature 
developed the research question itself began to mutate under the influence of new 
knowledge, and issues, which emerged. The process has been mapped in Figure 5:7. 
This account has been constructed from a number of cognitive maps, some using a 
simplified version of Eden’s ‘strategic options design and analysis’ methodology (see 
Eden, 1989 in Rosenhead, 1989) and some using Buzan’s ‘mind mapping’ approach 
developed over the whole period of the research (Buzan, 1982 - for an example of 
applying this particular approach in management research see Easterby-Smith et al, 
1991:137). The final version is both a simplified, and to some extent sanitised, 
account which nevertheless gives a far richer flavour of the development of ideas than 
a simple linear account.
As has already been stated, the original key issue posed was the nature of strategic 
management in the public sector. Two chains of thought and literature investigations
223
emerged from this initial question. The first concerned the nature of public sector 
management (and later public services management in particular) and how it differed 
(if at all) from generic management. This particular trail led quickly to domain theory 
and a reconsideration of this from a strategic management perspective. It also led to 
reviewing how far domain theory was not simply a set of differing configurations of 
decision making processes, methods, time scales and so on but how far the differing 
domains also represent very different, and competing, value systems.
Meanwhile, the investigation of the generic strategic management literature led to an 
early identification of the notion of ‘strategic thinking’ as a major theme. This led in 
turn to two further branches of enquiry. Firstly, if ‘strategic thinking’ was an 
emerging trend in the literature, what was it replacing? What other trends existed? Are 
they clearly identified anywhere? Are they compatible or do they represent competing 
trends in strategic management theory and practice? Secondly, if strategic 
management requires ‘strategic thinkers’ - how are they to be developed? It was at 
this point that the issue of management development in general, and its relationship to 
strategic management in particular, began to appear relevant.
Management development had also begun to emerge as an issue from the direction of 
consideration of models of public management. If public management is different and 
if, for example, domain theory helps to explain significant aspects of it then one 
obvious implication is that public managers may need specific skills, knowledge or 
competences. This issue was given added impetus by the rise of the MCI’s 
management competences framework and the rapid expansion of MBAs, both 
representing a growth of generic management education programmes which posed 
serious questions of legitimacy for ‘specialist’ or ‘sectoral’ programmes (see Talbot, 
1993 & 1994).
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Figure 5:7 Mapping an evolving research question
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At this point it is worth returning to the issue of strategic management. As already 
noted, one issue which seemed relevant was how far there are competing trends in 
strategic management approaches. The literature on strategic styles (e.g. Miles &
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Snow, 1978; Goold & Campbell, 1987; Porter 1980) merely suggested generic 
strategies or strategic relationships within organisations which suited particular 
contingencies or organisational configurations. However, during the course of the 
research a number of accounts of strategic management trends began to be published 
which clearly suggested different, and competing, approaches to strategic 
management (e.g. Mintzberg, 1990a, 1990b, 1991b, 1994; Ansoff, 1991a, 1991b; 
Whittington, 1993). This led to the beginning of development of the notion of 
‘strategic modes’, a process and content based model linked to issues of values 
conflicts.
It was at this point that the issue of competing competences also became apparent, 
following the management development trail. R. E. Quinn’s work on competing 
values and competences for generic management seemed to offer a methodology 
which could combine the elements of competing values which seemed to emerge from 
the literature on public management and strategic management. It also offered a fertile 
approach for furthering the approach to management development which had been 
pursued as a result of the management competences vs. traditional management 
education debate (see Talbot, 1992 & 1993 and Chapter 4).
Quinn’s work also led to his, and his collaborators, development of the notion of 
paradox in organisational systems which provided a much richer framework for 
understanding how competing, values based, systems could co-exist within 
organisations. This helped to provide a more coherent theoretical framework to the 
evolving approach.
By this point the original research question about strategic management in the public 
sector had mutated to being more focused on public services, to looking at the 
development of managers capable of operating ‘strategically’ within such 
organisations and approaching it from a competing values and competences 
framework.
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The cognitive (and narrative) map offered here is only a rough sketch of this 
intellectual journey. To use Korzybski’s famous dictum ‘the map is not the territory’, 
this cognitive map is only a partial account and naturally coloured by retrospective 
distortions. Its central value lies in indicating some of the key ideas that have led in 
the direction of both the central research question and the framework within which it 
has been posed and investigated. Importantly, it indicates some of the many choices 
that are made during the evolution of a research project.
One important caveat to add is that this is map of the successful elements of the 
journey. The dead-ends, red-herrings and failures are not included, yet in many ways 
these are as important as the successes. To take just one example, early in this process 
the idea of ‘strategic thinking’ led to consideration of some of the literature on 
decision-making and especially game theory (see for example Dixit and Nalebuff, 
1991).
This avenue was abandoned for two inter-related reasons, one subjective and the other 
methodological. The subjective reason was that whilst this literature was interesting to 
the researcher its narrowness of focus on individual behaviour seemed unappealing as 
a research direction. This was linked to the problems of researching the area of this 
area of decision-theory, which would have required an approach which did not mesh 
with other research objectives very easily. It would have required quite different 
methods from the exploratory survey approach which had been decided on in order to 
address some of the issues about lack of data on strategic management practices in the 
public sector.
Research Objectives
On the basis of the review of the literature, and the evolution of original research 
question, the research objectives were established as:
1. To establish some broad-based (and comparative) information about the nature 
and extent of strategic planning practices within UK public services.
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2. To explore the idea of competing, paradoxical, systems within public services 
strategic practices - by specifically (i) construction of theory or models of how 
such paradoxical systems might apply to strategic management in the public 
services and (ii) carry out some limited testing of the possible validity of one set 
of (deduced) ‘strategic modes’ and ‘strategic sub-systems’.
3. To establish a framework for analysing possible approaches to the development of 
strategic managers, establish some information about the management 
development practices and preferences of managers and organisations in relation 
to strategic management skills, knowledge and abilities and to gather some broad- 
based (and comparative) information about the knowledge-base of UK strategic 
managers in the area of strategic techniques and approaches.
4. To explore the idea of competing, paradoxical, strategic ‘competences’ and to test 
the possible validity of a specific set of (deduced) competences.
5. On the basis of the above, to make some recommendations about further research 
which would aid the ‘development of strategic managers for UK public services’.
It is important to note that a balance had to be struck in this research between 
deductive theory construction and empirical exploration. The first four Chapters of 
this thesis have combined a review of existing theory and research in the three areas of 
public management (Chapter 1), strategic management (Chapter 2) and management 
development (Chapter 4) with attempts to derive (deduce) new synthesised models 
relating to strategic management, strategic managers competences and strategic 
managers development in the public sector (Chapters 1-4).
This work of theory derivation has been supplemented by the empirical exploration of 
strategic management practices and strategic managers’ development and 
competences, knowledge and skills in UK public services. It was not the intention of 
this empirical phase of the research to fully test the theoretical constructs derived in
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the first part of the thesis. This speculative theory covers such wide territory that it is 
clearly beyond the scope of a singleton researcher and a single thesis to tackle. For 
example, the new MCI draft standards for senior managers were developed to a draft 
stage through
“a process which involved hundreds of practising senior managers from 
large and small companies, public and voluntary sector organisations. A 
number of techniques were used - workshops, interviews, written accounts 
of senior managers’ experience - to establish what their jobs entail.”
(MCI, 1994:3).
Obviously it would have be too ambitious for a singleton researcher to establish a 
similar set of draft standards for UK strategic public managers. Rather, as the thesis 
title implies, this has been an attempt to establish a ‘competing values and 
competences’ approach to such a project and the principle outcome is intended to 
validate such an approach and point to further areas of research (see research objective 
(5)). It is therefore seen as being an attempt to introduce a new element into debates 
about the nature of public services strategic management, managers and their 
development, through the development of new theoretical avenues and presentation of 
new, exploratory, empirical data.
The ideas explored in Chapter 4 on the nature of management development also 
suggested a further research area - the ‘supply-side’ of management development. 
Some work was carried out on this area and a small pilot survey conducted. It soon 
became apparent that, whilst this is an important and possibly fruitful area for 
research, it was beyond the constraints of a single thesis. Thus the research has 
concentrated on the ‘demand-side’, although the question in the survey on methods of 
developing strategic managers in organisations did provide some useful initial 
information.
Politics of the research - access and resources
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It is useful at this point to turn to some of the ‘political’ issues encountered in the 
research process. As already mentioned above, from the initial research question and 
the early review of literature on strategic management in the UK public sector, it 
became rapidly evident that there was (and still largely is) a significant gap in 
availability of any general data on the scope and content of practice. Whilst there are 
some very good case studies, many not so rigorous ‘best practice’ cases and much 
more prescriptive models available, there was little evidence extant on what public 
organisations and their managers actually practised in relation to strategic 
management.
Fairly early in the research process the researcher used a morphological analysis (Gill 
& Johnson, 1991:18) to clarify the likely nature of the field research to be undertaken.
Figure 5:8 Morphological analysis
Objective Method | Target
Exploratory --------- Experiments j Individuals
Explanatory Quasi-experiments | Professional group
Clarification Action research I Department
Theory Surveys ------------ j Inter-departmental
Problem-solving Case studies j Interorganisational
Conceptual Longitudinal j National
Predictive Ethnographic j International
Source: basic table adapted from Gill & Johnson, 1991 :i 8)
At this point, as described above, the research was still largely focused on the nature 
of strategic management practice in the public sector. This morphological analysis 
helped to establish that the research was to be largely exploratory, confined to the UK 
but conducting by as large a survey as practicable.
Despite later changes in research objectives, the method and target remained the same. 
This could seem to be somewhat lax, however there were clear justifications for such 
an approach and these relate to issues of resources and planning in a research project, 
as well of issues of access. A number of writers on research methods strongly 
advocate planning the research project, sometimes using project management
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techniques (e.g. Howard & Sharp, 1983; Phillips & Pugh, 1987). This project was in 
fact planned using some simple project management software (Schedule Express ® ) 
both early in the project and periodically since.
The project planning exercise quickly identified that if the research were to be 
conducted as a relatively large sample survey of UK public sector organisations and 
managers it would be necessary to identify means of carry out such a survey. This 
required funding and access to equipment and data for carrying out and analysing the 
survey. This required a two-pronged strategy of identifying an adequate source of data 
about public managers/organisations and acquiring the resources to carry out such a 
large survey (early estimates put the costs well into four-figures). Considerable effort 
was therefore invested in finding a source of targets for the survey (which was 
eventually identified from a commercial source in the form of a database of some 
20,000 public managers details in local government and the NHS) and raising the 
resources needed from within the researchers own resources and through a long 
process of acquiring support from the researchers employers.
The investment of time and energy into making the survey based research possible 
effectively precluded changing the research methods even after the shift in emphasis 
had occurred unless it was absolutely necessary. It did not prevent the researcher 
reviewing the proposed methods and reaching the conclusion that not only was a 
change of method not necessary but was equally valid for the ‘mutated’ research 
objectives.
T e c h n iq u e
This section will report on some of the issues involved in designing and implementing 
the survey research. A number of texts on survey research were consulted in this 
process (e.g. Hoinville et al, 1977; Hutton, 1990; Belson, 1981) as well as a number 
of more general management and related research texts (Bell, 1987; Bennett, 1987; 
Cohen & Manion, 1985; Easterby-Smith et al, 1991; Howard & Peters, 1990; Howard
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& Sharp, 1983; Phillips & Pugh, 1987; Reason & Rowan, 1990; Smith & Dainty, 
1991). These are not cited directly unless immediately relevant.
The section deals with two main issues - the design of the survey questionnaire and 
the design of the survey itself, including the thorny issue of populations, samples and 
bias.
Questionnaire design
The first question to answer in questionnaire design for this survey was - is 
quantitative or qualitative data being sought, or a mixture of both? Given the research 
objectives set out above, the answer was primarily quantitative but with space for 
additional qualitative comments.
At first it was felt unlikely that there would be sufficient qualitative responses and it 
was likely that some follow-up interviews might be useful (hence the check box 
asking if respondents were willing to be interviewed). Here the researcher’s 
experience of conducting a parallel large scale survey of very similar design, shortly 
before the final preparations for this survey, suggested that the ‘additional comments’ 
sections of the questionnaire might elicit much more extensive comments than 
initially thought (see Talbot, 1994a). As will be seen below (Chapters 6 and 7), this in 
fact proved to be the case and a fairly large number of qualitative comments were 
gathered.
The actual questionnaire design can be separated into several parts:
1. basic informational questions attempting to gain a better descriptive picture of the 
extent of strategic planning (questions 1-12)
2. questions designed to elicit both descriptive data about managers’ knowledge of 
some aspects of strategic management theory and techniques (questions 13-14)
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3. to test out the ‘strategic modes’ and competing ‘influence sub-systems’ developed 
in Chapter 3 (questions 15-16)
4. to test out the ‘competing competences’ derived from the theoretical models 
developed in Chapter 3 and get some additional comments from managers 
(question 18 and 19)
5. to gain some information about development of strategic managers and their 
careers (questions 17 and 20)
6. additionally, basic data about respondents organisations was asked for (question 
21)
7. finally, a ‘catch-all’ question for additional qualitative comments was added 
(question 22)
Some general and specific points about the questionnaire design can be added to the 
above broad outline.
Firstly, serendipity often crops up in research processes. In this case it took the form 
of obtaining a survey of private sector companies, ‘A study o f  strategic practice’, 
about strategic management and information technology issues which had been 
conducted in 1992 (BDO, 1992). At the time, the researcher had been struggling with 
a design for questions to elicit some basic data about public services strategic 
practices. This survey offered the opportunity to ask similar questions to public 
services organisations and gain comparative data to match against a private sector 
survey. Given the nature of BDO’s survey, many questions were not relevant for this 
research and some of those that were had to be adapted to ‘public sector terminology’. 
However, these provided a very useful basis for the first two parts of the survey 
(questions 1-12 and 13-14).
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Besides ‘contextualising’ some of BDO’s questions for the public sector, it was also 
felt necessary to extend the questions covering knowledge of strategic theorists and 
techniques (questions 13-14). Here again, luck helped with this process. Discussions 
with a leading publishing house, with extensive management publishing experience, 
led to the author being given confidential access to their sales research data on a range 
of management authors. This enabled the to make significant additions to the list of 
authors (question 14) with reasonable confidence that these were linked to levels of 
UK sales of their books. However, in both cases (questions 13 and 14) the lists were 
also discussed and amended with the help of a number of colleagues, to ensure that 
they were not unduly influenced by the researcher’s own knowledge and preferences.
The parts of the questionnaire dealing with testing the notions of competing strategic 
modes, influence sub-systems and competences presented some difficulties (questions 
15, 16 and 18). The problems of researching paradoxical elements have already been 
noted above. This led to the conclusion that giving managers the opportunity to say 
whether a specific factor existed at all, and to what degree, would give data which 
could be analysed in a variety of ways (see Chapters 6 and 7) to establish whether 
these constituted paradoxical factors or not.
A question clearly arises here about how the demonstration of paradoxical elements 
can be established from the data returned. The questionnaire design attempts to allow 
the expression of responses which indicate paradoxical elements by allowing for 
logically inconsistent responses. An useful example here is to compare the question 
on strategic modes (question 15) which sought to gather data on four different and 
logically inconsistent strategic modes (learning, politics, planning and vision - as 
defined in Chapter 2) with Greenwood’s (1987) study of UK local authorities which 
sought to establish data about four logically inconsistent strategic styles (prospector, 
analyser, defender and reactor - derived from Miles and Snow). Greenwood’s 
methodology assumed that the four strategic styles were mutually exclusive and the 
questionnaire design therefore adopted a ‘forced choice’ approach, asking respondents 
to identify from four statements describing each strategic style which one (and only 
one) best described their organisation. This method assumes consistency and
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coherence in organisational strategic styles and excludes the possibility of paradox 
and contradiction in such styles. A respondent who clearly saw, say, two logically 
inconsistent statements about strategic style as nevertheless both being simultaneously 
accurate for their organisation has no scope to record such a response in this ‘forced 
choice’ approach.
The alternative approach adopted in this survey is to give respondents the chance to 
record responses which do select more than one of a number of logically inconsistent 
statements about their organisations (in this case more than one of the four statements 
about strategic modes).
Analysis of the data for correlations allows the researcher to then establish if 
respondents have identified what appear to be paradoxical elements of organisational 
behaviour. If there were no paradoxes present, that is respondents clearly opted to 
choose one, and only one, of the four statements then the data set would show strong 
negative correlations between each of the four statements. That is for one respondent 
describing one organisation only one strategic mode would be an accurate description 
and the others would not be at all accurate. For each statement there would therefore 
be a strong negative correlation with the other three statements. Alternatively, strong 
positive correlations would indicate that all the strategic modes were present to similar 
degrees in all organisations simultaneously. This ‘strong paradoxes’ variant is 
unlikely, for some of the reasons of flux and continuous change discussed in Chapter
2. The most likely result, if paradoxical elements are present in organisations is 
therefore that more than one, but less than four, statements will be to some degree 
accurate for each organisation. The overall results would, in these circumstances, 
therefore to display the following characteristics: (a) there would be correlations 
ranging from 0 to weak positive correlations* between different paradoxical 
descriptive statements and (b) there would be few cases where only one statement 
would be seen as wholly accurate to the exclusion of all others. (*The correlations 
would be very weak because of the number of possible combinations of more than one 
paradoxical statement being to some degree accurate.)
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Some inspiration also came here from work on establishing ‘competences’ involved in 
'the expertise o f the change agenf (Buchanan & Boddy, 1992). The first part of their 
methodology differs from the approach adopted here in so far as they derived an 
initial set of competences from analysis of audio diaries of actual change agents. 
These were then subjected to survey confirmation (see Buchanan & Boddy, 
1992:Ch.4). Whilst the competences (and strategic modes and influence sub-systems) 
in this survey have been derived from theory, the approach of survey confirmation 
adopted by Buchanan and Boddy has been replicated (with changes to their rating 
scales) here.
The question covering strategic competences (18) was constructed by distributing, as 
far as possible, the 24 individual competence statements in a pattern which 
deliberately broke up their sequencing on both the ‘strategic mode’ and ‘influence 
sub-system’ dimensions (see Figure 5:9).
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Figure 5:9 Numbering system applied to strategic competences in question 18
Strategic Mode
Sub- system Planning Mode Visionary Mode Political Mode Learning Mode
Policy
Making
1. set detailed 
missions, policies, 
objectives and 
rules for the 
organisation
16. set broad 
missions, policies, 
objectives and 
values for the 
organisation
22. integrate 
ambiguous 
missions, policies, 
objectives and 
rules for the 
organisation
24. tolerate 
diversity o f 
missions, policies, 
objectives and 
rules within the 
organisation
Provision
(Resource
Allocation)
5. integrate 
resource allocation 
and policy making 
systems
2. derive resource 
allocation and 
targeting from 
mission and policy 
objectives
17. adjust resource 
allocations to meet 
conflicting 
priorities and 
policies
23. allow 
flexibility in 
resource allocation 
and allow 
resources to follow 
'success'
Planning 9. use the 
organisation's 
planning system to 
produce rational 
solutions to 
problems
6. use the 
organisation's 
planning system to 
justify the 
organisational 
mission
3. use the 
organisation's 
planning system to 
support particular 
projects or policies
18. use the 
organisation's 
planning system 
for learning and 
adaptation
Pragmatism 13. make 
pragmatic 
adjustments to stay 
within the overall 
plan
10. make 
pragmatic 
adjustments to stay 
within the broad 
organisational 
mission
7. make pragmatic
adjustments
through
negotiating
internal
compromises
4. make pragmatic 
adjustments 
through experience 
of practical service 
delivery
Professional
Practice
19. integrate, 
through persuasion 
or coercion, 
professional 
practice to match 
plans
14. integrate, 
through persuasion 
or coercion, 
professional 
practice to match 
mission
11. integrate,
through
compromise,
professional
practice into
organisational
goals
8. allow 
professional 
practice scope for 
innovation, within 
broad goals
Product/
Service
21. ensure services 
are clearly defined 
and organised to 
meet plans
20. ensure services 
are broadly 
organised to meet 
mission and 
policies
15. achieve 
compromise and 
consensus over the 
design and 
organisation of 
services
12. allow for 
diversity and 
innovation in 
design and 
organisation of 
services
Finally, the draft questionnaire for this survey was field-tested on two groups (of 
about 25 each) of public managers participating in a Masters course in public services 
management. In both cases, not only were the results analysed but also the 
respondents gave detailed oral comments to the researcher on problems of 
interpretation and understanding of individual questions and general layout and design 
of the questionnaire and in its general ‘face validity’. These proved extremely useful 
in improving individual questions and the overall layout of the questionnaire and in
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giving an estimate of ‘completion time’ for respondents (which proved to be about 30 
minutes).
Survey design and responses
The survey was designed as a structured sample of public services strategic managers. 
Rather than attempt to sample across all sub-sections of UK public services specific 
service organisations were selected. Thus the survey was, in effect, mailed to the 
whole populations of selected sub-groups of public services senior managers (i.e. 
chief executives or equivalent).
Hoinville et al observe that “deciding what sample size to use is almost a matter more 
of judgement than of calculation” and go on to show how textbook methods of 
calculating samples sizes are often unworkable in practice because of lack of data 
about populations, multiple purposes, etc. (Hoinville et al, 1977). They might have 
added that it is, besides a matter of judgement, a matter of resources (in sending out a 
survey) and luck (in getting sufficient replies). In this case, resource limitations meant 
that the survey despatch had to be limited to around 3,500 (in fact 3,626 were 
despatched), which is partially why it was thought better to concentrate on whole sub­
groups (e.g. all local authority chief executives) which would be more likely to yield 
returns which would provide adequate samples for each sub-group. The overall 
response rate was 19.8% (717), of which and 17.8% (644) were usable.
In local government these included the Chief Executives and Chief Officers of 
specific service departments. These included three ‘human services’ departments 
(housing, social services and education), one borderline ‘human service’ departments 
(environmental health), one physical service (direct service organisations) and two 
uniformed services which are slightly at ‘arms length’ from local authority control 
(police and fire services). In the health service the chief executives of all regional, 
district, family and special health authorities and of all NHS Trust and non-Trust 
providers were included. In central government, chief executives of all ‘Next Steps’ 
executive agencies were included as well as selected officials from departmental
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headquarters. The detailed survey despatches and returns are given in Figure 5:10, 
Figure 5:11 and Figure 5:12. Generally, these show that the return rate gave very good 
samples sizes for each sub-group (between 10 and 30% in most cases).
In only one sub-group (non-Trust NHS provider units - 5%) did the returns fall below 
10% of despatches. However, it is noticeable that the figure for returns from NHS 
Trusts is very high (34%). This is almost certainly due to the fact that the non-Trust 
provider units despatch included many ‘fourth-wave’ NHS Trusts which became 
Trusts on 1-April-1994 (the day after the closing date for return of the survey 
questionnaires) and so identified themselves as ‘Trusts’ in the returns.
Data for the survey was obtained primarily from a commercially available database of 
local government and health service managers (Keystroke Knowledge). In the case of 
central government, data was obtained from two sources: the Civil Service Yearbook - 
1993 and the Next Steps Review -1993 (Cm 2430). In all cases there are variations in 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and as far as possible the equivalent 
organisations were included.
Figure 5:10 Local Government - survey despatch and returns
i  Despatch Returns Percent
{ CE’s 551 133 24% |
! Housing 473 53 11% |
j Social Services 122 29 24% |
1 Education 133 26 20% j
j Police 52 11 21% |
! Environmental health 507 57 11% |
|  Fire service 61 19 31% |
|  DSO’s 494 67 14% j
j Other 43
I Total 2393 438 18% |
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Figure 5:11 Health service - survey despatch and returns
| Despatch Returns Percent
| RHA 14 5 36% |
| DHA 217 38 18% j
| FHSA 98 18 18% j
j Special HA 12 4 33% j
j Trust 377 127 34% |
! Non-Trust provider 244 13 5% |
| Other 19
! Total 962 224 23% |
[notes: “DHA” includes English and Welsh DHAs; Scottish Health Boards and NI 
Health & Social Services Boards; “FHSA” includes English and Welsh FHSAs]
Figure 5:12 - Central government - survey despatch and returns
Despatch Returns Percent
Department 55 9 16%
Agency 150 24 16%
Quango 66 18 27%
Other 4
Total 271 55 20%
Data analysis was carried initially using SNAP survey analysis software. This 
provided the basic percentage data on responses. Additional work on parts of the data 
was conducted using Microsoft Access database software and Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet (the latter was used specifically for calculating the correlation’s reported 
in Chapter’s 6 and 7).
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Samples. Bias and Populations
The issue of immediately arises here of possible ‘bias’ in the responses to the survey. 
This issue can be addressed in a number of ways. Firstly, all discussions of sampling 
for the purpose of probability sampling begin with the issue of deciding on 
populations size. What is the population size for strategic managers in the UK public 
sector? This question is impossible to answer on available data. There is data available 
on two key variables - total employment within public services and the total number 
public of public organisational units (although even this is not entirely certain and 
subject to fairly rapid change -see the comments about NHS Trust hospitals above). 
Estimating the total number of managers, let alone strategic managers, is extremely 
difficult. There are clearly some managers who can be considered to be definitively 
‘strategic’, i.e. the most senior manager for each organisational unit. However, there 
are clearly many more managers who play some strategic role and this number is 
probably increasing with the moves to greater decentralisation and disaggregation of 
public organisations (see Chapter 1 and Talbot, 1994, especially on the increasing 
numbers of public managers describing themselves ‘senior’ or ‘chief executive or 
director’ levels.). A further complication arises from the discussion of different 
strategic modes (Chapters 2 and 3). If, as is suggested in these Chapters, there are 
different strategic modes operating in organisations, either simultaneously or even 
exclusively, then it follows from the definitions of these modes given that even in 
organisations with the same formal stratification’s of managers there may be wide 
differences in who would be considered ‘strategic’. For example, in an organisation 
which was exclusively dominated by a ‘strategic vision’ approach the number of 
managers considered ‘strategic’ would be quite low, whilst in a formally identical 
organisational structure which acted in practice as a ‘strategic learning’ organisation a 
far wider group of managers would be considered as ‘strategic’ managers.
There is therefore no easy way of estimating, even broadly, the numbers of public 
managers in the UK who could be described as ‘strategic’, and indeed given the four 
different operational definitions of strategic management being employed in this 
thesis no obvious way of resolving this problem.
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Instead of starting from the ‘top down’ approach of defining population, population 
stratification and sample frames the approach adopted here has been to select a series 
of individual ‘populations’ of public organisations (e.g. housing, social services and 
education departments) and of managers who could clearly be seen as strategic (i.e. 
the most senior manager in each unit). By surveying all managers in each category 
and receiving a random response from each ‘population’, at an average rate of 18% 
per population group, it is reasonable to assume that these are fairly good samples 
from each group (according to most authorities), with one proviso. The use of a postal 
questionnaire with unknown biases affecting responses is clearly problematic. The 
possible effects of response bias therefore have to be bom in mind throughout the 
following analysis (Chapters 6 & 7). These should not be exaggerated, however. The 
key variables in non-response from the types of groups surveyed here are likely to 
unrelated to the issues being considered - the key variables are likely to be around 
competing demands for managers immediate attention in the time-frame for 
responding to the survey and this is likely to be a fairly random variable in relation to 
the subject matter of the survey. Moreover, the range of questions addressed in the 
survey make it unlikely that any one specific managerial type (e.g. a ‘visionary’ [in 
terms of strategic modes] or a ‘reflective’ [in terms of management development] 
strategic manager) would be more or less likely to respond than another type. The 
survey responses themselves, which are extremely diverse on some issues (e.g. on the 
strategic modes and competences questions and in many of the additional comments - 
see Chapters 6 & 7) strongly suggest that if there has been response bias it clearly has 
not been of the type which would have strongly excluded any particular approach.
The strategy adopted of building up a reasonable sample of strategic managers by 
adding together samples from a number of clusters obviously has the danger that the 
clusters or sub-groups selected may themselves be unrepresentative. Broadly, the total 
numbers of managers from each public sector sub-sector (local government, health, 
central government) were reasonably balanced with regard to the very broad measure 
of sub-sector size by staffing levels, with the exception of central government which 
was a little under-represented.
242
The comparison of the data from this survey with that from the BDO survey offered a 
very useful check on the validity and reliability of both. It may be pure coincidence of 
course, but the strong correlation in the results of the two surveys on some issues and 
their clear differences in others tends to suggest strongly that they are both reasonably 
valid and reliable.
Jankowicz (1991) makes a strong divide between non-probability sampling (used 
mainly in exploratory research designs to establish if there is something worthy of 
further investigation) and probability sampling (used to make more specific 
predictions about population behaviour derived from sample data). In reality this 
divide seems somewhat artificial, as even in exploratory research the purpose is to 
make some kind of prediction about population behaviour, in so far as the conclusions 
to be drawn are. that there is sufficient evidence that there is something worthy of 
further study, even if the results obtained cannot be claimed as fully reasonable from a 
probability sampling perspective. This particular study falls very much into this 
category. As the research aims were essentially about establishing a framework for 
further work they were very much exploratory, and therefore not intended to be 
wholly probabalistic in nature. However, the techniques employed needed to be 
sufficiently robust to defend the notion that here was adequate prime facie evidence of 
something worthy of further work (in this case, competing strategic systems, 
competences, etc.). As will be seen in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 the approach adopted does 
seem to have been adequate to the research aims set
2 4 2 b
Chapter 6 Results and Analysis I - Strategy processes in the 
public services.
P a r t  I: S t r a t e g ic  P l a n n in g  P r a c t ic e s  &  C o m p e t in g  M o d e s  a n d  
In f l u e n c e s
As explained in Chapter 5, the survey questionnaire included questions (Q1-Q14) 
which were, deliberately, broadly similar to some of the questions asked in a survey of 
183 private sector organisations by BDO Consulting (1992) about their strategic 
practices. The results of the BDO survey are reported in the following analysis of the 
public sector survey, as appropriate.
(NB: survey figures are rounded to whole numbers. This means some totals may not 
equal 100. Also, non-responses to particular questions have not always been reported 
which means some totals may fall significantly below 100.)
The full percentage responses to the survey are contained in Appendix A to the thesis. 
Formal strategic plans and reasons for not planning
Asked if the respondent’s organisation had a formal strategic plan, 493 (77%) public 
managers responded “yes”. This compares favourably with the private sector (65% - 
see Figure 6:1) and is surprisingly high given other reports on public sector strategic 
practices (see Chapter 3, section “Trends in the Public Sector”). The figures obtained 
from the survey tend to confirm Pollitt and Harrison’s assertion (1992) that strategic 
planning became popular (again) in the public sector in the late 1980s, driven in part 
by the views of some politicians that strategic planning was a private sector practice 
and would therefore be a ‘good thing’ for the public sector.
The fact that nearly three quarters of public sector respondents, compared with about 
two thirds of private sector respondents, reported formal strategic planning taking
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place in their organisations suggests that strategic planning is now more prevalent in 
the public than the private sector (see Figure 6:1). This obviously raises questions 
about how far the public sector is ‘following’ private sector practice, as some models 
of changing public sector management, such as Hood’s ‘new public management’ (see 
Chapter 1) would seem to suggest. It is therefore worth exploring this issue in some 
detail.
Figure 6:1 Prevalence of formal strategic planning
I
Private Public
Sector
(Private N=183; Public N=644 - percentage of responses) P>0.001 
Sources: BDO (1992); Talbot (1994)
The time-lag between the two samples (two years) could conceivably account for the 
differences in several ways. If private and public usage of strategic planning were in 
fact increasing in tandem, rather than the latter leading the former, then possibly the 
two year difference could account for the variance between the two samples. This 
would mean that both public and private sector practices would have reached around 
65% prevalence in 1992 and around 77% by 1994. This account of the data would 
refute the idea that public sector lags behind, and ‘apes’, the private sector and suggest 
instead that all organisations, whether private or public, are increasing their use of 
strategic planning.
However, as most accounts suggest that public sector practice tends to lag behind 
private sector trends by about 4-5 years (see Chapter 3 - on trends in the public 
sector), is there an alternative explanation of the data which could fit this model? If
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the time-lag is indeed 4-5 years but the private sector was on a descending curve in 
1992, having peaked at a similar figure to the public sector in about 1989-90, then the 
public sector could also be ‘peaking’ in 1994 (see Figure 6:2 for an illustration of this 
idea).
This explanation is, of course, purely speculative. Whilst it would account for both the 
data in the two surveys, and correspond to the ‘accepted wisdom’ about public sector 
practice emulating and trailing that of the private sector, there is one factor which 
suggests this is in fact unlikely to be the explanation. This comes from the data on 
those organisations which are not planning. If private sector strategic planning were 
on the decrease, then there would have been at least some, of the 35% of ‘non- 
planners’, who would have reported that they had tried strategic planning and found it 
to be ineffective. In fact, no private sector respondents to the BDO survey claimed this 
(see Figure 6:10 below). On the contrary, while the degree of enthusiasm amongst 
private sector ‘non-planners’ for planning was lower (15% of ‘non-planners’) than 
amongst public sector ‘non-planners’ (40%), this would suggest that private sector 
planning still seemed to be on the increase in 1992. Thus the scenario suggested in 
Figure 6:2 has to be rejected.
Figure 6:2 Speculative graph of public and private sector usage of strategic 
planning - assuming 4 year time lag in public sector practice ----------
4 year time lag
1992 private 
sector surveyPublic sector Private secor
1994 public 
sector survey
20
10 -
o
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
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A third explanation of the data might be derived from analysis of the data in both 
surveys on the duration over which strategic planning has been practised in 
organisations (see Figure 6:3).
Figure 6:3 Length of time strategic planning practised - public and private
□  Private
H Public
less than 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 to 5 6 to 10 over
1 year years years 10years response
(Private N=183; Public N=644 - percentage of responses) 
Sources: BDO (1992); Talbot (1994)
This data seems to show public sector strategic planning increasing more rapidly 
recently (e.g. 61% having done so for less than 3 years, compared to 47% for the 
private sector), but it is somewhat misleading because of the different survey dates.
However, when this data is cumulated and plotted over time (see Figure 6:4) the 
growth pattern for strategic planning, amongst those who do plan, in both public and 
private sectors, is almost identical. The public sector seems to be lagging behind the 
private sector by about 3 years with, however, a narrowing of the gap from about 4 
years to about 2, with both reaching what may be appear as a ‘saturation point’.
The three sets of data (on the prevalence of planning, the length of time organisations 
have been planning and the lack of evidence of organisations abandoning planning) 
suggest a complex picture. While the public sector has tended to lag behind the 
private sector in the prevalence of strategic planning practice it may well be that in the 
last few years there has been an accelerating trend in the public sector which has
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caught up with, and perhaps overtaken, the private sector. This is clearly a more 
complex picture than the ‘public-follows-private’ thesis, suggesting there is no simple 
‘follow-the leader’ explanation for the growth of strategic planning in the public 
sector.
One explanation, which seems to emerge from the data, is that the growth of strategic 
planning is linked to the degree of pressure (and control) exercised by central 
government and ancillary bodies over public organisations, which will be discussed 
further below.
Figure 6:4 Growth in Formal Strategic Planning - Public and Private
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Source: derived from Talbot, 1994: the figures from Figure 6:3 have been cumulated, 
starting from 6 years before the survey date.____________________________________
This raises the issue of how far public sector respondents may be reporting ‘formal 
strategic planning’ which is actually more ‘formal’ than it is ‘strategic’ or ‘planning’. 
It may be that some public sector formal strategic planning is in fact an exercise to 
satisfy the requirements of political direction rather than actual planning.
For example, detailed examination of formal strategic plans from one large central 
government department found a large degree of detailed paperwork but very little 
evidence of either strategy or planning across the Department’s divisions and 
agencies. Many divisional and agency plans were mere statements of existing activity 
and sketchy projections, often excluding vital issues such as human resources. There
□  Private 
B Public
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was clearly a large element of ‘form filling’ and ‘going through the motions’ in the 
documentation (Talbot, 1994 - unpublished case study). There is some evidence later 
in the survey that the prevalence of formal planning bears some relation to the amount 
of influence central government has been able to exercise over public organisations.
This may also be evidenced in the differential levels of formal strategic planning 
reported in different parts of the public sector. There were some marked differences 
from respondents from different public sector organisations (see Fig. 6.2). Central 
government organisations seem to have the highest level of formal strategic planning 
(94%), NHS organisations the next highest (83%) and local government organisations 
the lowest (72%).
Figure 6:5 Formal strategic planning - intra-public sector comparisons
100 T
80 ■■
Local
Government
(392)
NHS (224) Central
Government
(53)
(N for each category in brackets - percentage for each category) 
Source: Talbot (1994) ___________
These are marked differences. They can be partly accounted for by the degree of direct 
control central government has to force public organisations to implement strategic 
planning. In establishing executive Agencies, NHS Trust hospitals, grant-maintained 
schools and other semiautonomous units, government policy has encouraged strategic 
planning. Other pressures have come from the Audit Commission and the NAO (see 
Chapter 3).
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In the survey returns, how far central government has direct power to force 
implementation of strategic planning does seem to be a factor in its prevalence across 
the public sector (although not the only one). Thus central government departments 
and agencies are much easier to compel to adopt formal strategic planning than local 
government organisations. For local government, unless local politicians also want 
formal strategic planning, it is more difficult for central government to do other than 
merely encourage its adoption. However, as discussed above, formal adoption of 
strategic planning is not always the same as actual strategic planning.
Some useful data were gained in the comments which were added to the survey by 
respondents. A number of comments mentioned this problem of planning being driven 
by external (usually government) requirements. A comment highlighting this 
‘imposed’ context of planning was made by a Scottish local authority manager who 
notes a specific example of where local authorities can be compelled to draw up 
strategic plans as the basis for obtaining funds:
“Our housing plan and housing management plan are due to be submitted 
to the Scottish Office by Sept. 1994, therefore planning is occupying 
much of our thought at present.”
Another manager from a scientific research institute (central government) commented 
on the tendency (noted above) to engage in ritualised strategic planning:
“I think strategic planning is essential but from my experience the plans 
are often seen as an end in themselves, not as a means of achieving better 
or more products, research, etc.”
For local government, the finding that 72% of respondents reported that their 
organisations do have a formal strategic plan is very similar to findings of a study of 
local authority annual reports, which found that 70% of the sample of annual reports 
studied included references to strategic plans (Dlaboha, 1994).
A manager from one large English county council commented that:
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“The County Council instituted a comprehensive and integrated 
management of change initiative aimed at (1) better strategic management 
(2) better local management (3) maximising resources in front-line 
services. The initiative has won a number of awards, and has recently 
been studied by the Audit Commission, ESRC and the Local Government 
Management Board. We are also participating in a European network of 
authorities exchanging and disseminating experience in this area.”
Whilst a manager from a large Scottish regional Council commented:
“The Council has corporate objectives and within these corporate 
priorities. It operates a strategic management procedure annually to match 
budget/resource allocation decisions to these objectives and priorities.
This is proving to be very useful. The Council also has a number of 
corporate strategies relating to its objectives and priorities to which all 
regional services are expected to respond positively.”
At the other end of the spectrum, a manager from a small District council in Northern 
Ireland (where councils have relatively few responsibilities compared to English, 
Welsh and Scottish authorities), commented on the newness, and political problems, 
of their attempts at developing strategic planning:
“This District Council is presently developing a corporate strategy for the 
next three years. We are still learning what is involved. In Northern 
Ireland senior staff in councils may have very different views from 
councillors from particular political groupings.”
One interesting issue for local government is the degree to which various initiatives - 
such as CCT, decentralisation and reorganisation - are affecting strategic planning. 
One manager commented that fragmentation was increasing the need for strategic 
planning:
“With the fragmentation of local authority services, through CCT and 
other developments, the need for strategic direction and management will 
become increasingly important for all local government organisations and 
senior managers.”
Another manager, of a DSO, clearly felt that the pace of change inhibited the 
possibilities of planning:
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“As a DSO manager facing local government re-organisation, budget cuts 
in client departments, staff competition in the second round of CCT, and a 
legal case that may put us out of business I cannot see further than 90 days 
ahead!”
Another commented on the problems of strategy in a strongly decentralised local 
authority:
“We are a decentralised authority with dual corporate/neighbourhood 
chief officers. As a corporate chief officer I have responsibility for a range 
of corporate policies, strategies and services including leisure, family, 
retired, advice and welfare rights services and strategic policy, research 
and development. We have tried to integrate strategic management into 
neighbourhood working. We do not have hierarchical departments but are 
team orientated. As a ‘general manager’ for two neighbourhoods I have 
responsibility for strategy development at that level too!”
These comments illuminate some of the problems and opportunities for strategic 
planning in local government. They also indicate that some managers see these 
changes as enhancing the possibilities and necessity for strategic planning, whilst 
others see them as obstacles. However, it should be bom in mind that, despite some of 
the negative comments recorded above, the survey shows overall an increase in the 
use of strategic planning. Below, further comments from the NHS will be examined.
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Figure 6:6 Formal strategic planning - local government - by type
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Within local authorities the pattern of formal strategic planning between departments 
and services is interesting, with quite strong variations occurring ( see Figure 6:7). At 
the top of the ‘planning league’ come the uniformed services of police and fire 
departments, who reported a very high level of strategic planning (91% and 95%). 
These organisations are in somewhat of an ‘arms-length’ relationship to local 
authorities (in some cases they are even administered by joint boards rather than 
directly by individual authorities). They also have a strong relationship with central 
government, because of Home Office direct funding of a substantial portion of their 
services, and various Home Office controls and powers of regulation of these services. 
This opens up a channel of additional pressure to encourage strategic planning.
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Figure 6:7 Formal strategic planning - local government - by department
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The highly ‘commandist’ cultures of these two types of uniformed service means that 
formal strategic planning, once decided upon, is much more likely to be implemented 
than in looser, less rigidly hierarchical structures. This does not, of course, preclude 
strategic planning developing in less hierarchical structures or more participative 
planning processes evolving in commandist structures such as these. The Metropolitan 
Police service, for example, ran a strategic planning process which involved a high 
degree of participation by senior and middle managers, although the decision to 
establish the system was a very ‘commandist’ one from the then Commissioner (see 
Talbot, 1992f).
The main human services departments - social services, education, housing - all have 
broadly similar levels of strategic planning, according to the survey (69%, 81%, and 
74% respectively). These are also similar to the level of strategic planning reported 
from Chief Executive’s departments (74%).
There is a somewhat lower level of planning reported from the main physical services 
departments in the survey, direct service organisations (DSOs - 61%), and from the 
main non-uniformed enforcement service, environmental health departments (EHDs -
253
60%). Interestingly, both of these types of departments are mainly managed by 
technical professionals who might be expected to have more faith, and make greater 
use of, planning practices. It is therefore worth examining in more detail the reasons 
for not planning given by respondents from these two departments (see Table 6-1).
On a number of counts DSOs and EHDs deviated from results for the whole survey. 
Firstly, resources seemed to be a higher than average problem: 19% of DSOs & 21% 
of EHDs of ‘non-planners’ saw ‘resources required unavailable’ as a problem, 
compared to only 13% in the survey as whole. Secondly, there is also seems to be less 
faith in planning being effective - only 27% of DSOs and 21% of EHDs compared to 
the average of 40%. More also reported planning to have been tried but found 
ineffective - 4% for both compared with an average of 1%. Also, in DSOs the number 
replying that planning would not improve performance (15%) was above the average 
(3%).
Table 6-1 ‘Non-planners’ reasons for not having formal plans (Q2) - percentages 
of non-planners
DSOs
(N=26)
EHDs
(N=24)
Average 
(all public 
sector) 
(N=151)
Plan exists but not formalised 35 46 44
Organisation’s situation too simple 19 0 4
Organisation’s situation too complex 23 4 15
Felt cannot improve performance 15 0 3
Felt would be effective and want to do 27 21 40
Has been tried, found ineffective 4 4 1
Resources required not available 19 21 13
There seemed to be marked differences, however, between the two groups of 
respondents from the two departments over how they viewed their organisational 
contexts. EHD respondents hardly rated their organisations situation as an issue at all., 
with only 4% seeing it as too complex, and none as too simple, to make planning 
feasible. DSO respondents, on the other hand, gave above average responses to both 
of these factors - 19% seeing their context as too simple to warrant planning and 23% 
seeing it as too complex to be planned. The main difference between EHDs and 
DSOs, at the time of the survey, was that the former had yet to be subjected to CCT
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whilst DSOs have faced competition for some years. It is possible that this may have 
contributed to why DSOs as whole see their organisation’s environment as more 
important whilst the polarisation within DSOs as to its complexity or simplicity may 
relate to their local circumstances, particularly their political environment.
Strategic planning in the NHS, like local government, shows levels of variation. The 
five RHAs which responded all indicated that they had formal strategic plans but other 
NHS tiers were less positive. The main ‘purchasing’ authorities, DHAs, responded 
that only 72% did have a formal plan whilst 28% did not. Given that the role of DHAs 
as purchasing authorities includes a specific commitment to planning health care 
provision it is intriguing that almost three out of ten did not have a formal strategic 
plan.
The NHS ‘providers’ - Trusts and non-Trusts - also provide some intriguing 
differentiation. Part of the process of NHS units applying for Trust status involves 
potential Trusts demonstrating that they have business plans. It is therefore not 
surprising to find a higher level of positive responses from Trust (86%) than non- 
Trust (73%) respondents. Given that most non-Trust providers have also been trying 
to gain Trust status the relatively high level of formal strategic plans which they report 
is also not surprising. Two comments from NHS Trusts managers are illustrative of 
these pressures:
“This is a third wave Trust, i.e. 1 April 1993. Much of the planning and 
strategic work has been undertaken specifically because it is required, not 
through any particular knowledge (or belief in its value) by the staff - until 
now.”
“Trust is fourth wave, from 1 April 1994. There is a lot of work and 
commitment being directed towards the development of a corporate 
strategy for the organisation.”
What is surprising is the 14% of Trust respondents who indicated their organisations 
did not have a formal strategic plan. Given that formal business planning is a pre­
requisite of Trust establishment, and an on-going requirement, the fact that 18 of the 
130 respondents admitted to not having such a plan is unexpected.
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Also intriguing were the different perceptions of managers of the effects which the 
NHS internal market was likely to have on strategic planning. Two managers clearly 
saw the NHS reforms as leading to greater planning:
“Strategic management is emerging in the NHS, in real terms, as a 
consequence of the NHS reforms. The problem is the slow pace of 
implementation and vested interests....”
“Dynamic strategic management skills are required more and more within 
the NHS market. The environment within which we are planning is 
becoming more and more fluid. Setting your context within this is 
becoming very challenging.”
However, another manager saw the internal market as undermining strategic planning, 
at least in the short-term:
“The questions....suggest a large-scale strategic planning ‘industry5 in the 
public sector. This tends not to be the case in the NHS now - the market 
has replaced some longer-term planning, though may become re­
established as the current system (e.g. annual contracts) is seen as having 
its weaknesses in achieving strategic shifts.”
These polarised views are strikingly similar to the divergent reactions of local 
authority managers quoted above. It is also worth noting that in above average 
numbers NHS organisations claimed that plans did exist but were not formalised (see 
Table 6.2). There is also an intriguing discrepancy between enthusiasm for planning 
(‘feel planning would be effective...5) from the ‘non-planning5 purchasers and 
providers. Amongst ‘non-planning5 purchasers 27% wanted to plan, compared to an 
average of 40%, and 67% from ‘non-planning5 Trusts and 50% from Non-Trusts.
One DHA manager commented that:
“The terminology and language employed in the survey does not fit 
comfortably with the role and responsibilities of a DHA.55
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Clearly this implies that strategic planning is not relevant in a DHA context. However, 
another comment from a purchasing authority manager showed both how strategies 
are being imposed on some NHS purchasers and also the problems this can cause. In 
this case these are due to a Government department imposing a requirement for a 
DHA and FHSA to have a joint strategy:
“There is real problem in responding [to the questions] in that we are 
required by the Welsh Office to have ‘joint’ strategies whereas our 
objectives - except in the broadest sense - are not common. There is also 
the difficulty that the cultures of the FHSA (BS5750) and the DHA 
(reactive, non-structured) are quite different.”
These comments clearly suggest that strategic planning is in a state of flux within the 
NHS and that two important factors are influencing it directly - the imposition of a 
requirement for strategies, by government, on both providers and purchasers and the 
effects of the internal market.
Table 6-2 ‘Non-planners’ reasons for not having formal plans (Q2) - percentages 
of non-planners
DHAs
(N=ll)
Trusts 
(N= 18)
Non-
Trust
providers
(N=4)
Average
(all
public
sector)
(N=151)
Plan exists but not formalised 64 61 75 44
Organisation’s situation too simple 0 0 0 4
Organisation’s situation too complex 9 6 25 15
Felt cannot improve performance 0 0 0 3
Felt would be effective and want to 
do
27 67 50 40
Has been tried, found ineffective 0 0 0 1
Resources required not available 9 0 0 13
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Figure 6:8 Formal strategic planning - NHS - by type
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The idea that the prevalence of formal strategic planning is in direct proportion to the 
level of government influence over public organisations is clearly supported most 
clearly by the high levels of positive answers from central government managers 
responding to the survey.
In the three main categories of respondents - Departments (90% ‘yes’), Agencies 
(96%) and Quangos (95%) - the levels are consistently very high. It is still interesting, 
however, to query why even here there are small minorities of respondents reporting 
no formal strategic planning (10%, 4% and 5% respectively). Of those responding to 
question two - about reasons for not having a formal plan - the only departmental 
respondent felt that planning would be effective but didn’t have the resources to do it. 
The only agency respondent also indicated they wanted to formalise planning but gave 
no reason why it was not happening, whilst the only ‘quango’ respondent felt their 
organisation’s situation was too simple and did not want to formalise planning. None 
of these three ‘non-planners’ claimed that there were non-formalised plans.
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Figure 6:9 Formal strategic planning - central government - by type
Department (10) Agency (23) Quango (19) Other (1)
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Sources: Talbot (1994)______________________________________________________
Some of the reasons for not having formal strategic plans have already been explored 
in relation to specific types of organisation. The full percentages of the reasons given 
by ‘non-planners’ for not planning are given in Figure 6:10, together with the results 
from the private sector survey.
More public sector respondents claimed their organisations do have formal plans 
compared to their private sector counterparts (77% public as compared to 65% private 
- see Fig. 6.1 above). The prevalence of ‘non-formalised’ plans reverses this trend, 
with more private sector ‘non-planners’ claiming to have plans which were not 
formalised (55%) than the public sector survey ‘non-planners’ (44%).
Organisational environment seems be a small but interesting differentiating factor - 
more private sector respondents saw their situation as too simple to require planning 
(9%) compared to the public sector (4%), whilst fewer saw their situation as too 
complex (only 3%) compared to public sector (15%).
Amongst ‘non-planners’ the private sector respondents recorded higher levels of 
scepticism about strategic planning’s ability to improve performance (8%) compared 
to the public sector (3%) and lower levels of enthusiasm for in introducing it (15%)
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compared to for the public sector (40%). However, the pubic sector records a slightly 
higher level of resource constraints preventing the introduction of planning systems 
(13%) compared to the private sector (9%).
Figure 6:10 Reasons for not having strategic plan - public and private
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Strategic planning, performance and effectiveness
The strategic planning was judged effective in improving organisational performance 
by slightly fewer public managers (62%) than private managers (69% - see Figure 
6:11). These judgements are reversed for those who see strategic planning as 
ineffective, with more private managers seeing it as ineffective (28%) than public 
managers (17%).
Intriguingly, 21% of public managers did not respond to this question (compared with 
only 3% of private managers). This suggests that more public managers find it too 
difficult to form an accurate judgement on this issue. Two reasons could be advanced 
to explain this reluctance to ‘rush to judgement’ by about one fifth of public 
managers.
260
^
Firstly, strategic planning has been practised in the public organisations responding 
for slightly less time than those reported in the private sector survey (see Figure 6:3). 
This relative lack of experience may partially account for the public sector ‘no 
responses’. Secondly, for public sector organisations the specific problems of 
performance measurement would probably make it relatively more difficult for 
managers to evaluate strategic planning’s contribution to organisational ‘success’ (see 
Jackson & Palmer, 1992; Cave, Kogan & Smith, 1990; Flynn, 1993; etc.).
This should, again, be seen in the context of the higher prevalence of formal strategic 
planning in the public, as opposed to private sectors, as shown in the two surveys (see 
Figure 6:1).
Figure 6:11 Strategic planning and improved performance - public and private
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Despite the differences between public and private respondents, the overall view is 
clearly that formal strategic planning is both popular (see Figure 6:1) and is seen by 
the majority of managers in both sectors as offering important performance gains (see 
Figure 6:11). Whether or not this is bom out in practical results is unclear, and it was 
not the intention of this research to examine the validity or otherwise of formal 
strategic planning as a management tool. However, it also clear from the data that 
amongst those with experience of strategic planning there is a sceptical minority -
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more than one-in-five in both sectors - who doubt its effectiveness in improving 
performance.
Figure 6:12 Reasons strategic planning not judged effective - public and private
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The reasons given by the those respondents, to both surveys, who thought that 
strategic planning was not working - the ‘planning not working’ group - to explain 
why this was the case are interesting (Figure 6:12).
Most of the ‘planning not working’ group actually thought that it was ‘too early to 
tell’ (76% public, 64% private) whether planning was working or not. This data 
reduces dramatically the significance of the numbers from each sector suggesting that 
planning is not working (17% public, 28% private) and suggests that the ‘don’t know / 
no response’ category is actually higher than suggested in Figure 6:11.
Of the ‘planning not working’ group who gave definite reasons why this was the case, 
three major reasons stand out for each sector - these were failures to define 
milestones, organisations were facing too complex or uncertain an environments and 
there were failures in gaining staff commitment.
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For the public sector the foremost issue was clearly failure to define milestones (26%), 
whilst private managers saw this as less of a problem (15%). This may be related to 
public managers seeing failure to define specific objectives as also relatively more 
important (9%) as compared to private managers (3%). The problems for public 
organisations, with multiple stakeholders, in setting agreed objectives have been 
discussed before (Chapters 1 and 3).
The organisations environment being ‘too uncertain’ or ‘too complex’ was seen as 
important for those who thought planning was not working in both sectors, although 
slightly more so for private sector (27%) than public sector (20%) managers.
Interestingly, this reverses the judgement made by managers from both sectors who 
gave reasons why their organisations did not have strategic plans. Only 3% of private 
managers felt their organisational situation ‘too complex’ to allow for planning, 
compared to 15% of public managers (see Figure 6:10). These differences may of 
course be attributed to experience - the ‘non-planners’ group were giving reasons why 
they were not planning whilst the ‘planning not working’ group were trying to explain 
what, in their view, were reasons for failure based on their experience. This would 
suggest that public managers may overestimate the problems of environmental 
complexity prior to strategic planning experience, whereas private managers may 
underestimate the problem.
Both sectors saw failure to gain staff commitment to plans as equally important in 
causing failure, with 18% in both surveys identifying it as a problem. However, public 
sector managers saw failure to gain staff involvement (‘no input from staff) as 
slightly more important (10%) as a factor than their private sector colleagues (6%). 
This is interesting when compared to the efforts made in both sectors to involve staff, 
at all levels, in the planning process. Here the public sector seems to be somewhat 
more committed to involving staff than the private sector (although comparisons are 
not exact because the two data sets - public and private - do not match completely - 
see Figure 6:27). Taken together, these two findings might suggest that public
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managers see staff involvement in the planning process as slightly more significant 
and also find it to be slightly more likely to be a cause of failed planning.
For the respondents in both surveys who saw strategic planning as making an effective 
contribution to organisational performance, there was a remarkable consistency of 
opinion across both sectors on most of the detailed factors, with two noticeable 
exceptions (see Figure 6:13).
Respondents from both sectors saw the contribution of strategic planning to 
‘achieving goals and objectives’ (81% private, 79% public) and ‘specifying 
milestones’ to achieve them (77% private, 76% public) as the biggest contributions 
towards organisational performance. This is very much the is very much the role for 
strategic planning given by Mintzberg in his latest work, seeing strategic planning as 
primarily a tool for codifying and communicating strategy decisions but not primarily 
as a means of taking strategy decisions (Mintzberg, 1994).
Strategic planning as a tool for making strategic decisions fares much less well than as 
a tool for implementing decisions. When asked if it aided ‘targeting resources on areas 
of greatest opportunity’ (private 51%, public 45%) or ‘identified new opportunities or 
ideas’ (private 51%, public 58%) strategic planning was seen as markedly less useful, 
but still obviously important, across both sectors. This suggests while the strategic 
planning process can, and does, contribute to strategy formation, its role as strategy 
communicator is much stronger. This is bom out by the fact that the specific 
‘communications’ role - ‘giving staff a unified vision of the organisation’ (private and 
public both 64%) - fared slightly worse than the formal implementation roles (setting 
objectives and milestones) but better than the strategic decision making roles.
It is in the last two roles for strategic planning - achieving cost savings (private 68%, 
public 43%) and enabling the organisation to ‘make better use of resources’ (private 
5%, public 69%) - that striking differences between the two sectors emerge.
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If achieving cost savings is taken to mean essentially efficiency savings then it is clear 
that the private sector respondents saw strategic planning as making a greater 
contribution to efficiency than their public sector counterparts. If ‘making better use of 
resources’ is taken to mean essentially a contribution towards organisational 
effectiveness the it is clear that public managers see strategic planning as far more 
useful than their private sector counterparts.
Figure 6:13 Benefits of strategic planning - public and private
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Superficially, this does not seem to agree with the earlier findings that the majority of 
both sets of managers see strategic planning as leading to better organisational 
performance (see Figure 6:11).
It may be that public and private managers simply define organisational ‘performance’ 
in quite different ways - with private managers seeing it primarily as being about 
efficiency and producing products or services for the lowest cost possible whilst 
public managers tend to focus more on the products or services themselves. Thus, they 
could both see strategic planning as contributing to ‘performance’ but in quite 
different ways, as these differences seem to suggest. It would not be fruitful to 
speculate too much on the basis of this data and there is clearly scope here for further
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investigation - particularly about the possibly different managerial ‘languages’ 
employed in the two sectors.
Figure 6:14 Elements of strategic planning - public and private
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When the surveys attempted to identify in some more detail about exactly what 
‘formal strategic planning’ actually consisted of, the results were fairly consistent 
across both surveys, although with some interesting minor variations. Three areas - 
mission statements (private 72%, public 80%), corporate plans (private 90%, public 
75%) and subsidiary or departmental plans (private 77%, public 80%) - stood out as 
the largest elements in strategic planning for both sectors and broadly similar.
The other three areas asked about to both sectors - functional plans (private 55%, 
public 49%), integration of corporate and departmental plans (private 59%, public 
47%), and integration of corporate and functional plans (private 41%, public 43%) - 
showed markedly lower scores across both sectors. This suggests that broadly, in both 
sectors, there are high levels of planning at both corporate and individual business or 
departmental levels but that the level of integration between the two is not as strong. 
Functional planning is also both less common and less well integrated to corporate 
level plans.
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There is however a stronger tendency for lack of integration in the public than in the 
private sectors. Public sector respondents actually report that departmental plans are 
more common (80%) than corporate plans (75%) whilst the levels of integration of 
corporate and departmental plans (47%) are lower than in the private sector (59%).
This trend is particularly strong in local government (see Figure 6:15), where 
respondents reported that many more organisations (21%) had departmental plans 
(85%) than had corporate plans (64%). In both central government (93% corporate 
plans, 75% departmental plans) and the health service (92% corporate plans, 71% 
departmental plans) the survey responses showed the opposite trend. Quite clearly, the 
fragmentation of local government planning systems and their lack of integration at 
corporate level, which has been a constant source of discussion, advice and pressure 
(see for e.g. Audit Commission, 1986), continues to be a feature of local authority 
organisation.
Indeed, the levels of corporate-departmental integration in the NHS and central 
government seem to be much more in line with the private sector data than with local 
government.
Figure 6:15 Planning - Corporate, Departmental and Integration in the public
sector
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In defining how progress against strategic targets should be monitored (see Figure 
6:16), there is again a broad similarity across the private and public sectors, but with 
some small variations.
As could be expected, given the continual pressure on public spending, public 
managers seem to give slightly higher priority to meeting spending targets (80%) than 
their private sector counterparts do (72%). The latter often have greater flexibility in 
matching spending and revenue targets. Similarly, given the greater ease of 
monitoring outputs in the private sector, there is greater emphasis (90%) than in the 
public sector (75%) on monitoring quantified non-financial targets.
■  Private
■  Public
Figure 6:16 Defining progress towards goals - public and private
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Unquantified, non-financial targets get almost equal priority in the private (77%) and 
public (80%) sectors. This is an interesting area that may deserve further investigation, 
given the high prevalence of these types of targets in both sectors. A whole host of 
possible targets could be subsumed under this heading (e.g. reorganisation, 
acquisition, process re-engineering, quality, or others). This research did not attempt 
to explore this area, but it is obviously a potentially interesting one.
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Competitive targets get fairly similar, although somewhat lower, priority in both 
sectors, with the private sector respondents seeing them as slightly more important 
(55%) than the public sector (49%). The ranking for ‘competitive targets’ for the 
private sector (compared to other targets) is obviously somewhat lower than may have 
been expected, whilst the very similar rating it is given in the public sector is 
somewhat higher than may have been expected, even given the introduction of market 
and quasi-market mechanisms (for other evidence on the impact of competition on the 
public sector see Talbot, 1994).
The frequency with which organisations review their strategies is also broadly similar 
across the two sectors (see Figure 6:17). The majority of respondents from both 
sectors used a one-year review period (63% private, 56% public) whilst marginally 
more private managers use a half year period (private 13%, public 8%) and a larger 
number of public managers monitor continually (14%, private 3%).
The patterns of monitoring against strategic targets are somewhat different across the 
two sectors (see Figure 6:18). Private organisations clearly tend towards shorter 
periods, with one third opting for monthly monitoring (33%) compared to less than 
half that number for the public sector (15%). On the other end of the spectrum, one 
third of public organisations (33%) opt for a monitoring period of one year, or longer, 
compared to only one fifth of private organisations (20%). For quarterly or half-yearly 
reporting, the numbers for each sector are more closely matched (with differences of 
only 5% and 3% respectively).
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Figure 6:17 Strategy review periods - public and private
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Figure 6:18 Progress reports against strategic targets - public and private
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It could be suggested the two critical factors in public sector planning systems, 
especially in relation to resource allocation, are the annual expenditure and budgeting 
process and the electoral 4-5 year cycle (usually, but for some local authorities one-
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third of councillors are elected annually). These are clearly reflected in the survey 
responses - 2 year or less planning horizons account for 31 % of public compared to 
15% of private respondents (Figure 6:19). A quarter of public sector respondents 
(25%) report a 1 year or less planning horizon (Figure 6:20). This ties in with the pull 
towards a 1 year monitoring cycle in the public sector noted above (see Figure 6:18).
The more detailed figures show a clear pattern within the public sector. A minority, 
31%, of local government respondents reported planning horizons of 1 year or less, 
compared to only 15% for the NHS and central government. Over 70% report 
horizons of 70%, compared to 47% and 55% for the NHS and central government.
Central government responses group around a 3-4 year horizon (59% - compared to 
38% of local government and 30% of NHS respondents). NHS responses indicate 
much longer time scales, with nearly half indicating periods of 5 years or longer 
(48%) (see Figure 6:20).
Figure 6:19 Planning horizons - public and private
| ■  Private B  Public
Under 1 year 1 to 3 years 3 years 3 to 5 years 5 years 5 to 15 years
(Private N=183; Public N=644 - percentage of responses) 
Sources: BDO (1992); Talbot (1994)
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Figure 6:20 Planning horizons - public sector and by type
■  Local Govt BNH S ■  Central Govt D A II Public
Under 1 year 2 3 4 5 6 to 10 to
1 year years years years years 10 15
years years
(Public N=644 - percentage of responses) 
Sources: Talbot (1994)
P a r t  II: S t r a t e g y  M o d e s , In f l u e n c e  s y st e m s  a n d  P a r t ic ip a t io n  
S tra teg ic  m odes
The concept of organisations having different, and competing, strategic modes was 
developed in Chapters 2 and 3. It was suggested that it would probably be the case 
that organisations would tend to have two or more strategic modes competing within 
them and that only a small minority would, at a particular point in time, be dominated 
by one or another mode.
The survey results seem to broadly support this conclusion. An average of 10% of 
respondents identified their organisation as fitting one of the strategic mode 
descriptions ‘very accurately’ (see Figure 6:21). In fact, the numbers who thought 
their organisation fitted only one description very accurately were lower still (planning 
6%; political 6%; learning 4%; visionary 5%).
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Figure 6:21 Strategic modes - tendency towards each
■  not at all B slightly ■fairly accurate □  very accurate ■  Score
accurate accurate
50 
40 
30  
20 
10 
0 
-10 
-20 
-30
Planning Political Learning Visionary
(N=644, percentages of respondents - ‘not at all accurate’ responses have been given 
negative score for illustrative purposes.)
Source: Talbot, 1994
The weighted ‘scores’ (out of 100) for each mode also suggest that there are few 
examples of pure dominance by one mode or another (planning 46; political 43; 
learning 45; visionary 41). There are also few managers who see one or another 
strategic mode as being totally inaccurate for their organisations, with a mean of 14% 
saying that any one mode was ‘not at all accurate’. Put another way, a mean of 86% of 
respondents saw at least two or more strategic modes as at least partly present in their 
organisations. This is powerful evidence for the prevalence of paradoxical practices in 
strategic process and content systems.
Where respondents did express a clear preference by indicating that at least one 
strategic mode statement was ‘very accurate’ in describing their organisation’s 
practices there was still very strong evidence of other strategic modes presence (see 
Table 6-3). In almost every case the mean scores for the other three modes lies 
between *1’ (‘slightly accurate’) and ‘2’ (‘fairly accurate’).
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Table 6-3 Modes and Preferences
Planning Politics Learning Visionary All
(70) (51) (42) (75) (644)
Planning very slightly slightly fairly fairly
3.00 1.35 1.42 2.06 1.52
Political slightly very fairly slightly slightly
1.17 3.00 1.70 1.20 1.40
Learning slightly fairly very slightly slightly
1.29 1.75 3.00 1.27 1.45
Visionary fairly slightly slightly very slightly
1.89 1.13 1.38 3.00 1.31
(Calculated by giving numerical scores to each category, i.e. ‘not at all accurate’ = 0; 
‘slightly accurate’ = 1; ‘fairly accurate’ = 2; etc. Mean scores and rounded to nearest 
category)
The four modes were not expected to correlate (either positively or negatively) 
strongly with one another. If there were to be any correlation it might be expected to 
be mild negative one - i.e. when one mode was relatively strong others could be 
expected to be relatively weaker. When they were correlated with each other (see 
Table 6-4) to see if these views were upheld some intriguing patterns emerged. Firstly, 
there were two moderately weak negative correlations, between political-planning (- 
0.27) and political-visionary (-0.22) modes. There were two further very weak 
negative correlations, between planning-learning (-0.13) and visionary-learning (- 
0.09). There was one moderately weak positive correlation, between political-learning 
(+0.26) and a reasonably strong correlation, between planning-visionary (+0.45).
These two positive correlations are particularly interesting because they correspond to 
one of the axes which forms the matrix for the strategic modes - that concerned with 
radical change versus incremental change. It also corresponds to the ‘deliberate’ - 
‘emergent’ ideas of Mintzberg and others. The two incremental-emergent strategic 
modes, learning and political, show the moderately weak positive correlation (+0.26) 
whilst the two radical-deliberate strategic modes, planning and visionary, show a 
reasonably strong positive correlation (+0.45).
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Table 6-4 strategic mode correlations
Planning Politics Learning Visionary
Planning 1.00
Politics -0.27 1.00
Learning -0.13 +0.26 1.00
Visionary +0.45 -0.22 -0.09 1.00
N = 644
Source: calculated from Talbot, 1994
The other dimension of the strategic modes matrix - rational Vs non-rational decision 
processes - produces two sets of negative correlations - a very weak negative 
correlation between planning-learning (-0.13) and a moderately weak negative 
correlation between vision-politics (-0.22).
Taken together, these positive and negative correlations could suggest that the radical- 
incremental, content, dimension of strategy content is more important than the 
rational-non-rational, process, dimension of strategy process.
This is especially interesting given the format of the ‘strategy mode’ statements in the 
questionnaire - in each case the statement gave a strategy process description first and 
a strategy content description second - e.g. “a rational decision making process 
leading to major shifts in organisational direction” (planning mode description). 
Given a two-part statement it would be more likely that respondents would focus on 
the first half of the statement, forgetting the second half. The results clearly indicate 
that respondents were looking at the whole statement.
As was suggested in Chapter 3, it was likely that the ‘visionary’ mode would be 
relatively weak because of the nature of public service organisations. This proved to 
be the case with this mode gaining the lowest score (41 points) and the highest 
number by far (22% - double the average for the other three modes) saying that it was 
‘not at all accurate’ for their organisation. It was also suggested that the planning 
mode, whilst the espoused theory of much public management pronouncement, would
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not actually be as pre-eminent as this would suggest. Whilst it does rank highest of the 
four modes (46 points) it is only marginally above average for all modes.
The strategic modes were cross-referenced with the data on ‘formal strategic planning’ 
explored at the beginning of this Chapter. Figure 6:22 gives the figures for the levels 
of formal strategic planning for respondent’s organisations where there is strong 
preference for a particular strategic mode. In this case, not only those responses where 
a strategic mode description statement was given a ‘very accurate’ response have been 
analysed, but also those responses where only one such statement was given a ‘very 
accurate’ response by those surveyed. In both cases the difference between the formal 
strategic planning percentage for all respondents (77%) and the percentage for each 
strategic mode has been given.
This analysis shows that for all the strategic modes, where there is a strong mode 
preference there is some tendency towards greater use of strategic planning than for 
the whole sample. This is not surprising given Hop wood’s analysis of the various uses 
to which such systems may be put in the ‘service’ of one particular approach to 
strategic decisions (see Chapter 2). However, it is noticeable that there are some 
strong variations between different strategic modes. The strongest increased tendency 
towards formal strategic planning occurs in those respondent’s organisations 
identified as being ‘strategic planners’ (12%-13%), which is to be expected given the 
nature of the suggested ‘strategic planning mode’. Similarly, the least deviation from 
the total percentage for formal strategic planning occurs in the political mode (5%- 
1%), which again by its nature might be expected to have less consensus about, and 
tendency towards, using formal systems except as ‘ammunition machines’ (Hopwood, 
1980). The visionary mode respondents show a relatively moderate increase in 
propensity for formal planning (7%-4%) while the learning mode respondents show a 
slightly higher preference (9%-6%) but still not as strong as the planning mode.
It is noticeable that the differences between the planning and politics mode is more 
exaggerated the more a respondent closely identified their organisation with a 
particular mode - in the cases where they identified with a only one particular mode
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the differences are higher (13% to 1% respectively) than where they may have 
identified with one of more modes (12% to 5%). Similarly, for the other two modes, 
learning and visionary, the increased preference for planning is markedly less where 
there is a stronger identification with only one particular strategic mode. Thus, only in 
the case of the planning mode does the preference for formal strategic planning 
increase the more pure the identification with the particular mode.
One issue posed by previous research is whether the existence of paradoxical systems 
within organisations, by themselves, influences organisational performance. The 
‘logical-determinist’ view would be that the existence of contradictory systems 
controlling the process and content of strategic decisions would inevitably reduce 
organisational performance. Previous studies have shown that this is not the case and 
indeed it may be that well managed tensions between paradoxical systems may 
actually enhance performance (Cameron & Quinn, 1988:8-10).
The data from the survey was analysed to see if there was any difference between 
those who said that strategic planning was or was not improving their organisations 
performance, in terms of their tendencies towards having less paradoxical strategic 
modes. The results show very little change in the overall balance between different 
strategic mode ‘scores’ (see Table 6-5), suggesting that the success of organisational 
planning has little correlation with the prevalence of competing strategic modes as 
such.
Table 6-5 Strategic modes and ‘planning works’
Mean ‘scores’
Strategic mode All (N = 644) ‘Planning works’ (N = 
397)
Planning 1.51 1.63
Political 1.40 1.38
Learning 1.45 1.49
Visionary 1.31 1.42
(Calculated by giving numerical scores to each category, i.e. ‘not at all accurate’ = 0; 
‘slightly accurate’ = 1; ‘fairly accurate’ = 2; etc.)
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However, within the minority or organisations that display a tendency towards one or 
more strategic modes over others there is some evidence that they feel that strategic 
planning is more likely to be successful. The percentage of all respondents who felt 
strategic planning was successful was 62%, however this figure increases when 
respondents expressed a view that at least one strategic mode was a ‘very accurate’ 
description of their organisation - planning (81%); politics (69%); learning (83%; and 
visionary (73%).
Figure 6:22 Strategic modes and formal strategic planning
14
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0
Planning Politics Learning Visionary
(70:41) (51:36) (42:23) (75:42)
Strategic modes: (a) where mode = ‘very accurate’ (b) where only one mode = ‘very 
accurate’ - N for each in brackets(aib) - percentage difference from overall ‘formal 
strategic planning’ of 77% (see Figure 6:1)
Source: calculated from Talbot, 1994
Influence Sub-svstems
In Chapter 3 a model was suggested of six ‘influence sub-systems’ within public 
sector organisations, two for each ‘domain’. The survey attempted to establish if there 
was any validity in these six sub-systems - if managers recognised them - and how far 
each actively influenced the strategy systems of public organisations.
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Table 6-6 Influence Sub-systems in public organisations
Sub-system no effect slight
effect
some
effect
strong
effect
weighted 
score 
(of 100)
Policy making 1 5 36 55 81
Resource allocation 0 3 16 78 90
Planning 2 16 43 36 70
Response 2 19 50 24 64
Professional Practice 4 21 44 26 62
Product/Service 2 13 42 39 71
N = 644, percentages of respondents 
Source: Talbot, 1994
Respondents clearly recognised all six sub-systems as categories and active influences 
on strategy making in public organisations. Firstly, managers responding to the survey 
indicating that the any individual influence sub-system had ‘no effect’ in their 
organisation did not exceed 4% for any category and actually averaged only 1.8% 
across all six sub-systems. In other words, a minimum of 96% of respondents 
recognised each sub-system as felt it had some effect in their organisation.
The figures show clearly (see Figure 6:23) that the two ‘policy domain’ influence sub­
systems - policy making and resource allocation - somewhat dominate the overall 
constellation of sub-systems. In fact the average weighted scores for the two ‘policy 
domain’ sub-systems is 86, compared to an average of 67 for both the ‘management’ 
and ‘service’ domain’s pairs of sub-systems. This was not unexpected and confirms 
that, at least in the views of the survey respondents, the policy domain is stronger than 
the other two domains in public services organisation’s strategy making. However, all 
six sub-systems clearly have considerable influence (with the lowest weighted score 
being 62). Of the six, resource allocation (weighted score:90) clearly stands out as the 
most influential sub-system.
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Figure 6:23 Influence sub-systems
Policy Resource Planning Response Professional Product /  
making allocation practice service
(N = 644, weighted scores [max. 100]) 
Source: Talbot, 1994
The relative positions of the pairs of influence sub-systems derived from domain 
theory (see Chapter 3) are interesting. When the scores for each of the pairs of sub­
systems are averaged they give an intriguing picture of the balance between the three 
domains it terms of strategy processes: the ‘policy’ domain pair (policy making and 
resource allocation) have a mean score of 86 points whilst the ‘management’ domain 
pair (planning and response systems) and the ‘service’ domain pair (professional 
practice and service delivery systems) each have a mean score of 67 points (see Figure 
6:26).
The data-set was also analysed to see if there were any tendencies for particular sub­
systems to be more influential when organisations had a preference for a particular 
strategic mode. The data was grouped by those respondents who had indicated that 
one of the ‘strategic mode’ statements was ‘very accurate’ for their organisation (more 
on strategic modes below). The influence sub-system weighted score for each strategic 
mode group was then calculated (see Figure 6:24).
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■  Policy S  Resource □  Planning □  Response
■  Professional □  Product /  service
practice
Figure 6:24 Strategic mode preferences and influence sub-systems
(Grouped by strategic mode ‘very accurate’, N for each group in brackets). 
Source: calculated from Talbot, 1994
Planning (70) Politics (51) Learning (42) Vision (75)
To see how much these scores deviated from the mean scores, they were subtracted 
from the mean score (for all 644 respondents - see Figure 6:23). This shows the 
different weightings given to each of the six influence sub-systems for each strategic 
mode group, compared to the mean scores for all respondents (Figure 6:25). 
Throughout the analysis that follows, the six sub-systems will also be grouped by 
‘domain’ to see how a particular strategic mode alters the balance between ‘domains’ 
(see Chapter 1 and 3).
The first aspect which stands out from this analysis is that many sub-systems are given 
higher than average weightings when the organisation has also been ascribed a strong 
strategic mode. This is particularly true for the two ‘deliberate’ strategic modes - the 
‘planning mode’ and the ‘visionary’ mode (score increase mean - 10.5 points each). 
The two ‘emergent’ strategic modes deviate less from the overall scores (mean 
increases of 4 points for the ‘political’ mode and 5.3 points for the ‘learning’ mode). 
There are also differences as to which sub-systems gain most in influence depending 
on the particular strategic mode.
In the ‘visionary’ strategic mode, the two ‘service domain’ sub-systems exhibit the 
greatest gain above the average level of influence (13 points each), followed closely
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by the two ‘management domain’ sub-systems (11 points each) and then by the two 
‘political domain’ sub-systems, with the ‘resource allocation’ sub-system showing the 
least deviation from the mean scores. However, as could be expected the two ‘policy 
domain’ sub-systems retain the dominant position of influence (mean 93 points) 
compared to the other two domains - management (mean 78 points) an service (mean 
80 points).
In the ‘learning’ strategic mode, it is the two ‘management domain’ sub-systems 
which show the greatest increase, although one each of the other two domain pairs of 
sub-systems also shows increases. Again, the two ‘policy domain’ sub-systems retain 
the dominant position of influence (mean 89 points). It could have been expected that 
the ‘service’ domain sub-systems would have shown a greater increase and 
improvement in position relative to the other two pairs but this is clearly not the case.
In the ‘political’ strategic mode no clear domain-based change pattern emerges, with 
the overall level of change from the average being fairly low. Indeed in two cases 
(response and professional practice) there is no change at all from the mean for the 
survey. The ‘political’ mode in fact most resembles the pattern of influences on 
strategy for the whole survey with almost exactly the same ‘gap’ between the policy 
domain and the other two domains.
In the ‘planning’ strategic mode the changing configuration of influence sub-systems 
most closely follows what could be expected from the combination of domain theory 
and the strategic modes theory. It would be expected that organisations with a strong 
preference for the strategic planning mode would show the strongest increase in the 
management domain influence sub-systems. This is in fact the case, with the two 
management domain sub-systems increasing at their highest above mean scores - 
planning (14 point increase) and response system (16 point increase). They also 
increase relatively more than the other two domain pairs of sub-systems. However, 
even in this case the policy domain pair remain clearly dominant (95 points) all the 
management domain pair are gaining ground relatively (82 points) and have moved 
considerably ahead of the service domain pair (74 points).
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■  Policy B Resource □  Planning □  Response
■  Professional E  Product / service
practice
Figure 6:25 Strategic mode preferences and influence sub-systems - differences 
from mean
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(Grouped by strategic mode ‘very accurate’, N for each group in brackets, and figures 
given difference between strategic mode sub-system score and average for all 
respondents).
Source: calculated from Talbot, 1994
■  Policy domain BManagement domain ■  Service domain
Figure 6:26 Strategic modes, influence sub-systems and domains
Planning (70) Politics (51) Learning (42) Vision (75) All (644)
(Grouped by strategic mode ‘very accurate’, N for each group in brackets, and figures 
grouped by domain pairs).
Source: calculated from Talbot, 1994
To be sure that managers were making distinctions between the six categories a 
correlation of all six was performed. If managers were making clear distinctions and
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assuming that the influences of sub-systems was unlikely to be closely balanced, it 
could be expected that there would be weak, or moderate, positive correlations 
between them.
The results of the correlations broadly correspond to this expectation. One interesting 
correlation is that between the professional practice and product/service sub-systems 
(+0.5) which is moderately strong, suggesting a ‘domain’ relationship in the ‘service 
domain’. The other two ‘domains’ showed less strong correlations - in the 
‘management’ domain the correlation between the ‘planning’ and ‘response’ sub­
systems was somewhat weaker at +0.36 whilst in the ‘policy’ domain the relationship 
between the ‘policy’ and ‘resource’ sub-systems was weaker still at +0.28. the average 
of the three intra-domain correlations is +0.38, compared to an average for the twelve 
inter-domain correlations of only +0.23 (the average for all fifteen correlations is 
+0.26). The does suggest there is a slightly stronger link, in respondents views, 
between the influence of sub-systems within domains rather than between domains.
On the other hand, if there were any negative correlations between any of the sub­
systems this would have suggested a negative relationship, i.e. if sub-system ‘A’ was 
strong, sub-system ‘B’ would be weak. There are no such negative correlations, 
suggesting that all six sub-systems can coexist and influence strategy without being 
mutually exclusive.
Table 6-7 Correlations between influence sub-systems
Policy Resource Planning Response Professional Service
Policy 1
Resource 0.28 1
Planning 0.36 0.22 1
Response 0.25 0.17 0.36 1
Professional 0.20 0.07 0.27 0.31 1
Service 0.23 0.10 0.21 0.34 0.50 1
N = 644
Source: derived from Talbot, 1994
The results of the analysis of the six strategy process influence sub-systems gives little 
support, except in the case of the strategic planning mode, that the prevalence of a 
particular strategy mode within an organisation leads to any predictable changes in the
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pattern of influence exercised by the different sub-systems. This is unexpected given 
the theoretical framework in which the sub-systems were identified. There is then no 
clearly proven link between the six sub-systems and strategic modes.
There does seem to be some evidence that the three pairs of influences on the strategy 
process are possible to sustain within the framework of domain theory - the relative 
weight of the three domain pairs does seem to fit with the general view in domain 
theory of the dominance of the political domain but also the relative strength of the 
service (professional) domain within public services organisations. The correlations 
between the three pairs of sub-systems, especially in the case of the service domain 
pair, does offer support to this view. This conclusion also fits with the evidence of 
politicians and service professionals involvement in the strategy process (see Figure 
6:27).
The six sub-systems themselves however do seem to have a high degree of validity - 
they are clearly recognised by managers and attributed levels of influence on the 
strategy process (see Table 6-6).
Participation
Participation by various groups in different aspects of the strategic processes of public 
organisations show some marked variations with their private sector counterparts (see 
Figure 6:27, Figure 6:28 and Figure 6:29 - note that some categories were not covered 
in either survey).
In terms of involvement in the process of formulating strategy (see Figure 6:27), the 
most marked difference is the much higher levels of customer/client involvement 
reported by public sector respondents (35%) compared to the private sector (7%). This 
seems a remarkable result, especially given the emphasis in much of the generic and 
private sector specific literature on ‘customer orientation’ since In Search of 
Excellence appeared over a decade ago. It suggests that public organisations have 
become much more customer orientated than their private sector counter-parts. There
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are some interesting intra-public sector variations on this issue, with the NHS showing 
much higher levels of customer involvement in formulating strategy (49%) than either 
central or local government (24% and 30% respectively).
Another area where there are higher levels of participation in the strategy formulation 
process in the public sector are amongst senior managers and directors. Senior 
managers show a relatively higher level of involvement in the public sector (87%) 
compared to the private (78%) and directors show an even more pronounced result 
(89% and 64% respectively). Again, the NHS shows higher levels for both groups 
(98% for directors, 92% senior managers), marginally in relation to central 
government (95% and 87%) and more markedly in relation to local government (84% 
for both).
The final area where public sector participation rates are noticeably higher them in the 
private sector is for planning staffs (39% public, 29% private). Here again, the NHS 
seems much more likely to be using planning staff for strategy formulation (59%) 
compared to either central (44%) or local (29%) government.
The only really noticeable area where private sector participation in strategy formation 
outstrips public sector rates in for the use of consultants (private 25%, public 18%), 
although the difference is not heavily pronounced. On the other hand the differences 
within the public sector are very pronounced - again the NHS records higher rates 
(38%), in this case quite substantially higher than either central (11%) or local (9%) 
government. Indeed, the NHS rates of using consultants seem to be markedly higher 
than the rate in the private sector (38% to 25%).
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Figure 6:27 Involvement in the planning process
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Other staff (private) 
Other staff (public)
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(Private N= 183; Public N=644 - percentage of responses)
NB: The categories ‘junior managers’, ‘professional staff, ‘admin. & support staff and ‘politicians’ 
were not included in the private sector study. An ‘other staff category was included but does not 
correspond to ‘other staff in the public sector study and is included separately.
Sources: BDO (1992) Talbot (1994)
The patterns of differences between the public and private sectors in terms of strategy 
formulation are broadly repeated in terms of who the strategy is communicated to (see 
Figure 6:28). Again, the public sector seems much more likely to communicate its 
plans to customers (59%) than the private sector (23%). The NHS also again is more 
likely to do this (77%) than central government (46%) or local authorities (50%).
The differences between the sector for communicating to senior managers (83% 
public, 51% private) and directors (73% public, 34% private) are also pronounced.
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However the differences within the public sector are less marked - (for senior 
managers, NHS - 88%, CG - 91%, LG - 80%; for directors, NHS - 81%, CG - 86%, 
LG - 69%).
Communicating to planning staff about the outcome of the strategy process also varies 
markedly (public 43%, private 18%). However, although public organisations seem 
much less likely to be using consultants to formulate strategy, they seem much more 
likely to tell them what the strategy is (public 20%, private 8%). This could suggest 
that the difference between the public and private sectors here is that the private sector 
is more likely to use consultants for formulation and not for implementation, whilst 
the public sector is more likely to use them for implementation and not formulation. 
Unfortunately this rather neat hypothesis is does not seem to be bom out when 
respondents were asked who is responsible for implementation, with the private sector 
relying more heavily (12%) than the public sector (7%) on consultants (see Figure 
6:29).
On implementation of strategy more generally (see Figure 6:29), the differences 
between the public and private sectors is slightly less pronounced in some areas. The 
level of directors responsibilities are almost equal (82% public, 83% private) whilst 
senior managers are seen as less important in the private sector (64%) compared to the 
public (84%). The differences, proportionately, on the use of planning staffs for 
implementation are about the same as for other parts of the process (public, 18%, 
private 9%).
Within the public sector, the differences follow a similar pattern for implementation 
as for formulation and for communication across the NHS, central and local 
government but they are somewhat less pronounced.
The public sector data was also analysed in respect of the strategic modes in relation 
to participation by selected groups, determined by the framework of domain theory. 
Three groups were selected - professionals, politicians and senior and junior 
managers. The totals for each group by strategic mode are given (see Figure 6:30) and
288
the differences between these figures and the percentages for all the public sector 
respondents are also illustrated (see Figure 6:31).
According to the ideas on public sector strategy formation developed in Chapter 3, it 
might be expected that in the strategic mode could affect the levels of participation by 
various groups in the process.
The figures for the learning mode seem to give the strongest support for this 
suggestion - with both professionals (22% increase) and junior managers (13% 
increase) (who are often professionals themselves) showing relatively large increases 
in participation rates in this mode, whilst the participation of politicians (8% decrease) 
drops noticeably below the average. The relative increase in senior management 
participation (8%) does not fit this pattern.
For the other strategic modes the patterns of change are far less pronounced and fit the 
patterns which might be expected far less. One intriguing result is the relatively large 
increase (18%) for professional participation in the planning mode.
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Figure 6:28 Communicating the strategic plan - public and private
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(Private N= 183; Public N=644 - percentage of responses)
NB: The categories ‘junior managers’, ‘professional staff, ‘admin. & support staff and ‘politicians’ 
were not included in the private sector study. An ‘other staff category was included but does not 
correspond to ‘other staff in the public sector study and is included separately.
Sources: BDO (1992) Talbot (1994)
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Figure 6:29 Responsibility for implementing the strategic plan - public and 
private
Politicians
Consultants
Professional
advisers
Suppliers 
Customers/clients 
Other staff (private)
Other staff (public)
Admin. & support 
staff
Professional staff 
Planning staff 
Junior managers 
Senior managers 
Directors
B  Private 
■  Public
20 40 60 80 100
(Private N= 183; Public N=644 - percentage of responses)
NB: The categories ‘junior managers’, ‘professional staff, ‘admin. & support staff and ‘politicians’ 
were not included in the private sector study. An ‘other staff category was included but does not 
correspond to ‘other staff in the public sector study and is included separately.
Sources: BDO (1992) Talbot (1994)
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■  Professionals H Politicians ■  Senior managers □  Junior m anagers
Figure 6:30 Strategic modes and participation in the planning process
(Participation rates for selected groups by strategic mode - N for each mode in 
brackets - percentages of respondents)
Source: Talbot, 1994
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Figure 6:31 Strategic modes and participation in the planning process - 
differences from all public sector results.
■  Professionals ■  Politicians ■  Senior managers □  Junior managers
Planning (70) Politics (51) Learning (42) Visionary (75)
(Participation rates for selected groups by strategic mode - difference from total 
participation rates for all public sector - N for each mode in brackets - percentages of 
respondents)
Source: Talbot, 1994
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Chapter 7 Results and Analysis II: Strategic Public Managers - 
Knowledge, Competences, Development.
This Chapter examines the data gathered from the survey with respect to three areas: 
strategic knowledge; strategic competences; and strategic managers’ development. 
The first of these looks at the data on both strategic techniques and knowledge of 
strategy (or strategy related general management) authors. In this section it is possible 
to make some comparisons with the private sector survey. The many additional 
unstructured comments which managers added to the survey sections on techniques 
and authors have been analysed in the section dealing with strategic managers’ 
development, for reasons which will become apparent below. The second section, 
drawing on the model of strategic competences developed earlier (see Chapters 3 and 
5), looks at managers responses to these competences - both the quantitative data from 
the survey and the additional comments which many managers made. Thirdly, the data 
from the survey - again both quantitative and qualitative comments (in this case the 
comments come from earlier sections of the survey) - on strategic management 
development is examined, using the framework developed in Chapter 4.
S t r a t e g ic  K n o w l e d g e  - T e c h n iq u e s , A u t h o r s  
Knowledge I - Techniques
When asked about what techniques they might know about for use in developing 
strategic plans, an average 34% of all 644 respondents replied that they knew about 
one of the 16 techniques or mechanisms listed ( see Figure). On the other hand, only 
16% on average of those who did not have a personal knowledge of these techniques 
expressed a feeling that they ought to know about them.
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The levels of personal knowledge of, and the desire to know about, various techniques 
have been divided into five categories - relatively high (40% or over); average (30- 
39%); moderate (20-29%); low (10-19%) and very low (below 10%).
Seven of the sixteen techniques fall into the ‘relatively high’ category for personal 
knowledge - workshops and project teams (42%); mission statements (45%); 
executive information systems (EIS - 40%); market research (46%); risk analysis 
(42%); cost / benefit and SWOT analysis (49% each). However, no technique falls 
into this category in terms of desire to know about it.
Given the prevalence in the public sector management literature of items such as cost- 
benefit and risk analysis, the relatively high level of personal knowledge of individual 
strategic managers is not particularly surprising. Similarly SWOT analysis and the use 
of mission statements are fairly common items in generic management literature. On 
all four of these areas the desire of those who don’t have a personal knowledge of 
them already to know about them is either low (risk analysis) or very low (mission 
statements, cost/benefit analysis and SWOT). The knowledge of EISs falls just within 
the relatively high category (40%) and there is a slightly higher, but still low, desire to 
know more about it (12%).
One item which does stand out is the relatively high knowledge of market research 
(46%). This might not have been expected, given the traditionally ‘non-market’ or 
‘non-competitive’ orientation of public organisations. This ties in with other survey 
evidence of the increasing customer orientation, rather than the competitive 
orientation, of public sector organisations (see Talbot, 1994a). However the desire to 
know more amongst those without a knowledge of market research is very low (3%).
Only three items fall into the average category for individual knowledge - cost 
analysis (39%); scenarios (31%) and force field analysis (31%). Another two fall into 
this category for individuals desire to know about them - Ishikawa diagrams (34%) 
and mapping strategic problems (37%). In the case of cost analysis there is little desire
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to know more it (5%) but the other two techniques exhibit markedly higher levels of 
interest - scenarios (19%) and force field analysis (25%).
Figure 7:1 Techniques - respondents knowledge and desire to know
■  Know about BOught to
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Market research 
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Cost / benefit 
SWOT
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Scenarios 
Force field 
Ishikawa 
Mapping
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(N = 644 - percentages for all respondents for each category)
Source: Talbot, 1994________________________________________________________
Techniques which show a moderate knowledge base include the ‘7S’ framework 
(29%); five forces model (27%); PEST analysis (28%); and stakeholder analysis 
(27%). Interestingly, all four of these also show a moderately high level of interest - 
‘7S’ framework (29%); five forces model (25%); PEST analysis (27%); and 
stakeholder analysis (25%).
In the low, or very low, category of knowledge about techniques only two appear - 
Ishikawa diagrams (3%) and strategic mapping (17%) but in both of these cases, as 
noted above, there are relatively high levels of interest in knowing more.
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Figure 7:2 Techniques - organisational practice
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Source: Talbot, 1994
The use of individual techniques varies widely (see Figure 7:2) from the very high - 
workshops and project teams (77%) and mission statements (75%) - to the very low - 
Ishikawa diagrams (6%) and strategic mapping (5%).
The differences between individuals knowledge of specific techniques and their use in 
organisational practice (see Figure 7:2 and Figure 7:3) show some interesting issues. 
The actual usage of techniques averages 36% (compared to the average individual 
knowledge of 34%) but this apparent closeness of knowledge and practice hides some 
wide divergence’s for individual areas.
A number of techniques show a marked surplus of individual knowledge over 
organisational practice, such as the ‘7S’ framework (+16%), force field analysis 
(+19%) and strategic mapping (+12%). A number of others show small surpluses -
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EIS (+6%), five forces (+8%), PEST (7%), stakeholder analysis (7%) and scenarios 
(5%) or very small surpluses - risk analysis (3%) and cost benefit analysis (1%).
Six techniques show a deficit - i.e. a situation where the individuals’ knowledge falls 
short of the level of organisational practices. One of these is fairly minor - the use of 
Ishikawa diagrams (-3%). However all the other five show substantial deficits - 
workshops and project teams (-35%), mission statements (-30%), market research (- 
13%), cost analysis (-19%) and SWOT (-18%). These clearly indicate areas where 
there are probably gaps between individual knowledge and organisational practice and 
point towards a possible area of management development need.
It should be remembered that analysis is based on overall percentages - it is quite 
possible that for many individuals there may be either surpluses (or deficits) of 
personal knowledge over (or below) organisational practice in any of these particular 
techniques. The analysis does however show the broad pattern and illustrates where 
there may be major management development needs for public sector strategic 
managers.
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Figure 7:3 Techniques - knowledge Vs practice
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Where there is a direct comparison possible between data collected for this research 
and the BDO survey of private sector practices it is clear that there are both some 
areas of strong similarity and strong difference (see Figure 7:4).
In seven cases there is a difference of 10 percentage points or less between usage of 
techniques in the public and private sectors, although in some cases these still 
represent proportionately large differences.
The use of mission statements (private 69%, public 75%); executive information 
systems (26%, 34%); market research (64%, 59%); risk analysis (38%, 39%); cost- 
benefit analysis (42%, 48%) and SWOT analysis (57%, 67%) show fairly close 
patterns of similarity between the two sectors. One other area shows a 10 percentage 
point difference, but this is proportionately very high - ‘7S’ framework (private 3%, 
public 13%). This relatively much higher use in the public than the private sector also
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hides some significant differences within the public sector, with 16% of local 
government respondents reporting the ‘7S’ framework in use in their organisations 
compared to 12% in the NHS and only 8% in central government. Whether there may 
be a link here with the promotion by the Audit Commission of their own version of 
the ‘7S’ framework (discussed in Chapter 3) to local government in the mid-to-late 
1980s does seem suggestive.
■  Public sector use ■  Private sector use
Figure 7:4 Techniques - differences between public and private sector practice
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Sources: BDO, 1992 and Talbot, 1994
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The other three techniques show marked differences between the two sectors. The use 
of competitor analysis (five forces) shows a gap of 18 percentage points (private 37%, 
public 19%) which suggests that, while public organisations may use market research 
or SWOT analysis as part of the strategy process at similar levels to the private sector, 
their external focus is narrowed much more to individual customers and they are much 
less likely to be analysing competitors.
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The difference of 44 percentage points between the sectors on the use of cost analysis 
(private 14%, public 58%) is very similar to the useful attributed to strategic planning 
in making ‘better use of resources’ (private 5%, public 69%) recorded in Chapter 6. 
This suggests that public strategic managers place much greater emphasis on 
controlling costs than their private sector counterparts. This is further reinforced by 
recent findings that public managers see cutting costs as by far the greatest pressure on 
them (Talbot, 1994:28).
The final technique which shows the greatest difference, at 67 percentage points, 
between public and private sector usage is using workshops or project teams to 
develop strategy (private 10%, public 77%). This ‘participative’ technique is clearly 
favoured much more strongly in the public sector and this reinforces the other 
evidence of there being a stronger preference in this sector for participative strategy 
systems (see Chapter 6). It does not seem unreasonable to speculate that the more 
complex nature of public organisations, in terms of stakeholders, domains, objective 
setting, etc., may well make such participative mechanisms as workshops and project 
teams both more desirable and necessary. Given the much higher levels of experience 
of using these techniques in the public sector, suggested by these results, it would also 
not be unreasonable to suggest that those advocating their greater use in private sector 
might gain valuable insights from public sector practice.
Knowledge II - Authors
In turning to respondent’s use of particular management authors approaches in 
developing strategy, it is worth staying with the public-private sector divide briefly. 
Where direct comparisons were possible between the BDO and this survey (see Figure 
7:5), there are few major differences exhibited between respondent’s organisations use 
of these approaches. In four out of five cases the difference is less than 3 percentage 
points - Drucker (private 12%, public 15%); Argenti (5% both); Ohmae (3%, 2%) and 
Peters (16%, 18%).
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■  Used in organisation B Private sector use
Figure 7:5 Authors - differences between public and private sector practices
Drucker 
Argenti 
Porter 
Ohmae 
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0
Source: Talbot, 1994
Only in the case of Michael Porter is there a significant difference, of 8 percentage 
points, with the public sector (8%) showing relatively much lower usage than the 
private (16%). This obviously corresponds to the similar proportionate difference 
between the two sectors in the use of competitor (five forces) analysis recorded earlier 
(see Figure 7:4).
A wider range of authors were included in the public managers survey (see Figure 
7:6). The responses show that public managers exhibited a very strong knowledge of 
the work of Peter Drucker (58%) and Tom Peters (61%), with around 6 out of 10 
managers knowing about both, whilst not more than half that number knew of any of 
the other authors. J.B.Quinn and Mintzberg (26%) and Ansoff (23%) showed 
moderately levels of knowledge about their work. In all four of these cases the levels 
of desire to know more about the authors fell below existing levels of knowledge, in 
the first two cases substantially so.
In only two cases did the percentage of those professing knowledge fall below 10 
(Bowman & Asch - 9%, Stacey - 7% - but to be fair to the latter it should be pointed 
out that this is also the newest of the titles included in the survey!).
301
■  Know about Ei Ought to
Figure 7:6 Authors - respondent’s knowledge and desire to know
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Source: Talbot, 1994
S t a r p u
The levels of desire for knowledge obviously partly follows the pattern of existing 
knowledge, but certain authors seemed to fair particularly well - Bryson especially 
showed the highest desire for more information (28%), a fact probably not 
unconnected with the fact that this was also the only title which explicitly mentioned 
the public sector (“Strategic Planning for Public and Non-Profit Organizations”). 
However, in all cases except the ‘top four’ mentioned above the desire to know more 
about the authors exceeded existing knowledge, usually significantly. Only in the case 
of Porter were the existing levels of knowledge and desire for knowledge almost equal 
(19% and 20% respectively).
It is worth mentioning that there were a large number of ‘write-in’ additions to the list 
of authors supplied in the survey questionnaire. The most significant of these included 
Charles Handy (mentioned by 3% of ‘write-ins’), John Stewart (2%), Peter Senge and 
John Harvey-Jones (1% each).
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Figure 7:7 Authors - knowledge and use in organisations
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Unlike for the use of techniques, the correspondence between respondents knowledge 
of particular authors and the application of the author’s approach within their 
organisation showed a surplus in all cases (see Figure 7:7). In other words, for all 
these authors more respondents knew about their approaches than reported that they 
were actually practised in their organisations. As will be seen when we turn to the 
comments made by many respondents, this probably has a great deal to do with the 
pragmatic and eclectic way in which such ideas tend to be used.
S t r a t e g ic  c o m p e t e n c e s
The survey asked managers to say “how useful would you think each of the following 
strategic abilities, knowledge or skills are for public service managers?” Each of the 
24 statements which followed described one of the ‘strategic competences’, offering a 
four-point range of responses from “not at all useful” to “very useful”. The responses
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for each of the 24 strategic competences questions is set out in Table 7-4 to Table 7-7 
(grouped according to the strategc mode from which they were derived (see Chapter 3 
and 5)), with a summary of the ‘s:ores’ for each in Table 7-1.
Competence Patterns
Before looking at some of the individual competence scores in more detail, it is worth 
looking at the overall patterns which emerge. As can be seen from Table 7-1, there do 
seem to be significant differences within each strategic mode and differences in the 
patterns for each mode compared with the others.
Table 7-1 Strategic competences - scores grouped by mode
Planning
Mode
Visionary
Mode
Political
Mode
Learning
Mode Means
Policy making 80 80 4 3 3 5 6 0
Resource provision 82 82 7 4 5 7 7 4
Planning 6 7 4 0 71 6 1 6 0
Response 6 4 6 4 5 4 76 6 5
Professional practice 5 0 5 2 5 5 72 5 7
Service/product 78 7 3 5 5 7 3 7 0
Means 7 0 6 5 5 9 6 2
N = 644, c o m p e t e n c e  s c o r e s  g r o u p e d  b y  m o d e  a n d  s u b - s y s t e m ,  s h a d e d  a r e a s  a b o v e  
m e a n  f o r  m o d e  s c o r e s .
Table 7-2 Competences - by donain
Deliberate - radical modes Emergent - incremental modes
Domain Sub-systems Planning Visionary 
Mode Mode
Political
Mode
Learning
Mode
Policy Policy making & 
resource 
allocation
81 81 59 46
Management Planning and 
response 66 52 63 69
Service Professional 
practice and 
service/ product
64 64 55 73
N = 644, mean scores for each pair of competences per mode/domain - strongest 
domain shaded
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Overall, the planning mode competences are ranked highest of the four sets of 
competences (mean 70 points), with the visionary mode second (65), learning mode 
third (62) and political mode last (59). This suggests that the competences most 
associated with rational planning are, broadly, seen as most useful by public services 
managers.
When looked at as groupings of competences associated with a strategy sub-system 
the resource allocation competences clearly rank top (mean 74 points). It is interesting 
to note that the rankings of these mean scores for each sub-system could be seen as 
broadly conforming to ‘managerialist’ perspectives - that is the ‘harder’ competences 
associated with resource provision and the end product or service scoring highest.
The patterns of mean competences scores between different strategic modes emerge 
even more clearly if the results are grouped by public organisation domains (see Table 
7-2). These show that within the grouping of competences for the two radical- 
deliberate modes - planning and visionary - the policy domain competences are clearly 
ranked as relatively more useful than the competences related to the other two 
domains. In the political mode, on the other hand, the relative balance between all 
competences related to all three domains is quite evident. In the learning mode it is 
also noticeable that it is the service domain competences score relatively highly whilst 
the policy domain competences score markedly lower.
These figures do seem to give some credibility to idea that the groups of competences 
for each mode reflecting the way in which each distinct mode tends to operate, as 
outlined in Chapter 3.
Individual Competences
The notion that these are competing and paradoxical competences can be established 
in a number of ways.
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Firstly, establishing that they have some validity individually can be done by 
establishing how useful respondents see each competence. If, for example, a majority 
of managers did not see a particular competence as at all useful it could reasonably be 
concluded that this was not a general public services strategic competence. Further 
investigation might establish it is a specific competence in specific types of 
organisation/situation but its utility as a general competence would obviously be very 
doubtful.
Secondly, the problem of establishing that they are paradoxical is slightly more 
complex. Assuming that the competences are reasonably valid individually, how can 
the fact that the are both competing and paradoxical be established? For them to be 
both competitive (contradictory) and paradoxical (i.e. capable of existing 
simultaneously despite being contradictory) it must be shown that there are not any 
strong correlations, either positive or negative, between them.
If the competences are competing but not paradoxical then they would tend to be 
mutually exclusive - i.e. if one competence were strong then others should be 
correspondingly weak. Whether this is the case can be established by seeing if there 
are any significant negative correlations between them. Absence of such strong 
negative correlations would tend to suggest that are not mutually exclusive.
On the other hand, if strong positive correlations existed between competences it 
would suggest that they are not competitive - i.e. if one increases as others increase it 
would suggest that they are not competitive but co-operative. Absence of strong 
positive correlation’s and strong negative correlation’s would therefore suggest that 
they are indeed paradoxical.
In terms of individual competences, the scores obtained for each (see Table 7-4 to 
Table 7-7) suggest that most of the competences do indeed have some validity for the 
majority of respondents. Firstly, the highest “not at all useful” percentage (34%) is 
only about one third of the respondents - i.e. two thirds of managers responding saw 
this competence as useful to some degree. In fact only four out of the twenty-four
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competences were ranked as “not at all useful” by more than 10% of respondents, or 
put he other way round, twenty competences were seen as to some degree useful by at 
least 90% of all respondents.
The competences have also been ranked by their individual scores (see Table 7-3). 
The rankings themselves do not produce any obvious patterns. In fact it is clear from 
the full responses and the scores that there are three ‘doubtful’ competences, i.e. 
where there scores fall below 50 (out of 100 possible) points. These are (with scores 
in end brackets):
(v) integrate ambiguous missions, policies, objectives and rules for the 
organisation (43)
(f) use the organisation's planning system to justify the organisational 
mission (40)
(x) tolerate diversity of missions, policies, objectives and rules within the 
organisation (35)
Two of these deal with concepts of ambiguity and diversity, suggesting that it is this 
type of idea which may be seen as not useful. However, other competences include 
such concepts - e.g. (1) “allow for diversity and innovation in design and organisation 
of services” which scores well (73 points) or (q) “adjust resource allocations to meet 
conflicting priorities and policies” (74). These suggest that its is not ambiguity or 
diversity as such which managers are rejecting.
The other factor which the two statements have in common is relating ambiguity and 
diversity to the organisation’s “mission, policies, objectives and rules.” It seems 
therefore that while managers are willing to recognise the need to tolerate ambiguity 
and diversity in other areas, the idea of doing so at the level of organisational 
objectives, in its broadest sense, does not seem useful. Given the amount of literature 
concerning conflict, ambiguity and diversity in the objectives of public services 
organisations (see Chapter 3) this is a very interesting finding, and one which may 
well deserve further research. (It is also interesting to note that these pair of 
competences have a correlation of +0.36, which is relatively strong.)
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The last competence which is doubtful due to low score is (f) “use the organisation's 
planning system to justify the organisational mission.” This competence, as baldly 
stated as this, may perhaps have been seen as being ‘unethical’ to some managers. 
Interestingly, when a very similar concept is presented in slightly more neutral 
language and in a more restrictive form - (c) “use the organisation's planning system 
to support particular projects or policies” - scores much better (71). (Incidentally, this 
is also the competence which correlates most strongly with (f) - +0.30).
As will be seen below, when the correlations between all competences are examined, 
there are other competences where, at a minimum, the wording of the descriptive 
statements may have produced unreliable results.
The individual competences have all been correlated to one another (see Table 7-8). 
Each sub-system level group of four competences has been highlighted by blocking 
them in a solid box.
Following the argument advanced above, for each group of four competences at each 
sub-system level it could be expected that there would not be any strong correlation’s, 
either positively or negatively between them. Similarly, for all the correlations it 
should not be expected that there would be any strong correlations.
In only three cases do positive correlation’s exceed +0.5, i.e. indicating what would 
generally be called a moderate positive correlation. One is in fact quite strong (+0.72), 
that between (s) “integrate, through persuasion or coercion, professional practice to 
match plans” and (n) “integrate, through persuasion or coercion, professional practice 
to match mission.” Both of these competences fall within the professional practice 
sub-system. There is clearly a strong possibility here that the fact that there is only a 
one word difference between the descriptions given for each competence (“mission” 
or “plans”) that respondents were not distinguishing between the two statements. 
(This does lend some (accidental) credence to the validity and reliability of the 
survey).
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Table 7-3 Competences statements - ranked by score
Sub-system Competence statement ;Scor
e
R ank
Provision/Resource (e) integrate resource allocation and policy making systems 82 1
Provision/Resource (b) derive resource allocation and targeting from mission and 
policy objectives
82 2
Policy (a) set detailed missions, policies, objectives and rules for the 
organisation
80 3
Policy (p) set broad missions, policies, objectives and values for the 
organisation
80 4
Product/Service (u) ensure services are clearly defined and organised to meet 
plans
78 5
Pragmatism (d) make pragmatic adjustments through experience of practical 
service delivery
76 6
Provision/Resource (q) adjust resource allocations to meet conflicting priorities and 
policies
74 7
Product/Service (t) ensure services are broadly organised to meet mission and 
policies
73 8
Product/Service (1) allow for diversity and innovation in design and organisation 
of services
73 9
Professional
Practice
(h) allow professional practice scope for innovation, within broad 
goals
72 10
Planning (c) use the organisation's planning system to support particular 
projects or policies
71 11
Planning (i) use the organisation's planning system to produce rational 
solutions to problems
67 12
Pragmatism (m) make pragmatic adjustments to stay within the overall plan 64 13
Pragmatism (j) make pragmatic adjustments to stay within the broad 
organisational mission
64 14
Planning (r) use the organisation's planning system for learning and 
adaptation
61 15
Provision/Resource (w) allow flexibility in resource allocation and allow resources to 
follow 'success'
57 16
Professional
Practice
(k) integrate, through compromise, professional practice into 
organisational goals
55 17
Product/Service (o) achieve compromise and consensus over the design and 55 
organisation of services
18
Pragmatism (g) make pragmatic adjustments through negotiating internal 
compromises
54 19
Professional
Practice
(n) integrate, through persuasion or coercion, professional 
practice to match mission
52 20
Professional (s) integrate, through persuasion or coercion, professional 50 21
Practice practice to match plans
Policy (v) integrate ambiguous missions, policies, objectives and rules 
for the organisation
43 22
Planning (f) use the organisation's planning system to justify the 
organisational mission
40 23
Policy (x) tolerate diversity of missions, policies, objectives and rules 
within the organisation
35 24
Mean (shaded areas below mean score) 64
Another case shows a similar pattern to the first, although it is less pronounced. The 
positive correlation (+0.56) is less strong between (m) “make pragmatic adjustments
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to stay within the overall plan” and (j) “make pragmatic adjustments to stay within the 
broad organisational mission”, both in the response sub-system, may also have 
something to do with the specific wording of the descriptive statements. Although the 
critical distinction in the wording is again between “mission” and “plan” the use of 
slightly different phraseology around these key words may have caused greater 
differentiation than in the former case.
Finally, there is one case where there is a moderate positive correlation (+0.53) where 
the two correlating competences come from different sub-systems and strategic modes 
- (a) “set detailed missions, policies, objectives and rules for the organisation” (from 
the policy sub-system cluster and planning mode) and (b) “derive resource allocation 
and targeting from mission and policy objectives” (from the resource allocation sub­
system and visionary mode). There is no obvious reason for this correlation - the 
descriptive statements are obviously quite different, so there is no issue of respondents 
confusing the two.
Besides these individual cases of obvious positive correlation’s it is useful to look at 
the six ‘clusters’ of competences for each strategy sub-system and their correlation’s. 
If we use as a bench-mark those competences where they equal or exceed a correlation 
of +0.3, i.e. where there could be said, to be a weak positive correlation between 
competences the ‘scores’ within each cluster of competences vary markedly. At one 
end, none of the competences within the service/product sub-system correlates at or 
above +0.3 with any other competence. At the other extreme, all four competences 
within the response sub-system correlates at or above +0.3 with every other 
competence in the same group. There are not any very obvious reasons for these 
variations.
There are also four areas where three or more of the six possible correlation’s equal 
+0.30 or higher. These are between policy making and resource allocation 
competences (3); the resource allocation and planning competences (4); the response 
and professional practice (3) and the service/product competences (4); and finally the 
professional practice and service/product competences (4). The first and last of these
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sets are paired within domains (policy domain and service domains respectively) 
whilst there are fairly obvious reasons why there might be slightly stronger 
correlation’s between the other two groupings.
There are also a few relatively random weak positive correlations between individual 
competences. There are no significant negative correlation’s at all.
Overall, the 24 competences show a range from no real correlation at all to weak 
positive correlation, with a small number showing a moderate positive correlation and 
only one pair showing a fairly strong positive correlation. These results suggest that 
the competences do indeed exist relatively independently of one another and, in so far 
as they do exist and are logically contradictory to one another can reasonably be 
described as ‘competing competences’. The anomalies of strong positive correlations 
have been at least partly explained by faulty, or at least insufficiently clear, descriptive 
statements for competences.
However, there is still a clear pattern for there to be a noticeable tendency for there to 
be weak positive correlations between competences. Around 46% of the correlation’s 
are at +0.2 or above and 82% at +0.1 or above. Why should this be the case?
In R.E.Quinn’s work on competing competences at the general management level (see 
Chapter’s 4 and 5) there are two types of managers where there is a positive 
correlation between different competences, at either end of the effectiveness 
continuum. At the lower end are very poor performers who have little ability in any of 
R.E.Quinn’s competences or roles. Equally low scores for use of competing 
competences, in this framework, would give high positive correlation’s for these 
individual managers. At the other end of the performance continuum, Quinn’s “master 
managers” display strong abilities across all competences and roles. Likewise, 
therefore, the correlation’s between their scores would be high (see Quinn, 1988:98- 
99). Assuming normal distributions of managers it therefore follows that whilst the 
majority will display no strong correlation’s between competences, there will be a 
minority who do display strong positive correlation’s (at either end of the performance
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spectrum). These minority scores would tend to skew the overall correlation results 
towards a weak positive correlation.
Whilst managers in this survey were not self assessing their own competences, it 
could well be that there is a similar explanation for the very weak positive 
correlations. Minorities of managers at either end of the normal distributions of scores 
rating all the competences either very low of very high would produce a similar effect 
and possibly for similar reasons. Whilst this was not a self-assessment exercise, it is 
more than likely that managers perceptions of what is useful for their organisations 
may be coloured by their perceptions of their own strengths and weaknesses.
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Table 7-4 Planning mode competences
Sub-system Strategic abilities, knowledge or 
skills
not at 
all 
useful
slightly
useful
fairly
useful
very
useful
score
(of
100)
Policy (a) set detailed missions, policies, 
objectives and rules for the 
organisation
1 8 33 55 80
Provision/
Resource
(e) integrate resource allocation and 
policy making systems
1 5 33 58 82
Planning (i) use the organisation's planning 
system to produce rational solutions 
to problems
3 18 43 32 67
Pragmatism (m) make pragmatic adjustments to 
stay within the overall plan
2 19 47 26 64
Professional
Practice
(s) integrate, through persuasion or 
coercion, professional practice to 
match plans
11 29 34 18 50
Product/
Service
(u) ensure services are clearly 
defined and organised to meet plans
1 8 28 57 78
3.17 14.5 36.33 41
(percentage responses - n =  644)
Table 7-5 Visionary mode competences
Sub-system Strategic abilities, knowledge or 
skills
not at 
all 
useful
slightly
useful
fairly
useful
very
useful
score
(of
100)
Policy (p) set broad missions, policies, 
objectives and values for the 
organisation
1 6 27 60 80
Provision/
Resource
(b) derive resource allocation and 
targeting from mission and policy 
objectives
1 6 34 57 82
Planning (f) use the organisation's planning 
system to justify the organisational 
mission
24 34 23 13 40
Pragmatism (j) make pragmatic adjustments to 
stay within the broad organisational 
mission
3 19 50 24 64
Professional
Practice
(n) integrate, through persuasion or 
coercion, professional practice to 
match mission
9 27 35 20 52
Product/
Service
(t) ensure services are broadly 
organised to meet mission and 
policies
2 8 39 44 73
6.67 16.67 34.67 36.33
(percentage responses - n = 644)
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Table 7-6 Political mode competences
Sub-system Strategic abilities, knowledge or 
skills
not a t 
all 
useful
slightly
useful
fairly
useful
very
useful
score
(of
100)
Policy (v) integrate ambiguous missions, 
policies, objectives and rules for the 
organisation
27 19 26 19 43
Provision/
Resource
(q) adjust resource allocations to 
meet conflicting priorities and 
policies
1 10 34 48 74
Planning (c) use the organisation's planning 
system to support particular projects 
or policies
1 16 45 36 71
Pragmatism (g) make pragmatic adjustments 
through negotiating internal 
compromises
6 35 38 17 54
Professional
Practice
(k) integrate, through compromise, 
professional practice into 
organisational goals
7 28 38 20 55
Product/
Service
(o) achieve compromise and 
consensus over the design and 
organisation of services
5 29 41 18 55
7.83 22.83 37 26.33
(percentage responses - n =  644)
Table 7-7 Learning mode competences
Sub-system Strategic abilities, knowledge or 
skills
not a t 
all 
useful
slightly
useful
fairly
useful
very
useful
score
(of
100)
Policy (x) tolerate diversity of missions, 
policies, objectives and rules within 
the organisation
34 24 23 12 35
Provision/
Resource
(w) allow flexibility in resource 
allocation and allow resources to 
follow 'success'
8 22 41 22 57
Planning (r) use the organisation's planning 
system for learning and adaptation
4 21 40 27 61
Pragmatism (d) make pragmatic adjustments 
through experience of practical 
service delivery
1 9 44 44 76
Professional
Practice
(h) allow professional practice scope 
for innovation, within broad goals
2 13 41 40 72
Product/
Service
(1) allow for diversity and innovation 
in design and organisation of 
services
2 11 37 45 73
8.5 16.67 37.67 31.67
(percentage responses - n = 644)
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Table 7-8 Competence correlation’s - grouped by strategy sub-system
policy resources planning response professional practice service/product
a P V X e b q IV i f C r m i 9 d s n k h u t o 1
a 1.00
Policy P
V
X
0.16
0.03
-0.02
1.00
0.09
0.04
1.00
0.36 1.00
e 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.05 1.00
Resources b 0:501 0.20 0.06 0.04 0.33 1.00
q 0.06
CMo 0.31 0.08 0.30 0.21 1.00
w -0.06 0.12 0.26 0.41 0.13 0.09 0.15 1.00
i 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.31 0.29 0.15 0.13 1.00
Planning f 0.21 0.01 0.22 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.23 1.00
c 0.28 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.38 0.43' 0.18 0.13 0.38 0.30 1.00
r 0.05 0.19 0.11 0.06; 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.12
CDCOo 0.18 0.41 1.00
m 0.13 0.10 0.25 0.18 0.28 0.16 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.14 1.00
Response 1 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.56 1.00
g 0.06 -0.01 0.27 0.24 0.17 0.11 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.37 0.36 1.00
d 0.13 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.15 0.29 0.19 0.33 0.37 0.35 1.00
s 0.02 0.07 0.32 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.26 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.12 0.20 0.29 0.33 0.29 0.24 1.00
Professional practice n 0.04 0.08 0.27 0.17 0.10 0.09 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.20 0.72j 1.00
k 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.09 0.10 0.43 0.41 0.19 0.41 0.40 1.00
h 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.25 0.22 0.11 0.24 0.27 0.12 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.18 0.27 1.00
u 0.26 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.26 0.24 0.17 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.12 1.00
Service/product t 0.07 0.36 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.28 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.10 0.13 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.24 1.00
0 0.08 0.21 0.23 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.22 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.37 0.27 0.35 0.19 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.21 0.09 0.28 1.00
1 0.04 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.30 0.24 0.02 0.17, 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.40 0.13 0.14 0.22 1.00
N = 644, Correlations between all 24 competences - shaded areas indicate => +0.30
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Before leaving the individual competences it is worth recording some of the additional 
suggestions, and other comments, which respondents made (of which there were some 92 
in this section). Although these comments ranged over a number of topics and suggested 
a range of additional competences, skills or knowledge. In order to give some 
organisation to these suggestions, they have been divided into groups linked to the four 
strategic modes, although some do not easily fit into these categories. Some of the 
comments from individuals have been split between sections - although the fact that they 
made comments appropriate to more than one section could be noted as adding extra 
weight to the idea of paradoxical strategic modes.
First, it is worth recording the negative comments made about this section of the 
questionnaire. Some were very hostile comments:
“This section tends to be the worst form of theoretical crap. I doubt if it is at 
all practical or measurable.”
“What a daft bloody questionnaire.”
Other comments showed the difficulties some managers experienced in completing this 
section of the questionnaire:
“I'm sorry - 1 don't have the time.”
“I thought the above list was very vague and ‘woolly’.”
“By now I've lost track of all rational thought!”
“I found the above statements a little confusing to follow.”
Obviously this was a difficult and complex section of the questionnaire, made more 
difficult by the constraints of partially ‘randomising’ the questions. It does (as the pre­
tests showed) take some time and a fair degree of concentration to complete. An issue for 
future research of this type would obviously be to try to bring out the essential points of 
competence descriptions without being too leading.
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Political Mode Comments
Respondents comments which could be described as falling within the strategic politics 
mode focused to negotiation skills, political skills (small and large “p”), pragmatism and 
common sense. They also mentioned issues such as networking, communications skills 
and interpersonal relations.
A number specifically focused on politics with a big “P”:
“The political dimension in local government.”
“Patience to deal with politicians!!”
“Political skills to integrate short and medium term objectives of Councillors 
into longer term strategy.”
“Awareness and skill in manipulating the political environment of the public 
sector.”
“The important thing to remember is that we are at the end of the day 
answerable to political masters (who can change their minds, not necessarily 
for the needs of the service).”
“Political environment.”
Some managers mentioned the problems of dealing with competing pressures from 
different parts of the political domain:
“Reconcile national missions, policies and objectives imposed by the political 
system with local missions policies and objectives.”
“Integration of strategic departmental development within context of political 
environment both locally and nationally.”
“Managing with political skill between central government and local 
government policy objectives.”
“Translate political and external goals into local objectives.”
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“The basic "mission" spans a very broad base and is heavily controlled by 
statute. This makes answering some of these questions very ambiguous.”
“In a complex organisation there may be a wide range of aims and supporting 
objectives which nevertheless contribute to the whole. Tolerate is not the 
word I would choose.”
One mentioned the issue of what might be termed internal marketing:
“Understanding of market for services and ability to express rationale for 
intervention in ‘treasury-ese’.
Another issue which surfaced was the degree to which strategic managers can effectively 
influence their political domain:
“Knowledge and awareness of political environment (i) in which influence 
can be exercised (ii) in which have little influence/control.”
“Influencing/understanding external politics.”
“Understanding, managing and using the political process to achieve change 
(i.e. political and in elected party-political councillors).”
“The ability to manage the shifting sands of the member interface, 
particularly in a hung council where there are few if any strategic objectives 
shared by the Politicians.”
Some mentioned the problems of reconciling the professional and political domains, both 
stressing the need for persuasion and one stressing the inappropriateness of coercion:
“Political skills (with a big or a small p) and understanding of where political 
goals have to be reconciled with professional/organisational goals.”
“I must say I do not think that coercion works, for strategic management, 
there is a huge gap between persuasion/and coercion. Coercion surely is only 
a minimal last resort....”
A number of managers mentioned “political skills”, “political tact” and “politics with a 
small ‘p’”. Several also mentioned “negotiation skills”, including:
“Negotiating ability (customer client v. Politicians).”
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“Negotiation skills to ensure acceptance of the mission, objectives and rules.”
“Political ability to identify and negotiate around or within external 
constraint.”
Linked to these issues of political and negotiating skills were others skills such as “good 
communication skills”, “public speaking”, “tolerance”, “common sense”, and “sense of 
humour.
“If ‘pragmatism’ means ‘flexibility’ then you have covered it all! Issues 
around political changes and adaptability?”
One manager noted the usefulness of “networking” in building personal “awareness” 
whilst another commended:
“The ability to work with managers from other organisations with different 
cultures. Public and private.”
Visionary Mode Comments
A sense of organisational vision and abilities which could be associated with developing 
vision and selling it to the organisation featured in a number of comments. Some which 
combined the need for vision with ability to implement were:
“A sense of vision and an understanding of how the organisation functions 
and power and influence to change organisation to more really achieve sense 
of vision.”
“Analysis, insight, product champions.”
“Need to develop "lateral thinking" and visionary managers, in order to use 
imagination in strategy formulation. Also the development of complementary 
communication skills in order to transmit the "vision" through the 
organisation.”
319
Some simply stated the need for organisational vision:
“Longer term vision and planning needed - 5 years +.”
“Establishing vision.”
Creating this sense of vision, including the ability to opportunistically recognise 
possibilities through analysis and intuition formed the core of a number of comments. 
Comments about opportunism included:
“In the NHS: a "nose" for "business opportunities" based on knowledge of 
purchaser preferences, some of which will be highly personalised e.g. 
favourite subjects of G.P. Fundholders, individual tastes of key people in 
Health Authority Commissioning Teams.”
“Opportunism. Zero based analysis...”
“Seizing opportunities as and when they arise, particularly those which bring 
'new' investment/resources and which if not seized now may never be 
available again - if it needs a label how about ‘Learning to think on your 
feet!’.”
“Identify changing environment, internal and external, and be able to assess 
the affect these have on current and future objectives and plans and to be able 
to adjust accordingly.”
Comments which focused on what might be called the strategic thinking process required 
for creating strategic vision included:
“1. An ability to see the broad corporate picture. 2. Vision beyond the 
parameters of what appears to be achievable. 3. Lateral thinking. 4. 
Creativity. 5. Outstanding interpersonal skills 6. Optimism!”
“Lateral thinking/vision and synergy inter-service and with external 
agencies/organisations.”
“Lateral thinking.”
“Clairvoyance. Making bricks without straw.”
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“Strategic management is about positioning the organisation in relation to the 
outside environment. The necessary skills include: negotiating, analytical, 
psychology, game theory, political, organisation development, etc.”
Others tended to focus on the problems of implementing the vision, putting it into 
practice within the organisation and overcoming obstacles:
“Ability to present mission and policies in a way that can be readily accepted 
by staff.”
“Leadership skills to motivate and build teams delegation.”
“1. The ability to take people with you is crucial (i.e. leadership). 2. Not to be 
put off by operational distinctions or short-term crisis. 3. To believe in what 
you're doing.”
“Sheer bloody-mindedness and determination.”
“Stayability.”
“Organisational development and the management of change, including 
'cultures' of large organisations. Basic 'new' management philosophy and style 
and approach to underpin strategic and corporate management. Corporate 
approach and management - recognising how much this requires fundamental 
action in large public sector organisations to counter professional power.”
“Ability to influence 'corporate culture' towards delivery/feedback.”
Others saw influencing skills, for implementation, as more subtle and in some ways these 
comments lie of the boundary between strategic vision and strategic learning modes:
“Communication skills, influencing but not coercing. Flexibility, adaptability. 
Listening!”
“Realising the potential of people, harnessing the power of technology, 
entrepreneurial skills.”
Planning Mode Comments
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Strategic planning has been the most promoted mode of strategy in public services. 
However, the survey results showed that it was not significantly more prevalent than 
other modes (planning scored 46, political 43, learning 45 and visionary 41 - see Chapter 
6, Part II). The number of comments about strategic competences (or abilities or skills) 
which could be attributed easily to this category was similar, if not slightly lower, than in 
some other modes.
One comment which certainly displayed a need for rationality and order in strategic was 
in response to the competences which mentioned ambiguity:
“There shouldn't be ambiguous missions, etc.”
Another manager, however, commented from what is clearly a strategic planning 
perspective on the need for slightly more flexibility and tolerance for uncertainty:
“Whilst I am in strong believer in agreeing Mission 
Statement/Values/Objective and Action Plans, I believe also that work 
demands are unpredictable and that planning cannot cover a significant 
proportion of the issues (say 30%) that have to be dealt with on a re-active 
basis. In this context it is useful to be patient/pragmatic.”
Others emphasised the need for a thorough implementation of strategic management 
systems:
“The whole arena of strategic analysis is poorly understood within the public 
sector with the result that many strategies are built on sand because the 
foundation work has not been undertaken.”
Another manager highlighted the importance of seeing planning within a broader strategic 
management context:
“Understanding the concept of strategic management as a whole, which is 
quite distinct from individual strategic management processes and systems 
such as formulating and developing a strategic plan.”
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A further comment suggested the need to link core capabilities of the organisation with 
client satisfaction and overcome opposition from the professional domain:
“Understanding client wants as distinct from needs and learning how to 
produce client satisfaction. How to overcome ‘professional bureaucracies’.
How to identify core capabilities and develop support systems that work 
effectively
It is interesting to note this manager’s use of Mintzberg’s ‘professional bureaucracy’ 
terminology. The following comment, advocating the use of specific analytical tools, also 
clearly draws on knowledge of management theorists:
“The application/development of Porter's five forces and/or value chain 
specifically for the (new) public sector.”
Another specifically commented that management education provided a useful way of 
accessing strategic management knowledge:
“Non-public service specific training, e.g. MBA gives useful perspectives on 
issues, solutions, methods, etc.”
A number of managers mentioned specific topics which needed to be understood clearly 
as a basis for strategic analysis. These included what might be called ‘imposed planning’,
i.e. where the organisation is subject to strong external constraints:
“The answers to these questions are to some extent defined by the nature of 
the Service. Being a Fire Service performing to nationally set criteria in terms 
of risk, etc., we do not have a free hand, as would the private sector, to 
develop all of these areas.”
Another mentioned a range of issues:
“The nature of the relationship between central and local government. Public 
vs. private/independent/voluntary organisations. Change from resource led to 
needs led service. Risk(s) of the local authority competition in public 
sector The competent work force.”
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Others focused on issues to do with financial control and more commercial skills:
“Finance, finance and again finance - profit element.”
“Financial planning.”
“Awareness of the financial ground rules.”
“Business/commercial skills - internal market will force this.”
One manager suggested the need to integrate control, monitoring and performance 
measures into the strategy process:
“Integrate quality and measurements of control and monitoring into the 
design and organisation of service. Allow for review of performance within 
the planning process.”
Finally in this section, one respondent pointed out the boundary difficulties in 
establishing ‘strategic’ Vs ‘operational’ management competences:
“This organisation has developed its own competence profiles for 
management tiers 1, 2 and 3. It is difficult to draw a clear boundary around 
which competences are "strategic" as opposed to those which are merely 
essential, the latter including, for example, a range of inter-personnel and 
general management skills.”
All of the above comments can be seen as falling broadly within the ‘rationalist’ terrain of 
formal strategic planning approaches, although some are clearly more generally 
applicable.
Learning Mode Comments
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The strategic learning mode, as defined in this work, is primarily about establishing 
strategy through practice, experiment and experience. This implies a close relationship 
with the organisation’s clients/customers and, in the case of public services especially, 
other allied organisations, actors or professionals in the same field of activity.
Comments which seemed to fit this strategic learning mode well included:
“A good knowledge of the population/customer base, i.e. age, sex, race, 
socio-economic make-up. Strong links/networks with local population. Skills 
in public relations, particularly putting over the purpose and achievements 
and plans of the organisation in a positive and interesting way. Good alliances 
with partner agencies, i.e. health with social services, education, housing and 
leisure departments of local authorities, plus local voluntary organisations.”
“Consultation and participation of customers such as Council Tenants or 
other service users in the promotion of strategic plans, and their 
implementations.”
“Communicating throughout the process and during implementation (high 
profile on planning and contracting all staff and League of Friends, 
Community Health Council and [health service] purchasers).”
“To develop an outward looking customer focus or viewpoint rather than an 
introspective organisational driven approach.”
“Constant awareness of the external comparatives influencing the "business" 
e.g. political, economic, etc. Regular contact and consultation with customers, 
shareholders and other users of the services.”
“Alliances with other public bodies locally.”
“Listening and establishing priorities to meet the needs of users.”
“Experience.”
“Grasp of health issues and awareness of health and health care distinctions.”
“Allow planning system to modify strategy/mission through bottom up 
component to planning process.”
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The emphasis on an outward looking, learning approach is clear in the above quotes. The 
last point about ‘bottom-up’ planning is particularly relevant to the learning approach. 
One comment which set out a broad learning approach in the form of a brief list, which 
seemed, in some respects, similar to J.B.Quinn’s ‘logical incrementalism’, was:
“knowledge of socio-political context (changing);
ability to tolerate uncertainty and long time scales;
ability to formulate and stick to broad objectives and plans;
teamworking, lack of defensiveness re professional or other base.”
Public services, according to one manager, have far more complex values systems 
underpinning their operation than their private sector counterparts, as well as the need to 
learn from users:
“Listening to an incorporating user's and potential user's needs. 
Understanding and working with a political, or public service ethos, rather 
than a private sector, simpler ethos’s.”
Two comments mention issues to do with personal learning or self-knowledge:
“(Question) 18 employs a technical vocabulary but excludes any explicit 
reference to 'people' abilities, knowledge or skills. Clearly public service 
managers, at the strategic level, should stay in touch with themselves, as 
human individuals, and maintain a humane and empathetic insight into the 
people they serve both inside the organisation and in the community.”
“Personal self-learning - the process and appreciation of the need to do it! 
Principles of ‘Kaizen’ - the need for continuous change.”
Three comments cover what could be termed ‘leaming-in-action’ situations, where 
flexibility, adaptability and the need to learn to handle new situations/conditions are 
important:
“Being able to manage effectively having regard to increasing workloads due 
to new legislation and drastically reducing resources.”
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“Ability to manage change with inadequate resources and impossible 
timescales!!”
“Given the nature of our 'business' events outside of our control can deflect 
strategic plans. Flexibility, adaptability and sometimes the need to manage 
perceived 'failure' through no fault of the organisation are essential factors.”
Strategic Masters?
In what has been covered above there have already been glimpses of managers who have 
mentioned strategic competences, skills or abilities which cross more than one strategic 
mode.
In R.E. Quinn’s work on general management competences managers who display high 
levels of ability across all the competing competences, and who understand and self- 
manage the values conflicts inherent in the different competences, are called “master 
managers”. (“Master” here, and in Quinn’s work, is used in a gender neutral sense.)
The same concept could be applied to managers who recognise the different modes of 
strategy within organisations and attempt to manage them all, and the contradictions 
between them. They could be seen as exhibiting what Torbert (1991) has called “the 
power of balance.”
Obviously, a few lines of additional comments made on this survey do not constitute 
adequate grounds for identifing the strategic equivalent of Quinn’s “master managers.” 
However, a few comments certainly give some idea of such a balanced approach. One 
manager specifically recognises the value of all the competence statements and comments 
precisely on the tensions (contradictions?) between them and the need for a flexible 
approach:
“Taking each of the above in isolation, it is evident that all have at least some 
value, but it is difficult, given the complexity of an organisation such as
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XXX, to give them a weighting relative to one another - particularly as the 
nuances and subtleties - together with the tensions and opportunities that go 
with business, means that a very flexible (but responsible) approach is 
needed.”
One comment which broadened out to include what could be seen as skills appropriate to 
strategic vision, politics and planning was:
“1. The ability to align departmental objectives with corporate objectives.
2. Being able to thrive on uncertainty - i.e. live in the grey areas - and be 
aware of opportunities and how to use them. Nothing is certain even in one 
year let alone 3 or 5 years!”
Another very detailed comment included at least vision, learning and politics was:
“Ability to identify responses to external pressures e.g. legislation which 
enable the authority to continue to meet it's own objectives as far as possible. 
Ability to learn from other authorities practice and to adapt according to local 
conditions. Ability to integrate equalities issues in policy and strategy 
development. Political skills and understanding : explicit awareness of own 
value systems and politics. Ability to build up an integrated strategic picture 
and make recommendations which take full account of community needs e.g. 
poverty. Understanding of theories of the State and their different 
implications for practice.”
Three other, somewhat briefer comments are worth including here. One manager simply 
commented on the competences that they were “all useful”. Another emphasised 
integration and communication:
“Knowing how it all works and how it all hangs together and being able to 
communicate that.”
Whilst the final manager quoted in this section commented:
“More emphasis on interpersonal skills including their direct application on 
most, if not all, of the above. Perhaps a general broad need for conceptual 
skills and the ability to link different, not obviously linked elements to a new 
amalgam. Lastly, skills around networking in the realisation of working with,
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supporting and enabling others, often outside the organisation, to design, 
manage and deliver the outputs/outcomes.”
These are mere hints at ideas of what a balanced strategic management approach could 
look like, the masters of public sector strategic management. It is beyond the scope of this 
specific work to take this further at this stage. It does perhaps suggest some fruitful lines 
of further research development.
D e v e l o p in g  S t r a t e g ic  M a n a g e r s  - c o m p e t in g  a p p r o a c h e s
When managers were asked in the survey to identify those techniques and authors with 
which they were familiar and which were applied in their organisations they were also 
given the opportunity to add any comments they wished. Many did so (a total of 154 
comments were added to the two questions). Allowing for those who added comments to 
both questions, this represents about 20% of respondents. Obviously these comments 
cannot be taken as being ‘representative’ of the whole sample but they do add some very 
useful qualitative material to the quantitative analysis of the responses.
The first point which stands out from an analysis of these additions is how many of those 
commenting chose to focus on the relationship between techniques or authors and 
practice. The majority of the comments posed, explicitly or implicitly, the relationship 
between theory and practice. The analysis which follows uses the framework, discussed 
in Chapter 4, of Kolb’s learning cycle, as simplified and popularised by Honey and 
Mumford into the four learning styles of Activist, Reflector, Theorist and Pragmatist 
(Honey and Mumford, 1988).
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Table 7-9 Methods of developing strategic managers
not at slightly fairly very score
all used used heavily
used
heavily
used
(of
100)
a qualification courses including strategic 
management (e.g. MBA, DMS, etc.)
11 57 26 3 39
b in-house management short course including 
strategic management
19 33 35 9 43
c external management short-course including 
strategic management
12 59 22 3 37
d job-rotation schemes aimed at developing 
strategic managers
57 31 5 1 15
e mentoring scheme to develop strategic 
managers
49 34 10 1 19
f assignment to special projects or 
secondments to develop strategic managers
21 50 20 4 34
g participation in the strategic management 
process to develop strategic managers
19 40 28 9 41
(percentage responses - n = 644)
These qualitative comments can be combined with an analysis of how managers approach 
developing strategic managers - what methods are used most frequently to equip 
managers with strategic techniques, knowledge or competences? The survey’s findings 
about the use of methods for developing strategic managers employed in respondent’s 
organisations are interesting (see Table 7-9). Of the seven methods asked about, all were 
in use to some degree but with very large variations between them. The results can be 
usefully analysed by grouping them according to the categories of management 
development approach developed in Chapter 4, also applying the learning cycle concept 
to these methods (see Figure 7:8).
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Figure 7:8 Development methods - scores by approach
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Learning 
Project based 
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Participation in
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Reflective
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Professional
development
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Theorists
Clearly, traditional management education methods seem to be the most favoured 
approach. All three methods which can be grouped under this heading - management 
qualification programmes, internal and external short courses - score relatively highly (39, 
43 and 37 points respectively).
Many managers commented about management qualification courses. Some obviously 
saw this as a major source of knowledge about strategic management, for example:
“I have done an MBA!”
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“Many of the concepts considered and promoted by these authors form part of 
current thinking with a group of senior managers who have pursued DMS and 
MBA courses of study.”
“Have completed an MBA so have an understanding of strategic management 
approaches. They are not, however, used with commitment or rigour in the 
organisation.”
“Reason is that I am third year of an MBA!”
“There is not yet the culture of applying theory of strategy ... in practice 
though this is improving through education - particularly staff undertaking 
MBA studies.”
“I'm pleasantly surprised that we seem to utilise so many of the above!!!”
One manager obviously regarded management qualification courses as an important 
factor, but also hghlighted possible biases (with apologies to Prof. Johnson!):
“I suspect that much depends on the extent to which senior managers have 
been on particular courses/where they have done postgrad, degrees, for 
example, I studied for an MBA at Cranfield University therefore Johnson and 
Scholes book much used as Gerry Johnson was the teacher!”
Some managers, although clearly supportive, commented on the problems of translating 
management theorists ideas into practice, as well as being critical in their approach. They 
also, in some cases, illustrated how theory was being applied:
“Many names recognised e.g. Ansoff, Mintzberg, Stacey, Argenti - the 
corporate strategy development "framework" lives on in the mind following 
the DMS or MBA - but the detail/names/books etc., fade with time! Many 
theories seem to be rehashes of older ones or minor departures. Tom Peters is 
merely an evangelist!”
“The strategic process is undoubtedly influenced by a distillation of the above 
rather than one specific 'guru'.”
“I read widely in general management issues and believe that these and other 
valuable sources that are not 'strategy' in orientation but contribute to the way 
strategy is developed and implemented.”
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“To know is not necessarily to love ...”
The comments which identified the use to which theory is put, and some of the 
adaptations which occur, included:
“Use some ideas from some but not any in TOTAL.”
“These ideas are used in the organisation, even though not necessarily the 
authors you have listed.”
“We use workshop and seminars at Director level and departmental level 
(Management Team) to develop corporate or departmental plans, these are 
the background against which individual cost centres set their business plans.
First time this year politicians and officers worked together to set strategic 
priorities.”
“In preparing for CCT and Reorganisation Corporate Strategies are being 
prepared and timetables are being implemented which will conclude Strategic 
Review, Choice and Implementation.”
Others obviously saw management education in general as important, but found there 
were serious personal constraints, especially time, in gaining access to strategy ideas, e.g:
“Obviously got a lot of reading to do!”
“So much to learn, so little time!”
“I need to do some reading!”
“Were there time to read them all!”
“I am surprised at the number of authors who I am not familiar with.”
A few managers identified issues which they felt ought to have been in the lists offered, 
for example one manager thought the quality should have been included:
“Quality issues should be seen as part of Strategic Management not a bolt-on 
extra.”
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Other techniques or approaches identified included: critical success factors; forecasting 
techniques; decision support; statistical techniques; option appraisal; bench-marking; and 
life cycle analysis.
Other sources of developing strategic knowledge included specific courses, official and 
other sources:
“I know about these techniques through LSE course : Public Sector 
Management Programme, attend 1993.1 hope to encourage their use with the 
Museum over next 2 years.”
“We tend to use public sector frameworks coming out of departmental good 
practice guidance (DOH, Welsh Office to our case) aided by academic ideas 
(King's Fund, Health Policy Depts.)”
“A great deal is written specifically for Local Government on the subject of 
strategic management. In particular, there are two good weekly magazines :
Local Government Chronicle and Municipal Journal.”
A final, interesting, example of a straightforward theory-driven approach to strategic 
management is given in the following comment:
“A series of chief officer workshops completed a mission and values 
statement and SWOT analysis. A working group gathered facts (using [PEST 
analysis] above). Values were set out under 8 themes - Mission, Team, 
Organisation, Communication, Individual, Change, Recognition and People. 
Standard business planning approach - objectives - targets - strategies - 
resources - monitoring and evaluation (including performance indicators and 
audits).”
Activists
The approaches to strategic management which focus on developing concrete experience 
-job rotation and particpation in the strategy process - gain a very mixed reception from 
respondents (see Figure 7:8). Job rotation is not seen as being very prevalent in
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respondent’s organisations with a score of only 15 points. The majority of respondents 
report that this method is not used at all in their organisations (57%) and nearly all the 
rest say it is used only slightly (31%). There is some variation within the public sector, 
with the NHS and central government using job rotation rather more (21 and 18 points 
respectively) compared to local government (12).
On the other hand, the use of participation in strategy process as a developmental tool 
scores relatively very well - 41 points (the second highest). Again, there is some variation 
within the public sector and along identical lines to hose of job rotation - the NHS scoring 
highest (48 points), central government second (43) and local government lowest (38).
In the comments sections on strategy techniques and authors, some managers were 
extremely hostile to the use of theory at all - comments such as: “jargon++”, “pleasant 
theoretical balderdash”or “what about a column - I do not know about and don’t want 
to!?” These extreme reactions to theory were not isolated examples, others included:
“Because I do not know about it does not necessarily mean I want to know 
about it.”
“Do not know about and am not particularly interested (haven't got time or 
inclination to read the books).”
“Those unmarked I neither know about nor feel that I should.”
“A lot of the above is jargon/gobbledygook!”
“? I am not aware of these ‘Terms’.”
“Pick any 10 from 100.”
“It is not "Academic" ability to analyse the theories of the above, compare, 
contrast and attribute them to their originators which is important in the 
business environment. What matters is using pragmatic techniques to achieve 
the most effective outcomes. Thus I am unfortunately unable to answer this 
question.”
Probably two of the most defensive comments were:
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“Am I now supposed to feel inadequate? I've managed very happily without 
all this theory.”
“Does this identify significant gaps in my knowledge base or are these 
theorists relevant to the real world which I inhabit?”
Some managers recognised their own, or their organisations weaknesses in the area of 
theory but were far less defensive or hostile to theory in general:
“I must confess no use has been made of "formal" or "academic" strategic 
management thinking.”
“It would be nice to have the time to read these books. However, I very much 
doubt that this organisation has any of them or realises that they exist; I've 
never heard of them - coming from a science background perhaps this isn't 
unusual.”
“Maybe I'd be able to tick more of the boxes if the jargon in the questions was 
replaced by explanation. Quite often one finds one is already implementing a 
particular type of analysis, but never knew its ‘official’ name”
“I cannot comment on books about which I have no knowledge.”
“Very weak in this area.”
“Those I don't know about have been left blank if I don't feel I should know 
about them from the description given. The use of these tools can be over­
emphasised.”
One manager seemed to be expressing a degree of uncertainty about the their personal 
relationship with theoretical ideas:
“Being unable to give a reference does not mean that I am not totally unaware 
of the ideas but I am not certain!”
Whilst another thought that lack of use of theory was a specifically public sector problem: 
“Little use made of academic/organisational publications in public sector.”
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Others were also obviously not happy with the use of theory but somewhat more playful, 
such as the managers who simply added “Que?” or “?” in the comments section. 
However, the ‘activists’ also had positive alternatives to offer to what they clearly saw as 
unnecessary theory. Some recommended the use of external networks to access 
experience:
“We use our own experience, that of other local authorities and relevant 
publications from LGMB, etc.”
“Exploitation of relationships and networks critical in achieving adaptive 
positioning whilst internal/external environments change/develop.”
Others simply rely on ‘common sense’ and experience to see them through:
“Our business plans are very 'hard' focused documents.”
“Concentrate our use on practical ideas.”
“Common sense goes a long way!”
Whilst disparaging textbook based ideas, others also suggested ways of accessing them 
without having to read them, especially through the use of management consultants:
“The organisation tends to use Management Consultants from time to time 
who must base a lot of their work on the above. Therefore, indirectly senior 
staff have knowledge of some of the above works.”
“Consultant appointed vis a vis leadership.”
“We used an O.D. consultant (private) for 18 months to help develop our ??? 
thinking skills. When we had to write our first Strategic Plan, we found we'd 
(almost) already written it!”
“I do not have the time nor the desire to read management textbooks! I do not 
believe they are as helpful as a good facilitator.”
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Others suggested that they did have some access to ‘theory’ but did not use it directly or 
consciously, e.g:
“Don't directly work from theory.”
“Most of the ideas in (the above) publications support sensible use of 
information, people, ideas in formulating and implementing strategy.”
“Many of the ideas are used informally/sub-consciously - we do not formally 
adopt the Argenti or other ‘method’.”
“Cannot say that any of them are used overtly .... however many of their 
'themes' are utilised frequently.”
“I would like to know more but do not have the spare time to consider new 
ideas unless packaged succinctly.”
“Whereas I/we know of most of the above, we seldom make use of these 
mechanisms/techniques in 'real' situations for the benefit of the organisation.”
“Individual directors awareness of management theory will influence decision 
making at board level although I would not claim that there exists a policy to 
adopt the theory of any one author detailed above.”
Both of the preceding sets of comments fall somewhat between the ‘activist’ and 
‘pragmatist’ categories, with the underlying hint that some ideas derived from theory may 
just be useful in some circumstances. We turn now to look at more explicitly ‘pragmatist’ 
comments.
Pragmatists
Only one method which focuses on strategic management development through active 
experimentation was asked about - assignment to special projects or secondments to 
develop strategic managers. This scored closely behind the ‘abstract conceptualisation’ 
approaches with 34 points. Half of respondents (50%) reported some usage and a further 
20% fairly heavy use (see Table 7-9). There was little variation within the public sector.
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Many managers comment on the eclectic, or piecemeal way in which strategic (and other) 
management ideas are used in the strategy process:
“Elements of various academic, leading management writers works, etc., are 
used within the organisation, either consciously or sub-consciously. A close 
examination of systems, styles and approaches usually reveals the origins of 
such innovative thinking and practice. Audit Commission and other 
publications are also used or adapted as appropriate by the organisation.”
“The plans of the organisation are not based on any one theoretical study, but 
uses elements of many.”
“Although some quoted are about general change management, they have 
strong relevance to strategic change and so to strategic planning. Our in- 
house strategic planning style is no doubt idiosyncratic, and not fully 
attributable to any 'school'. We are eclectic pragmatists!”
“Probably do use some of these techniques but not as described. As is 
common with many of these questions the answer is probably in part rather 
than complete usage e.g. market research which we are developing.”
“A range of methodologies are in use but because of the size of organisation - 
as part of a large local authority - their use is very variable.”
“The culture and training habits of this organisation incline more towards 
eclectic synthesis than towards 'guru worship'; managers will have come 
across and critically evaluated a number of the above works in the course of 
gaining management qualifications or in other ways.”
“Most are known about; many are used but in a relatively random way. There 
is insufficient management drive to develop across whole organisation. This 
is changing for the better.”
“When I say "used" ... that does not mean we rigidly and wholly follow 
everything (or even worst things) they say!!!”
“As the authority at business unit level moves more and more into a 
competitive environment, many of the above techniques are starting to be 
used at that level. At a strategic level, whilst there is currently no conscious 
use of many of the environmental analysis techniques, because of local 
government's limited market place, the in-depth knowledge of senior 
managers of the major issues facing the organisations means that much of the
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benefit to be gained from use of those techniques is being achieved in any 
event.”
As with many of the comments reported in the ‘activist’ section, managers reported here 
also showed a sceptical attitude towards theory but within a positive framework of asking 
‘what can they do for us?’
Academic guru's come in and out of favour depending upon who you read 
last. Their ideas should not be adopted as a set piece panacea for all ills - they 
all can generate good ideas or a general basis
Many of the above are known about and have influenced our approach but I 
wouldn't say we "use" any particular guru's approach
A general awareness of written material is useful. It is not necessarily 
appropriate to use all or any of this material in strategic planning
Other frameworks from public/private sector are used. Scenario planning to 
be further developed to link with analysis/environmental scene to 
marketing/development strategy
A number of comments indicate that there is somewhat of tendency for organisations, or 
individuals, to latch-on to specific ideas or approaches to the exclusion of others:
“We have used Argenti in the past because of early familiarity with it through 
the Civil Service College, however, other authors are influencing much of our 
strategic thinking.”
“I believe John Bryson's model for strategic planning is the best we have 
encountered.”
“The authority has engaged in a process of "Quality Improvement" (Crosby 
version) with the support of Local Government Management Board.”
“We are committed to quality improvement methodology (Crosby).”
“Have used framework laid down by Penn State University when I was at 
Kings Health care.”
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“Charles Handy is my favourite organisational theorist.”
However, one manager warns of the dangers of latching on to one particular approach at 
the expense of wider thinking:
“We have an (unfortunate) tendency to latch on to one high profile approach 
to the exclusion of all others.”
Another makes a similar comment:
“My senior manager is an enthusiast of Tom Peters and I consider is led by 
those thoughts. Personally I prefer to take a wider view...”
One manager attributes this tendency to a narrow focus on single approach to the 
pressures on public managers:
“There are many ways of developing a strategic plan but, in reality, workload 
and time pressures compel a focus on one or two strategic planning tools 
which have been proven to be effective (either by experience or by case 
study).”
Some comments were made about the sources of knowledge which is being applied in 
pragmatic ways:
“A recent course on strategic planning increased my knowledge of some of 
the systems which will in future be used within the organisation.”
“Ideas/processes etc. come via professional contacts/seminars not directly 
from source publications.”
“Few are used. Most information in the area comes from articles/seminars in 
'soundbites' rather than books.”
“My knowledge of strategic management is difficult to attribute to specific 
writers. I assimilate ideas from articles, conferences, and an ongoing C60 
learning set often without knowing source.”
“Amongst those involved there is varying awareness of some or all of the 
above [i.e. authors].”
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“We do make a lot of use of Local Government Management Board/Audit 
Commission and other commentaries, especially in the corporate 
development unit and at executive board level. Our aim however is to use 
these to inform rather than determine our strategies.”
“Many of the above are used in the development of business plans for 
specific services/Depts. rather than the authority's strategic plan.”
“Some terminology above may be unfamiliar, but techniques in use.”
“Used to some degree in plan, more in other contexts.”
“Suspect some of the techniques are known by alternative names or are used 
in varied forms.”
“Using a range of techniques [to] develop options.”
“Whilst the work of the authors above may not, formally, be utilised as a tool 
by the organisation they would form a background to managers decisions on 
many occasions.”
“The above are used in varying degrees by senior management and the 
Corporate Planning team and such use has been increasing over the past three 
years, before which no real strategic planning was undertaken .”
“Many of our staff undertake management development and will know of and 
use at least some of these sources.”
“It is difficult to say that the ideas are 'used' but they definitely form the 
backbone of thinking in terms of the way forward.”
One very clearly ‘pragmatist’ comment was:
It would be wrong to say I follow any particular 'disciple' - many have 
influenced my thinking but each needs to be balanced against success of 
current methods and use of past experience
Another emphasised the eclectic use of theories:
Practical organisational development and management tends to be eclectic, 
drawing on models not necessarily related to the organisation
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One manager suggested that the pressures of managerial work prevented managers 
adequately accessing these ideas and they needed to be made more ‘user friendly’:
“What is really needed is for these authors' (and others') ideas to be abstracted 
and synthesised into a practical set of working tools and concepts. Most 
health service managers read textbooks but don't have the time (or necessarily 
the experience) to translate their contents into practical advice and good 
practice. Could this be a role for management schools/ institutions/ 
associations?”
This emphasis on practicality, utility and ease of access clearly falls into the ‘pragmatist’ 
approach to learning, with the emphasis very much on ‘what can this do for me?’
One issue which is included here, but is not strictly a ‘pragmatists’ problem only, is how 
knowledge about strategic techniques/approaches does, and doesn’t, get distributed within 
organisations. Two managers commented on aspects of uneven distribution and use of 
techniques at different organisational levels, whilst another mentions the problem of 
accessing knowledge:
“Some of the above techniques are used informally by service managers 
rather than used to evaluate higher level strategic objectives or are part of the 
strategic planning process.”
“Knowledge not widely spread through department. However department 
structured into client-oriented teams and have just prepared one year business 
plans and some have used a number of these techniques.”
“There is a lot of knowledge in the organisation, but apparently we have 
difficulty in harnessing it.”
Perhaps the final comment in this section should go to the manager who seems to be 
implying they might need to know more about techniques/authors but realise they do not 
at the moment. It could be included as either a frustrated pragmatist or a realistic 
reflector. In any case, their comment was simply:
“Ouch!”
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Reflectors
Reflective observation on practice - in the form of mentoring of managers to develop 
their strategic abilities - faired least well of the four approaches amongst survey 
respondents (scoring only 19 points - see Figure 7:8). As has already been pointed out 
(see Chapter 4) the ‘apprenticeship’ or ‘professional development’ model of management 
development, recommended in the Handy report (Handy, 1988) was somewhat eclipsed 
by the growth of the competence based approach. It was also pointed out that the most 
exposed professional development model - Schon’s ‘reflective practicum’ - seemed to be 
mainly restricted to non-managerial occupations. The survey seems to confirm that these 
reflective approaches are indeed the least used, at least in public management.
The comments from respondents which can be included under the heading of ‘reflectors’ 
include many which are ‘reflective’ in the more general sense - comments which seem to 
suggest a thoughtful, contemplative approach to the issues raised in the survey. For 
example, a number of comments were made about the problems associated with 
transferring what are perceived as private sector practices to the public sector, for 
example:
“Again, most of the above literature references relate to private sector 
organisations with profit motivated objectives. While many of the ideas may 
have some relevance in the public sector, wholesale importation needs to be 
considered cautiously and in conjunction with applicability to the public 
sector context.”
“Problems in adopting private sector, strategic planning practices in the 
public sector context.”
“Whether [force field analysis, cause and effect diagrams, mapping strategic 
issues] have relevance to Local Government is debatable.”
“Not totally appropriate to NHS commissioner.”
“More relevant to private sector?”
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“There are particular difficulties involved in strategic planning in a demand 
led environment where very limited opportunities exist to manage demand 
i.e. the police service. Annual financial allocations also impede long term 
planning.”
Some fairly detailed reflective comments were made about how far, and in what ways, 
strategic planning tools are utilised throughout respondent’s organisations:
“I don't know what systems/ideas used as basis. I don't think our strategies 
were original thought though.”
“The 'plan' is hierarchical i.e. My senior manager prepares his for the 'group', 
and as an individual manager I then prepare mine for my office. I am 
therefore, to a large extent, planning within his set plan i.e. my initiative is 
limited to his consent or refusal.”
“The service/business planning process used in [XX] Council, when taken 
with developments such as our integrated policy/budget/review process, our 
emphasis on the achievement of core values and a gradual improvement of 
the organisation, means that some or all of the techniques are used by 
individual services and the "corporate" centre at some point. How effectively 
they are used and integrated is a different issue. We could do better in some 
areas.”
“The Organisation Development Unit uses all of the above when working 
both with our own team and also with Managers, Clinicians and Staff. The 
Unit is fairly new and there are 5,500 staff within the Hospital hence the 
variance in the answers. Some parts of the Hospital are more advanced than 
others in the application of these techniques and interventions.”
The main problem is the relatively short term notion of planning at the 
Centres of Departments
We could be more adventurous in our use of Strategic planning tools - this 
list is an interesting one
“I have a personal interest in strategic management as do a number of other 
senior colleagues. However, there is no formal recognition in the organisation 
- managerially or politically - of strategic management or organisational 
development as skill specialisms requiring expertise/experience.”
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“There is a need for more expertise in these areas available to X City 
Council.”
Other comments indicated reflective thinking about the usefulness of strategic planning 
and associated tools. For example, one manager questioned their relevance to community 
based management approaches, and their male-domination:
“Most of our ideas relate to neighbourhood delivery of services and decision­
making which roots our management style in a partnership with the 
community. This tends not to be taken into account in most management 
books. As you may notice most of the authors are ‘male’ - this can also lead 
to a particular bias in management theories!”
Another suggested that the lists of different techniques and authors in the questionnaire 
was implying that managers needed a wide knowledge, when a more focused approach 
might be adequate (a comment which probably lies somewhere between ‘reflector’ and 
‘pragmatist’):
“Organisational as well as personal capacity to take on too diverse a range of 
approaches may be problematic therefore guilt engendered by admitting lack 
of employing techniques may be associated with a focused approach by 
management!”
A comment which probably falls somewhere between ‘activist’ and ‘reflector’ was:
“Above are useful background documents but not very helpful in actually 
formulating and then delivering a business strategy.”
One manager gave an example of how strategic practices may evolve through reflective 
practice shared through peer-networks:
“In a public authority new management ideas are often generated through 
peer groups/networks rather than by formal adoption of academic models.”
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One or two managers made comments which seemed to reflect on their own need for 
more knowledge:
“Don't know enough about the others to know if I should know about them.”
“Help.”
On this optimistic note it is perhaps time to turn to drawing some conclusions from this 
mass of quantitative and qualitative data. In the final Chapter the analysis of the data set 
out in this and the previous Chapter will be reviewed, some conclusions drawn and some 
ideas for further research set out.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations
This Chapter sets out to review the substantive research contained in this thesis, 
covering both the theory and practice of developing strategic managers for UK public 
services, and to reflect on some of the methodological problems posed by the 
particular approach adopted.
This first part reviews the research using the objectives set out earlier (see Chapter 5) 
as a framework. The second part reflects on some methodological issues raised by the 
research experience. The third part summarises some of these issues and offers some 
thoughts on a possible research agenda to further understanding in the substantive area 
and the particular approach adopted.
Research  Objectives
The first research objective was:
1. To establish some broad-based (and comparative) information about the 
nature and extent of strategic planning practices within UK public 
services.
The survey has clearly achieved this aim. The successful return of 644 survey 
questionnaires from a reasonably broad sample of senior managers in UK public 
services has provided a substantial data set. This data set provides useful intra-public 
sector comparisons as well as inter-sectoral comparisons with the earlier private sector 
survey.
The main conclusion to be derived from this data is clearly that strategic planning is 
both extremely prevalent in the UK public sector and fairly diverse in the details of its 
application.
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The issue of prevalence is clearly an important one. Even in the area with the lowest 
level of formal strategic planning in the public sector (local government) more 
organisations reported it taking place than in the comparative private sector survey.
Taken together with those who replied that they had a non-formalised strategic plan, 
over 8 out 10 local government strategic managers replying to the survey said their 
organisations had some sort of strategic planning and the figures are even higher for 
other parts of the public sector. Whatever the trends that led to this position, whatever 
the content of this ‘strategic planning’, whatever the pressures which may have caused 
this prevalence, the force of the survey evidence suggests hat ‘strategic planning’ is a 
major factor for senior public sector managers.
The first implication of this finding, in the context of developing senior managers, is 
clearly that if strategic planning is such a prevalent phenomena in public service 
organisations it is reasonable to assume that understanding it, having skills in and 
knowledge about it, and being competent in it, are important for senior managers. 
Thus the issue of developing strategic managers for UK public services is potentially 
an important one.
The second aspect of this part of the research is however the divergences in what 
constitutes ‘strategic planning’ in practice. The survey shows some fairly wide 
variations across the public sector on a range of issues. For example, the level of 
strategic planning at corporate and departmental levels, and the levels of integration 
between the two, showed some wide differences, in particular between local 
government and other public organisations. The findings, below, on paradoxical 
systems provide only part of what is clearly a complex and diverse picture within the 
overall prevalence of formalised strategic planning. However, the findings on the 
varying levels of use of aspects of strategic planning, such as types of goals set, 
planning periods, levels of integration, levels of involvement, etc., all suggest that 
practice is reasonably diverse.
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The second research objective was to explore one aspect of such diversity, centred 
around the notion of paradoxical systems:
2. To explore the idea of competing, paradoxical, systems within public 
services strategic practices - by specifically (i) construction of theory or 
models of how such paradoxical systems might apply to strategic 
management in the public services and (ii) carry out some limited testing 
of the possible validity of one set of (deduced) ‘strategic modes’ and 
‘ strategic sub-systems ’.
The first part of this objective was achieved in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, through an effort 
at synthesis of existing theory on the nature of public management and on strategic 
management brought together within a paradoxical systems framework. This was 
clearly an exploratory, and ambitious, project and it was beyond the scope of a single 
researcher or a single thesis to fully explore this issue either in theory or in empirical 
research. In theoretical terms, the Chapters did succeed in providing models, based on 
the paradoxical systems approach, of both generic strategic management modes and of 
public sector specific strategic sub-systems. It should be stressed that the purpose of 
these models was two-fold - firstly, to offer a speculative attempt at developing such 
models within the paradoxical systems framework and secondly, to use these as the 
basis for some limited empirical exploration of the framework.
The statements about strategic modes and strategy sub-systems included in the 
empirical survey were derived from these models. The responses to these statements 
offer a reasonable support for the idea that these paradoxical four strategic modes and 
six strategy sub-systems do indeed exist. The analysis in part II of Chapter 6 shows 
fairly clearly that large numbers of respondents at least recognised these statements as 
‘real’ for their organisations and that the statistical analysis shows fairly conclusively 
that these results show that the responses represent paradoxical systems.
These findings represent important new evidence to support the growing field of 
research into paradoxical systems in organisations (discussed in Chapter 5). They 
suggest that, whatever the validity of the specific models offered here, there is clear 
evidence that public managers recognise contradictory, but parallel, elements in the
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way in which their public organisations operate strategically. For example, the results 
show that in most cases the four strategic modes suggested are present to some degree 
in most organisations (hence the low numbers for each mode who said it was ‘not at 
all accurate’) but that in few cases is one mode dominant to the exclusion of the others 
(hence the lack of strong negative correlation’s and small number of only one mode 
being described as ‘very accurate’). Moreover, the lack of any strong correlations 
(positive or negative) between strategic modes suggested their relative independence, 
whilst the weak correlations which are present (both positive and negative) tend to 
confirm what Weick has called the ‘loose-coupling’ of these systems (Weick, 1979).
This initial attempt at theory building and empirical verification has necessarily been 
fairly limited and in some respects crude (given its main utilitarian purpose in relation 
to the specific aims of the thesis). The specific strategic modes or strategy sub-systems 
undoubtedly need further exploration, refinement and possibly even recasting. 
However, the survey responses, and the theoretical developments, do seem to at least 
justify further research in these areas. As will be discussed further below, the attempt 
has also produced some developments and ideas about the methodological problems 
of exploring paradoxical systems.
The central purpose of this thesis is to explore the issues of the development of 
strategic managers. In order to this the third research objective of necessity addressed 
issues of management development:
3. To establish a framework for analysing possible approaches to the 
development of strategic managers, establish some information about the 
management development practices and preferences of managers and 
organisations in relation to strategic management skills, knowledge and 
abilities and to gather some broad-based (and comparative) information 
about the knowledge-base of UK strategic managers in the area of 
strategic techniques and approaches.
In order to be theoretically consistent, the paradoxical systems approach was also 
applied to the review of management development. In this case a readily available 
model (Kolb’s experiential learning cycle) provided a framework for such analysis. 
The resulting model of management development was used in a slightly different way
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than the models of strategic management. Here it was used primarily as an analytical 
tool to apply to data derived from the survey, both from specific quantitative questions 
and from more qualitative comments from many respondents (as detailed in Chapter 
7).
Firstly, a comment on the model itself. The model was derived from work on 
management development by the researcher which has been published and received 
some useful, and positive, feedback (Talbot, 1993a). This enabled the researcher, by 
invitation, to present the developed model (as presented in Chapter 4) to an audience 
of leading UK management educationalists, consisting mainly of Deans of University 
Business or Management Schools (at the Association of Business Schools 
Conference, June 1994). While the reaction to this presentation of the model is 
obviously being judged by a partisan observer, it certainly seemed to provoke a 
supportive response from a potentially very critical audience. This may not be a valid 
research method for establishing the validity of the model, but it certainly gave the 
researcher a great deal of confidence that the model of management development had, 
at the very least, substantial ‘face validity’.
The use of the model in the analysis of data derived from the survey also proved 
fruitful. The quantitative data on management development methods employed by 
organisations seems to show that a variety of methods are employed but that methods 
associated with ‘reflective observation’ are in relatively low usage. Probably more 
importantly, overall these responses also showed the levels of activity in public 
organisations in any type of developmental activity for strategic managers. When 
compared to the prevalence of strategic planning in public organisations established 
by the earlier questions in the survey, the levels of developmental activity seem low, 
with no method scoring more than 45 points out of a possible 100 and the mean score 
for all 7 methods asked about being only 33 points out of 100.
A recent survey by the same researcher of 1,160 UK public managers produced 
similar results when managers were asked about the adequacy of specific types of 
management development. Specifically, some 30% of respondents in that survey felt
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that the level of management development support for ‘formulating and implementing 
strategy’ was either inadequate or very inadequate and another 20% were unsure 
(Talbot, 1994:68). Taken together, these two survey results suggest a significant gap 
between strategic management development and needs.
This finding needs to be slightly modified in the light of the data obtained about 
respondents knowledge of specific authors and techniques and their use in 
respondents’ organisations. The data here shows that, in general, respondents 
suggested that they had greater knowledge of specific authors and techniques than the 
level of use of these authors ideas, or techniques, in their organisations. On 
techniques, while the levels of individual knowledge and organisational usage were 
very similar taking all techniques together, this included very important differences. In 
particular, six techniques (Ishikawa diagrams, workshops and project teams, mission 
statements, market research and cost analysis) showed deficits, with managers 
personal knowledge falling below levels of organisational usage. While personal 
knowledge of individual authors seems to exceed the organisational use of their ideas, 
this seems attributable to the lack of ‘pure’ application. Overall, the levels of personal 
knowledge of both techniques and authors were fairly low and a minority of 
respondents showed a strong desire to know more.
The qualitative statements made by survey respondents, in the comments sections 
following the questions about strategy authors and strategic techniques, clearly 
showed the diversity of managers’ approaches to the relationship between strategic 
theory and practice and the roles of pragmatic experimentation and reflection on 
practice. A great deal of very rich data provides strong evidence for the idea that 
differing approaches to developing strategic managers, related to ideas of personal 
learning preferences, are needed to provide a complete strategic management 
development system for public managers. Moreover, these comments also clearly 
show that managers’ personal value systems are inextricably linked to their learning 
preferences and approaches to theory and practice, etc. The affective content of some 
of the statements is quite striking in this regard, showing in some cases what could 
almost be called ‘emotional outbursts’ about specific issues.
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The fourth research objective build specifically on the model building under objective 
(2) to develop a set of competences:
4. To explore the idea of competing, paradoxical, strategic ‘competences’ 
and to test the possible validity of a specific set of (deduced) 
competences.
The responses to these competences in the survey questionnaire were generally very 
positive. In a small number of cases only did a substantial number of respondents (but 
not more than one third in any case) reject the competences as ‘not at all useful’. 
However, within this broad acceptance of the competence statements there were 
clearly wide variations, with individual competence scores ranging from 35 to 82 (out 
of 100) with a mean of 64 points. Moreover, the analysis of correlations between the 
competence statements suggests (as with the strategic modes analysis mentioned 
above) that they are paradoxical. Some of the detailed correlations and individual 
competence statement scores suggest particular areas of weakness in the model as it 
stands. Additionally, a great deal of work would be needed to operationalise the 
competences into specific development programmes (including setting clear 
development objectives, designing learning methods and assessment systems, etc.) 
which are clearly beyond the scope of this single piece of research. Nevertheless, the 
outcomes of this work does suggest that there is at least the foundations for a fruitful 
approach established here, both substantively and methodologically.
Before turning to the final research objective, it is worth considering some of the 
methodological problems and opportunities which have presented themselves during 
the course of this research.
Research  M ethodology
Paradoxical systems and quantitative approaches
354
As already noted (in Chapter 5) researching paradoxical systems presents a set of 
methodological problems which do not easily fit into many conventional research 
approaches. For example, to have used the language and methods of hypothesis 
formulation (null and alternate) and associated statistical techniques would have been 
unnecessarily cumbersome and, in a dealing with such complex variables and systems, 
ultimately produced more confusion than clarity. The researcher has therefore 
deliberately avoided using such terminology and concentrated on exploring the data 
descriptively, using simple statistical means and only resorting to more complex 
procedures where appropriate. This approach does seem to have achieved some 
benefits and even some methodological advance, in so far 21s similar attempts at 
exploring these types of systems have not been reported.
It is not suggested that this is necessarily a completely adequate response for 
investigating ‘loosely-coupled’ paradoxical systems. The researcher is not a 
statistician, but it does seem possible that development of more sophisticated 
statistical approaches than those applied here may be appropriate to research in this 
area. One possibility, which has recently suggested itself but has not been explored 
here, is to use some of the new software which has been produced for mapping and 
establishing quantitative relationships within complex systems. These approaches, 
derived from systems dynamics, could potentially be applied to loosely-coupled 
paradoxical systems. Software such as Ithink (or STELLA in its educational version) 
certainly appears to offer the possibility of mapping such systems and (using data of 
the type generated in this survey) modelling their performance. However, even with 
relatively sophisticated systems dynamics tools such as this, it has to be recognised 
that what is being attempted is essentially re-eductionist and structuralist, approaches 
which have limited value is exploring systems which are very complex and fluid.
Paradoxical systems and qualitative approaches
As explained (in Chapter 5) the research objectives (and some constraints of the 
research process) determined the particular approach adopted here. The collection and 
analysis of data from a relatively large sample of strategic public managers was seen
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as necessary for both research reasons (the paucity of background data on strategic 
management practices in the UK public sector, in particular) and expedient (because 
of the resource issues). However, if this research were to be taken further a much 
more qualitative dimension would need to be added.
Some methodological approaches have already been developed which would seem to 
lend themselves easily to such research. One particular cognitive mapping approach 
(SODA - Eden & Radford, 1990) is based on a cognitive psychological approach 
which emphasises bipolar contrasts in individuals cognitive processes (Kelly’s 
‘personal construct psychology’ and associated ‘repertory grid’ techniques, see 
Fransella & Porter, 1990) and has developed techniques for mapping these in a 
managerial environment. It would seem possible that such an approach might be 
adapted to investigation of paradoxical systems, particularly given its ability to absorb 
contradictory variables within its framework and its ability to capture very fluid and 
complex systems.
Problems of survey research
One further issue is the cognitive problems associated with using survey instruments 
to investigate such complex, and possibly poorly understood, issues. The problems of 
reliability and especially validity in surveys are well known and especially the 
problems generated by respondents’ misperceptions of questions or statements on 
which they are asked to respond (see Belson, 1984).
There is clearly some evidence in the analysis of the data (for example some of the 
unexpected, and uncommon, positive correlations between similarly worded 
competence statements) which suggests that there were problems with question 
interpretation. While every effort was made to minimise these at the design and field- 
trial stages it was clearly not entirely successful. It seems not unreasonable to 
conclude that while survey instruments may be useful for establishing some broad­
brush validation of the existence of paradoxical system elements it would be a mistake
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to expect to achieve a great degree of fine resolution with such an approach. Other 
procedures, of the type discussed above, may be more relevant.
These comments about quantitative and qualitative approaches to investigating 
paradoxical systems have emerged from the researcher’s reflections on this particular 
research process. There are undoubtedly many other issues and possibilities, as 
already indicated in the remarks of Quinn and Cameron (1988:15) already cited in 
Chapter 5.
Future Research
The final research objective was:
5. On the basis of the (first 4 objectives), to make some recommendations 
about further research which would aid the ‘development of strategic 
managers for UK public services’.
The research has produced a number of possible issues for further exploration from 
both the theoretical model building and the analysis of the empirical data gathered in 
the survey. These will be treated together under a number of sub-headings:
Strategic practices in the public sector
The research has established a great deal of empirical data about public sector 
strategic management practices in the UK which has not been reported elsewhere. 
This in itself suggests a number of possibilities for more detailed empirical work. For 
example, the lack of integration between local government corporate and departmental 
plans, compared to other public sector organisations deserves further attention. 
Another issue is clearly the degree to which strategic planning is seen as an, externally 
imposed, formality and how much it is a genuine activity. The focus of strategic 
planning systems - whether they in practice concentrate on implementation whilst the 
strategic direction is set in other ways - also seems an area worth further work.
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The models of strategic management modes and sub-systems clearly have some 
validity and this framework could be further explored using other research methods - 
case studies of specific organisations, possibly longitudinally based, could be used to 
examine patterns of strategic behaviour. Other methods, such as those discussed 
above, could also be employed in such investigations. In particular the issue of the 
relationship between the domains of public services organisations and strategic 
practices would seem a fruitful area for more projects. While the analysis of the data 
collected in this survey does not show as clear or simple a relationship as the initial 
models would have suggested, it is clear that there are some grounds for further 
exploration. This is particularly so given the relatively high levels of recognition 
accorded by the survey respondents to the strategic modes and strategy sub-systems 
used in the survey. The research reported here does seem to point to a useful 
framework for exploring these relationships further, even if it yet to fully account for 
them. Indeed it may be that, given the complexity and fluidity issues involved in such 
paradoxical systems the use of survey approaches is too crude an instrument to 
capture these subtleties (see the discussion of methodology above).
Strategic competences, knowledge and skills
The survey data has established a very useful baseline of information about the levels 
of knowledge of particular authors ideas and a range of techniques which can be used 
in strategic management. Together with information on what skills, ideas and 
techniques are actually employed, this could form the basis for translating into design 
of strategic management development programmes for public managers.
The analysis of the strategic competences also shows that this model has a great deal 
of validity, even if further work is clearly needed. Coupled with the analysis of 
qualitative comments - and especially the evidence on managers’ contradictory 
reactions to theory, practice, pragmatic and reflection - this could provide the basis for 
developing programmes which catered for differing approaches to learning and sought 
to improve managers’ understanding of paradoxical systems (in strategic practice, 
competences and learning) themselves.
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It was not the intention of this project to produce a fully-fledged development 
programme for strategic managers in the UK public services. As explained in Chapter 
5, this is far beyond the scope of a single researcher and project. However the analysis 
provided here does point to a framework for developing such a programme, even if a 
great deal more work needs to be done.
The ‘supply-side’ of public service strategic management development
One issue which has hardly been addressed at all in this thesis is the levels and types 
of existing provision of management development for strategic managers in the public 
services. The survey does establish some information from an organisational 
perspective, but obviously says nothing about the levels and types of ‘supply-side’ 
provision being offered outside of public organisations. It is quite possible, for 
example, that some of the innovative developments in management development 
touched on in Chapter 4 may already be leading, in practice if not in theory, to 
applying what could be called a competing values and competences perspective to 
strategic management development. This area certainly needs further exploration. 
Since the Handy and Constable & McCormick reports of 1987 addressed the issues of 
management development supply in the UK there seems to have been little further 
work to examine the major changes which have occurred since then. If this is the case 
for general management development the situation for both strategic management 
development and public management development are at least equally, if not more, 
poorly understood. Much more baseline data about the quantity, quality and type of 
such provision is needed.
Methodological issues in Paradoxical Systems research
The full title of this thesis is ‘Developing strategic managers for UK public services - 
a competing values and competences approach’. This was adopted at registration, 
heavily influenced by an initial reading of Quinn’s work on the general management
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competing values and competences. As the work has progressed it has become 
increasingly clear to the researcher, as must be apparent to the reader by now, that 
whilst the approach has been about competing values and competences it has raised 
somewhat more general issues about what might be called the ‘paradoxical systems 
approach’. While many of the elements of this approach already exist in the literature, 
in the work of Quinn, Weick, Morgan and many others, it seems to this researcher that 
the methodological approaches to using this framework for research are under­
developed, partly perhaps because with few exceptions it has yet to be explicitly 
recognised as distinctive approach, even where researchers are in practice adopting 
such a framework (see Chapter 5 for examples).
A deeper understanding of issues surrounding strategic management and managers in 
public services organisations has been the main benefit of this project, and it provides 
a great deal of useful data, analysis, and perhaps some useful models for approaching 
the problem of developing strategic managers. That in itself seems sufficient 
justification for the effort.
However, the researcher also feels that a perhaps more important benefit may lie in 
exploring the methodological and theoretical issues surrounding paradoxical systems 
in organisations. While some small progress has been made in this thesis, it has raised 
some issues which may be useful pointers for further work in exploring this issue. 
This approach seems particularly fertile in a public sector context, where conflicting 
values are perhaps more transparent than in the private sector and thus some of the 
paradoxes created that much more visible. It does seem to be a more generally useful 
approach which could be developed more widely. The model of ‘strategic modes’ 
developed for this thesis, for example, is a generic and not public sector specific one 
and clearly derives from adopting a paradoxical systems approach. The final thought 
therefore is that developing methodological and theoretical tools to better explore 
these types of systems seems necessary to exploit the possibilities of developing more 
fully this way of understanding what Mintzberg calls ‘our wonderful world of 
organisations’.
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A ppen d ix  A
Survey questionnaire as sent to public sector strategic managers (see Chapter 5)
Centre for Public Services Management 
South Bank University 
103 Borough Rd., London, SE1 OAA. Phone: 071-815-7794/7737

CENTRE FOR 
PUBLIC SERVICES MANAGEMENT
SOUTH BANK UNIVERSITY
March 1994 
Dear colleague,
Strategic Management and Managers 
in the Public Sector
Managers in the public sector are often urged to adopt strategic planning or management systems. Individual 
Chief Executives, Directors and other senior managers are urged to "think strategically".
We are inviting you to take part in a survey of over 3,500 Chief Executives, Directors, Chief Constables and 
other leading managers in the UK public service, covering local and central government and the health service. 
The purpose of the survey is to begin to establish:
• how far is strategic management actually being used in public organisations?
•  what sorts of skills, knowledge and abilities do strategic managers need?
• how are organisations developing 'strategic managers'?
A Free Executive Summary of the survey will be sent to everyone who replies.
The survey complements a separate survey of nearly 4,000 public managers recently carried out by the Centre 
for Public Services Management (CPSM), jointly with the Institute of Management (IoM), into the degree 
of real change taking place in public management. The results are being published this spring by the IoM.
Your help in completing and returning the attached questionnaire is vital in helping to build up an accurate 
picture of public sector strategic management and strategic managers in the UK. Your replies will be treated in 
strictest confidence.
Please return the questionnaire by 31 March 1994 (in the reply paid envelope enclosed) to the address below.
Please complete as much of the questionnaire as you can. We would prefer incomplete responses to no 
response at all!
Thank you for your help and co-operation.
Yours faithfully,
Colin Talbot 
Head of the CPSM
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Strategic Management and Managers
in the Public Sector
1 Does your organisation have a formal strategic plan? Yes □
(If "Yes", please go to Question 3) N oD
2 If no formal strategic plan exists, is this because (tick any
appropriate):
a a plan exists but has not been formalised aD
b the organisation's situation is too simple to require a formal plan bU
c the organisation's situation is too complex or uncertain for planning cU
d it is felt that strategic planning cannot improve performance dD
e you feel a strategic plan would be effective and want to prepare one soon eD
f strategic planning has been tried but found to be ineffective fO _
g the resources or expertise required to develop a plan are not available gn
Please go to Question 6
3 Has the strategic plan been effective in leading to better Yes □
performance? (If "Yes", please go to Question 5) No □
4 If no, why not? (tick any appropriate):
a it is too early to tell aD
b specific objectives were not identified bU
c no milestones for the achievement of objectives were identified cD
d did not solicit input to corporate strategy from staff dD
e did not gain commitment of staff to corporate strategy eD
f the organisation's environment is too complex or uncertain f□
g the plan was unrealistic §□
h the organisation did not possess the necessary planning skills hU
Please go to Question 6
5 If yes, how has the organisation benefited? (tick any appropriate)
a achieved goals and objectives set out in plan aD
b specified milestones for achievement of gaols and objectives bD
c gave all staff a unified vision of the organisation cD
d targeted spending in areas of greatest opportunity dD
e identified new opportunities or ideas eD
f achieved cost savings fO
g made better use of resources
6 Does the organisation have any of the following? (tick any
appropriate)
a mission statement aD
b corporate plan bD
c subsidiary or departmental plans (for each service area) cD
d functional plans (for each function, e.g. human resources, finance) dD
e integration of corporate with departmental plans eD
f integration of corporate with functional plans f □
g service level agreements (SLA's); framework documents or contracts gd__
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7 How does the strategic plan define progress toward specific goals?
(tick any appropriate)
a spending targets aD 
b quantified non-financial targets (e.g. outputs, quality levels) bU  
c unquantified non-financial targets (e.g. customer survey results) cD 
d competitive targets (e.g. numbers of contracts won) dD
8 What planning horizon do you use?
(tick one box only)
□  under 1 year □  4 years
□  1 year □  5 years
□  2 years □  6 to 10 years
□  3 years □  10 to 15 years
9 How often is the strategy reviewed?
(tick one box only)
□  continually □  yearly
□  monthly □  18 months
□  quarterly □  2 years
□  half yearly □  longer (please state in years)...............
10 How often is progress against strategic targets reported?
(tick one box only)
□  monthly (or more frequently) □  yearly
□  quarterly □  longer
□  half yearly □  not reported at all
11 How long have strategic plans been prepared in your organisation?
(tick one box only)
□  less than 1 year □  4 years
□  1 year □  5 years
□  2 years □  6 to 10 years
□  3 years □  10 to 15 years
12 (tick any (i) Who is (ii) Who is it (iii) Who is
appropriate) involved in communicated to? responsible for
formulating the implementation?
strategic plan?
a) Directors aD aD aD
b) Senior managers bD bD bD
c) Junior managers cU cD cD
d) Planning staff unit dU dD dD
e) Professional staff eD eD eD
f) Admin. & support staff f□ f□ fD
g) Other staff g n g n g n
h) Customers/Clients hU hD hD
i) Suppliers in in !□
j) Professional advisers j n ]□ j n
k) Consultants kD kD kn
1) Politicians ID ID in
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13 Do you know of, or use in developing 
your strategic plan, any of the following
(tick any appropriate):
(i) I do 
know about
(ii) I do not 
know about 
but feel I 
should
(iii) is used 
in
organisation
a workshops or project teams aD aD aD
b mission statements bD bD bD
c executive information systems cD cU cD
d market research dD dD dD
e '7S' framework (shared values, strategy, 
structure, systems, skills, style, staff)
eD eD en
f cost analysis fD fD fD
g risk analysis gn gn gn
h cost/benefit analysis hD hD hD
i SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, threats)
iD iD iD
j competitor analysis (e.g. five forces 
analysis)
jn jD jO
k PEST analysis (political, economic, social 
and technological environment)
kD kD kD
1 Stakeholder analysis in in ID
m Scenario's mD mD mD
n Force field analysis (driving and 
restraining forces)
nD nD nD
0 Ishikawa (cause and effect or fishbone) 
diagrams
oD oD oD
P Mapping strategic issues (e.g. soft systems 
method, 'SODA', etc.)
pO pO pO
Any comments?
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14 Do you know about, or feel you ought 
to know about, or use in your 
organisation, the ideas developed by 
any of the following?
(Titles o f recent or prominent books in brackets) 
(tick any appropriate)
(i) I do 
know about 
the ideas of
(ii) I do not 
know about 
the ideas of 
but feel I 
should
(iii) is used 
in
organisation
a Peter Drucker 
Managing fo r  the Future
aD aD aD
b John Argenti
Practical Corporate Planning
bD bD bD
c James Quinn & Henry Mintzberg 
The Strategy Process
cD cD cD
d Igor Ansoff 
Corporate Strategy
dD dD dD
e John Thompson
Strategic Management -  Awareness & Change
eD eD eD
f Gerry Johnson & Kevan Scholes 
Exploring Corporate Strategy
fD fD fD
g Cliff Bowman & David Asch
Strategic Management
gn gn gn
h John Bryson
Strategic Planning for Public and Non-Profit 
Organizations
hD hD hD
i Michael Porter 
Competitive Advantage
iD iD iD
j Kenichi Ohmae 
The Mind o f the Strategist
jn
k Tom Peters 
Thriving on Chaos
kD kD kD
1 Ralph Stacey
Strategic Management and Organisational 
Dynamics
ID ID ID
Others (please specify):
i iD iD iD
ii iiD iiD iiD
iii liiD iiiD iiiD
iv ivD ivD ivD
Any comments?
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15. Internal influences on strategy making
Please rate the importance of the following internal elements of the strategy process in
no
effect
slight
effect
some
effect
strong
effect
a policy making systems: processes and 0 1 2 3
decisions, setting broad objectives and □ □ □ □
rules governing organisational operation
b resource allocation systems: processes 0 1 2 3
and decisions, budget cycles, setting □ □ □ □
budgets, financial targets
c planning systems: and cycles, detailed 0 1 2 3
forward plans, setting detailed control and □ □ □ □
monitoring systems
d response systems: for responding 0 1 2 3
pragmatically to changes, adapting plans □ □ □ □
and budgets, switching resources
e professional practice systems: the 0 1 2 3
emerging practice of service delivery, new □ □ □ □
styles or policies evolved by service
professionals
f service delivery systems: changing 0 1 2 3
organisational needs of service delivery, □ □ □ □
new methods of service delivery, new
requirements for services
16. Styles of strategy making
How far does each of the following statements accurately describe the strategic style of 
your organisation? (please tick appropriate boxes)
Strategic decision making as:
not at all 
accurate
slightly
accurate
fairly
accurate
very
accurate
a a rational decision making process leading 
to major shifts in organisation direction
0
□
1
□
2
□
3
□
b a process of bargaining and 0 1 2 3
accommodation leading to small or 
incremental changes in organisational 
direction
□ □ □ □
c a rational decision making process based 0 1 2 3
on small changes in organisational 
direction, experimentation and learning
□ □ □ □
d a process of visionary leadership and 0 1 2 3
major shifts in organisational direction □ □ □ □
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17. Methods of developing strategic managers
How much are each of the following methods for developing strategic managers used in
your organisation? (please tick appropriate boxes)
fairly very
not at all slightly heavily heavily
used used used used
a qualification courses including strategic 0 1 2 3
management (e.g. MBA, DMS, etc.) □ □ □ □
b in-house management short course 0 1 2 3
including strategic management □ □ □ □
c external management short-course 0 1 2 3
including strategic management □ □ □ □
d job-rotation schemes aimed at developing 0 1 2 3
strategic managers □ □ □ □
e mentoring scheme to develop strategic 0 1 2 3
managers □ □ □ □
f assignment to special projects or 0 1 2 3
secondments to develop strategic □ □ □ □
managers
g participation in the strategic management 0 1 2 3
process to develop strategic managers □ □ □ □
18. Strategic abilities, knowledge or skills
How useful would you think each of the following strategic abilities, knowledge or skills
are: for public services managers? (please tick appropriate boxes)
not at all slightly fairly very
useful useful useful useful
1 set detailed missions, policies, objectives 0 1 2 3
and rules for the organisation □ □ □ □
2 derive resource allocation and targetting 0 1 2 3
from mission and policy objectives □ □ □ □
3 use the organisation's planning system to 0 1 2 3
support particular projects or policies □ □ □ □
4 make pragmatic adjustments through 0 1 2 3
experience of practical service delivery □ □ □ □
5 integrate resource allocation and policy 0 1 2 3
making systems □ □ □ □
6 use the organisation's planning system to 0 1 2 3
justify the organisational mission □ □ □ □
7 make pragmatic adjustments through 0 1 2 3
negotiating internal compromises □ □ □ □
8 allow professional practice scope for 0 1 2 3
innovation, within broad goals □ □ □ □
9 use the organisation's planning system to 0 1 2 3
produce rational solutions to problems □ □ □ □
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Strategic abilities, knowledge or skills not at all slightly fairly very
(continued) useful useful useful useful
10 make pragmatic adjustments to stay within 0 1 2 3
the broad organisational mission □ □ □ □
11 integrate, through compromise, 0 1 2 3
professional practice into organisational □ □ □ □
goals
12 allow for diversity and innovation in 0 1 2 3
design and organisation of services □ □ □ □
13 make pragmatic adjustments to stay within 0 1 2 3
the overall plan □ □ □ □
14 integrate, through persuasion or coercion, 0 1 2 3
professional practice to match mission □ □ □ □
15 achieve compromise and consensus over 0 1 2 3
the design and organisation of services □ □ □ □
16 set broad missions, policies, objectives 0 1 2 3
and values for the organisation □ □ □ □
17 adjust resource allocations to meet 0 1 2 3
conflicting priorities and policies □ □ □ □
18 use the organisation's planning system for 0 1 2 3
learning and adaptation □ □ □ □
19 integrate, through persuasion or coercion, 0 1 2 3
professional practice to match plans □ □ □ □
20 ensure services are broadly organised to 0 1 2 3
meet mission and policies □ □ □ □
21 ensure services are clearly defined and 0 1 2 3
organised to meet plans □ □ □ □
22 integrate ambiguous missions, policies, 0 1 2 3
objectives and rules for the organisation □ □ □ □
23 allow flexibility in resource allocation and 0 1 2 3
allow resources to follow 'success' □ □ □ □
24 tolerate diversity of missions, policies, 0 1 2 3
objectives and rules within the □ □ □ □
organisation
19. Are there any additional areas of strategic abilities, knowledge or skills which you 
see as important for public managers? (please continue on separate sheet if necessary)
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20. Public Management Careers (please tick appropriate boxes)
General 
admin, or 
management
Functional 
professions 
(e.g. legal, 
personnel, 
IT)
Service 
professions 
(e.g. teacher, 
doctor, social 
worker)
Other
(please
specify)
1. Was your pre- 
managerial background 
in:
□ □ □ □
2. Has your managerial 
career been mainly in: □ □ □ □
3. Are you now managing 
in: □ □ □ □
4. Where do you expect 
to be in 5 years: □ □ □ □
5. Do you have a 
qualification in: □ □ □ □
6. Do you expect to gain a 
qualification in: □ □ □ □
21. Public Organisation Type (please tick appropriate box):
A. Local Authority
a County Council aD
b District Council bD
c Metropolitan District Council cD
d London Borough dD
e Other (please specify) eD
Department:
1 Chief Executives 1 □
2 Housing 2D
3 Social Services 3D
4 Education 4D
5 Police Service 5D
6 Environmental Health 6D
7 Fire Service 7D
8 Direct Service Organisation 8D
9 Other (please specify)______________________________________________  9D
B. NHS
a RHA aD
b DHA bD
c FHSA cD
d Special HA dD
e NHS Trust eD
f Non-Trust provider unit fD
g Other (please specify) gD
continued on next page
Public Services 9 Developing Strategic Managers
C. Central Government
a Department aD
b Agency bD
c "Quango" (please specify) cD
d Other (please specify)________________________________________________dD
D. Other (please specify) □
E. Total Staff Employed
(please sive figure for your whole organisation, except where you are 
answering for a Local Authority department (e.g. Social Services, Police) 
where you should give department staffing).
a 0-249 aD
b 249-999 bD
c 1,000-4,999 cD
d 5,000-9,999 dD
e 10,000+___________________________________________________________eD
22. Other Comments
Are there are comments you would like to add? (please continue on separate sheet if 
necessary)
Name of Organisation:
Your Name: Telephone:
Would you be willing to be interviewed as part of the follow-up
research to this questionnaire? □  Yes □  No
Please return to: Centre for Public Services Management
South Bank University, 103 Borough Rd. 
London, SE1 0AA 
Using reply paid envelope enclosed.
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